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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is an ethnographic study of Lavasa, a new town planned, built and 
managed by a private company in India. It examines the ideologies, institutional 
arrangements, and political processes at work in the making of this town. It takes 
seriously the attempt to create a ‘market utopia’ (an inclusive, environmentally 
sustainable, properly planned, and profitable town), treating it as an empirical 
phenomenon with social consequences, and asks: why, how, and with what effects 
did Lavasa come to be? In tracing its conception, production, and contestation, the 
dissertation analyses the processes and consequences of transforming a rural 
landscape into an urban place. 
 
I make two main arguments. First, the construction of Lavasa is fundamentally 
speculative and is centred on the ability to transform cheap rural land into urban real 
estate. I show that the land market that enables the city is actively manufactured by 
the state, through powerful local political actors, and networks of brokers and 
agrarian intermediaries. The construction of this land market produces a speculative 
environment: one in which trading in land simultaneously becomes an opportunity to 
make money, a cause of dispossession, and a way to lay claim to the city.  
 
Second, such speculation generates both resistance against and support for the 
project. It also, paradoxically, emboldens the ideological project of city-making. 
Collective action is rendered difficult as it is mediated by the same conditions and 
state that created the land market. Therefore the contestation takes another form 
that moves beyond the domain of land, is couched in environmental concerns, and 
leverages a different level of the state to ultimately stall the project. 
 
I demonstrate how the symbolic power of this ‘market utopia’ conceals the 
conditions of its possibility, that is, the ways in which it was made through the state, 
through speculation, and the discursive and material operations of the land market. I 
show how this land market is historically and socio-politically constructed, and how 
its construction shapes and informs the politics of planning, privatisation, and 
resistance. 
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Introduction 
 
A Private Utopia? 
 
 
“Town and country must be married, and out of this joyous union will spring a 
new hope, a new life, a new civilisation.”  
 
Ebenezer Howard (1898: 7) 
 
Sometime in the mid-1990s, Aniruddha Deshpande, a powerful real estate developer, 
allegedly threw a lavish party at his farmhouse in Pune, Maharashtra. In attendance 
were many of the region’s important politicians and businessmen including Sharad 
Pawar,1 then in his third term as Chief Minister of Maharashtra (Damle, 2010: 27). 
Pawar had a long-standing vision: he wished to expand tourism in the state by 
developing a lake district in the scenic Western Ghat Mountains. Deshpande 
supported his passion: “no Indian has ever built a hill station…every hill station has 
been built by the British, right from Mahabaleshwar to Matheran, and from Dalhousie 
to Ooty”.2 
 
Hill stations are “curious monuments” to the British Raj (Kennedy, 1996: 1). As 
summer capitals they were “seasonal sites for the recreational activities of a highly 
transient expatriate population, whose memory of a distant homeland was lovingly 
evoked” (Kennedy, 1996: 3). Although they were places of escape for the British, 
particularly in the months of summer, over time they became increasingly ‘Indian’. In 
Maharashtra, for instance, hill stations like Matheran and Mahabaleshwar are popular 
weekend destinations for urban Indians from a variety of socio-economic 																																																								
1 Sharad Pawar (born 1940) has been a prominent figure in Maharashtra’s political landscape since the 
mid-1960s. He became a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) in 1967 and went on to serve 
three terms as Chief Minister of Maharashtra (1978-80, 1988-91, and 1993-95), contesting within the 
Indian National Congress Party. In 1999 he left the Indian National Congress Party (Congress) and 
founded the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), of which he continues to be party president. The 
NCP-Congress alliance has dominated positions of political power in Maharashtra for the last two 
decades. In 2004, he joined the ruling coalition headed by the Congress – the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) – and was appointed Union Cabinet Minister for Agriculture, a position he retained 
until 2014. 
2 L10 interview, 12/08/2012. See Appendix 1I for a full list of informants. 
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backgrounds3: from the family that takes a public bus to bathe in local waterfalls, to 
the elite who escape, much like the British, to their holiday homes. Hill stations 
occupy a space in popular imagination as destinations of cooler climes, Bollywood 
romance, and boarding schools reminiscent of colonial times. With the British long 
gone, and a continuing tourist demand for hill stations, Deshpande and Pawar saw an 
opportunity.  
 
In November 1996, a year after Pawar left his position as Chief Minister, the 
Government of Maharashtra (GoM) passed the ‘Special Regulations for the 
Development of Tourist Resorts/Holiday Homes/Township in Hill Station Type 
Areas’ (henceforth referred to as the Hill Station Regulation), which empowered 
private companies to build new settlements in designated areas. The swiftly passed 
policy waived land-ceiling laws4, permitted purchase of agricultural land, and provided 
considerable tax exemptions for developers. It was through this policy that 
Deshpande and a number of land agents purchased and consolidated 7000 acres (28 
square kilometres) in the Mulshi sub-district to build ‘Lake Town’.  
 
The plans for Lake Town became bolder over time. What started off as a 7000-acre 
development in 2000, became a 25,000 acre (100 square kilometre) project called 
Lavasa by 2004. Deshpande (the project’s primary promoter) exited the project 
soon after, and Pawar became Minister of Agriculture in the central government. By 
2006, Lavasa was largely managed by Lavasa Corporation Limited (LCL), a subsidiary 
of the well-regarded 100-year-old Hindustan Construction Company (HCC), with 
CEO Ajit Gulabchand at the helm. The project plan went well beyond its initial 
mandate of merely providing a tourist destination. Gulabchand’s wished to develop a 
“replicable model for the development of future cities” (LCL, 2014: 76). 
 
Planned for a stable population of 240,000 and 2 million annual visitors, Lavasa is 
imagined as an “inclusive city”, a “prime tourist destination”, with educational 
institutions, “non-polluting industries”, and “world-class” facilities. It aims to be a 																																																								
3 Domestic tourism increased 620 per cent between 1997 and 2013 (MoT: 10) and hill stations are 
popular destinations among domestic tourists.  
4 The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 caps the total area of rural land 
that can be owned by a single individual/company in Maharashtra. The ceiling limit depends on the 
type of land in question – it ranges from 18 acres for irrigated land to 54 acres for dry-crop land (per 
individual). 
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“more liveable city of the future” where people can “Live, Work, Learn, and Play in 
harmony with nature” (LCL, 2012a: 2). It is envisioned as a city “unique in its scale 
and guiding philosophy” (LCL, 2012a: 2), offering a “wide variety of advantages of 
urban living in the lap of nature” and a “unique value proposition” of “good 
governance”, “sustainability”, and “value-added features not found in the average 
city” (LCL, 2012b: 1). More importantly, it is a city conceptualised, built, and 
controlled by a private company – Lavasa Corporation Limited (LCL).  
 
Its vision brings together in an experimental (and arguably utopian) manner, the 
seemingly disparate goals of inclusion, environmental sustainability, economic 
profitability, and exemplary service delivery. It is no surprise that Lavasa is inspired 
by a multiplicity of references; the physical plan is New Urbanist5 in design, the 
business model combines a conference economy with an education hub and is 
inspired by Davos, Switzerland and Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the architecture 
of its town centre is reminiscent of the seaside town of Portofino, Italy. Part lake-
town, part hill station, and part city, it is a distinctly new kind of urban settlement, 
coming to life in a rural and forested setting. 
 
  
																																																								
5 New Urbanism is an American design movement that emerged in the 1980s as a response to sprawl 
and automobile-centred urban development. It is premised on creating mixed communities with 
walkable neighbourhoods, transit-oriented development, environmental conservation, compact living, 
and is often characterised by nostalgic/traditional architectural styles. See ‘The Charter of New 
Urbanism’ (http://www.cnu.org/charter) for the tenets of the movement.  
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Figure 1.1: Dasve Town Centre, Lavasa  
 
 
Source: photography by Cryongen (2009), distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share 
Alike 3.0 Unported license. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dasve_Town.jpg and 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lakeside_View_at_Dasve_-_Lavasa.JPG 
 
Bold visions for the (re)creation of urban spaces are not new. History provides a 
long list of such experiments from the restructuring of Paris by Hausmann (Harvey, 
2003) and Lutyen’s New Delhi (Irving, 1983) to new cities such as Brasilia (Holston, 
1989) and Chandigarh (Sarin, 1982). Private companies too have built their own 
towns with varying degrees of success. From Henry Ford’s company town of 
Fordlandia (Grandin, 2009) to Walt Disney’s Celebration (Ross, 2000), these 
settlements have often attempted to provide exemplary spaces outside the 
maelstrom of existing urbanism. Planners, ‘starchitects’, corporations, and 
governments have time and again been lured by the promise of starting afresh, of 
designing and planning new ways of living, unencumbered by the problems of the past 
and present. Their visions for the future are often organised around a “metaphor of 
rupture” (Kanna, 2011: 32), seeking to use the blank slate as a way to make a radical 
break with the past. But, as some notable scholars have argued, in implementing 
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their visions, they encounter not the tabula rasa that is at the foundation of their 
planning fervour, but society in all its contradictions (Holston, 1989; Grandin, 2009; 
Gururani, 2013).   
 
Lavasa is no exception. As India embarks on its urban transition, its ‘cities of 
tomorrow’ (Hall, 2002) are being built in the villages of today. Their construction 
requires an encounter not with a blank slate but with the rural, agrarian, and political 
societies that inhabit those very landscapes. Lavasa’s terrain subsumes 18 villages, 
forests, and a reservoir. Invoking the opening quote by Howard, then, one must ask, 
how do town and country meet, and what kind of hope and civilisation does this 
union spawn? How is this ‘private city’ conceptualised? How are rural communities 
thrown into the making of a city, and how do they reshape its making (Goldman, 
2011)?  
 
Not unlike its global predecessors (some of which are discussed later in this 
chapter), Lavasa has become a source of critical political contests and questions. 
While LCL prides itself on the efficiency, ambition, and lawfulness with which it has 
built (and is building) this city, the National Alliance for People’s Movements 
(NAPM)6 deems it “a city founded on lies, cheating, deceit, gross corruption and 
violation of laws” and “the best example of crony capitalism in this era of unholy 
alliances between corporations, politicians and bureaucrats” (Patkar, 2011: n.p7). The 
NAPM asserts that the various regulations and policies put in place to enable Lavasa 
are “signs of political manoeuvring” and that the project has “forcibly evicted tribal 
populations, purchased land illegally and flouted environmental norms” (Patkar, 2011: 
n.p). To this effect, the NAPM has lodged numerous complaints with various 
government departments, held protests, filed land dispute court cases, and a Public 																																																								
6 The NAPM was founded in 1992 as an alliance of social movements across India. It works to “bring 
the struggle for primacy of rights of communities over national resources, conservation and 
governance, decentralised democratic development and towards a just, sustainable and egalitarian 
society” (NAPM, 2012: n.p.). The NAPM consists of heterogeneous movements (both rural and 
urban), which draw on a range of discourses including Gandhianism, Ambedkarism, Marxism, 
environmentalism, and feminism (Omvedt, 1993). They are united by their “commitment to 
deepening democratic control over markets, productive resources, and economic development more 
generally” as well as their struggles against corporate and state led displacement and dispossession 
(Levien, 2007: 124). Medha Patkar, a politically powerful social activist most well-known for leading 
community struggles against the Narmada Dam and other dam related displacement, is actively 
involved in contesting Lavasa and at the helm of the NAPM.  
7 Throughout this dissertation ‘n.p.’ will be used in instances for web and government documents 
where no page number is available.  
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Interest Litigation (PIL) case in the Mumbai High Court. Ironically, despite the city’s 
focus on environmental sustainability, in 2010, the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) stalled the project for over a year on the grounds of environmental 
violations (MoEF, 2010). 
 
That said, other civil society members have argued in favour of the project just as 
vociferously: 
 
“Lavasa is perhaps the first world-class city being developed in India 
which has chosen not to be an alienated gated community. The Lavasa 
Corporation did not get the state government to forcibly acquire land 
using the coercive power at its disposal through the Land Acquisition 
Act of colonial vintage. It purchased land from individual owners at 
the then prevailing market prices on the basis of government records 
regarding ownership rights. All the 18 panchayats8 have made common 
cause supporting Lavasa in the High Court battle being fought. The 
vision of Lavasa is intrinsically inclusive.” (Kishwar, 2011: n.p.) 
       
 
Therefore, Lavasa presents a number of curiosities (discussed further in Chapter 
Two). First, set against a context of increasing numbers of gated communities that 
promise exclusivity (Searle, 2010), LCL seeks to create an “inclusive city”. Second, in 
contrast to most mega-projects in India, which deploy the state’s powers of eminent 
domain to forcibly acquire land from landowners, Lavasa has followed a model of 
voluntary land purchase, not thought to be possible in the Indian context.9 Third, 
despite nationwide farmer-led mass protests around mega-projects (associated with 
land acquisition), Lavasa has seen relatively little mass-based collective resistance on 
the issue of land. Instead, and paradoxically, this “environmentally sustainable” city 																																																								
8 A gram panchayat is an elected local government at the village level (village council) 
9 Land assembly is considered to be near impossible without the use of the Land Acquisition Act 
(1894), which allows the government to forcibly expropriate land for ‘public purpose’. This is for a 
number of reasons: first, given the land holding patterns in India (the presence of a large number of 
small farms), the transaction costs for such an endeavour would be prohibitively high. Second, the 
probability of holdouts (land-owners unwilling to sell) could prevent the developer from fully 
carrying out their plan. Third, the knock-on speculative effects on the price of land could result in 
untenably high land costs for the developer. Therefore, the use of state force is seen as necessary for 
assembling land. This will be discussed at length in Chapters Two and Five. 
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was blocked, for a time, on environmental grounds. Fourth, resistance to the project 
has been met with counter-resistance from both activists and local residents. 
 
Using qualitative interviews, archival evidence, and land records, this dissertation 
examines the ideologies, interests, and political processes at work in the making of 
Lavasa. It takes seriously the attempt to create a ‘market utopia’ (an inclusive, 
environmentally sustainable, properly planned, and profitable town), treating it as an 
empirical phenomenon with social consequences. It asks: why, how, and with what 
effects did Lavasa come to be? How are rural communities thrown into city-making 
and how do they reshape its making? In tracing the making of this town – its 
conception, production, and contestation – the dissertation examines the processes 
and consequences of transforming a rural landscape into an urban place. 
 
I make two main arguments. First, the construction of Lavasa is fundamentally 
speculative, and is centred on the ability to transform cheap rural land into urban 
real estate. I show that the land market that facilitates this city is actively 
manufactured by the state through powerful local political actors, as well as 
networks of brokers and agrarian intermediaries. The construction of this land 
market produces a speculative environment: one in which trading in land becomes at 
once an opportunity to make money, a cause of dispossession, as well as a way to lay 
claim to the city.  
 
Second, such speculation generates both resistance against and support for the 
project. It also, paradoxically, emboldens the ideological project of city-making. 
Collective action is rendered difficult as it is mediated by the same conditions and 
state that created the land market. Therefore the contestation takes another form 
that moves beyond the domain of land, is couched in environmental concerns, and 
leverages a different level of the state to ultimately stall the project. 
 
In telling this story, I demonstrate how the symbolic power of this ‘market utopia’ 
and the imaginaries deployed in its portrayal conceal the conditions of its possibility, 
that is, the ways in which it was made through the state, through speculation, and 
the discursive and material operations of the land market. I show how this land 
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market is historically and socio-politically constructed, and how its construction 
shapes and informs the politics of planning, privatisation, and resistance. 
 
This introductory chapter situates this study of Lavasa within a context that speaks 
to the politics of new city development globally. Section 1.1 surveys aspects of the 
long history of new towns, especially those built by private companies, arguing that 
these projects are often ideological, routinely subverted and undone, and as much a 
product of structures as individual actors. Given this, Section 1.2 assesses the recent 
resurgence of new town construction, problematises how they have been 
conceptualised, and locates Lavasa within the contemporary moment. Section 1.3 
then lays out the conceptual terrain for the dissertation: the production of space. 
Section 1.4 concludes with detailed research questions and an outline of the 
dissertation. 
 
1.1. Urban Experiments: from Garden City to Suburbia 
 
Modern (Euro-American) urban planning originated as a response to the social ills of 
the Victorian industrial city and the resultant fear of untamed urbanism (Hall, 2002). 
As 19th century London became mired in the despair of slums, urban poverty, and 
inadequate housing, concerns about public health, social tensions, and political 
upheaval grew. Social reformers of the time began to see the city as a site for social 
transformation – where poverty could be addressed through an intervention in the 
built environment through the provision of planned housing and sanitation. 
Underpinning such proposed interventions was the belief that reforming the urban 
environment could eradicate prevalent social ills (Faludi, 1973) and “create a new set 
of social relationships and a new set of social perceptions” (Hall, 2002: 45). Urban 
planning and reform, therefore, was not just about creating an alternative built form 
and city layout, but also a vision for an alternative society. Over the years planners 
put forth a variety of visions, some to reform existing cities and others to respond 
to existing social problems by starting afresh. A detailed narrative is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but a brief historical overview of new towns/cities raises some 
cross-cutting themes that will be addressed in this dissertation. 
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Many new cities were premised on the idea that radical new cities would solve the 
urban and social crises of their time. In a sense they were “manifestos for an urban 
revolution” (Fishman, 1982: 22). The driving architects and planners of these cities 
spurned the gradual improvement of existing cities in support of comprehensive 
planning in new sites. Their visions for the future were not only founded on an 
indictment of the present, but in sketching out what a better city could look like 
they also incorporated (either explicitly or implicitly) the means and processes by 
which that future could be achieved. Furthermore, they regarded the economic and 
social systems within which they worked to be temporary hurdles to be overcome 
in order to transform society through new urban forms. But, as we shall see, they 
proved to be more than temporary hurdles, often subverting and undoing the 
original visions. 
 
These visions can be considered utopian. I deploy the term utopia not to mean a 
perfect fantasy world, as originally used by Thomas More (1516)10 to symbolise a 
fictional, perfect, and unreachable society, or as “sites with no real place” in which 
“society itself” is presented in a “perfected form” (Foucault, 1984: 3): rather, the 
term is used to represent both the vision of an ideal and desired city and the 
impossibility of this vision. In treating these places as utopian, I allude not only to the 
idealised vision but also the unrealisable nature of that vision. As we shall see in this 
section, which is largely a chronological account of new city development, the initial 
goals of these visions were rarely met, although in some instances they were 
curiously achieved in unexpected ways.  
 
One such historically important vision, which inspired city-making the world over, 
was Ebenezer Howard’s ‘garden city’. Howard (1850-1928), a writer, planner, and 
social reformer, developed his idea in response to the problems of poverty, squalor, 
and congestion in Victorian London. In his book ‘To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to 
Real Reform’ (1898), he outlined his vision for the garden city, a settlement that 																																																								
10 More’s Utopia does not have private property, locks on doors, unemployment, gender inequality, 
and luxury commodities; it is a welfare state with a six-hour workday. Ironically, this perfect 
unreachable society is founded on exploitation, with each household owning two slaves (who are 
either from other countries or are Utopian criminals). As Lim and Liu argue, the “cost of utopia is 
what lies outside utopia, the forgotten communities and infrastructure required to support it” (Lim 
and Liu, 2010: 10).  
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provided both the economic opportunities of the city and the natural environment 
of the country. These garden cities were imagined and planned as a number of self-
contained towns, a short distance from London (where land prices would be low) 
and separated from it by a large green belt. In Howard’s vision, they were to be 
cooperatively owned, optimally sized at 30,000 people, economically independent 
“self-governing welfare states”, with an abundance of public space, and employment 
opportunities in light industries (Hall, 2002: 139). The city revenue would come from 
rents from various tenants and be used to cover the capital costs, the interest on 
capital, and to maintain public works. The first garden city – Letchworth – was 
registered in 1903, but despite its initially successful publicity it remained severely 
undercapitalised (Hall and Ward, 1998); finances and ownership proved difficult and 
many of Howard’s collectivist goals had to be compromised. For instance, 
cooperative ownership became impossible, and buildings and businesses needed to 
be privately owned. Land speculation made the rents too high for poor workers, and 
factories failed to relocate as anticipated. Although Howard had imagined the garden 
city as a diverse urban space, housing became unaffordable for the working classes 
and the cities never managed to reach their target populations or become financially 
stable without government support (Hall and Ward, 1998).  
 
Despite its lack of immediate success, the idea of the garden city travelled all across 
the world including to the United States in the 1920s where it was reinterpreted 
beyond recognition. The Regional Planning Association of America, under the 
stewardship of Clarence Stein and Henry Wright, modified the garden city to create 
the ‘Radburn layout’. The key innovation here was a spatial layout that grouped 
houses in small cul-de-sacs facing on to parks, and separated vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic to reduce the presence of cars within the town. This, too, was an attempt at 
social reform, but on a smaller scale. Its intention was to renew the “neighbourhood 
as a political and moral unit” (Hall, 2002: 129) and it was premised on a desire to 
integrate the new immigrants and their American-born children away from city 
slums. The first deployment of this layout was in Radburn, New Jersey, and was 
undertaken by a private company – the City Housing Corporation – in 1929. Despite 
aiming for a socially mixed community, by 1934 the settlement was largely elite with 
almost no blue-collar workers; realtors also kept out the Jewish community as well 
as African Americans. The city’s population hovered at a mere 1500 people, the 
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costs of maintaining it soared, and the onset of the Great Depression ensured that 
industries did not relocate there. Thus, instead of the garden city it had hoped to be, 
Radburn became a commuter suburb. More than twenty years later, Clarence Stein 
reflected that, “a private corporation had at best a gambler’s chance to build a new 
community” (Stein (1958) quoted in Hall (2002): 133). 
 
Across the globe, in colonial India, the garden city took the form of a company town. 
Indian industrialist Jamshedji Tata obtained capital from 8000 Indian investors and 
land from the colonial government to build Jamshedpur, a company town with a steel 
plant at its core (Dutta, 1977). Jamshedpur represents an early attempt at private 
sector planning, albeit focused on the well-being and productivity of the industrial 
worker. Yet, Tata was clear that he was “not putting up a row of workmen’s huts in 
Jamshedpur” but he was “building a city”, one that “encompassed a secular outlook, 
and valued open space” (Sinha and Singh, 2011: 266). In Tata’s own words, the town 
was a “notable example of a garden city admirably serving the needs of a great 
industry and the people whom it supports” and it was unique, for it was “built and 
run entirely by a private concern” (Koenisberger, 1945: 1). The town was planned 
incrementally, in four distinct phases, each of which was “aided by foreign expertise” 
(Sinha and Singh, 2011: 263). The Kennedy Plan (1911) conceptualised the town, the 
FC Temple Plan (1920) focused on landscape, civic improvement and urban 
infrastructure, the Stokes Plan (1936) addressed the housing shortage that resulted 
from the town’s explosive growth, and finally, architect Otto Koenigsberger’s plan 
(1944-5) attempted, with only partial success, to bring elements of the garden city to 
Jamshedpur. Koenigsberger struggled to overlay a garden city layout on this rapidly 
growing town. Over time, growth outstripped the most perspicacious of plans and 
Jamshedpur now has a “planned nucleus” with an “unplanned rural-urban fringe” 
(Dutta, 1977: vi).11 Today, it is home to 1.1 million people and is one of the few 
company towns in the world that has stood the test of time.  																																																								
11 A number of company towns (centred on steel plants) were built in India in the 1950s. These state 
projects were built with foreign aid: Bhilai (Soviet assistance), Durgapur (British) and Rourkela (West 
German). Nehru referred to them as the “Temples” to “India’s industrial modernity that would 
abolish centuries of economic stagnation; beacons along the path of “progress” that would allow the 
new nation to “catch up” with the developed world. Not just about forging steel, they were as much 
about forging a new society” (Parry and Streumpell, 2008: 47). These towns were not only meant to 
be sites of employment provision for locals as well as migrants but also “entirely new kinds of places 
inhabited by new kinds of people who would directly participate in the grand project of building the 
nation” (S Roy, 2007: 135). They were to be “melting pots, exemplars of unity in diversity, symbols of 
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Farther afield, another kind of colonial project was underway. In the 1930s Henry 
Ford embarked on building a company town in the Brazilian Amazon. Fordlandia, as 
it came to be known, was both a town to support a rubber plantation and a 
“civilising mission”. Grandin (2009) argues that the project was never commercially 
profitable but was fuelled and justified by idealism, as Ford considered the project 
not just a way of securing his company’s rubber supply (which it never did) but as a 
“Work of Civilisation” (Grandin, 2009: 24). In trying to “ensure fulfilment of workers 
outside the factory”, Ford sought to re-create a puritanical “mid-western dream” 
with vegetable gardens, the promotion of ballroom dancing, and alcohol prohibition, 
incongruously mixed with Cape Cod style houses (Grandin, 2009: 6). Fordlandia was 
enabled by a series of middlemen who organised the concessions, bought land, and 
found workers. It was only made possible through enormous tax and land 
concessions (free public land) provided by the local and national Brazilian 
governments who hoped that Ford would help revive the regional economy which 
had been in decline since 1910 on account of a changing global rubber market and a 
slump in world prices of rubber. These concessions were widely criticised by 
Brazilians at the time.  
 
For all its idealism, Ford’s vision of a pastoral American life was rejected by mutinous 
locals who revolted against the paternalism demonstrated by the company, had 
numerous altercations with authorities, and defied prohibition. Furthermore, the site 
attracted all kinds of unseemly characters who frequented the emergent bordellos 
and gambling houses, and brought with them an element of chaos. In its short life, 
Fordlandia was permanently in crisis: worker attrition rates were high, various 
diseases decimated the American employees, and the rubber output was poor. Ford 
failed to tame the jungle and gave up the project in 1945. The Brazilian government 
took over in 1950 but abandoned it soon after. Fordlandia, Grandin argues, 
“represents in crystalline form the utopianism that powered Fordism – and by 
extension Americanism. It reveals the faith that a drive toward greater efficiency 
could be controlled and managed in such a way as to bring balance to the world and 
that technology itself, without the need for government planning, could solve 																																																																																																																																																														
national integration,” and in hindsight, “temples to Nehru’s vision of a secular India” (Parry and 
Streumpell, 2008: 47). Unlike Jamshedpur, however, these towns were largely state projects.  
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whatever social problems arose from progress's advance” (2009: 356). Ford 
“imagined his industrial method as leading to social cohesion” (2009: 358), but the 
hubris of this vision resulted in a failure that was equally spectacular.  
 
While the garden city emerged in a variety of public and private forms across the 
globe in the 19th and early 20th centuries, high modernism12 emerged on the urban 
landscape in many post-colonial settings. Cities built under the ideology and aesthetic 
of high modernism were of substantially different form and content than the garden 
city. Their unsentimental architectural designs sought to embody scientific and 
technical progress and aimed to transcend the “rot, decay, scum and refuse” of 
existing cities (Scott, 1998: 117). Unlike the self-contained rural-urban garden cities, 
many post-colonial cities such as Brasilia, Canberra, Chandigarh, Abuja and Dodoma, 
were built by the state as administrative capitals and served a larger ideological and 
political purpose (Scott, 1998).  
 
Chandigarh, for instance, was intended to represent newly independent India’s “new 
genuine, productive and universal modernity”, neither steeped in Indian tradition, 
nor the “inauthentic modernity” of the colonial city (Khilnani, 1999: 128). Prime 
Minister Nehru's ambition was to remake the city as a symbol of a “new 
sovereignty”, breaking with the existing city which was “stamped by colonialism, 
soiled by partition, and in the grip of often corrupt municipalities” (Khilnani, 1999: 
135). It was a way in which to renew and reclaim the city as an “engine to drive India 
into the modern world” (Khilnani, 1999: 110). Thus Swiss architect/planner Le 
Corbusier’s design was entirely unsentimental and Chandigarh was built to reflect 
Nehru's idea “that India must free itself of both the contradictory modernity of the 
Raj and the nostalgia for its indigenous past" (1999: 132). While the building of 
Chandigarh was a political project, it remained a “supremely conceptual city”, failing 
to generate any “shared understanding of its meanings” among its citizens and 
became instead, a city of the most prosperous civil servants, professionals and 																																																								
12 High modernism was a particular instance of modernism (widely varied in its form and application). 
Scott (1998: 4) defines it as “a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-
confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing 
satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and above all, the 
rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws”. See 
Scott (1998) for detailed discussion on High Modernism as an ideology and Holston (1989) on high 
modernism and its deployment in the making of Brasilia. 
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bureaucrats (Khilnani, 1999: 135). It did, inadvertently, become an economic 
powerhouse through an unplanned expansion of industrial townships, but some 
argue that Chandigarh failed to generate “a society of secular individual or modernist 
politics: drawn into the vortex of Punjab’s politics, it was turned into a cipher in a 
battle of communities” (Khilnani, 1999: 135).  
 
Around the same moment in time, on the other side of the globe, Brazil’s populist 
President Kibitschek promised Brazilians “fifty years of progress in five” and 
commissioned architects Oscar Niemeyer and Lucio Costa to design the new capital, 
Brasilia. Like Chandigarh, the vision for Brasilia sought to make a break with the past 
and the present. It was conceived as a “city of the future, a city of development, a 
realizable utopia” and made “no references to the habits, traditions, and practices of 
Brazil's past, or of its great cities” (Scott, 1998: 119). Brasilia’s plan was not merely 
an architectural blueprint for a new city; its master plan contained within it a 
“program for social change and consciously embodied new and desired forms of 
social life” (Holston, 1989: 60). It attempted to create a city without classes. The 
plan's mythology disguised an agenda for the transformation of Brasilian society. The 
agenda explains why Brasilia had to be radically different and modernist in order to 
produce regional and national development. The planners and architects believed 
that the redesign of the urban environment could “refashion public and private life” 
and rework social relations. But as Holston argues, the utopian project of city-
making (a “common type of development project”) was “founded on a paradox”; 
although the desired future for Brasilia sought to be a rupture from the existing 
social conditions of Brazil, its emergence required the very “existing conditions it 
denied” (1989: 5). Holston (1989: 5) therefore shows that “the paradoxes of utopia 
subverted” Brasilia’s “initial premises”. 
 
In North America, suburbia became a powerful ideal which received increasing 
support (Fishman, 1987; Glaeser, 2011). Its power came from improvements in 
transport infrastructure, real estate speculation and from “the capacity of suburban 
design to express a complex and compelling vision of the modern family freed from 
the corruption of the city, restored to harmony with nature, endowed with wealth 
and independence, yet protected by a close-knit, stable community” (Fishman, 1987: 
x). Suburbia was not just a triumph of the middle class, but also an escape and 
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“alienation of the middle classes from the urban-industrial world they themselves 
were creating” (Fishman, 1987: 4). It was thus not an automatic fate; rather, it was a 
cultural creation and a conscious choice, a “bourgeois utopia”, “a collective creation 
of the bourgeois elite” (Fishman, 1987: 4) or as Lewis Mumford so wonderfully 
described it, “a collective effort to live a private life” (1938: x).  
 
Levittowns were a series of such early large-scale privately planned 
settlement/suburban developments across the United States. Imagined, planned and 
bankrolled by Levitt and Sons, they became, inadvertently or not, a “prototype of 
post-war suburbia” (Gans, 1967: xvii). In the 1940s, Levitt and Sons were building 
upper-middle class Tudor-style houses and soon after a contract from the 
government to deliver housing across the eastern United States. By the time they 
ventured into building the first Levittown in New York, they were already one of the 
country’s largest builders (Jackson, 1985). Using new building technologies and 
innovative cost-saving construction techniques, Levittown offered relatively 
inexpensive housing and hoped to attract both middle and working class people in 
order to create some kind of community. The first Levittown housed 82,000 
residents in 17,400 housing units (Jackson, 1985) and was hugely successful in terms 
of sales. It would, however, be erroneous to think of the Levittowns as purely 
private developments. As Gottdeiner (1985) shows, large land areas could only be 
converted rapidly into urban areas through a variety of state support – either 
indirectly through the subsidisation of mortgages and homeowner tax shelters or 
directly with the state partnering with real estate speculators and developers 
operating in the region. They did so ostensibly to “create property owning citizens 
with a stake in their country” (Glaeser, 2011; 176). Although they did enable 
working class families to own better quality housing than was available in the 
tenements of existing cities the various Levittowns rarely achieved the diversity they 
set out to (Glaeser, 2011). 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s hundreds of self-contained private communities were 
publicised in the United States in order to respond to “ugly and conformist suburban 
expansion, social isolation and environmental problems” (Forsyth, 2005: 1). 
American communities such as Irvine (California), Columbia (Maryland), and The 
Woodlands (Texas) were planned to be “phased, coordinated, socially balanced, 
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environmentally aware, and economically efficient. Their developers wanted to 
create whole “master-planned new communities” (Forsyth, 2005: 2), which would 
house anywhere between 10,000 to 500,000 people. “By avoiding many of the 
problems of uncoordinated incremental growth – or sprawl – they imagined both 
improving urban areas and creating a real estate product that would sell” (Forsyth, 
2005: 2). Designed as compact mixed-use spatial layouts with access to nature, many 
of these communities were inspired by the Radburn layout and garden cities. These 
communities were backed and developed by very wealthy individuals and 
corporations who were able to mobilise their elite networks to gain permissions and 
change regulations in their favour. These communities represent the private, for-
profit planning approach in America, where developers obtain legitimacy through 
their control over private property. Over time many were financially successful, with 
robust property markets and stable populations.13  
 
Perhaps the most extreme version of a corporate city was that of EPCOT 
(Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow). Entrepreneur Walt Disney felt 
that addressing the ills of old cities was futile, rather his goal was to “start from 
scratch on virgin land…and build a special kind of community” (Arnold, 2002: n.p.). 
EPCOT was imagined as an evolving display of modern technology. Designed as a 
community of tomorrow, it was to “be a showcase to the world for the ingenuity 
and imagination of American free enterprise” (Arnold, 2002: n.p.). In EPCOT, Disney 
wanted to replace democratic institutions within the city with the company and its 
corporate partners. Underlying his vision for this city was the belief that 
corporations, rather than traditional government, were better placed to create jobs, 
prevent poverty and provide for the common good. 
 
Although EPCOT failed to take off, in 1994 Disney launched ‘Celebration’ – “a 
showcase town of 20,000 designed as a corrective to sprawl” in Florida (Ross, 2000: 
5). Celebration, like many American urban experiments, sought to create a small 
town community by adopting New Urbanist planning principles of mixed land use, 
compact development, mass-transit orientation and some landscape preservation. 																																																								
13 For instance, in 2000 the Woodlands had over 50,000 residents and Irvine had 200,000 residents 
with a sizeable Asian and Hispanic population. Columbia had 100,000 residents and made big strides in 
racial integration, with 20 per cent of its population being African American. 
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Ross (2000: 8) argues that despite Disney’s original vision, Celebration was “a 
shrewd bet on a horse with everything going for it: timing, turf, and a critical mass of 
influential advocates”. It was built on cheap land purchased by multiple front 
companies in 1967, and designed based on consumer market research. It sought to 
“take credit for building a showcase public realm in a suburban landscape bereft of 
public life” and in so doing prove “that corporations could be entrusted with the 
charge of restoring public space” (Ross, 2000: 312). Furthermore, speculators and 
homeowners saw it as a safe investment given that it was backed by Disney. Many 
Americans flocked to the town, seeking a perfect community and relying on their 
faith in Disney to provide it. ‘Celebrationites’, as the residents came to be called, 
were at first “attracted to the efficiency of private government” (Ross, 2000: 310). 
But within a few years of its first occupancy, there were troubles around poor 
housing quality, a malfunctioning school, and the management’s inability to address 
these problems. That said, over time, the town became successful on its own terms, 
with a stable population of 8000 people, well-maintained public spaces, and a healthy 
real estate market. 
 
In summary, this (necessarily partial) global overview of new towns makes a number 
of key arguments: First, that the impulse to start afresh embeds within it a political 
purpose – be it the desire to establish a new sovereignty as in the case of 
Chandigarh, create an ostensibly classless society as in Brasilia, provide a work of 
quintessentially American civilisation in Fordlandia, or a wish to create a city free 
from government like EPCOT. These projects embody different registers of 
utopianism, ranging from the realpolitik of Brasilia, to the narcissism of Fordlandia 
and the more modest goals of Jamshedpur. Whatever the political purpose may be, 
these visions often serve as demonstration projects – of alternate possibilities of the 
future and they contain within them normative ideas of what the future city (and 
society) should look like and what ‘development’ consists of. They are attempts to 
provide exemplary spaces outside of the maelstrom of existing urbanism, serving as 
important examples of what is possible and therefore embed within them a socio-
political purpose.  
 
Second, these experiments reject and seek to reform the very societies that they 
emerge from. In imagining another future, they represent a “negation of existing 
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conditions” (Holston, 1989: 5). However, these projects can only emerge using the 
very existing conditions that they deny and are therefore often frustrated by them. 
In implementing their visions, the planners encounter not the ‘blank slate’ upon 
which their plans are premised, but society and all its contradictions. It is this 
interaction that often subverts the original ideals of the project, creating the very 
dystopias the visions sought to eradicate. Therefore, the visions for these places are 
often undone; some, like Fordlandia, are colossal failures, and abandoned, others, like 
Jamshedpur and Casablanca, are victims of their own success – their growth 
outstrips the most perspicacious of plans.  
 
Third, these experiments are as much about the underlying ideas as the mavericks 
that envision them and the patrons that support them. At every step of the way 
there are specific actors that imagine an alternative future – be it Ebenezer Howard, 
Le Corbusier, Hubert Lyautey, Henry Ford or Walt Disney. These actors usually 
project and realize their own visions with substantial backing from the state (or 
favours from key individuals within the state), which facilitates and legitimates such 
projects through partnerships, subsidies, exemptions, and by managing contestation. 
Consequently, in examining such urban experiments one has to pay attention not 
only to the structural conditions under which they emerge but also to the individuals 
that propel them (Hall, 2002).  
 
Fourth, imagining the new has almost always involved foreign actors, ideas, and 
architectural and urban forms. The circuits of urban planning have long been 
globalised and internationalised, (Prakash, 2002; King, 2004; Harris, 2008; Legg and 
McFarlane, 2008; Healey, 2013). Whether it is Geddes in Tel Aviv, Corbusier’s 
modernism in Chandigarh, or Fordlandia’s Cape Cod aesthetic, these new sites often 
experiment with urban design and architectural forms, and are planned by foreign 
experts.14 While many of these planning ideals were imported, they were invariably 
“hybridised”, altered, and interpreted in their new contexts (Harris, 2008). While 
such hybridisation can “be understood as part of a field of power”, “the nature and 
direction of its cultural and political significance should never be assumed” (Harriss, 																																																								
14 Such experts could include engineers, urban designers, sanitation, and transport planners, who 
often helped “export town planning to the colonies” and modified “entrenched ideas about what 
colonial urban development was”, encouraging “tentative engagements with local urban forms” (Legg 
and McFarlane, 2008: 9).  
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2008: 16). In examining the movement of ideas, one must ask, how does “a local, 
indigenous population, respond to, modify, control or domesticate the urban 
development strategies of an external authority of power, be it a colonial state, a 
powerful commercial interest, or simply a firm of planning consultants?” (King, 2004: 
85).   	
This historical overview informs the perspective with which I engage the re-
emergence of new town projects: the political work that they do, the actors they are 
driven by, the networks of ideas they draw from, and the role of the state in 
privatised city-making.  
 
1.2. The Resurgence of Privatised New Towns  
 
Although privately planned, financed, and developed greenfield cities are not a new 
phenomenon, there has been a resurgence of such projects in recent years. Why do 
we see a revival of these strategies and what, if anything, is different about the 
contemporary moment? Current scholarship suggests that what is different is that 
these cities are being built in the context of privatisation and neoliberalism. From 
Mazdar in Abu Dhabi (Caprotti and Romanowicz, 2013) to Daoyan in China (Pow, 
2013), such projects have been given a range of names, ‘bypass-implant urbanism’ 
(Shatkin, 2008), ‘wannabe cities’ (Short, 2006), ‘splintered urbanism’ (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001), and ‘zones of exception’ (Ong, 2006). In this section, I offer a critique 
of this literature and locate Lavasa within it. 
 
Privatised urban settlements have taken on a variety of forms, including gated 
communities, enclaves, smart cities, eco-cities, townships, and Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). In this respect, privatisation has moved beyond the mere provision of 
services, housing, and infrastructure into the ‘privatisation of planning’ – “the 
transfer of power over and responsibility for the visioning of urban futures and the 
exercise of social action for urban change from public to private sector actors” 
(Shatkin, 2008: 388). Conceptualised as self-contained entities they represent an 
urban model based on an interpretation of what a “global urban area should look 
and function like” (Shatkin, 2011: 78). So what does such “privatisation of planning” 
look like and what work does it do?  
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With respect to gated communities, which one can arguably see as privatised towns 
on a smaller scale, scholars have argued that they serve functions of security, 
aspiration and escapism. For instance, drawing from her research in Sao Paolo, 
Caldeira (2001) shows that these “fortified enclaves” emerge as a response to (and 
further push) concerns of security. To this effect they require security features such 
as electric fencing, high walling and other methods and motifs of fortification (Ellin, 
1997; Low, 2005). In some cases these concerns go as far as creating “security 
parks” (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002). In the South African context, Ballard and Jones 
argue that they can be seen as a kind of “geographical escapism” aiming to “restore 
feelings of safety and control that were enabled by the earlier state-led spatial 
strategy of apartheid” (2011: 2). Pow notes that Chinese housing estates are 
“meticulously planned in order to create [a] picturesque and pristine living 
environment” and that behind these “pretty housing façade(s) lies an aestheticized 
landscape of social exclusion and residential segregation” (2009: 372). This 
aestheticized vision, she argues, serves to depoliticize class relations, reducing them 
“to questions of lifestyle choices, consumption patterns, visual pleasures and “good 
taste”” (2009: 373). And so, these gated communities across the world serve as 
forms of escapism and exclusion, walled-in from the poor, and rooted in concerns of 
security and consumption of space. In some cases, contemporary new towns are 
characterised by similar concerns and responses.  
 
Advertised as the “world's first electronic city”, with “no factories, no pollution, no 
problems”, Dreamland was Egypt’s experiment in city-making (Mitchell, 2007: 2). 
Construction began in 1995 and it is now the “largest, privately owned urban 
development project not only in Egypt but in the entire Middle East” (Dreamland 
Egypt, 2013). Overlooking the Pyramids, Dreamland is a real-estate project 
supported by various government officials and institutions. But, as speculators 
realised that they had overbuilt, its values collapsed and it remains under-populated 
today, a mirage of itself, as its name suggests.  Similarly, Iranian Arg-e-Jadid, a 5000-
acre artificial oasis in the form of a model town was built in the middle of a desert as 
part of a special economic zone (SEZ) centred on automobile-assembly. The then 
President Rafsanjani hoped to diversify Iran’s economic base away from oil and 
natural gas by developing a domestic consumer economy and increasing private 
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investment. Construction commenced in 1994 with goals of catering to 50,000 
people. New Urbanist in design, and built on “unproductive” public land, it is a 
financially successful real estate venture, with a turnover of USD 200 million in 2005. 
Arg-e-Jadid mixes commerce and housing to provide a free-market enclave and can 
be seen as a form of “Islamic neoliberalism” (Forti, 2007). At present it has only 
3000 residents and workers are brought in from surrounding villages.  
 
Surveying plans of yet to be built African cities, Watson suggests that they are driven 
by international real estate companies interested in developing city-region scale 
satellite cities post the 2008 financial crisis. Watson (2014: 225-226) refers to them 
as “urban fantasies”: “hyper-modern” in their design, sometimes referencing Dubai 
and Shanghai, seeking to be free of the ““disorder” of existing cities”. Tatu City in 
Kenya for instance, is planned for 70,000 “discerning residents” and companies “who 
wish to live, work and play in the most modern well-planned urban development in 
East Africa” (2014: 4219). Outside the Angolan capital of Luanda, Chinese 
developers have built a range of towns comprising towers of apartments priced at 
USD 200,000. Understandably vacant, these physical “fantasies”, as if to drive home 
the improbability of their existence, are now referred to as ‘ghost towns’. Similarly, 
the city of Kigamboni outside Dar es Salaam, aims to relieve the latter’s land 
shortages and congestion; developed by companies from Dubai, UAE and China, it 
promises an “ultra modern urban centre with facilities competing with those in 
places like Dubai, Hong Kong, and Kuala Lumpur” (Watson, 2014: 223). Taken 
together, these plans seek to provide elite Africans with serviced urban land that is 
aspirational and global in scope.  
 
These plans are also “clear attempts to link physical visions to contemporary 
rhetoric on urban sustainability, risk and new technologies, and are underpinned by 
the ideal that through these cities Africa can be “modernized”” (Watson, 2013: 218). 
Almost always designed by foreign consultants, these master-planned settlements are 
large-scale, based on private property, with elaborate physical visions that are 
embedded in contemporary discourses of sustainability and new technologies. 
Surveying privatised city development (what he calls ‘urban integrated megaprojects’) 
in Asia, Shatkin argues that their globally referenced urban visions “function in part 
as allegories” “intended to illustrate a possible urban future” (Shatkin, 2011: 7) and 
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represent a “vision for the transformation of the urban experience through the 
wholesale commodification of the urban fabric” (Shatkin, 2011: 78). Furthermore, 
the presentation of these towns as simply a response to the consumer demand of 
the increasingly global elite/middle classes allows them to transcend debates about 
propriety and insulates them from public input and accountability (Shatkin, 2011).  
 
China is the most fervent of city builders today, although unlike the above-
mentioned projects, these cities are largely funded and enabled by the state. While 
Shanghai was designed to “flaunt cutting-edge style”, its nine satellite towns were 
designed as meticulous imitations of European cities including a Paris (with an Eiffel 
Tower) and Venice (with canals and gondolas). In a survey of these theme-park 
towns, Bosker (2013) argues that they “re-create not only the superficial appearance 
of Western historical cities, but also the “feel””, which in “subtle but important 
ways” shapes “the behaviour of their occupants while also reflecting the 
achievements, dreams, and even anxieties of their inhabitants and creators” (2013: 2-
3). While tourists frequent these towns, the properties – owned by speculators, 
parking their money and watching their investments grow – often remain empty. 
 
China has also undertaken a number of eco-city projects in order to demonstrate 
low-waste or sometimes even carbon-neutral urban development pathways. Amidst 
mounting pressures to respond to global climate change, eco-cities have emerged as 
potential solutions to this imminent ecological crisis. Caprotti (2014) argues that 
such eco-cities are “experimental locations in which to trial new technologies, 
architectures, and environmental-economic reform” that conceptualise the city as a 
“laboratory” (2014: 2). For instance, Dongtan, China’s first eco-city project, sought 
to develop a carbon neutral town to house 500,000 people in a wetland area (Pow, 
2013). Similarly, Yixing’s ‘Sustainable Development Demonstration Zone’ seeks to 
demonstrate low carbon development by developing a town centred on the solar 
energy industry (Chen, 2012b). These sites are necessarily demonstration projects 
which show possible models of an environmentally sustainable and economically 
productive urban future. They are seen to “promise economic progress, social 
harmony and ecological protection and represent the apotheosis of China’s pursuit 
of green civilisation” (Pow, 2013: 2256). May (2011: 103) suggests that they “hold 
forth the promise of cutting the tie between urbanisation, energy and land 
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consumption enabling those who have heretofore been left behind by the industrial 
revolution to enjoy an increased quality of life without pushing the planet beyond an 
ecological tipping point”.15 Caprotti (2014: 3) goes further to argue that “the use and 
marketing of eco-cities” is a “foil for economic strategies enabling the reproduction 
of neoliberal economies in the guise of transitions towards “green capitalism” and 
the “green economy””.	 
 
The literature summarised above has a number of shortcomings. First, the historical 
overview in Section 1.1 impels us to see these new town projects as products of 
specific actors in particular historical moments. Most new town experiments were 
driven by the singular obsession of a few individuals – architects/planners and their 
patrons – to create something new. Yet, in foregrounding structural connections 
between the state and capital, the key importance of actors and the relationships 
they share with each other (the visionaries, key government officials, developers, and 
politicians) is largely ignored in recent scholarship on privatised (and other) city-
making (Shatkin (2008) and Sami (2013) are notable exceptions).  
 
Brenner and Theodore (2002) provide some nuance, arguing that neoliberal projects 
are contextually embedded, “produced within national, regional and local contexts” 
(2002: 351). Therefore, an analysis of “actually existing neoliberalism” requires an 
exploration of the “path-dependent, contextually specific interactions” at different 
scales (2002: 351). However, this approach, too, as Parnell and Robinson (2012) 
rightly argue, privileges the global over the local. That is to say, if all the diversity of 
urban outcomes can be explained as a “tendency of neoliberalisation at the urban 
scale” (2012: 599) then what of the collective importance of other processes that 
shape urban change, such as the role of traditional elites, land use, and local political-
economies? As the introduction to this chapter suggests, ideas are not just products 
of structures but also of very specific actors (Pawar, Deshpande and Gulabchand, in 
the case of Lavasa) and to call them neoliberal projects would be to underestimate 
the very local specific interests, ideas, and associations that generated them. This 
dissertation thus heeds Parnell and Robinson’s (2012: 594) call of developing a “post-
																																																								
15 For recent detailed surveys on eco-cities see Rapoport (2013) and Caprotti (2014). 
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neoliberal analytic optic” in urban studies, in order to foreground the local actors 
and conditions as drivers of urban change.  
 
Second, these studies expansively analyse the roots and implications of the plans and 
visions deployed in making new cities. They foreground the plans, the 
representations that they draw on, the discourses used to justify and sell such 
projects, and the political work that these representations do. This analytical focus 
on imaginaries and symbolism is unavoidable, as many of these cities exist only on 
paper. Regardless, such analysis ascribes too much power to the plans themselves. In 
focusing on the imaginaries, the global references they deploy, and seeing 
neoliberalism as a “package of policies, ideologies, and political interests”, these 
works miss “the processes that pertain to local structures of meaning and symbolism 
in reshaping neoliberalism” (Kanna, 2011: 32). Here again, history cautions us. We 
have seen that plans on paper are imperfect – works in progress that are shaped and 
changed in their implementation. What is of relevance then is to examine how 
developers plan to achieve their goals, and how the plans are remade or re-imagined. 
In other words, to understand the true weight and force of the plan, scholarship 
should move beyond the plan and engage instead with the life of the plan.   
 
Third, there is a growing literature on how plans for new cities (eco-cities and SEZs) 
impact rural populations in both China (Ong, 2006; May, 2011; Chen, 2012a; 
Caprotti, 2014) and India (Goldman, 2010; Levien, 2013; Sampat, 2013; Jenkins et al., 
2013) and their conclusions are universally grim. By and large, they demonstrate how 
these projects are premised on dispossessing rural peasantries. While there can be 
no doubt that the dispossession of peasantry from their lands is a serious global 
issue, these studies rarely account for the spaces that communities can create, often 
against substantial odds and sometimes in subversive ways, to shape or participate in 
the plan. For instance, in terming these new projects speculative real estate projects, 
they are largely imagined as projects undertaken by domestic and foreign real estate 
companies, and the government. These studies (with the partial exception of Levien 
(2013)) rarely uncover how those communities that are thrown into city-making 
speculate and with what consequences (this point is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Two).  
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Finally, a vast majority of these projects remain on paper, unable to get off the 
ground due to inadequate capital, and/or a range of local legal and political obstacles 
(Shatkin, 2011; Watson, 2014). In some cases projects are built, but, in the absence 
of residents and businesses, are rendered dystopian ghost towns (Bosker, 2013; 
Watson, 2014).16 In other cases, they have been thwarted by protest and litigation, 
as is evident from the numerous SEZs in India (Sampat, 2013; Jenkins et al. 2014). In 
the Indian context, Roy (2009a: 87) argues that such projects of urban 
developmentalism “remain damned by the very deregulatory logic that fuels them”. 
While she is not referring to new towns specifically, her point is that attempts to 
remake Indian cities are often undone either through resistance or through the 
informalised planning processes of the state. In other words, “it is precisely the 
nature and ambitions of these plans that will be their undoing, for the “chaos” that 
they seek to evade is precisely the context in which they must take root” (Bhan, 
2014: 235).   
 
To say that these utopian projects end up dystopian, subverted in some manner or 
another is banal. History shows us that the hubris of many such schemes ensures 
their subversion. What is of interest is not the fact that they do not live up to their 
ideals, i.e. whether these projects are successes or failures on the terms that were 
initially set out. Michel Foucault asserted that nothing happens as laid down in 
programmers’ schemes - yet he insisted that they are not simply utopias “in the 
heads of a few projectors”, they are not “abortive schemas for the creation of a 
reality” but “fragments of reality” itself and they “induce a whole series of effects in 
the real” (Foucault, 1991: 81). The utopia conjures images and circulates imaginaries 
about the future. What must be paid attention to is how the plan as an idea and the 
plan in action interact with one another to produce a living and breathing city. 
 
As I have demonstrated, the scholarship on contemporary new towns has therefore 
largely either focused on the imaginaries and ideologies accompanying such urban 
projects, or the dispossession that they bring about. But these studies rarely bring 
together the myriad aspects of city-making. For instance, they seldom discuss the 																																																								
16 For instance, the new city of Chenggong consists of 100,000 vacant apartments (BBC, 14 August 
2012). Other Chinese cities like Thames Town (modelled on an English village) and the Kangbashi 
district, which was built to accommodate a million people by 2010, are empty too (Time, 2014). 
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tactics deployed by the state, private sector, and local communities in moving the 
project forward as well as resisting and remaking it (Shatkin, 2011). It is these 
questions that this dissertation seeks to engage with through an ethnography of 
Lavasa. 
 
1.3. The Production of Space 
 
Scholars working on contemporary urbanism have been enormously influenced by 
Lefebvre’s idea of ‘the production of space’ (1991) and his writings on ‘the right to 
the city’ (1996). These two works offer a framework with which one can begin an 
inquiry into the making of a place. Marxist perspectives on the production of space, 
most notably developed by Lefebvre (1991 (1974)), Castells (1977), and Harvey 
(1973, 1990) explain urbanisation as the spatial manifestation of capitalist 
accumulation and explain urban growth and change in terms of the circulation of 
capital. Harvey argues that capitalism’s crisis of over-accumulation is temporarily 
attenuated through investment in the built environment, i.e. through a “spatial fix” 
for capital. The built environment thus becomes a collective means of consumption 
and production and absorbs surplus capital in its construction and maintenance 
(further elaborated upon in Chapter Two). Lefebvre suggests that contemporary 
capitalism is urban capitalism – where the production of space becomes the driver of 
the economy and society. Capitalism, according to him, survives by occupying space. 
Lefebvre sees urbanisation as a product of real estate capital and commodification, 
everyday symbols and representations. Therefore, late capitalism is “not just an 
economic, ideological, and cultural project but also a spatial one” (Kanna, 2011: 17). 
 
What is meant by the production of space? Lefebvre argues that space is not merely 
a means of production, but also a product in and of itself. Its use and design are 
political instruments of social control. Lefebvre is interested in the production of 
space – “the ways in which surplus value is produced through the commodification 
and exchange of space”, i.e. the material development of the built environment and 
“through the representation of space (spatial conceptions of experts and planners), 
and the collective meanings of representational space” (quoted in Roy (2009a): 825). 
Space, according to him, is actively produced and its production is “a social process 
involving the confrontation and negotiation of various practices (architectural, 
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institutional, and quotidian) that is determinate, embedded in concrete relations of 
power” (Kanna, 2011: 83).  
 
Lefebvre’s heuristic device of a triad consisting of conceived-perceived-lived space 
serves as a framework for understanding the production of space. The first 
(conceived space) is what he calls ‘representations of space’; space as conceptualised 
by planners and experts. These representations are conceptual domains of 
“scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers, and social engineers...all of 
whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with, and what is conceived” 
(Lefebvre, 1991 (1974): 38). They are products of latent historical processes and 
marked by signs, codes, ideology and power. The dominance of capital is coded 
within these representations. The second (perceived space) is what he calls ‘spaces 
of representation’ which is lived and experiential space, “modified over time and 
through its use, spaces invested with symbolism and meaning” (Elden, 2004: 190). 
The third ‘spatial practices’ (lived space) is space as “a physical form, real space, 
space that is generated and used” (Elden, 2004: 190). The production of space 
therefore is as much a product of material activities as conceptual. 
 
There are a number of ways in which Lefebvre’s conception of the production of 
space provides a framework for thinking about the emergence of a city, particularly 
one that represents itself as a kind of market utopia. First, the city of Lavasa is a 
product, not just in Lefebvre’s understanding that all space is produced but also quite 
literally, as Lavasa is to be sold and marketed to future ‘consumer-citizens’. 
Accordingly, in examining the city, Lefebvre suggests we pay attention to the 
material – the capitalist forces through which the city emerges; the conceived – the 
ways in which Lavasa is planned and conceptualised (by experts, planners, etc); the 
lived – the ways in which the space is experienced and directly lived by those who 
are subsumed in its making; and finally, through spatial practice – the relationship 
between the perceived space and its lived realities through physical space.   
 
Second, Lefebvre’s writings on ‘the production of space’ emerged from his 
observations on the development of a French new town called Mourenx in the 
1950s. In examining the transformation of the rural landscape from which it 
emerged, Lefebvre argued that urban processes extend beyond city limits. The city 
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therefore, was not the “appropriate scale for urban analysis”. Rather, the process 
requires “a grasp of how agrarian economies have been affected by industrialisation 
and then by the shift of economic locus to finance capital” (Ballard and Jones, 2013: 
4). He therefore insists that as part of examining the urban processes, we also 
examine how rural economies/societies have been transformed. 
 
Third, the production of space requires us to pay attention to surfaces and 
imaginaries, not only because of what they produce but also because of what they 
conceal. The built environment (like commodities in Marxist analysis), conceals the 
ways it is produced (Lefebvre 1991 (1974): 80). In this concealment, “particular 
interests reproduce themselves”, often in very violent ways (Ballard and Jones, 2013: 
4), to give the appearance of stability. So Lefebvre suggests that we not only pay 
attention to the surfaces but scratch beneath them too. 
 
Although not a Lefebvrian thesis, the idea of the production of space informs the 
structure of the thesis. Consequently, this thesis seeks to go beyond understanding 
new urban spaces as simply a product of real estate speculation. It seeks to 
understand the creation of new urban spaces both in terms of how they are 
envisioned and how they are materially made. It examines why and how urban 
development projects (particularly megaprojects) actually get adopted and how they 
are actively produced and reflect a set of political interests and claims (Shatkin, 
2008). Contemporary literature on urban India rarely uncovers how projects were 
imagined, or why particular strategies were undertaken (were there alternatives?) 
This project seeks to do both, in a Lefebvrian sense to understand the production of 
space in representation and in practice, i.e. Lavasa as an example of speculation in 
real estate and a speculation of a future city realised through an ideology of planning. 
 
By using these lenses to examine how Lavasa comes to life, this thesis contributes to 
the literature on urban studies through an ethnographic study of the first city 
developed, financed and managed entirely by the private sector in post-independence 
India. Through the case of Lavasa, I consider the production of space by the private 
sector in a post-colonial setting, where profit and reform are explicit aims of the 
developers. This dissertation examines the nexus between the state, private sector, 
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and society in India in a quintessential example of the production of space: the 
wholly private city of Lavasa. 
 
1.4. Dissertation Road Map 
 
“We believe, and always have, that India and the rest of the 
developing world needs cities like Lavasa. It is a prototype of a 
medium-sized city, which can act as a financially viable, and 
environmentally and socially sustainable substitute to the ill served and 
overcrowded mega cities. We need manageable, planned cities, not 
burgeoning slums.” (Ajit Gulabchand quoted in LCL (2010: 5)) 
 
Many greenfield sites in India distinguish themselves from existing Indian cities 
through three main claims: first, that they will have ‘world-class’ infrastructure and 
services, second, that they will be built and managed (at least partially) by the private 
sector, and third, that they will be ‘properly’ planned. Lavasa makes an additional 
claims that by adhering to the Master Plan and imposing “strict financial controls”, it 
will be a profitable, environmentally sustainable, and inclusive city, one where people 
from various socio-economic classes will come together to live (LCL, 2009: n.p.). It 
is within these ideals that my inquiry is located. Since planning, inclusion, and 
environmental concerns are usually domains of the state, what are the tensions of 
situating these social goals within market forces? Each chapter takes a salient part of 
the vision – private planning, inclusion, and environmental sustainability – and 
examines the nature and the implementation of that vision, what it reveals and 
conceals, the ruptures, undoing, and remaking of that utopian ideal. It examines, in a 
Lefebvrian sense, how the city was imagined, materially made, and made real. 
Accordingly, the dissertation is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter Two sets out further thoughts on the theoretical terrain for the thesis, 
which lies at the intersection of the literatures on urban planning and agrarian 
change. It locates Lavasa within the contemporary urban moment in India, which is 
defined by the twin ascendance of privatised urban development and resistance 
(Shatkin and Vidyarthi, 2014). The chapter outlines and critiques the dominant 
theoretical narratives deployed in explaining why, how, and with what effects, new 
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forms of privatised development have emerged in India. Chapter Three describes the 
methods used in studying Lavasa, detailing both the epistemological basis for the 
study and the nuts and bolts of conducting it. 
 
Chapter Four sets up the case of Lavasa and traces the ideologies, rationalities, and 
interests that enabled its making. It seeks to explain how and why the government 
enabled and rationalised the creation of a privately built hill station and makes three 
connected arguments. First, it shows that the state government’s policy for new hill 
stations emerged not from techno-scientific analysis or even expert opinion (unlike, 
perhaps, its modernist predecessors), but rather from a long standing and common 
sense view that upholds the development of new cities as a solution to the 
intractable problems of existing cities. Invoking this common sense, then, the 
development of hill stations was justified both politically and legally as being in the 
‘public interest’ even though these hill stations were essentially meant to be private 
real estate projects. This redefinition of public interest effectively curbed all 
discussion on the propriety of such privatised settlements. Second, the chapter 
demonstrates how a network of politically powerful individuals, connected through 
kinship and friendship, often occupying influential positions within the government 
and in real estate companies, was crucial to the foundation of this city. Their 
involvement further blurred the line between the project’s public and private 
interests. Third, it argues that while Lavasa can be seen as a real estate project, 
generating surplus through the monetisation of land, it is also building, sustaining and 
making real the representation of a private and somewhat utopian space. This vision 
promises that future cities, when planned and managed properly through private 
partnerships and with a complete top-down vision, can avoid the politics and turmoil 
that characterise the Indian city of the past (and present). Lavasa, therefore, is a 
speculative project – a real estate gamble as well as a gamble on what a future city 
should look like. This speculative vision, as will be seen in the chapters that follow, 
produces all kinds of socio-political and economic effects.  
 
Having established that the Hill Station Regulations and Lavasa are premised on the 
conversion of rural land into urban space, Chapter Five seeks to explain how Lavasa’s 
land parcel was assembled. It asks a number of related questions: how did LCL 
purchase thousands of acres from villagers on the land market? Why were these 
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villagers willing to part with their lands? And if locals were cheated, as the NAPM has 
argued, then why was their collectively protest against LCL? The chapter shows that 
land purchase was made possible by the historical specificity of the land in question. 
That is to say, the state government had created conditions in which the rural 
population was sparse, effectively fragmented, partially urbanised, and disconnected 
from agriculture. The process of land assembly, therefore, was slowly manufactured 
and it involved the state, law, and agrarian structures. Second, land was purchased 
quietly over a decade by a multitude of intermediaries (land agents, other real estate 
companies, and aggregators). Thus, much of the land had already been purchased 
before the project was formally announced to the villagers. These intermediaries in 
some instances did cheat farmers, either by forging documents, providing inadequate 
compensation, or engaging in aggressive coercion.  
 
But, despite these grievances, collective action was feeble and thwarted by three 
mechanisms (generated by the market process itself). First, the process turned some 
villagers with relative power and wealth into land speculators with a stake in the 
project. Second, the voluntary and bilateral nature of market transactions 
individualised land disputes, making them issues to be addressed within the private 
and domestic sphere, rather than collectively and publicly. Third, many villagers who 
had sold their land took responsibility for selling at low prices, buying into the 
ideology of the market, rather than questioning the grossly asymmetric terms under 
which such land sales had taken place. Finally, the ostensibly voluntary nature of the 
transactions disrupted the politically powerful narrative of ‘dispossession’ that is 
usually invoked by social movements when contesting land grabs, making collective 
action all the more difficult. Together, these processes ensured that, aside from a 
small number of land disputes, LCL managed to assemble its land parcel with relative 
ease. 
 
That said, a number of villagers did not sell their land (referred to as ‘holdouts’) and 
many of those who did continue to reside in Lavasa. Accordingly, Chapter Six 
examines Lavasa’s vision for building an inclusive city. It asks how, and with what 
effects, have rural communities been thrown into city-making? If Lavasa aims to be an 
‘inclusive’ city then what are the terms of its inclusion and what are its effects? The 
chapter shows that while LCL seeks to build an inclusive city, one with affordable 
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housing and services, and a corporate social responsibility programme, their idea of 
inclusion is founded on retaining control over land. In the plan’s conception, 
therefore, the holdouts are an aesthetic, planning and security liability. The holdouts 
in this view represent a kind of propertied resistance to the project, unwilling to sell 
their land and disrupting Lavasa’s Master Plan. However, although the holdouts pose 
a challenge for the company in terms of planning and resistance, they also, by their 
very existence, politically legitimise the town. The holdouts’ presence is presented 
by LCL as testimony to the lack of coercion/use of violence in the land purchase 
process as well as an affirmation of Lavasa’s ideology of development. The holdouts 
are in good measure responsible for the project surviving multiple legal and political 
contestations. Furthermore, in finding themselves amidst a city building project, 
some holdouts provide affordable services to others and have set up their own 
businesses within the city, ironically, making real the possibility of inclusion. It is 
through their propertied citizenship, rather than their plan-based inclusion that they 
are able to lay claims to the city. Thus, while the holdouts prevent LCL from 
executing its plan to a certain extent, paradoxically, it is their presence that allows 
the plan to at least partially succeed.  
 
Chapter Seven interrogates Lavasa’s vision for building an environmentally 
sustainable city. It asks why and how was Lavasa, an “environmentally sustainable” 
city, contested and stalled on environmental grounds? It argues that the contestation 
is premised on ideologically opposed conceptions of environmentalism held by the 
competing groups: LCL and the NAPM. Their respective conceptions of the 
environment are imbued with ideologies of development and embody irreconcilable 
views on privatisation and the control and ownership of land. These competing ideas 
also reflect conflicting interests. LCL’s goal is to generate a compelling urban future 
that is sellable and marketable both domestically and internationally. Such visioning is 
made possible by and further enables land and resource privatisation. In the case of 
the NAPM, the environment is invoked to guarantee land and resource rights for the 
villagers. It serves as a way in which to challenge privatisation and land/resource 
capture by leveraging environmental laws in a context where land disputes are 
increasingly difficult to fight (as demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six). In this 
instance the environment is also used strategically as part of a larger, nationwide 
struggle against privatisation, displacement and neoliberal economic development. 
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Therefore, Chapter Seven shows how the environment is leveraged in order to 
generate support both for and against land privatisation.  
 
Having traced the making of Lavasa – its inception, production, and contestation – 
Chapter Eight concludes with some reflections on the main themes and arguments 
raised in this dissertation and its contribution to the study of Indian politics and 
urban studies.  
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Chapter Two 
 
India’s Urban Transition 
 
On a Sunday evening in 2011, Shankar Dhindale, a local land agent and resident of 
Dasve village was kidnapped. The kidnappers, later identified as members of a 
criminal network, threatened Shankar, took his keys, and ransacked his house. They 
stole the INR 4.7 million (USD 94,000) they found in his cupboard, but left behind 
gold of undisclosed value (Indian Express, 01 November 2011). Local informants 
narrated this incident to me on multiple occasions. As they told the story, often with 
great hyperbole, they highlighted the sheer volume of money that had been making 
its way into the local economy. But in all the retellings of this story there was little 
incredulity that someone would stash such a large sum of money in a cupboard, and 
even less disbelief that the kidnapped person was not just any land agent, but also 
the sarpanch of the Dasve gram panchayat.17  
 
Dasve is no ordinary village. It is one of the eighteen villages subsumed within Lavasa 
and slowly being transformed into a single urban settlement. But the story of 
Shankar Dhindale is more common than one might think. As infrastructure projects, 
SEZs, and townships grow in number and scope, tales of real estate related crime 
abound. Accounts of land sharks, dispossession, and conflict find their way into local 
newspapers on a daily basis. The kidnapping, therefore, raises many questions; how 
did Shankar Dhindale amass such wealth and power? What is the role of agrarian 
intermediaries in the making of urban space? And what, if anything, does his case tell 
us about the ongoing rural—urban transition in India?  
 
In trying to answer these questions, this chapter lays out the theoretical foundation 
for the dissertation, which lies at the intersection of the literatures on urban 
planning and agrarian studies. It outlines the dominant theoretical perspectives 
deployed in explaining why and how new forms of urban development emerge in 
India and argues that Lavasa disrupts some of these narratives and also points to key 																																																								
17 Gram panchayat is the elected local self-government at the village level and the sarpanch is its 
elected head. The sarpanch is the chief liaison between the government and the village community.  
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silences within them. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.I outlines the 
empirical context of urban development in contemporary India. Section 2.2 lays out 
the dominant academic narratives used in understanding India’s urban transition, 
namely: i) speculative urbanism ii) land grabs and dispossession, and iii) contestation 
and resistance. Section 2.3 concludes by making a case for studying Lavasa.  
 
2.1. India’s Urban Century 
 
The Indian state’s relationship with urbanisation has not been straightforward. As 
historian Janaki Nair notes, the city “has had a fugitive existence in the political, 
cultural and sociological imaginations of modern India” (Nair, 2005: 1). In the years 
just after independence, Nehru saw industrialisation as the way to usher India into 
the future, and wished to remake the city as “an engine to drive India into the 
modern world” (Khilnani, 1999: 110). But if modern India lives in its cities, then 
Gandhi’s India began and ended in its villages (Nair, 2005: 4). Gandhi believed that 
the villages of India could be self-sufficient and India’s progress was rooted in the 
revival of the village economy. In both his and Nehru’s view, the village was seen 
“not only as a place where people lived but as a site which reflected the basic values 
of Indian civilisation” (Beteille, 1980: 108). Therefore, rural India, housing the 
majority of the country’s population, has long dominated the political imagination of 
post-colonial India. Paradoxically, despite the political importance of rural India, 
Lipton (1977) argued that post-independence policies reflected an urban bias, 
resulting in the long-term impoverishment of rural areas. In the years that followed, 
explosive urbanisation was routinely predicted. Although urban population growth 
rates remained low and well below global averages, given the size of India’s 
population, these marginal growth rates generated a substantial increase in the urban 
population (Table 2.1) (Kundu, 2011). 
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Table 2.1: Average annual growth rate of urban population for India 
and the world’s major regions, 1950-2015 
 
 
Period 
Latin 
America 
 
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
India 
India % urban 
population 
1950-55 4.70 4.64 3.93 2.41 17.04 
1960-65 4.28 5.10 3.86 3.00 17.92 
1970-75 3.56 4.38 3.38 3.74 19.76 
1980-85 3.17 4.29 3.77 3.30 23.10 
1990-95 2.46 3.79 3.17 2.81 25.55 
2000-05 1.94 3.40 2.83 2.37 27.67 
2010-15 1.33 3.28 2.17 2.38 30.01 
Source: Excerpts from Tables 1 and 2 in Kundu (2011: 6, 7) 
 
When the Indian government liberalised the economy and opened its markets to 
global trade and finance in the early 1990s, it did so to address its current account 
deficit, increase foreign investment and make Indian industry globally competitive. 
Entrenching the Nehruvian vision of cities, liberalisation was accompanied by a 
distinct policy focus towards growth-oriented urban developmentalism (Gooptu, 
2011). In 2005, launching the (fittingly named) flagship Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM)18, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, 
“our urban economy has become an important driver of economic growth. It is also 
the bridge between the domestic economy and the global economy. It is a bridge we 
must strengthen” (as quoted in Gooptu, 2011: 37). Cities, although home to only 30 
per cent of the country’s population, are responsible for 66 per cent of GDP 
(Alhuwalia et al., 2014). The anticipation of an urban population explosion combined 
with a decline in the agricultural economy (which dropped from 37 per cent to 17.5 
per cent of GDP between 1981 and 2011) presents itself as a “structural 
transformation” waiting to happen (Ahluwalia et al., 2014: 2). Scholars and policy 
makers argue that this urban transformation is taking place in an “increasingly 
unplanned manner” (Ahluwalia et al., 2014: 2) with poor public services, and 
substandard and/or inadequate infrastructure slowing the growth of the Indian 
economy (Nilekani, 2008; MGI, 2010). To that effect, the Twelfth Plan for Urban 																																																								
18 The JNNURM was launched in 2005 to reform 65 selected Indian cities. The policy linked central 
government funding with a set of required city-level reforms aimed at altering financial management of 
cities, planning and governance frameworks, improving urban services for all citizens, and de-
regulating the urban land market (Shaw, 2012). The JNNURM sought to develop ““an efficient real 
estate market with minimum barriers on transfer of property” (JNNURM, 2007: 74) and thus 
“catalyze investment flows in the urban infrastructure sector” so that cities will live up to their 
projected contribution to national economic growth (MUD, 2006)” (Searle, 2010: 82). 
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Development (2011-2016) identified the need for investment in cities, claiming that 
“the challenges of urbanisation in India are unprecedented in scale and significance” 
(GoI, 2011: 3). Indian cities therefore are seen as both engines of entrepreneurship 
and growth, as well as sites in need of urgent reform (Nilekani, 2008; MGI, 2010; 
Ahluwalia, 2014). 		
In contrast to urban planning and governance which, until the 1990s, was a “state 
dominated affair” characterised by public housing boards (Levien, 2013: 57) and strict 
controls over land, the post-liberalisation reforms encouraged private sector 
involvement in the construction of infrastructure and real estate (Banerjee-Guha, 
2002; Mathur, 2005). For instance, the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 
(ULCRA), a law that prevented the concentration of land holdings beyond a specified 
limit, was repealed in 1999 to allow for the restructuring of urban land markets. In 
2002, private developers were permitted to seek foreign direct investment (FDI) for 
township construction and this policy was further liberalised in 2005 to include a 
wider range of real estate types. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) allowed venture capital funding in real estate, which resulted in the 
establishment of a number of real estate investment funds. It is thus no surprise that 
Indian real estate values grew at twice the rate of inflation between 2001 and 2011 
(Chakravorty, 2013). The real estate market grew from USD 12 billion in 2005 to 
USD 55.6 billion in 2010 and is expected to grow to USD 180 billion by 2020 (FICCI, 
2013).  
 
As part of the post-liberalisation policy emphasis on urbanisation and economic 
growth, there has been a renewed focus on greenfield developments. In the years 
just after Independence, a range of new towns/cities such as Chandigarh (Punjab), 
Gandhinagar (Gujarat), and Bhilai (Madhya Pradesh)19 were built almost entirely 
through state planning and funds. Between 1947 and 1981, India built 118 new towns 
and accommodated 5 million people in them, making it one of the largest new town 
programmes in the world (Glover, 2013). The 1970s and ’80s saw the development 																																																								
19 Chandigarh and Gandhinagar were post-independence attempts to create new administrative 
capitals for Punjab and Gujarat, respectively. Bhilai, Durgapur, Bokaro and Rourkela were some of the 
new steel towns built through the second Five Year Plan (1954-55) under the guidance of Nehru. 
These industrial towns were to be ““temples” to India’s industrial future and secular “modernity”” 
(Parry and Streumpell, 2008: 47) ushering in employment, industrial production, and economic 
growth. 
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of satellite towns such as Navi Mumbai (New Bombay) (Shaw, 2004) and Kengeri and 
Yehlahanka New Towns outside Bangalore (Nair, 2005). Since 2000, various state 
governments (particularly those in already relatively urbanised states such as 
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Gujarat) have resurrected the development of greenfield 
settlements as a way to address the demands of industrialisation, and deficits in 
urban housing stock and infrastructure (Shaw, 2004; Nair, 2005). 		
As urban development lies within the domain of state governments, the policies 
under which new towns/townships emerge vary from state to state (these are in 
addition to central level policies like the Special Economic Zone Act (2005) which 
has generated numerous enclave settlements nationally20). In Maharashtra alone, 
policies such as the Industrial Township Policy (1994), the Special Township Policy 
(2006) and the Hill Station Regulation (1996) have, and continue to promote 
integrated greenfield developments by the private sector or through public-private 
partnerships. Other states like Karnataka and Gujarat have similar 
policies/regulations.21 Thus, in just over a decade, the private sector has gone from 
building apartments to full-scale cities across the country. For example, the Delhi 
Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) has identified twenty-four nodal cities that will 
be developed over the next ten years through the private sector (DMIC, 2010). 
Encouraging the private sector to build integrated and mixed-use settlements 
therefore is part of a larger state strategy of urban development. Most recently, 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced plans and a budgetary allocation to 
develop 100 new ‘smart cities’ to take the pressure off existing cities, as well as 
create new centres for economic development.22 
 
Therefore, as more and more private sector companies undertake aspects of city 
building, urban planning has taken on a profit making form. This is in sharp contrast 
to the historical tenets of Indian planning, which were rarely about selling urban 																																																								
20 By 2011, 585 SEZs were formally approved and 133 were already operational. These SEZs were 
disproportionally concentrated in the IT sector, pharmaceuticals, and gems and jewellery. Between 
2006 and 2011, “exports from SEZs increased tenfold in value terms, representing an average annual 
growth rate of nearly 72 per cent” (Jenkins et al., 2014: 4). 
21 For example, Gujarat Integrated Township Policy (2007), Gujarat Special Investment Region Act 
(2009), Bangalore Mysore Industrial Corridor, Karnataka New Industrial Policy (2001).  
22 The national government allocated INR 7060 crore (USD 1.2 billion) for the development of 100 
smart cities (almost twice the amount allocated for affordable housing through the National Housing 
Bank (INR 4000 crore)) in the 2014 union budget (Economic Times, 10 July 2014, n.p.). 
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space but rather about acquiring, planning, and allocating it. In placing urban 
development in the hands of private developers and corporations, one observes a 
gradual shift towards urban planning as a means of selling urban space. This has 
required changes in land use and ownership, particularly in rural and peri-urban 
areas, as agricultural land is transformed to industrial and/or urban use and 
ownership.  
 
This transition has not been without significant problems. For instance, Jenkins et al. 
(2014: 5) argue that SEZs have come to symbolise two conflicting views of 
contemporary Indian politics. On the one hand, SEZs represent the potential 
“growth performance that the rest of India could achieve were it not shackled with 
burdensome regulation, crushing taxes, insufficient infrastructure, and tumultuous 
politics.” On the other hand, they are seen as emblematic of “state-assisted land-
grabbing” (2014: 5), where the poor are dispossessed of their lands and the 
commons are appropriated to facilitate real estate development masquerading as 
industrial projects (Shrivastava, 2008; Levien, 2013; Sampat, 2013). Forcible 
acquisition of rural lands by the state to facilitate such projects, particularly SEZs, has 
generated ire from many farmers and a large proportion of these new developments 
have been steeped in contestation and violent protest (Chakravorty, 2013; Sampat 
2011, 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014). Thus, “whether one takes a positive or negative 
view of SEZs, the picture that emerges of India’s actually existing democracy is 
exceedingly grim” (Jenkins et al. 2014: 6). 	
Twenty-first century Indian urbanism has been marked by a sometimes violent 
expansion of the urban frontier. Such expansion has generated widespread resistance 
from the urban and rural poor alike (discussed at length later in this chapter). In this 
transformation, the idea of a ‘world-class city’ has emerged as a vague, yet politically 
powerful, normative vision of an urban future. This vision emerges at a time of 
growing dependence on the city for national economic growth and envisions the 
creation of ‘world-class’ infrastructure and services to facilitate linkages with global 
capital networks. For instance, in preparation for hosting the Commonwealth Games 
in 2010, Delhi officially announced its plan to become a “world-class city”. In doing 
so it began to shift funds away from public housing, health care and education 
towards “highly visible modern infrastructure” in order to “dispel most visitors’ first 
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impression that India is a country soaked in poverty” (Ghertner, 2011: 280). And 
while Delhi’s transport infrastructure saw significant improvements under this vision, 
the city also saw the eviction of nearly 45,000 households in 2007 alone (Bhan, 
2009). Thus, while there have been celebrations of Bangalore and Delhi as emerging 
global cities (Glaeser, 2011), contests over urban space have intensified substantially 
in the last decade (Maringanti et al., 2011). In contrast, in Mumbai, developers have 
not been able to bulldoze their way into redeveloping the Dharavi slum due to the 
political power of its residents (Weinstein, 2009). Similarly, attempts to build a 
world-class Indian city in Kolkata have been “repeatedly blocked” through “peasant 
uprisings and electoral challenges” (Roy, 2011: 259). Thus, while in some instances, 
the nature of urban change has been “indeterminate” (Shatkin and Vidyarthi, 2014: 
2), such processes of urban development have undoubtedly been contested. It is this 
very dispossession, dissent, and resistance that has been the focus of much recent 
academic work in India (Menon and Nigam, 2007; Shrivastava and Kothari, 2012; 
Jenkins et al., 2014).		
In a recent survey of scholarship on the political economy of the Indian city post-
liberalisation, Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014: 2) assert that the scholarship is 
characterised by two approaches, which are “sometimes drawn in too sharp 
contrast”. The first argues that Indian cities are undergoing changes similar to other 
capitalist societies, as they are adopting neoliberal models of governance that favour 
corporate interests (i.e. they are converging). The second argues that the political 
and spatial changes observed in Indian cities are distinctive. They are riddled with 
contradictions and are defined by “chronic street-level subversion” which limit the 
state’s ability to “impose its desired social vision” (2014: 3). Regardless, what is clear 
is that cities and their making are now strategic sites for reform and contest. It is in 
the moment of urbanisation that certain political questions come into sharp relief 
and it is within this dual (sometimes contradictory) rise of privatised urban 
development and increasing resistance, that this dissertation is located. 		
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2.2. The Dominant Narratives 
 
This section assesses three dominant narratives used in describing the emergence 
and consequences of privatised urban development in contemporary India: i) 
speculative urbanism, ii) land grabs and dispossession, and iii) the politics of 
resistance. In so doing, it identifies the problems and silences within these narratives, 
making a case for studying Lavasa.  
 
2.2.1. Speculative Urbanism 
 
With 45.23 per cent of its population living in urban areas, Maharashtra is one of the 
most urbanised states in India. With high demand for housing and a series of land use 
regulations curtailing the supply of developable land, Mumbai’s land market has long 
been defined by high prices (Nijman, 2002; Weinstein, 2009). Liberalisation 
introduced new demands on land, and at one point in 1996 property in Mumbai’s 
business district became the most expensive real estate (per square metre) in the 
world (Nijman, 2002). Furthermore, the Mumbai-Pune region was identified as an 
economic corridor in the early 1990s and the state government built a high-speed 
highway to reduce travel time between the two cities, attract investment, and 
further industrial clustering. The corridor is now the site for numerous integrated 
townships, information technology hubs, and real estate projects (Balakrishnan, 
2013). The dynamics of a highly constrained land market coupled with a state policy 
for industrial expansion has led to a sharp increase in land prices in the peri-urban 
areas of Mumbai and Pune; between 2007 and 2014, house prices in Pune and 
Mumbai increased by 132 and 129 per cent respectively (Jain, 2014).  
 
Recent studies on Indian cities describe emergent urbanism as speculative – fuelled 
by real estate speculation taking place both within existing cities and at their edges 
(Searle, 2010; Goldman, 2010). Within cities, transforming land from one use to 
another can propel speculation in anticipation of new real estate values; for example, 
the conversion of former textile mill lands into shopping malls unlocked real estate 
values in the heart of the city. The restructuring of space within cities and the 
concomitant creation of rents through land and property markets has been 
discussed at great length in the literature on gentrification (Smith, 2002; Atkinson 
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and Bridge, 2005; Whitehead and More, 2007; Weinstein, 2008). At the edges of 
existing cities, it is the conversion of land from rural to urban use that allows for the 
extraction of rent and new values. Such conversions transform land from agrarian or 
industrial ownership to ““financial ownership” where land is no longer evaluated for 
its productive value but where land is itself the means of extracting profit” (Massey, 
2007: 48). For developers, investors, and homeowners, real estate and urban 
planning are becoming increasingly lucrative avenues for making money.  
 
Such speculation is often facilitated by the state. The SEZ Act (2005), which allows 
private companies to bid to create SEZs for the purposes of industrial development, 
is a case in point. The Act requires a minimum 50 per cent of acquired SEZ land to 
be used for actual industry, giving developers the discretion to put the rest of the 
land to use as they see fit. Land has been, and continues to be forcibly acquired from 
farmers at low prices by the state using its powers of eminent domain (discussed at 
length in the next section). This land is then largely used to create high-end real 
estate, the financial benefits of which largely accrue to the developer and investors. 
In fact, SEZ developers argue the business viability of most SEZs lies in their real 
estate component and they use them as a means to build satellite cities on subsidised 
land acquired by the government in the midst of an unprecedented real estate boom 
(Searle, 2010; Levien, 2013).  	
Scholars have argued that speculation is driven by a perceived and/or real scarcity 
and a need for serviced land. Such scarcity and need may actually exist but they are 
also discursively produced. For instance, the McKinsey Urbanisation Report ‘India’s 
Urban Awakening’ states that the country has the potential to “unlock many new 
growth markets in its cities, many of them not traditionally associated with India, 
including infrastructure, transportation, health care, education, and recreation” 
(MGI, 2010: 17). It projects that to meet urban demand, “the economy will have to 
build between 700 million and 900 million square meters of residential and 
commercial space a year – equivalent of adding more than two Mumbais or one 
Chicago every year” (MGI, 2010: 17-18). Simultaneous narratives of scarcity and 
need are deployed to define land as a commodity (much like gold during the Gold 
Rush) that is valuable, in short supply, and expected to rise in value (Li, 2010). These 
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narratives can also be “discursive instruments to attract investors and potential 
buyers into investing in land and real estate” (Balakrishnan, 2013: 11).  	
The real estate market has expanded alongside the Indian middle class which, since 
the early 2000s, has grown in size and has increased disposable income and access to 
housing finance23. New spatial forms such as enclaves and gated communities have 
been characterised as an inevitable outcome of the rise of the middle class and their 
desire to occupy the city (Chatterjee, 2004; Fernandes, 2006). But in examining 
Delhi, Ghertner (2008) and Searle (2010) argue that some of these big property 
developments are not fully linked with a middle class occupation of the city; rather, 
they are speculative in nature, often owned for investment purposes by Non-
Resident Indians (NRIs). Real estate has become a financial instrument that relies on 
speculation for profit, and such speculation is supported through the creation of 
alternative futures for the (aspirational) Indian middle class and “representations of a 
prosperous globally integrated Indian future” (Searle, 2010: vi).  
 
King (2002) posits that the internationalist imagery deployed in the advertising of 
these developments seeks to bridge the gap between India and the NRI world by 
pegging their aesthetics and vision to foreign places: “The world is an oyster for you. 
You breakfast in New York, lunch in London, and have dinner in Singapore. But your 
heart reaches out to India” (King, 2002: 81). The increase of NRI investments in real 
estate, some argue, has accelerated overall demand and further propelled “local 
speculative interests” (Nijman, 2002: 165). It is this imagined global Indian and the 
myth of the Indian middle class that sustains land privatisation and drives speculation 
(Ghertner, 2010). Searle argues that this speculation is as much about capital as it is 
about imaginaries, and that it is through holding up ideas of the future that the 
“productive power of speculation” (2010: vi) is put into motion, propelling the real 
estate industry further. 	
Speculation is also characterised by a state of uncertainty as it is premised on a 
conjecture about the future. Thus, generating real estate assets also produces a 																																																								
23 Historically, Indian banks did not provide loans to buy real estate. In 1998 only 8 per cent of real 
estate transactions involved a financial institution and mortgages were rare before the late 1990s 
(Nijman, 2002).  
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whole series of speculative effects and an environment of anxiety in the face of 
uncertainty. Using the example of Bangalore, Goldman (2010) shows that whether 
or not projects are built, “land will be churned many times over in the process of 
speculation”, and even middle class residents will “feel heightened anxiety” about 
their futures (Goldman, 2010: 22). Although there is great uncertainty about how 
many and which of the proposed projects will actually be built, it is “this state of 
uncertainty and anxiety that generates increased cash flows, increased risk-taking in 
urban planning and development, speculative government and the suspension of 
justice for the dispossessed in the name of world-city making” (Goldman, 2010: 22).  
 
As detailed in Chapter One, contemporary urban studies literature characterises 
speculation as driven by global capital (Goldman, 2011; Watson, 2014). Searle (2010) 
argues that the combination of international capital overhang (due to the 2008 global 
financial crisis) and absence of other profitable investment portfolios in India led to 
partnerships between international investors and local developers for the creation of 
real estate assets for investment purposes. To that effect, USD 23 billion of FDI was 
invested in Indian real estate between 2000 and 2014 and real estate absorbed 11 
per cent of total FDI in India in 2010 (IBEF, 2014). But, as Searle (2014) notes, 
despite an opening of markets, foreign investment in the Indian real estate market 
has been slow by global standards, owing to the high risks associated with it. Real 
estate in India is a highly local business, requiring knowledge of local land records 
systems and district-level government contacts, and foreign firms need partnerships 
with domestic firms to navigate the complex terrain of both urban and rural land. 
While relatively small and local firms have historically dominated the Indian real 
estate sector, in recent years a few companies such as DLF, Ansal, Sahara, and 
Raheja have grown to be large and national in scope24. Therefore, after decades of 
public and semi-public real estate development, private property developers have 
become important players in urban development (see Searle (2010) and Shatkin 
(2014) for extensive discussion) and real estate is increasingly being treated as a 
financial asset. Despite its growing prominence in Indian urbanisation, there is scant 																																																								
24 For instance, DLF, one of India’s largest developers, has been solely responsible for developing 
Gurgaon (outside New Delhi). It has developed a number of commercial and residential projects in 30 
cities across the country, as well as a 3000-acre township called DLF City. Similarly, Ansal API, a 
family real estate business based in New Delhi, has developed more than 190 million square feet of 
real estate and holds a land reserve of over 9000 acres (CCI, 2013). 
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“literature on [the] real estate industry – the actors who shape it, the models of 
urban development they adopt, and their influence on urban policy” (Shatkin and 
Vidyarthi, 2014: 15). This dissertation attempts to fill those gaps. 
 
Furthermore, “contrary to popular and anthropological characterizations (cf. 
Appadurai, 1996), capital does not “flow” around the world; it is painstakingly 
moved” by myriad actors (developers, consultants, bureaucrats, etc) coming 
together (Searle, 2010: 10). This is an important point and closer attention needs to 
be paid to who speculates, why and how they speculate, and how and why capital is 
moved to fuel this speculation. Weinstein (2008) argues that the combination of high 
prices and a relatively opaque and constrained regulatory regime has rendered the 
real estate sector particularly open to corruption and created conditions which 
allow members of criminal networks to become real estate players. Similarly, one 
could argue that investment in real estate is driven less by a capital overhang in the 
traditional sense but more as a way to park and convert black money domestically 
(Kumar, 1999; Goldman, 2010; Chakravorty, 2013). Indeed, it is for this reason that 
real estate is a domain in which politicians are active (a point discussed in the 
following section).  
 
Finally, speculation is assumed to be a practice of elite political and business actors 
(whether domestic or foreign). Must it be so? What about villagers/land agents/ small 
agrarian capitalists like Shankar Dhindale? In a very recent and nascent literature, 
scholars have begun to pay attention to the presence and importance of middle-men, 
brokers, agents, and rural intermediaries in the construction of land markets (Baka, 
2013; Levien, 2013; Sud, 2014a). These actors are the “local searchers” and fixers 
that enable land speculation to take place, but in focusing on the “high profile actors, 
particularly big capital and the state” (Sud, 2014a: 594), the larger scholarship has 
missed an important facet of the construction of land markets and speculation, and 
their effects.  
 
Lavasa is in part a real estate project that is facilitated by the state and is premised 
on the conversion of rural land into urban property. It is a speculative project not 
only in that it is a real estate project but also because it speculates on a certain 
representation of space – the future city (as we shall see in Chapter Four). But such 
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speculation is made real, both in policy and on the ground, by different sets of actors 
with different stakes in the game. The dissertation, accordingly, delves deeper into 
the practices of speculation – who speculates, in what ways, and with what political 
effects.  
 
2.2.2. Land Grabs and Dispossession 
  
The construction of new cities requires land, and this is made possible through a 
change in land use and ownership. Therefore, an analysis of the politics of land is 
germane to understanding how, why, and with what effects cities come to life. Given 
that greenfield cities can only be built on peri-urban and rural land, I restrict the 
discussion below to issues pertaining to such land and argue that the insights derived 
from the voluminous scholarship on the politics of rural land and agrarian change in 
India rarely travel to inform urban studies. 
 
The issue of ‘land grabs’ has received significant recent scholarly and political 
attention (Zoomers, 2010; Deininger, 2011; Borras and Franco 2012; Edelman, 2013; 
Grain, 2013; Oya, 2013; Scoones et al., 2013). Much of this literature refers to post-
2006 large-scale land acquisitions for agriculture, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and focuses on how and with what effects land use and ownership have been 
changing. Such consolidation of land has taken place for agriculture, industry and/or 
pure speculation where land has been cleared, kept vacant and “investors are simply 
preparing for the next global crisis” (Borras et. al., 2011: 209).25 Unlike in many 
other parts of the world, where rural land has been consolidated for agricultural 
purposes, in India such acquisitions are driven by industrial and real estate projects 
and pushed forward by domestic companies with the assistance of the state (a point 
we shall return to shortly). For instance, Morgan Stanley Research estimated that 
between 2003 and 2007 seventeen major Indian developers had acquired a total of 
46,200 acres and planned to purchase another 99,164 acres (Searle, 2010).  
 																																																								
25 Critiques of this literature suggest that given the methodological difficulties in collecting and 
verifying information on land, the data on global trends are often unreliable and inaccurate. 
Furthermore the work tends to use concepts such a “local communities” without precision, and 
deploy binaries such as global and local, agriculture and non-agriculture without sufficient nuance or 
grounded empirical research (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013). 
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Most of the ‘land grab’ literature is rooted in Marxist scholarship, extending Marx’s 
ideas of primitive accumulation and Harvey’s idea of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
to contemporary processes of enclosure. Developed to describe the enclosures of 
peasants’ land in England, Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation is used to 
understand “how capitalist social relations are created, how they spread and how 
they are reproduced in the face of resistance” (Hall, 2013: 1585): that is to say, how 
people ‘outside’ capitalism are brought into its fold or how producers are divorced 
from their means of production to become wage labourers often through the 
enclosure of common land (Hall, 2013). In the literature on agrarian change, the 
process of primitive accumulation, typically seen to involve state and landlords, 
creates the preconditions for capitalism, and accordingly, the recent literature on 
‘land grabs’/‘new enclosures’ focuses on the role of the state in facilitating these 
processes.  
 
Harvey understands urbanisation as the spatial manifestation of capitalist 
accumulation and explains urban growth and change in terms of the circulation of 
capital. Capitalism, according to him, “requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is 
to confront and circumvent pressures of over-accumulation. If those assets, such as 
empty land or new raw material sources, do not lie to hand, then capitalism must 
somehow produce them” (Harvey, 2003: 143). He argues that capitalism’s crisis of 
over-accumulation is temporarily solved through investment in the built environment 
i.e. through a ‘spatial fix’ for capital. New assets, such as real estate, are created 
precisely to do this. The built environment thus becomes a collective means of 
consumption and production and absorbs surplus capital in its construction and 
maintenance.  
 
Because capitalism is plagued by recurrent crises, capital calls upon the state to assist 
it in guaranteeing the provision of certain collective necessities and thus maintaining 
the balance between capital and labour and preventing class conflict. Thus, the state 
features centrally in the process of accumulation as it enables speculation and 
regulates class conflict, servicing the long-term interest of monopoly capital. 
Therefore, “an intimate connection emerges between the development of capitalism 
and urbanisation” (Harvey, 1985: 315-6) and the latter is propelled by “distinctive 
ideologies”, which often reflect the “prevailing ideology of the ruling group and 
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institutions in society” (1985: 310). The urban process therefore, is fuelled by 
accumulation and is fundamentally “a class phenomenon, since surpluses are 
extracted from somewhere and from somebody” (1985: 315). This accumulation 
sometimes takes place by dispossessing the public (and often the poor) of their land 
and/or wealth.  
 
Much of the recent literature on enclosures sees land grabs, “however varied and 
inconclusive”, as “symptomatic of a crisis of accumulation in the neoliberal 
globalisation project” (McMichael 2012: 681), that is a “top-down phenomenon 
driven by global markets and foreign states” (Fairhead, 2013: 335). A number of 
scholars have refuted this point, arguing that land grabs are not necessarily related to 
crises but are a function of local political economies (Hall, 2013; Levien, 2013). In the 
Indian context for instance, large purchases of land are driven by local (rather than 
foreign) capital (Levien, 2013) and are in no small measure fuelled by investors 
seeking to park and convert large volumes of black money (Kumar, 1999).26 In 
examining real estate markets Nijman (2002: 165) notes a “tendency to overestimate 
the importance and autonomy of global forces and to underestimate the significance 
of local and national actors”. Land grabs, therefore, are not merely a function of the 
logics of global capital but often take place through states, bureaucrats and local 
opportunities for corruption (Hall, 2013: 1590). 
 
While large-scale land acquisition has become topical again, it is by no means a new 
phenomenon. The Indian state has long acquired land for the development of dams, 
industries, and power plants using the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (LAA). The Act 
endows the state with powers of eminent domain, i.e. the right to expropriate 
private property for projects of ‘public purpose’.27 It lays out the procedures that 																																																								
26 Black money (undeclared income), though difficult to study, is most commonly parked in real 
estate/agricultural land. This inflow of black money has contributed to sustaining the rise in land prices 
in India (Aiyar, 2011). The Central Board for Direct Taxes argues that, “land and real estate are 
possibly the most important class of assets used for investment of black money” and in 2011-12 the 
largest portion of undisclosed income detected by the Income Tax department came from the real 
estate sector (Sharma, 2014; Nagpal, 2014). 
27 What defines ‘public purpose’ is open to interpretation. Ramanathan (1996) argues that the law 
assumes that the state acts in the interests of the public and that it is impractical as well as impossible 
to list which actions and type of projects can be considered as being in the interest of the public. In 
practice, the definition of what is and is not ‘public purpose’ remains politically contentious. Sampat 
(2013) asserts that in post-liberalisation India, the idea of ‘public purpose’ has been recast to mean 
economic growth, underemphasising the more expansive understandings of development.  
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need to be followed by the state to acquire land as well as the terms of 
compensation for landowners. The colonial roots of this legislation, unsurprisingly, 
ensure little opportunity for landowners to object to the acquisition itself, therefore, 
the disputes that have plagued the implementation of the LAA since its enactment 
have largely been restricted to the domain of compensation (Goswami, 2012). 
Immediately after Independence, the LAA was used to acquire land in order to build 
new cities, dams, and factories. As democracy deepened in India, scholars and social 
movements began to take note of and protested the displacement and dispossession 
resulting from the use of eminent domain, the most salient example being the 
Narmada Dam.28 The many projects that have deployed eminent domain acquisition 
have largely been referred to, in the literature on the topic as well as within political 
parlance, as projects that have displaced and dispossessed peasantries (Fernandes 
and Thukral 1989; Baviskar, 1995; Harvey, 2003).  
 
Levien (2013) argues that if earlier rounds of land acquisition were for modernist 
nationalist projects like big dams and steel plants then contemporary developments 
such as SEZs and townships represent a “radically privatised mutation of this old 
spatial form” (2013: 384). That is to say, while acquisition continues to take place in 
the name of public interest, lands are being handed over to private companies. In 
such circumstances, acquisition has not been smooth and has been subject to debate 
and contestation. Forcibly acquiring land from unwilling sellers has led to an increase 
in land-related conflicts, including the 2007 riots against Tata Motors in Singur, the 
Nandigram protests against the West Bengal government,29 the 2011 protests against 
the Yamuna Expressway30, and various SEZ protests across the country (Jenkins et 																																																								
28 The Narmada Dam is one of India’s most controversial dam projects. Protest against the project 
began in the 1980s and continues even today. The project was contested in court as well as through 
longstanding non-violent protest by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) social movement, which was 
established in 1986. The NBA opposed the dam-related displacement of approximately 20,000 families 
and resultant environmental destruction. The social Despite controversy and the World Bank’s exit 
from the project, it is still underway and due to be completed by 2025 (Baviskar, 1995; Omvedt, 
2004; Nilsen, 2013). 
29 Nandigram received international attention in 2007 when the West Bengal government executed its 
plans to create an SEZ. This led to violent resistance between villages and the police, and left 14 
villagers dead. Singur had similar (although not fatal) clashes over forcible land acquisition of farmland 
to establish a Tata car factory. 
30 The Yamuna Expressway is a planned 165 km highway from Agra to Noida in Uttar Pradesh. The 
land acquisition process for this project ran into trouble when several hundred farmers staged 
protests about compensation and rehabilitation. The protests turned violent, killing two policemen 
and a farmer (Kaushika, 2011; India Today, 2013). A number of industrial parks and residential 
colonies have been planned alongside the expressway. 
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al., 2014). Levein (2013) argues that these skirmishes reflect a crisis of legitimacy, i.e. 
farmers are unwilling to give up their lands for projects they do not see as being in 
the larger public interest. Other scholars argue that the contestation is primarily 
based on inadequacy of compensation (Chakravorty, 2013; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 
2013). In light of this, the LAA was recently modified (in 2013) specifically to provide 
higher compensation rates and improved resettlement and rehabilitation 
arrangements.31  
 
Why do private companies need the state to engage in land acquisition? Eminent 
domain land acquisition is premised on the inability of private companies to purchase 
contiguous tracts of land through voluntary transactions. Industrial development 
officials across the country insist that, “without the state’s role in land acquisition, 
large industrial and infrastructural projects would not get off the ground” 
(government official quoted in Levien, 2011: 463). This view is held for a number of 
reasons: first, given that land holdings in India are small32, fragmented, and often 
contested, the sheer number of transactions a developer would have to undertake 
to purchase a large tract of contiguous land would generate prohibitively high 
transaction costs.33 Second, the probability of holdouts (unwilling sellers) could 
prevent the developer from fully carrying out their plans. Third, the knock-on 
speculative effects on the price of land would result in untenably high land costs for 
the developer.  
 
Given this difficult terrain, LCL’s ability to purchase approximately 13,000 acres of 
land instead of acquiring it using eminent domain is puzzling and needs to be 
explained. Furthermore, it raises a number of questions: what does voluntary land 
sale mean and why does it take place? What are the conditions that make such land 
transfers possible and what are the politico-economic consequences? While the 																																																								
31 In other parts of the world, such acquisition is not limited to real estate and industrial projects 
alone. In some cases it has taken place for environmental purposes and/or conservation projects. 
These acquisitions have been cynically termed ‘green-grabbing,’ where lands and resources are 
appropriated for environmental ends and ownership of resources is transferred from the poor to the 
powerful (Fairhead et al., 2012).  
32 The average operational land holding size in India was 1.6 hectares in 2010 (NABARD, 2014). 
Landholdings are also highly fragmented and such fragmentation increases the probability of land 
disputes. The World Bank (2007) estimates that 28 per cent of all peri-urban landholdings in India are 
under legal dispute. 
33 For example, Ghatak and Ghose (2011) show that the 1000 acres of land required for the Tata car 
factory in Singur was owned by12,000 owners.  
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dominant narrative around land acquisition has been dispossession, do transactions 
that take place through the land market necessarily result in dispossession?  
 
Consequently, Lavasa engages with three notable gaps within the ‘land grab’ 
literature. First, Levien argues that Harvey’s (2003) framework “under-theorizes the 
deeply political role of states in orchestrating dispossession” (2013: 15). That is not 
to say that he does not acknowledge state force, rather in emphasizing finance 
capital and global forces, he underemphasizes “the fundamental and transparent 
reliance on state force” as there is nothing self-evident nor “automatic about capital 
finding outlets in land or in any other asset” (2013: 15). According to Levien, it is a 
‘land broker state’, which goes about “dispossessing peasants for any private 
economic purpose that constitutes “growth”, including real estate speculation” 
(2013: 24). For instance, the state features as an important enabler – through a 
series of exemptions, the common post-facto regularization of illegal construction, 
and/or as an enabler of land acquisition. Lau’s (1996) work on land in Karachi shows 
that private extortion is rooted in formal state law and institutions. While many 
scholars have discussed the crucial role of the state in land acquisition, the 
scholarship largely imagines the state as a unitary actor, acting in favour of capital (or 
capitalists). It also presupposes a distinction between the state and the non-state, 
where the state is seen as an institution with clearly defined boundary lines. But, as 
scholars of rural India have long noted, while state and society are distinct 
theoretical categories, the separation is often empirically unclear (such blurring has 
been extensively discussed in the rural context by Harriss-White, 2003; Corbridge 
et al., 2005; Gupta, 1995, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, although the state does engage in specific policies that enable land 
acquisition (such as the SEZ Act), the real forces of transformation are often 
individual political actors. Land and political power have had a long-standing 
relationship in India. For instance, Surpiya Sule (Sharad Pawar’s daughter) is 
simultaneously a Member of Parliament from Baramati in Pune district, a key figure in 
the NCP, and a shareholder in multiple real estate firms in Maharashtra (Ray and 
Tare, 2011). Similarly, Robert Vadra, son-in-law of Sonia Gandhi (leader of the 
Congress Party) was recently seen to be involved with real estate giant DLF in 
Gurgaon (Agarwal and Malik, 2012). Several other politicians such as Nitin Gadkari 
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and Vilasrao Deshmukh have been directly associated with land and real estate firms 
(Malik, 2014). Most recently, Jayalalitha, four times chief minister of Tamil Nadu, was 
imprisoned, in part for using government officials to acquire 3000 acres of land 
assets (Roshan, 2014).  Shankar Dhindale, for instance, acts as a villager, a sarpanch, 
and a broker. Similarly, many state and national level politicians juggle multiple roles 
and it is through their involvement that land and public resources are ‘grabbed’. 
Nowhere else is the blurring of the public and the private more explicit than in the 
domain of urban development and land, yet its implications are underexplored. 
 
Second, the literature almost always conceptualises capital to be large and those who 
are engaging it or being dispossessed by it as being outside capitalism. It does not 
engage with the myriad of small-scale land grabbing that takes place at the local level 
as part of the larger land grab. While an older agrarian studies literature does discuss 
the possibility of smaller farmers taking over lands, the recent work rarely explicitly 
examines the processes and implications of small-scale land expansion (Hall, 2013). A 
notable exception is Cotula (2012), who uses data from West Africa to show that 
the aggregate area acquired by many small deals is greater than the larger corporate 
deals. More recent scholarship from India highlights the importance of local 
intermediaries in the land market (Baka, 2013; Levien, 2013; Sud, 2014a). To bring it 
back to the opening anecdote, how do we understand the role of land agents such as 
Shankar Dhindale? The literature fails to conceptualise the ways in which those who 
are in danger of being dispossessed may themselves begin to engage in land grabs. 
The scholarship focuses on capital and the state but neglects the “smallholders” that 
are “responding to ‘multiple crises’ by grabbing land” (Hall, 2013: 1590) or perhaps 
not responding to a crisis at all, but seeking to participate in speculation. We are 
therefore impelled to ask: who engages in such land grabbing and with what 
implications? How do their actions change, if at all, the dynamics and our ideas of 
dispossession? Are there synergies between small-scale land acquisition and 
corporate land acquisition, and do they further each other’s goals?  
 
Third, the crude debate about whether accumulation takes place through extra-
economic means or economic means and whether it is voluntary or involuntary 
needs further elaboration. One line of argument, derived from examining eminent 
domain acquisition, suggests that land is expropriated from farmers through the use 
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of political or legal power. Levien asserts “it only makes sense to talk about a ‘grab’ 
when land is expropriated using means other than voluntary market purchase” 
(2011: 436); an assertion that endows the landholder with more power than s/he 
actually has. A robust agrarian studies literature has shown that economic processes 
can compel farmers to sell their lands if they are in debt or need money to survive 
(Athreya et al., 1990; Ramchandran, 1990; Ramchandran and Rawal, 2010). 
Therefore, even though such sales are often ‘voluntary’ they take place under 
substantial structural constraints. Although the distinction between voluntary and 
coerced transactions can be made in theory, it cannot be made so easily in practice. 
The conditions and rules of the market may be heavily stacked in favour of capital or 
those in political power; an eminent threat may induce a ‘voluntary’ exchange, and a 
fraud may blur the lines between economic and extra-economic forces.  
 
Furthermore, scholars have argued for the need to disaggregate the term ‘local 
communities’ as they encompass a wide variety of people including poor peasants, 
landless labourers, pastoralists, small-scale farmers, brokers, landlords, politicians 
and traders, etc (Borras and Franco, 2011; Hall, 2013). Given that communities are 
diverse, it should be no surprise that the impacts of such projects too are 
differentiated. As Borras and Franco (2011: 48) suggest, the question we must ask 
then is “who was dispossessed, why, how and to what extent?” As McCarthy (2010), 
in his analysis of land use changes in Indonesian oil plantations suggests – some 
farmers were dispossessed and others were not. Similar arguments have been made 
for Ukraine (Visser and Spoor, 2011), and the Philippines (Borras and Franco, 2012). 
Therefore disaggregating local groups allows us to identify the differentiated impacts 
as well as which groups engage in the land game and stand to win from the process. 
As Balakrishnan (2013: 8) asserts, “the simplistic and misleading framing of India’s 
land conflicts as between farmers and industrialists cannot capture this complicated 
terrain of land politics”. What is certain, however, is that the politics of peri-
urban/rural land are central to the project of (greenfield) urban place-making. 
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2.2.3. Politics of Resistance 
 
An emerging body of scholarship points to how planning and urban governance in 
India, whether operationalised by the state, the middle class, or the private sector, is 
largely exclusionary to the poor (Baviskar, 2006; Bhan, 2009; Ghertner, 2010; 
Chatterjee, 2004; Fernandes, 2006). The private sector has gone beyond the mere 
provision of urban infrastructure and services to planning and visioning urban spaces. 
Spanning a range of typologies such as satellite cities, large-scale gated communities, 
and industrial and economic enclaves, many of these developments are planned with 
a view to creating high-end exclusive settlements that cater to the elite, often to the 
exclusion of the poor. In a similar vein, middle class urban movements often frame 
their discourse through rights as “consumer citizens” (Fernandes, 2004) and “such 
reform movements devalorize the citizenship of those who are poor and property-
less” (Roy, 2007: xxxiii). Ghertner (2011) showed that the Delhi government had 
displaced over one million poor over the last decade and made the land available for 
private development. Exclusionary practices are therefore not just a product of a 
new powerful middle class but also a project of the state. Together, they are seen to 
be forces by which Indian cities have become “bourgeois at last” (Chatterjee, 2004: 
131). That said, class relations have historically been mediated by the politics of 
space and these forms of exclusion and marginality are by no means new to post-
liberalisation India (Gooptu, 2011).  
 
But equally there is a literature that shows that the poor, however defined, often 
resist such exclusion. Such resistance is observed both within cities and at their 
edges and takes multiple forms. In some instances such claims to the city are made 
through social movements and in others through political associations. For instance, 
Kaviraj (1999: 91) posits that although planning has had ‘relative autonomy’ from 
electoral politics, the lower level non-elite bureaucrats are tasked with interpreting 
the plans. Thus the system has “feet of vernacular clay” and non-elites, through their 
associations, are able to mould the plans to suit their needs. Chatterjee (2004: 138) 
shows how the urban poor wield their power through ‘political society’ – the power 
of their vote, through which they engage in “strategic political negotiations with the 
authorities”. Benjamin (2008) argues that the poor subvert exclusionary formal plans 
through local democratic processes that allow for the occupation of locations. 
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Similarly, Anjaria (2011) shows how traders in Mumbai create spaces for themselves 
by negotiating arrangements with individuals within the local government, such as 
police and municipal officers.  
 
City-making in India has been characterised as middle class/elite interests and/or 
higher-level state plans negotiating political association between the local state and 
the urban poor. But, as Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014) argue, the outcomes of such 
negotiations are “indeterminate”. Although within Mumbai, the residents of Dharavi 
managed to hold on to their properties and prevent developers from taking over 
(Weinstein, 2009), in Delhi, entire settlements (such as Bawana) have been 
demolished (Bhan, 2009). Similarly, although the villagers contesting Singur managed 
to prevent Tata from developing its factory, the villagers at Mahindra World City (to 
some extent) consented to the project (Levien, 2013). As Maringanti et al. (2011: 39) 
summarise, “the urban is now the strategic site both for aggressive reforms and 
restructuring as well as social movements contesting the reforms agenda. These 
developments in India have a unique character but they are also of a piece with 
transformations across the world”. 
 
In rural India, Levien (2013) argues that the increased tenacity of resistance to land 
acquisition is due to lack of ideological legitimacy of the current ‘regime of 
dispossession’; that is to say, earlier rounds of dispossession for big dams and 
industrial projects benefited from greater public legitimacy than current projects 
which are largely private and connected to real estate. This is a bold claim, and one 
that cannot easily be verified. Regardless, not all these ‘land grabs’ or private projects 
result in paralysing protests. Studying SEZs in Tamil Nadu, Vijayabaskar (2010) argues 
that the state’s political economy, which encourages farmers to move away from 
agriculture, is partly responsible for the lack of resistance to land acquisitions. 
Furthermore, policies that provide generous compensation with little room for 
negotiation and incentives to avoid litigation also contribute to willingness to part 
with land. Levien, looking at a SEZ in Rajasthan, argues that “market-oriented 
compensation policy” facilitated by a “broker state” creates “very unequal relations 
to the SEZ, enlisting some fraction of the village as self-seeking middlemen and 
effectively undermining any basis for collective action" (2012: 25). In this respect, the 
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presence, form, and effects of certain types of resistance in Lavasa need to be 
explained. 
 
A long lineage of scholarship, rooted in the works of Polanyi (2001 (1944)), Gramsci 
(1971), and Scott (1985, 1990, 1998), focuses on the modes, tactics and politics of 
resistance in contexts of both rural and urban ‘development’. Resistance, as defined 
by Scott (1985: 22), is “any act(s) by members of the class that is (are) intended 
either to mitigate or to deny claims (rent, taxes, dependence) made on that class by 
superordinate classes (landowners, the State, money lenders) or to advance its own 
claims (work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis these superordinate classes”. Resistance 
in this view is intimately connected with structures of power. Ideas of what is just 
and unjust are calibrated both ideologically and materially within these structures. 
And so, resistance can and does take diverse forms, ranging from the overt such as 
collective action through social movements to covert everyday struggles such as 
“foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, 
arson, sabotage, and so forth” (Scott, 1985: 29).  
 
Perhaps the largest body of work on resistance in the rural context is derived from 
trying to explain the presence and efficacy of social movements. Here, the resistance 
is overt, in the form of a counter-hegemonic movement that responds to class/state 
domination. Gramsci (1971) distinguishes between different types of such overt 
movements – those that engage in ‘wars of movements’ through direct assaults 
against state power (e.g. strikes, military action, etc) and those who undertake ‘wars 
of position’ – non-violent resistance such as boycotts that interfere with the 
everyday functioning of the state. If Gramsci’s work examines resistance against the 
state and/or forms of class domination, then Polanyi’s ‘counter-movement’ is 
deployed to protect society from market forces. Examining the conditions that led 
to the crises of the 1930s, Polanyi argued that the drive to expand the self-regulating 
market generated a number of ‘counter-movements’ in order to protect workers 
from the commodification caused by the expansion of market society. Thus, 
dispossession/displacement from land generated by capitalist expansion would result 
in a political response in the form of a counter movement. If the creation of the 
market processes was the movement, then the resistance to it was the counter-
movement. Together this double movement can be used to understand how market 
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processes are subverted and re-embedded back into society, and how capitalism is 
saved from itself.  
 
Both frameworks conceptualise social movements as a form of resistance/collective 
action built on solidarity. They assume a certain “collectivity” in the 'movement' and 
this has the effect of constructing counter/social movements as united fronts in and 
of themselves” (Chin and Mittleman, 1997: 30), a point that a number of scholars of 
social movements have refuted. Second, the scholars do not examine instances 
where conformity and resistance coexist and generate inconsistencies between 
thought and action (Chin and Mittleman, 1997). Indeed, it is entirely possible that 
people identify with multiple groups and can support one cause in one instance and 
another in another. Finally, Polanyi does not consider circumstances under which 
individuals buy into exploitative market processes and therefore prevent movements 
from being generated. Scholars have noted that there are some problems in applying 
these frameworks to understanding resistance today.  
 
Gramsci’s idea of hegemony offers ways to think about how those who are exploited 
may find themselves buying into the very ideological project that ostensibly 
oppresses them.  He argues that the ruling class/state controls not only the “means 
of physical production but the means of symbolic production as well” (Scott, 1985: 
315). That is, it is through the control of ideas and ideology that the ruling powers 
propagate ideas that further their own ends. For Gramsci, the proletariat is more 
enslaved at the level of ideas than at the level of behavior” (Scott, 1985: 39). Thus in 
Gramsci’s conception, power is not enforced via coercion, rather it is produced 
through compliance and consent, “by creating and disseminating a universe of 
discourse and the concepts to go with it, by defining the standards of what is true, 
beautiful, moral, fair, and legitimate, they build a symbolic climate that prevents 
subordinate classes from thinking their way free.  
 
Nowhere is this clearer than in Ghertner’s (2011) study of slum demolitions in 
Delhi. He argues that although the “utopian image” of the “world-class city” is part 
of the “practice of government”, it is both accepted and reinterpreted by the slum 
residents (2011: 301). Residents have “profound ideational critiques of Delhi’s 
world-class redevelopment” and the hegemonic aesthetic aspirations of what a 
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‘world-class’ city is, are held by the very people who stand to lose from it. He 
demonstrates that in Delhi, slum residents are enlisted into “the image of the world-
class city, by making “sensible” a world-class aesthetic, and by advancing a myth of 
private property and the “good life” associated with it” (2011: 300). Residents 
“tune[d] their aspirational strategies” to the hegemonic “image of the world-class 
city”, and in so doing they also accepted “the promise that such a city will provide 
them with a world-class lifestyle – be it quality education for their children, secure 
employment and private property” (2011: 301) even though it directly results in the 
demolition of their homes and livelihoods. However, it is through this acceptance 
that their “expectations of improvement can crystallize into new demands and points 
of politics, threatening to turn the promise of the world-class city into a political 
demand for world-class citizenship” (2011: 301). 
 
Scott (1985) challenges the idea of hegemony through his work in rural Malaysia. He 
argues that acquiescence does not necessarily symbolize the hegemonic beliefs of 
those who are being oppressed. He shows that there are innumerable “anonymous 
acts” of behavioural as well as ideological resistance behind the “facade of 
behavioural conformity” as well as “symbolic and ritual compliance imposed by 
elites” (1985: 304). He reasons that the idea of hegemony fails to make sense of 
social realities on a number of grounds; most importantly, it runs the risk of 
conflating what “is inevitable with what is just, an error that subordinate classes 
rarely, if ever, make” (1985: 318). Consequently, Scott disagrees with Gramsci’s idea 
that “radicalism of subordinate classes is to be found more in their acts than in their 
beliefs”, arguing instead that it is the reverse, that it is “at the level of beliefs and 
interpretations where they can safely be ventured that subordinate classes are least 
trammeled”. “The realm of behavior particularly in power-laden situations is 
precisely where dominated classes are most constrained”, as the rich “can usually 
insist on conforming public behavior” but they “can neither insist on private 
ideological conformity, nor do they need it” (1985: 322). Thus while acquiescence 
may result from a sense of inevitability, people may not see it as just (and therefore 
do not automatically subscribe to the hegemonic ideal). Furthermore, he argues that 
in the context of peasant resistance, it is not overt revolution that is the norm, 
rather it is these everyday acts of covert resistance that propel, incrementally, social 
change. Scott therefore holds to a rational view of peasant behaviour, where risks of 
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various actions are calculated and limit the propensity to action. 
 
Thus, according to Scott, not only are everyday acts of resistance more common 
(and understudied) than overt forms but they are also the most effective as 
“persistent practice of everyday forms of resistance underwritten by a subculture of 
complicity can achieve many, if not all, of the results aimed at by social movements” 
(1987: 422). But perhaps Scott goes too far in reifying the covert over the overt. As 
Gutmann notes, “the emphasis here is wrong; it is not a question of overt or covert 
in isolation; rather, at least in Latin America today and historically, these forms occur 
together, alternate, and transform themselves into each other” (1993: 77). This is an 
important critique – it asks us to pay attention to the different forms of resistance 
that can emerge simultaneously, and the effects that they produce. Furthermore, it 
allows us to ask what the impact of covert or overt resistance is on those who find 
themselves aligned in the hegemonic project. 
 
This finds relevance in an important dimension of resistance in India; in recent years, 
protests have often been met with counter-protests. This is marked by the tension 
between the opposition to certain projects and the desire to participate in the very 
same types of consumption, economic organisation, and governance. Roy (2011: 
272) highlights a counter protest to Tata’s factory in Singur where a segment of the 
local population announced, “Welcome Ratan Tata. We want industry, we do not 
want confrontation”. She argues that under “persistent structural violence, it is 
impossible to assert that the subaltern has consented to the wage-slavery of the 
world-class city. Yet it is equally impossible to assert that industrialisation and 
urbanisation are elite interests imposed on the poor” (Roy, 2011: 273). Instead, she 
argues for the importance and centrality of the making of consent to the project of 
world city making, arguing that “the Indian world-class city cannot be simply 
understood as an elite project or as the interest of property capital, or even as the 
practice of an activist state. Rather it is an ideal to which there is broad subscription” 
(Roy, 2011: 266). Roy’s analysis points to an important facet of contemporary 
politics of resistance in India, but fails to account for the class, caste, and other 
differences between those who protest and those who support the project.  
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In summary, the extensive literature on resistance largely draws on the work of 
Gramsci, Polanyi and Scott. They allow us to conceptualise and look for different 
modes of resistance and their effects. But how do we understand these multiple and 
often contradictory claims being made on or against Lavasa? Lavasa presents a 
complicated terrain of contestation and resistance. Undoubtedly, the project has 
faced opposition, largely from local adivasi (scheduled tribe) communities, mobilized 
through a social movement – the National Alliance of People’s Movement (NAPM). 
This opposition has taken the form of protests, a range of court cases, blockades, 
and appeals/complaints to the central, state and local governments. The Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF) eventually stalled the project on the basis of 
violation of environmental laws, in no small part due to NAPM’s concerted and 
highly publicised efforts. But, as was briefly described in Chapter One, the project 
defines itself as “inclusive” and has also enjoyed considerable support in the form of 
counter-protests by village communities, court affidavits by villagers, and some 
support from a few civil society members. Most notably the project did not 
experience any collective action on the issue of land acquisition, the lynchpin of 
development related resistance in contemporary India. What explains the forms of 
resistance taking place? What explains the difference in claims made for and against 
Lavasa by rural communities – is it different interpretations of the meaning of 
development? Is it based on tangibly different material effects for different 
populations (does Shankar Dhindale support this project because he is made wealthy 
by it)? Is this a form of hegemonic consolidation in spatial production? If so, how is it 
taking place and in what idiom? Is it at all tied to LCL’s desire to construct an 
“inclusive” city or its model of voluntary land purchase and with what consequences? 
It is these questions that this dissertation seeks to engage with.  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examines why and how, according to what logics, conditions and 
interests, Lavasa came to be. It also assesses how rural communities have been 
thrown into city-making, and how they have reshaped it. In essence, it is an 
ethnographic study of a new city planned, developed, and managed by a private 
company. It draws within its ambit not only the diverse issues that are at the centre 
of urban development today but also a diverse range of actors. By examining both 
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issues and actors - how the project was imagined, as well as discursively and 
materially made, this study goes to the heart of the ideologies and interests that 
drive spatial transformation in contemporary India. 
 
Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014) correctly argue that the literature on Indian urbanism is 
broadly located within two strands of thought. The first argues that India’s urban 
political economy and spatial transformation is in keeping with changes apace in 
capitalist societies across the world. That is to say, this literature focuses on 
“convergence and sameness”, i.e. the “adoption of neoliberal governance advocated 
by corporate interests and imposed or propagated through international and 
bilateral aid organisations” (2014: 2-3). The second strand characterises India’s urban 
processes as ‘distinctive’, where the agenda for urban change is riddled with 
contradiction and plans are limited by “chronic street-level subversion”, and 
“prevalence of forces within the state that militate against any re-scaling of state 
power, to empower municipal governments” and the forces of capital (as 
demonstrated in the works of Benjamin, 2008: Arabindoo, 2011: Bandhopadhyay, 
2011) (2014: 3). One can argue however, that these two strands can - and do - co-
exist, that despite every attempt at convergence and sameness, plans are routinely 
remade. If the literature points to the rise of exclusionary urbanism – such as 
enclaves, revanchism and middle class reform movements, then it also points to a 
rise of responses that span collective action, hegemonic aspirations, and subversion. 
This literature, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, is rooted in the twin ascent of 
increasingly privatised forms of land use and planning, and collective action to take or 
retain control over urban space. Lavasa, spanning all these themes – planning, 
speculation, land, and resistance, can be used as a synecdoche to understand the 
politics of spatial transformation more broadly.  
 
This chapter has identified some of the key pitfalls and silences within the literatures 
of both agrarian studies and urban planning that are traversed in this dissertation. It 
shows that while projects like Lavasa can be seen as part and parcel of a global 
neoliberal project, they are in fact, in large part a product of domestic real estate 
speculation. The literature identifies the main forces of such transformation as led by 
powerful corporations or capital, and backed by the state. But using Shankar 
Dhindale as an example, I point out that this narrative misses the different ways in 
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which other actors, villagers, local government officials, etc. are all engaging in 
speculation. This speculative force can be productive through the imaginaries it 
deploys, the city that it generates, and the political effects that it produces. The 
dissertation will go on to examine why and in what ways speculation becomes a 
force of urban change and show how such speculation is shaped by who controls 
land. 
 
With respect to assembling land, an issue that lies at the crux of India’s rural-urban 
transition, Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014: 23) note that only the “more heavy handed 
attempts by state actors” have received scholarly attention but in fact there are 
often “more creative” and “less blunt efforts to access land”. This is certainly true of 
Lavasa - Shankar Dhindale, a sarpanch, acting as an agrarian intermediary in the 
making of a city, is part of that creative approach to assembling land. Therefore in 
this dissertation I look at what these other ways are and what effects they have on 
ideas of dispossession. Land has always been at the centre of resistance in rural India 
but “land and livelihood is no longer just an agrarian question, it is also an urban 
question” (Roy, 2007: xliii). I therefore examine how the politics of land shapes the 
politics of the project. 
 
Maringanti et al. (2011) note that “Indian cities today are battlegrounds” and that 
“they are the new frontier of concrete and ideological struggle[s] in India” (2011: 
40). Lavasa is certainly a battleground, but the competing claims and resistance 
strategies from within communities and their concomitant effects have yet to be 
sufficiently explained. The dominant literature suggests that new urban projects in 
India are exclusive and founded on dispossession. How then do we make sense of 
LCL’s vision to make an inclusive and environmentally sustainable city? What are the 
terms of this inclusion and what are its effects? In this context, how do we explain 
the multiple ways in which the project has been resisted and supported by the rural 
communities that have been thrown into its making? In answering these questions, 
this dissertation examines how and with what effects a set of villages are converted 
and made into a city.  
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Chapter Three 
 
A Note on Method 
 
On June 21, 2012, a fire torched the fourth floor of the Mantrayala, the Maharashtra 
government’s secretariat in Mumbai. This floor had long housed the Urban 
Development Department (UDD), and the reams of paper and files that so 
epitomise Indian bureaucracy ensured the entire department was rendered dust and 
ashes. Six people died and many were injured. The subsequently issued police report 
ascribed the fire to an electrical fault.   
 
Some civil society members cried foul (Rahman, 2012). How was it possible that the 
fire only affected the UDD, they asked. In the months running up to the incident, 
activists had uncovered an important real estate ‘scam’. Various high-powered 
government officials, military officers, politicians and bureaucrats had issued 
permissions and modified development plans to enable the construction of Adarsh 
Housing Society on land that had been earmarked for housing war veterans. 
Government officials subsequently allotted flats to themselves and their relatives. 
While similar incidents had taken place before, in this case, activists had used the 
Right to Information (RTI) Act (2005)34 to uncover a paper trail that indisputably 
demonstrated corruption and unlawful relationships between builders and politicians. 
The Adarsh ‘scam’ became a turning point in the investigation of builders and 
politicians working together to capture public land in Mahrashtra. It led to the 
resignation of then Chief Minister Ashok Chavan, the arrests of a number of military 
officers, and the suspension of government officers (Chadda, 2012). 
 
Thus, when the archive of the UDD went up in flames, activists and opposition 
parties saw it as arson (First Post, 23 June 2012; Kumar, 23 June 2012, Mumbai 
Mirror, 11 July 2012). A number of other potential real estate related inquiries were 
underway but now – with an archive of cinder – there would be no documents to 
turn to for evidence. This is a compelling counter-narrative but it is equally possible, 																																																								
34 The RTI Act (2005) empowers citizens to file for any non-classified information housed in the 
Government of India and entitles them to a response within 14 days. This is discussed further in 
Section 3.3.2 of this chapter. 
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as the police concluded, that the fire was simply electrical in origin as the building 
was old, connections faulty, and the documents ready fuel. Indeed government 
officials were quick to rule out sabotage (DNA, 1 July 2012). 
 
This event, which took place mid-way through my fieldwork serves as a 
methodological metaphor for this dissertation. First, studying urban development in 
Maharashtra is a murky business. On the one hand, it is a sector characterised by 
widespread corruption, popularly referred to as ‘the builder-politician nexus’. On the 
other hand, not all builders are corrupt, and neither are all politicians; as an 
informant argued, “that every private company is corrupt is a null hypothesis”.35 Yet, 
a discourse of corruption permeates all writing, thinking, and conversation on the 
issue. A shroud of suspicion is therefore cast over every real estate project, which 
makes it not only difficult to uncover basic facts but also generates an environment 
where industry members are unwilling to divulge even the most innocuous 
information. Were the controversies surrounding Lavasa a function of actual 
illegalities and “special favours” as activists argued (Patkar, 2010: n.p), or was LCL 
simply caught in political turmoil, as it insisted? Second, when searching for 
documents, files were often incomplete with only a semblance of order; were the 
documents missing for a reason or merely a casualty of the (rather archaic) filing 
system? Third, it points to the importance of the unverifiable in engaging with urban 
development: with facts being contested, multiple narratives about the same process 
or event abound. 
 
When friends and family heard I was studying new urban formations, and Lavasa in 
particular, I was almost immediately asked, “tell me, what is really happening there? 
What’s the truth?” My informants too, frequently claimed to be telling me the “real 
truth”, implying that others were either fabricating stories or vastly exaggerating. 
This raised a number of questions: how do you examine projects that have multiple 
and contradictory versions of the ‘truth’? And if there are so many competing 
‘truths’ about the project, without conclusive evidence, which does one privilege? 
How does one study a contentious project within a notoriously corrupt sector? 
How does one research objects and processes that are shrouded in secrecy, either 																																																								
35 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
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on account of corruption, the desire to be out of the public eye, or simply to 
protect business interests and advantages?  
 
The position of the researcher then, is to not uncover a unified truth but to “enrich 
our understanding of divergent socially-situated truths” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 
paraphrased in Baviskar, 1995: 3). ‘‘Objectivity’’ then is not ‘‘contemplation without 
interest’’ but the employment of ‘‘a variety of perspectives and affective 
interpretations in the service of knowledge” (Flyvberg, 2001: 139). Through close 
engagements with those whose lives are connected with Lavasa, I have chosen to 
represent multiple “truths” with the intention of understanding why and how Lavasa 
emerged in its imagined, material, and lived form. This dissertation therefore, does 
not seek to produce “ultimate, unequivocally verified knowledge”. Rather, it seeks to 
provide input into “ongoing social dialogue” (Flyvberg, 2001: 139) about the city and 
the larger social processes that enabled its creation.  
 
This chapter outlines the epistemic terrain and methods adopted for this research, 
along with its promises and perils. In so doing, it reflects on the nature and theory of 
method in inter-disciplinary research and, in particular, the difficulties in studying 
contested domains such as the state, the private sector, corruption and land. Section 
3.1 locates the case of Lavasa within the larger terrain of urban development in 
contemporary India.  Section 3.2 outlines the methodologies adopted in collecting 
data and reflexively assesses my position in the research process. Section 3.3 
highlights three methodological and conceptual concerns in studying ‘up’, examining 
state-society relations, and understanding land and real estate. Section 3.4 concludes.  
 
3.1. Lavasa: the Case and its Significance 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to understand the politics of new city development in 
India. I had originally hoped to study new forms of urban development in western 
Maharashtra as it is home to a number of new town projects such as Amby Valley, 
Magarpatta City, and numerous other SEZs. As time passed, I was drawn more and 
more to Lavasa, for reasons outlined below.  
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While other new city projects are present in this thesis by way of comparision, but 
at its heart, this dissertation is a study of the first city built entirely by the private 
sector in post-independence India. It seeks to understand the mechanisms through 
which Lavasa was imagined and made real, following an inductive and ethnographic 
approach to examine the production of space. By ethnographic approach, I do not 
mean participant observation, but rather an ethnographic sensibility around 
immersion in a context aimed at understanding the multiple ways in which social 
processes are made and made meaningful. I choose this approach in great part due 
to the ‘newness’ of the phenomenon. It responds to a call to use “ethnography to 
focus on complex interactions of economic, social, political, and cultural processes, 
without a priori privileging causally any of them” (Marcus, 1998: 44). In so doing, the 
dissertation reflects on broader processes at work in city-making, the politics of 
planning, as well as the relationship between the state and the private sector, 
particularly in urban development projects in post-liberalisation India.  
 
There are, of course, dangers of making claims about larger processes based on a 
single project, particularly if the project is in its infancy. Can a site within one state 
be used to make broader claims about the Indian state and the processes of 
privatised urban development? If as Gupta and Ferguson posit, the field is “not just a 
parochial local place, but a place that has its connected links and networks with the 
outer world and its interests”, if the field is “a meeting point” (1997: 39), then it is 
possible to argue that a single site can allow us to reflect upon larger processes. The 
extended case method (Burawoy, 1998, 2009) attempts to rethink theory through 
deep empirical observation of large processes in (often) single small sites. It does so 
not through the representativeness of the sites chosen, but rather by extending from 
the micro case to macro context and from the case to theory, contending that 
“there can be no microprocesses without macroforces, nor macroforces without 
microprocesses” (Burawoy, 2009: 9).  
 
Lavasa can be seen as a microcosm of the politics of contemporary urban 
development in India. It relates to a range of diverse issues such as real estate, 
transfer of land, planning, and a host of ideas (public purpose, environmental 
sustainability, economic development strategies, displacement, tourism, local 
government, resistance, and citizenship). It draws upon a range of actors and 
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relationships between them such as the state government and the central 
government, activists, NGOs, courts, politicians, businesses, local communities and 
the media. More importantly, Lavasa emerges quite explicitly as a possible model for 
private sector-led urban development, and a replicable one at that. In this sense, it is 
a provocation. 
 
That said, it would be absurd to call Lavasa and its subsumed villages representative 
of townships and villages in Maharashtra or India. Although it bears many similarities 
with other townships and SEZs, I selected Lavasa precisely because it was anomalous 
and extreme – in size, in the boldness of its vision, in the lack of collective action it 
faced on the issue of land. I wanted to see how a project this large had assembled its 
land parcel, given that similar projects in the state and the country had come to a 
standstill on land issues. I also chose Lavasa because it was one of the first such cities 
to be built and the most mature site (open to public and partially occupied). 
Furthermore, Lavasa has been designed to be “a replicable model of the future Asian 
cities” that brings “world-class standards to Indian urban life” (Lavasa CEO Ajit 
Gulabchand quoted in Cramer (2010: n.p.)). Thus lessons from this process will likely 
affect the development of other towns quite significantly. In this it is a landmark case 
and a study of it should stand on its own grounds. 
 
In this study I connect the making of Lavasa and the changes it brought to the people 
who lived within it, to the larger forces of Indian urbanisation, in particular the 
process of rural urban transition. Thus, through the case of Lavasa we can examine 
some of the more general processes such as new forms of planning, speculation, land 
assembly, and resistance that characterise urban development and the rural-urban 
transformation apace in India. The dissertation draws within its ambit not only the 
diverse issues that are at the centre of urban development today but also a diverse 
range of actors. By examining both how the project was imagined as well as 
discursively and materially made, this study goes to the heart of the ideologies and 
interests that drive spatial transformation in contemporary India. This work is 
necessarily partial but it is only through many detailed ethnographies in particular 
sites that we can conjure a more robust and ‘general’ theory, if any. This study is 
therefore in conversation with the nascent literature on these new settlements both 
in India and across the global south (Shatkin 2008, 2011; May, 2011; Chen, 2012a 
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2012b; Levien, 2013; Sami, 2013; Pow and Neo, 2013; Rapoport, 2013; Shwayri, 
2013; Caprotti, 2014).   
 
3.2. Entering the Field 
 
Mumbai is the city I belong to. It is the city I am most familiar with and at home in.  
When I returned to Mumbai in January 2012 to commence my fieldwork, I found 
myself both in a deeply familiar and unfamiliar terrain. On the one hand, I knew the 
landscape and its associated politics. Mumbaikars routinely lament the city’s 
skyrocketing property prices; real estate and its effects have been a long-standing 
refrain for those who live (and love) the city. Implicit in this view is the widely held 
assumption that the real estate business is always and already corrupt. However, on 
the other hand, when I dug deep into my tacit knowledge, I realised I knew very little 
about the actual workings of real estate in Maharashtra.  
 
The highway that connects Mumbai to Pune forms a corridor along which numerous 
townships and real estate projects have emerged, including Lavasa and Amby Valley36. 
This road and the adjacent sub-districts are also deeply familiar, as my high school 
was located in Mulshi sub-district, less than 25 km from Lavasa. The landscape has 
dramatically transformed in the 16 years since I first went to Mulshi; what was once 
forested and relatively remote is now peppered with integrated townships and 
tourism projects. The school I attended was itself on a 100 acre privately assembled 
parcel of land (still subject to litigation). I was interested in understanding this 
transformation. 
 
Having received an elite education in Mumbai, I had access to a number of real estate 
developers in my social circle. My work experience in the non-profit and academic 
space, made it easy to make connections with activists contesting these projects. My 
parents had worked for the government for a number of years as advisors, and so 
navigating the state was not an unfamiliar process either. I was thus both an insider 
and an outsider, to Maharashtra, to real estate, to government, and to civil society 																																																								
36 Briefly, the Amby Valley project was built by the Sahara Group, a firm with wide business interests 
(retail, finance, housing, hospitality and manufacturing). It serves as a gated tourism destination for the 
urban elite. The Amby Valley project will be discussed in the next chapter and throughout this 
dissertation.  
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activism. My insider status was largely beneficial to me, providing access that would 
have taken significantly longer to obtain had I been an outsider. My outsider status – 
as someone unfamiliar with the workings of real estate and land markets – allowed 
me to engage with my research with some distance and dispassion.  
 
I embarked into fieldwork between January 2012 and January 2013. I was based in 
Mumbai, where LCL and other developers are headquartered, and travelled to either 
Pune and/or Lavasa every other week for anywhere between a day to two weeks in 
those cities. This travel circuit was unavoidable as my respondents were spread 
equally across all three cities, and my archival data were housed in Pune and Mumbai. 
My fieldwork consisted of conducting interviews with a wide range of people and 
collecting documents from an array of sources, both of which I discuss below. 
 
3.3. Data Collection 
 
This dissertation asks a number of questions that draw upon different methods. First, 
it examines the conceptualisation of Lavasa – in policy and planning – by tracing its 
origins through elite interviews and documentary evidence. Second, it looks at the 
politics of land, specifically the process and consequences of assembling land through 
market transactions. It does so by using land records, other land transaction 
documents and interviews with elites, activists, and villagers. Third, it examines the 
lived experience of Lavasa, which it does through interviews with villagers. I describe 
below the different groups of people I interviewed and the sources of documentary 
evidence. 
 
3.3.1. Interviews  
 
Real Estate Developers 
 
When I commenced fieldwork, Lavasa was mired in controversy, just emerging from 
a year-long stay order where all construction had been stalled by the Ministry of 
Environment. In the interim, its public image had taken a beating – with corruption 
allegations, a damning report from the Comptroller Auditor General of India (CAG), 
environmental litigation, a litany of land claims, and declining investor confidence 
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(exacerbated by a slump in the Indian real estate market). Unsurprisingly, LCL was 
hesitant to meet with me until a friend (and former Lavasa employee) made an 
introduction to the Vice President of public relations (PR). 
 
After establishing my credentials as a scholar from the London School of Economics 
(and confirming that I was not a journalist), the PR representative was 
extraordinarily helpful, setting up interviews swiftly and providing me with many of 
the documents I requested. However, despite his candour, it was impossible to 
ignore that he was indeed in charge of public relations and understandably his job 
was to ensure that I was told a particular version of the Lavasa story. Large 
companies have gates, security, “inner lines of defence: public relations departments” 
and “whole levels of management trained in how to represent the company to the 
outside world” (Thomas, 1995: 5). Indeed, the PR representative was always present 
during my interviews with staff, although never explicitly intervened in them.  
 
I interviewed senior personnel currently working for LCL, including the Chief 
Planner, Head of Business Development, Head of Marketing and Sales, Head of Land 
Purchase, Head of Environment and the Town Manager. Most of them had been with 
the project for more than five years, had a sense of the history of and vision for the 
city, as well as in-depth knowledge of their departments. The interviews were semi-
structured, but with plenty of scope to pursue related conversations when they 
emerged. I went in expecting interviews to be short and to-the-point, given that 
these were busy executives, but I found that they were forthcoming and gave me 
their undivided attention for long periods of time. The interviews, conducted in 
English (the default language of corporate Mumbai), ranged from 45 minutes to 150 
minutes, with most of them being approximately 75 minutes long.  All interviews 
were recorded with verbal permission, barring two, where I took notes by hand. I 
also had a number of unrecorded conversations with other employees during my 
many visits to Lavasa. Those conversations were off the record and the data 
revealed do not find their way into this dissertation, but they gave me a fuller sense 
of the project and enabled me to ask better questions during formal interviews. 
 
The interviews were aimed at understanding how Lavasa was conceptualised, 
planned and operationalised. I commenced most of my interviews by asking 
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questions about their life histories and biographies, the ideas and conditions that 
drew them to Lavasa, their role within the project and how they understood it. I 
then asked questions regarding the origins of and rationale behind the ideas that 
underpinned various dimensions of Lavasa, questions regarding urban planning in 
India and the role of new cities, their relationship with the government, and the 
tensions and successes in the execution of the project. Unless absolutely necessary, I 
steered clear of controversial topics such as litigation, the environmental stay order, 
and anti-Lavasa activism. Some of these topics were raised by the informants 
themselves; perhaps they assumed that these issues were of interest to me and/or 
felt the need to explain their positions. 
 
The interviews were forthright, though somewhat formal, and took place at LCL 
offices ensuring that informants were always aware of their professional boundaries. 
I found it relatively easy to communicate my research aims and establish common 
ground in most interviews owing to an ostensibly shared “elite” upbringing and 
shared social networks. Such access was a double-edged sword, as it often resulted 
in generous interviews, rare in the experiences of other students of real estate in 
India (Searle, 2010; Sami, 2012) but with the risk that such proximity could prevent 
critical reflection, a point to which I shall shortly return. 
 
The information disclosed within interviews, however, had limits. I was told a 
number of times that certain information, particularly on land sales and profits, 
would not be made available. One could postulate a number of reasons for this; real 
estate business requires conditions of secrecy as information such as prices, profits, 
deal-structures could affect a company’s competitive edge (Searle, 2010). Others 
have argued that such secrecy exists partially “due to the illegal overtone” of real 
estate operations (Wadhva, 1989: iv). In addition, LCL’s cautiousness may have also 
stemmed from the need to protect the firm from further controversies. 
 
How then did I make sense of the narratives that emerged? Was I simply being fed 
the party line? This may have been so, but there were considerable nuances in what 
was revealed to me by different informants. I made attempts to triangulate as much 
information as I possibly could with other sources. And if I still found instances of a 
common party line, then the question became, why was this the party line and what 
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work did/does it do? I also interviewed a number of other developers and planners 
working on other township projects to get a sense of the larger (and more 
common) processes at work in Indian real estate. 
 
There is now a small but growing set of ethnographies of corporations. Although this 
is not an ethnography of a corporation, a little detour into that literature is 
instructive here. Echoing Marcus (1998), Welker (2006: 12) posits that we need to 
“surmount the belief that corporations are simply profit-maximizing agents”. 
Corporations need not be “bastions of dispassionate capitalist rationality” 
(Schoenberger, 2001: 290), rather, we should depart from Polanyi’s powerful 
proposition that economic activity is socially embedded and, thus, so too are 
corporations. Corporations, like other social organisations, contain within them a 
multitude of voices, internal dissonance and are “constantly negotiating with external 
social, legal and political forces” (Welker, 2006: 15).  
 
Welker (2006: 16-17) puts forth five propositions about corporations: first, that 
corporations are “social entities”; second, that they are not “fully self-present agents 
with clear self-interests”; third, that those who work for corporations do not 
necessarily share the same views of the larger corporate interest or how this 
interest should be achieved; fourth, that as scholars, it is “unproductive to reduce 
the content of corporate action into a singular intention, whether imputed to 
individuals or the corporation as a whole”. These propositions were certainly 
confirmed in my interviews. Those who worked at Lavasa came from diverse 
backgrounds, and with different viewpoints. Their beliefs and viewpoints transformed 
their practice and therefore Lavasa. While the collective import of the interviews did 
demonstrate something about the nature of the corporation (there were many 
commonalities), I have been careful not to conflate individual views with a larger 
‘corporate interest’. 
 
Government Officials 
 
Like many of the researchers that have come before me, I found Indian government 
officials difficult to access and interview. The departments I was interested in 
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interviewing – the urban development department, the town planning department, 
the land revenue department, and the various district and sub-district offices – tend 
to be under siege on a daily basis, with large number of people requesting forms, 
land records, permissions for construction, filing complaints and so on. In addition, 
these departments are routinely frequented by journalists and activists, seeking to 
uncover yet another real estate scam. As these departments address a number of 
politically sensitive issues, officers are incredibly busy (many working long after 
official working hours) and researchers find themselves to be low priority. 
Therefore, despite numerous calls and repeated personal visits, I was not able to 
interview a few key officials. Those who did agree to meet with me were cautious 
and highlighted that they were reluctant to speak as the project was controversial, 
politically contentious, and under scrutiny. Furthemore, my interviews were 
constantly interrupted by phone calls and visitors, and they were not able to spare 
more than 30 minutes of their time. On two occasions, I conducted interviews at the 
official’s residence, and those interviews were much more candid. 
 
I interviewed government officials at the state, district and taluka (sub-district) level. 
My interviews were formal and held in government offices. Interviewers were 
interested in knowing whether Lavasa was ‘good’ or ‘bad’. My interview questions 
related to the history and rationale behind certain government policies and township 
projects, the need for new settlements, the changing nature of urban development in 
the state, their opinions on the nature of planning and particularly private sector led 
planning, how they located Lavasa within broader changes taking place in the state, 
and how they had understood the contestation surrounding Lavasa and how this had 
affected their work (if at all). The interviews were often opaque and I therefore 
relied more heavily on the voluminous government documents to uncover the logics 
of government processes (detailed in the next section). 
 
Civil Society  
 
Making contact and gaining access to civil society organisations, independent 
journalists and academics was relatively easy. I identified key people by scanning 
newspapers and available litigation for names of persons who were either directly or 
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indirectly involved in either supporting or opposing Lavasa. This included those who 
had written about the city, whose names appeared in reporting on the city, as well as 
people who were consistently writing or working on issues related to township 
development within Maharashtra. The voluminous reportage on the city assisted me 
in identifying and locating key informants. I used personal networks for introductions 
and then met additional (though less vocal) civil society members through snowball 
sampling.  
 
My starting point was the Pune branch of the NAPM, the primary social movement 
contesting Lavasa. The alliance is spearheaded by Medha Patkar, one of India’s most 
prominent social activists who, through her contestation of the Narmada Dam in the 
1980s and ‘90s, has been credited with mobilising a large number of social 
movements across the country. Much has been written about her and the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (save Narmada movement) (Baviskar, 1995; Routledge, 2003; 
Dwivedi, 2006; Nilsen, 2013). The NAPM, founded in 1992, consists of 
heterogeneous movements (both rural and urban), which draw on a range of 
discourses including Gandhianism, Ambedkarism, Marxism, environmentalism, and 
feminism (Kothari and Sethi, 1984; Omvedt, 1993). These movements are united 
under the NAPM by their “commitment to deepening democratic control over 
markets, productive resources, and economic development more generally” as well 
as resistance to corporate and state led displacement and dispossession (Levien, 
2007: 124). I knew much of this before I met them. 
 
The Pune office of the NAPM was easy to establish contact with and several 
members were happy to meet and discuss Lavasa and similar projects at length. The 
person at the helm of the environmental and land contestation against Lavasa, Suniti 
Suresh, was very welcoming. She was responsible for lodging a PIL against LCL as 
well as assisting villagers in pursuing a number of lower court land claims. I 
accompanied the NAPM on a number of their meetings through the course of the 
year, both within activist circles and to the Lavasa subsumed villages, from which 
they drew their strength. The idea was not to study the social movement itself – the 
constituent movements of the NAPM (such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan and the 
Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao Andolan) have been well documented and critiqued 
(Baviskar, 1995; Routledge, 2003; Dwivedi, 2006; Nilsen, 2013; Ciafone, 2012; 
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Weinstein, 2013) – but to get a sense of how activists and locals associated with 
NAPM understood and negotiated their relationship with Lavasa. 
 
As my relationship with NAPM deepened, I found it difficult to remain non-partisan. 
Members of the NAPM, fairly familiar with engaging with researchers, did not probe 
too deeply about what I was interested in. However, in casual conversations over 
the journeys to Lavasa, I was constantly asked the question, “But what do you think 
of Lavasa?” Answering this question could compromise my research but not 
answering the question would affect trust. I often tried not to answer it, or 
answered it in terms of the research questions I was posing. As someone who was 
travelling between the different worlds of the LCL and NAPM offices, I was always 
acutely aware of my unusual position. Ultimately, I do believe that although both the 
NAPM and LCL were very forthcoming, neither party fully trusted me. 
 
In addition to the NAPM network, I interviewed activists that had contested or 
written about the project, journalists and activists who had written both in favour of 
and against Lavasa and similar new town/township projects, academics in Mumbai 
and Pune, and lawyers. These 17 semi-structured interviews lasted an hour on 
average and were conducted both in Hindi and English. These interviews were aimed 
at engaging with how they understood Lavasa, and the project of new cities, what 
they thought the main causes of concern were and how they viewed the process 
through which the city had emerged. Once again, I commenced most of my 
interviews with the personal, asking questions about their life histories and 
biographies, the ideas and conditions that drew them to either contesting or 
supporting Lavasa, and the strategies deployed in doing so. I then asked more general 
questions regarding urban planning in India and the role of new cities, the 
relationship with the state, the tensions and successes in the execution of their 
activism and tried to locate how they understood Lavasa within the larger political 
processes at work in contemporary India. 
 
Villagers 
 
Lavasa subsumes 18 census villages in 2 sub-districts (Mulshi and Velhe) in Pune 
district. These villages were and are very sparsely populated (the reasons are 
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discussed in detail in Chapter Five and Six), with a total population of 3129 according 
to the 2011 census. The smallest village has 2 households (Ugavali with 8 individuals) 
and the largest has 81 (Bhoini with 505 individuals) (Census 2011). When I began my 
interviews in 2012, LCL had purchased approximately 70 per cent of the earmarked 
land area and many villagers had already relocated from the villages. The population 
and sample therefore was constituted of those individuals who stayed, either by 
choice or circumstance, rather than those who left in the previous decade. About 
half the population still owns some land (see Table 6.1). The details of the village 
sample are outlined in Chapter Six. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 42 
randomly selected villagers across 7 of the larger villages – Admal, Bhoini, Dasve, 
Dhamanhol, Koloshi, Mugaon, Varasgaon, This included interviews with 4 sarpanches 
of 4 joint gram panchayats in the area and some villagers who also act as land agents. 
 
Interviewing villagers was by far the most difficult part of this research. In the 
months before I started interviewing people formally, I spent time in the local tea-
stalls, often alone, casually conversing with people. Many of these conversations did 
not go very far as people immediately suspected that I was a journalist, digging for 
yet another controversial news piece on the city. When I explained my position and 
research to them, they were more willing to speak but their scepticism remained. I 
conducted a number of interviews with (mostly) upper-caste (Maratha) informants in 
Hindi. I was able to conduct these interviews alone as these villagers were 
comfortable speaking Hindi and were frequently in the town centre or passing 
through chai shops on account of their businesses which were located in Lavasa.  
 
To access the villages that were farther afield, I conducted interviews on weekends 
(when people were more likely to be home) and travelled from village to village with 
a (paid) research assistant – Nagesh Jadhav. Nagesh grew up in a village in the 
neighbouring district, had lived and worked in Pune as an adult, and had worked as 
teacher within Velhe sub-district. Therefore, he was deeply familiar with the area, 
the working of local government, and local caste politics and his observations were 
immensely insightful. Nagesh’s presence and personable demeanour assisted with 
putting informants at ease before the inteviews commenced. Whereas I came across 
as an elite urban woman, villagers found it easy to both relate to and trust Nagesh. 
Even though land and the real estate business is notoriously a male domain, it was 
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only during interviews with villagers that I felt disadvantaged by my gender. Here too 
Nagesh was of immense assistance, men spoke more openly in his presence than 
they did when I attempted to speak to them on my own. He assisted by translating 
my questions from Hindi to Marathi as well as clarified informants’ responses, when I 
was unable to comprehend them.  
 
I found that the further the village was from Lavasa town centre, the more openly 
people spoke. Two explanations can be offered. In one of my early interviews, an 
informant, who had been speaking freely and with great flair, suddenly became 
reticent when I asked him a particular question. The framing of the question, he 
explained, was very similar to what either journalists or Lavasa’s own surveyors 
asked. According to him, a number of persons who introduced themselves as 
“independent” researchers in fact worked for Lavasa. Second, the villages closer to 
Lavasa town centre were more involved in Lavasa itself. Larger numbers of residents 
either worked there or had some relationship with the company. This led to a 
certain exercise of caution in speaking with ‘outsiders’.  
 
I started my interviews by gathering the life histories of the villagers, their families, 
their livelihoods, their connection to their village and the region, and their links to 
nearby villages, towns and cities such as Pune and Mumbai. I asked open-ended 
questions about village life, their engagement with local government, their opinions 
about Lavasa: when and how they first heard about it and what they saw it as, and 
what they felt the disputes were about. I also asked questions about land, their 
relationship to it, whether they had sold some land and/or if they intended to, and 
the reasons for the same. The length of interviews varied greatly from stunted 30-
minute dialogues to 90-minute animated conversations (in Marathi and Hindi). Most 
interviews were not recorded, as many villagers demonstrated considerable 
discomfort when I asked for permission. I therefore took copious notes by hand in 
an organised field notebook. The ones that were recorded were done so with oral 
consent and the interviews transcribed by a research assistant.  
 
It is worth reflecting on how, if at all, our caste/class/gender position may or may not 
have influenced informants’ responses. My position as an elite urban woman (who 
could have been viewed to be a journalist) could have made some villagers reluctant 
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to be critical of the LCL. Nagesh never explicitly revealed his caste to informants 
(for instance he always introduced himself by his first name alone; that said, the lack 
of last name, some would argue, is itself a marker of caste). While we did interview a 
variety of informants from a range of castes, I had conducted many of my interviews 
with upper-caste villagers alone. Nagesh’s position as a lower-caste man could have 
led to very critical interviews with lower caste informants and less critical interviews 
with upper caste informants. It is difficult to ascertain what kind of biases, if any, 
emerge from our particular positions. That said, I found that the informants rarely 
unequivocally praised or critiqued the project or LCL. Their responses (as evident in 
Chapters 5 and 6) were indicative of careful reflection of their lived experience: they 
gave credit to the company where they felt it was due and critiqued it when 
necessary. The villagers associated with the NAPM were more thoroughgoing in 
their critique. 
 
Finally, as mentioned above, on account of the fact that the interviews took place in 
2012, 12 years after the project was officially sanctioned, the sample interviewed did 
not include those who had either been evicted, or the landless who could no longer 
lay claim to the area. These villagers had longed moved, to a variety of different 
destinations and it was difficult, given the already large scope of the research project, 
to track them down and interview them. Accordingly, the discussions that come in 
the pages ahead are not focused on rehabilitation and resettlement or precise 
experiences of selling land or being evicted, but on the making of the city. This is 
discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
In total, I interviewed a total of 77 individuals across the various groups (elites, 
locals, civil society, government officials), all of whom were intimately associated 
with the project. I stopped interviewing when I encountered saturation and also 
when it became logistically difficult to add more informants. In many ways, because 
the scope of the project was relatively small, the number of individuals involved and 
therefore available to interview was quite limited. A complete list of (anonymised) 
informants is provided in Appendix 1I. 
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3.3.2. Documents and Archives 
 
Given the controversial nature of the project I relied heavily on documentary 
evidence to tell a verifiable story of Lavasa. As mentioned earlier, in the case of 
officials at LCL, their cooperation did not always translate to complete access to 
information. Many documents were not made available despite repeated requests 
(this could be for a number of reasons ranging from their own time priorities to 
protecting their business interests). I conducted interviews and collected documents 
in tandem, almost in an iterative manner, the documents often influenced the 
questions I would ask in my interviews, and the interviews lead me to different 
documents.  
 
The strategy I used to unearth documentary evidence was as follows. I first gathered 
all data that was available online, including newspaper articles, some government 
documents (including recently digitised land records), Lavasa’s voluminous 
promotional material, and documents related to other similar project, in particular 
the Amby Valley project. I then gathered documents from my informants. The 
NAPM offered some reports and allowed me to peruse the government documents 
they had collected over the years. Unsurprisingly, these documents had been 
collected for specific purposes: to investigate whether Lavasa had abided by the law, 
whether Lavasa was guilty of environmental violation, whether public land had been 
transferred to Lavasa, whether tribal land had been purchased by Lavasa, to name a 
few. These documents offered an important but necessarily partial narrative of 
Lavasa’s emergence. They were, however, an important starting point. 
 
Once I had a broad sense of the archival space I was working within, I accessed 
information using the Right to Information Act (RTI) (2005). The RTI Act empowers 
citizens to file for any non-classified information housed in the GoI and be entitled to 
a response within 14 days. This landmark act ensures that if you know what the 
document you are looking for and the department within which it is located, it is 
likely that you will be able to access it. But the Act is a double-edged sword: while 
on the one hand it has changed the nature of research in India, enabling researchers 
to access any document they would like to (providing they know of its existence), on 
the other hand, it has made government officials and developers reticent about 
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providing any kind of non-RTI access, never knowing whether the information 
revealed could be used against them.  
 
I filed two types of RTI requests: ones where I asked for specific sets of information 
and others termed as ‘file inspection’. Any member of the public may file a request 
to inspect files of any government department. I filed requests at all relevant 
departments to inspect files on Lavasa, the Hill Station Regulation, and other 
townships. I carried out the inspections over the course of several months, had to 
painstakingly list each and every document I wanted photocopied and would often 
wait months for the copies. On one occasion a request was denied on grounds of 
the data being classified information, the revelation of which could jeopardize LCL’s 
business. In addition, the files were often poorly organised, with large gaps in 
information, no page numbers, missing documents, substantial duplication, and in 
only a semblance of chronological order. Like the Mantralaya fire, one could not 
easily ascertain whether the missing files were absent by intent or carelessness. 
However, the Indian bureaucracy’s pathological desire to keep documents in multiple 
copies across departments ensured that if a document was missing in one place it 
was bound to show up in another.  
 
Finally, land records form an important informational basis for this thesis. These land 
records (also known as 7/12 extracts), were patched together from various sources: 
LCL’s submission to various government departments often provided maps and lists, 
laying out the type of land and ownership status; digitised land records available 
online revealed detailed land data for some parcels; and finally NAPM’s numerous 
inquiries to various government departments ensured that the government files 
were replete with statistics on land, lists of sellers, owners, and details of disputed 
properties. Pooled together, these land records revealed how ownership of land had 
changed over time and the (officially stated) prices that had been paid for individual 
land holdings. 
 
By the end of my fieldwork, I had amassed a large number of documents from 
numerous government departments that allowed me to construct the aspects of the 
history of Lavasa relevant for my research. There were a few documents I was not 
permitted to access as making them public could have potentially compromised 
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LCL’s competitive edge. However, I could easily patch together much of the 
essential information from a range of other documents. 
 
The purpose of the document/archival data collection was many-fold. First, I sought 
to construct a narrative that went beyond the mythology of the project, pointing out 
to the logics and rationales provided by the government for the decisions to 
conceptualise and enable such a project. Second, I sought to uncover how the 
project had changed over time, how it had been imagined and planned both by the 
government and by the corporation, in order to get a sense of why Lavasa looks the 
way it does today. Third, I wanted to understand the diversity of logics and 
rationalities within the government and LCL; who put forth what kinds of 
suggestions, who opposed them and on what grounds, what were the alternatives 
put forward and what view triumphed and why? Lastly, I sought to triangulate 
information provided in interviews. In his engagement with the bureaucracy in 
Pakistan, Hull (2012) shows that documents are not merely important for the 
information they contain. Rather they also demonstrate relations among places, 
peoples and paper, that is to say, they convey a set of relations between the state 
and individuals, social movements, and the corporation; their ubiquity reveals “the 
double sign of the state's distance and its penetration into the life of the everyday” 
(Das and Poole, 2004:15). Thus in assessing the documents I collected, I paid close 
attention to the relationships that had formed through those papers – between 
levels of the state, the corporation, civil society, and the villagers. In looking at 
archival evidence, I therefore sought to construct a short history of the city and the 
logics, ideologies and rationalities that enabled it.   
  
3.3.3. Research Ethics 
 
A deep engagement with a controversial project such as Lavasa that covers the 
highly sensitive domain of land use meant that ethical concerns around privacy, 
confidentiality, as well as data access were of regular concern (Baez, 2002; Wiles, 
2006).  Ethics in the field is often an imperfect exercise and fieldwork presented 
three key ethical challenges: 
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First, as mentioned earlier, there was the issue of moving between the worlds of the 
corporation, the social movement, NGOs, villages, and government officials. Both 
Lavasa and real estate/land are contested terrains and I interviewed a number of 
people who were often very critical of each other’s worldviews and actions. Some 
persons I interviewed were in direct legal litigation against each other, and 
allegations of corruption were made liberally. Over the course of the year a number 
of informants raised very sensitive issues in good faith and I had to continuously be 
non-partisan, be willing to engage with a range of opinions, and through repeated 
verbal assurances, communicate that their identities would be hidden. When I was 
with activists, they were interested in hearing what LCL’s views were; similarly, LCL 
was interested in understanding what activists’ ‘real problems’ with the project were. 
By and large I chose to not engage these questions, in most instances by changing the 
topic of conversation, and in one or two instances by explicitly stating that it would 
be unethical for me to act as an interlocutor.  In writing up, I have taken care to not 
reveal any information that would either jeopardise individuals or their work (be it 
LCL’s business interests or NAPM’s political strategy going forward).  
 
Second, this thesis relies heavily on documents, most of which were not gathered 
from LCL directly, but rather were compiled through RTI applications and by looking 
at files accumulated by activists. This raises the question: can one use data that is 
obtained without the informant’s knowledge (in this case LCL)? In response, I only 
chose to use the information that was already in the public domain (that is to say, 
retrievable through an RTI request). Moreover, there were occasions where some 
informants suggested I could get detailed data for a fee (especially with respect to 
land records and court cases), but I chose not to use such methods.   
 
Third, given that Lavasa is a well-known project that has been widely covered in the 
media, maintaining the anonymity of informants has been imperfect in the writing up 
of this dissertation. The informants at LCL were happy to be recorded, did so in the 
presence of a PR representative, and did not explicitly express concern about their 
names being used. While I have retained their anonymity, their identities cannot be 
totally protected as their interviews addressed issues directly related to their tasks, 
and many informants have been on public record discussing the same issues. I have 
taken utmost care to not divulge any details about government officials, activists, and 
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village-level informants, and this has come at the cost of some precision in describing 
them (their gender, caste, occupation, and the village that they are from). 
 
3.4. Three Methodological Concerns  
 
3.4.1. Studying Up, Down, and All Around 
 
In tracing the making of a city this dissertation could be seen, in the words of Laura 
Nader, as an attempt at ‘studying up.’ Nader (1974) initially called for studies of 
banks, realtors, corporations and other institutions that were considered to be at 
the centre of capitalist process, encouraging researchers to study the cultures of 
both the “powerful” and the “powerless” in order to “throw new light on the 
process of domination“ (Gusterson, 1997: 114). Since then, a number of scholars 
have paid heed to the call arguing that interviewing elites (and interviewing them 
well) can provide sharp insight into causal processes at work (Tansey, 2007). 
However, scholars have also highlighted challenges such as difficulty in access, time 
constraints, the risk of reinforcing dominant narratives put forth by the elite, and 
uneven power relations (in favour of the informant) (Ostrander, 1993; McDowell, 
1998; Rice, 2010) 
 
In researching developers and the government officials, I encountered some of the 
pitfalls of studying up. As mentioned earlier, access became an issue particularly at 
the government level, where meetings with senior bureaucrats were near impossible 
to organise despite my tenacious attempts. While many LCL officials met me at first, 
they no longer entertained requests for interviews towards the end of my fieldwork, 
stating that they had other priorities given that the project was back on track. On 
the whole, however, access was relatively good.37  
 
I found, however, that access and trust were much more difficult issues when I was 
studying ‘down,’ an observation echoed by a number of other scholars (Nader, 1974; 
Smith, 2006). People within the villages were suspicious of me, hard to locate, and 																																																								
37 The concept of ‘elite’ has been problematised in anthropological literature (see Smith (2006) for 
discussion).  In this context I use the term ‘elite’ to describe those who had considerable power in 
the creation of Lavasa, in as much as they planned, executed, or gave permissions for the project.  
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even harder to win over. In both cases I was worried about asking the wrong 
question, lest the interview be terminated and further access denied. If interviews 
were granted they were often reticent and were constantly punctuated with 
interrogations about my own position. That my ‘elite’ interviews were considerably 
longer is testimony to the fact that access and trust is not merely an issue associated 
with studying up as is often argued (Cochrane, 1998; Parry, 1998; Desmond, 2004). 
 
The second question of concern was to what extent were my interviews with elites 
merely reinforcing dominant narratives (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987; Mikecz, 2012). 
As mentioned earlier, the PR representative accompanied me on trips as well as 
some interviews. There was a real risk that I would strengthen their narrative. This 
risk was minimised because I began fieldwork knowing the numerous counter claims 
that had been very publically made against Lavasa by the NAPM. Furthermore, I 
addressed this issue through two ways: I interviewed all types of people and groups 
associated with the project. Thus, the narratives provided by LCL, government 
officials, activists, and villagers were all juxtaposed against each other. Furthermore, I 
triangulated as much information as possible through archival research. 
 
Third, a number of scholars who have researched the elite, have argued that they  
“treated research participants quite differently from the ethical ‘best-practice’ that 
one would normally adhere to” (Smith, 2006: 644). Some suggested “couching 
controversial topics in broad terms, whilst trying to ‘flatter’ the respondent by 
emphasising their influential role in the matter (Cochrane, 1998: 2124). I was always 
aware of creating the right impression and avoiding controversial aspects of the 
project, but as mentioned earlier, this was not restricted to elites alone but to all 
informants. I described and introduced my project consistently to all informants as 
wanting to understand the processes by which new models or urban development 
(new townships and hill stations) are emerging, using Lavasa as a case. 
 
The approach I therefore took was, as Gusterson describes, “a polymorphous 
engagement” (1997: 116). I interacted with informants across a number of sites, 
collected data from a wide array of sources in numerous ways to address the 
problems of “studying up” and “down”. In so doing, the purpose of this research is 
“not sharing knowledge with those who lack it, but forging links between different 
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knowledge that are possible from different locations and tracing lines of possible 
alliance and common purpose between them” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997: 39). 
 
3.4.2. On State-Society-Capital Relations 
 
The second issue is one of researching the relations between the state, society, and 
the corporation. As a number of scholars have argued, while state and society are 
theoretically distinct, they are not often empirically so (Harriss-White, 2003; 
Corbridge et. al., 2005; Gupta, 1995, 2012). They argue that the conventional 
distinction between state and society (and by extension state and capital) needs to 
be re-examined, particularly in the Indian context. This poses some methodological 
concerns. 
 
Mitchell (2006: 170) argues that we need to “take seriously the elusiveness of the 
boundary between state and society, not as a problem of conceptual precision but as 
a clue to the nature of the phenomenon” and “we need to examine the political 
processes through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and 
society is produced”. How then can we study the relationship between the state and 
the private sector in the production of space? While in theory these entities are 
considered to be separate, in practice these distinctions are not so clear. While this 
and its methodological implications have been discussed at great length when 
studying local bureaucracies (see Gupta (2012) for a review), little has been said of 
studying the collapse of this distinction at the higher levels of state, where chief 
ministers and party leaders also run full-fledged real estate businesses. We do not 
see the state and society as institutions/spaces with clearly defined boundary lines. 
During fieldwork I paid close attention to the lack of distinction between the two, 
for instance, noting the government official who is also a real estate agent, or the 
individual who is a villager, a sarpanch, a real estate broker, and has a contract with 
Lavasa. Such blurring gave way to a dominant discourse of corruption, one that many 
other scholars have echoed. Instead of foreground ideas of corruption, I chose 
instead to focus on the impacts of that blurring on city-making. 
 
Furthermore, every level of the state was involved in this project, including 
panchayats, various local and state level politicians, local government, bureaucrats, 
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courts, multiple state government departments, the auditor general, and several 
central government departments. The state is neither unitary nor coherent, and this 
multitude of departments allowed for an examination of precisely, when and why 
coherence or unity is or is not performed and/or discursively constructed. Allowing 
“the state to be disaggregated by focusing on different bureaucracies without 
prejudging their unity or coherence” allows us to “problematise the relationship 
between the translocality of “the state” and the necessarily localised offices, 
institutions, and practices in which it is instantiated” (Gupta, 2012: 77). I thus paid 
close attention to the ways in which the different levels of the state differ and speak 
to each other and did not presume unity in the same way in which I did not presume 
unity in approaches within LCL.  
  
3.4.3. Land and Real Estate   
 
In a country characterised by a large rural and peasant population, land is not only an 
economic and financial asset but is also deeply intertwined with livelihoods, identity, 
and culture. The Indian state has an elaborate system of laws and regulations in place 
(some central and some at the state level) to protect peasants and adivasis (e.g. by 
preventing sales of particular types of lands), to prevent further accumulation of land 
by the wealthy (by putting ‘ceiling’ limits to the amount of land that can be owned by 
a single person/ company) and to correct historic caste-based injustices and 
redistribute land to the landless.  
 
But land is also an instrument for hiding and laundering money, particularly ‘black 
money’ (Kumar, 1999)38. It is considered a safe investment, particularly by urban 
residents, who expect high returns in anticipation of India’s imminent urban 
explosion. The demand for land, particularly agricultural land,39 and therefore the 
need to subvert or bypass many of these land laws is high. It is because of this that 																																																								
38 Black money is loosely understood as cash incomes that are illegal, undeclared and/or untaxed. In 
1995, it was estimated that the black economy comprised 40 per cent of India’s GDP. This money 
comes from both illegal activities like drugs and smuggling as well as legal activities such as real estate 
and infrastructure (Kumar, 1999). 
39 Agricultural land is often in high demand as the capital gains on it are non-taxable. However, 
agricultural land can only be purchased by ‘farmers’ for agricultural purposes. Such land can only be 
used for non-agricultural purposes with prior consent from the Collector. A large number of land 
violations are centred on urban residents fraudulently claiming to be farmers and purchasing farm land 
or paying bribes to convert agricultural land to non-agricultural land.    
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land is also a domain of illegal and often criminal activity (Kumar, 1999; Weinstein, 
2008; Sami 2012). It is also a domain of political activity, with large numbers of local 
politicians participating in the land market. With so much regulation and discretion 
resting in the hands of government officials, land-use planning and therefore 
departments and officers associated with land-use planning are domains of power 
and contest. 
 
This heady combination makes land and land transactions particularly difficult to 
research. This is because land is a site of enormous contestation and details about 
land transactions are hidden or difficult to ascertain. Complete land records are 
tedious to obtain and they often hide as much as they reveal. Land prices registered 
in sale deeds usually do not reflect real land prices, as many land transactions are 
executed largely in cash, with only the non-cash component being declared on the 
land record (in order to lower property tax). Land ownership is often difficult to 
ascertain as land is often hidden under the names of other family members. At the 
household level, agricultural land is often inherited and held jointly among family 
members. Depending on the health of family relations, conflicting narratives can be 
told of the same plot of land from within the same family. Accusations of corruption 
and illegality are thrown about wildly and with little caution.  
 
And so, conducting factual research on land is an onerous task. But land assembly 
forms a core part of my research and understanding how and why LCL assembled 
13,000 acres of land through the market forms the core question of Chapter Five of 
this dissertation. The approach I took was to use the facts that are not disputable 
and instead of calculating rates of return on land, or who sold land to whom, my 
research focused on the narratives people told of the land. I assumed that if I 
conducted enough interviews and triangulated this information with land records, I 
could piece together narratives of why and how people parted (or did not part) with 
their land.   
 
3.5. Conclusion  
 
This dissertation seeks to tell the story of why and how Lavasa came to be. It does 
so by both studying corporate engagement with urban planning, the practices of the 
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state, as well as local communities and their response to such endeavours. But 
studying a controversial project within a contested sector made many facts 
unverifiable and questionable. Political sensitivity of the project resulted in some 
reticent interviews, difficulty in accessing documents, contested and contradictory 
narratives about the project, and issues of trust and ‘truth’.  
 
It was through fieldwork that a number of conceptual questions with methodological 
consequences were raised. These themes are repeated throughout this dissertation. 
First, the relative role of individual actors versus the structures that they inhabit in 
imagining and making real Lavasa, second, the theoretical separation between the 
state and the non-state/society and the private and public lives of officials that were 
empirically difficult to entangle. Third, discourses of corruption and secrecy which 
are intimately tied to the study of land and its transformation into real estate, making 
facts about land largely unverifiable. 
 
The aim, then, was not to uncover the ‘truth’: is the Lavasa corrupt by design? Were 
people cheated out of their land? Were villagers fabricating land-claims? Neither was 
it to ask more ‘practical’ questions: Will Lavasa work? Is it good for the villagers? 
Instead the aim is to tell the myriad stories that can be told of Lavasa, the ideologies 
that they represent and the political work that these stories do. The research 
process lies in engaging with multiple perspectives to tell narratives and counter-
narratives – narratives of development, narratives of corruption, and narratives of 
struggle – and how they come together in the messy and ruptured processes of the 
production of space. I hope that my informants are able to see their truths in this 
dissertation alongside opposing views and ideologies, and are able to understand 
them as socially situated rather than factually incorrect.  	
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Chapter Four 
 
Imagining Lavasa: Networks and Visions 
 
This chapter traces the ways in which Lavasa came to be and the ideologies, 
rationalities, and interests that enabled it. In so doing, it makes three connected 
arguments: first, it shows that the state government’s policy for new hill stations 
emerged not from techno-scientific analysis or even expert opinion (unlike perhaps 
its modernist predecessors), but rather from a long standing and common sense 
view that upholds the development of new cities as a solution to the intractable 
problems of existing cities. Invoking this common sense, the development of hill 
stations was justified both politically and legally in the name of ‘public interest’. Yet, 
despite the discourse of public interest, these hill stations were meant to be private 
real estate projects. The redefinition of public interest was not only crucial in 
enabling the project but also effectively curbed all discussion on the propriety of 
such projects, thus legitimising the privatised hill stations.  
 
Second, it demonstrates how a network of politically powerful individuals, connected 
through kinship and friendship, often occupying influential positions in the 
government and in real estate companies, was crucial to the foundation of this city. 
Their involvement further blurred the lines between the project’s public and private 
interests. 
 
Third, the chapter argues that while Lavasa can be seen as a private real estate 
project, generating surplus through the monetisation of land, it is also building, 
sustaining and making real the representation of a private and somewhat utopian 
space. Lavasa is imagined not just as a gamble as a real estate project but also a 
speculation on a certain representation of space – as an environmentally sustainable, 
inclusive, well-governed city with a diversified economy, that is also profitable. This 
vision promises that future cities, when planned and managed properly through 
private partnerships and with a complete top-down vision, can avoid the politics and 
turmoil that characterises the Indian city of the past (and present). In so doing, it 
redefines notions of the public and the private, and aims to generate a public that 
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sees cities on the same terms. But this future city is only made possible by the very 
governance institutions it seeks to break free from. Ironically, despite its hefty 
political backing, it is precisely by grappling with these governance institutions that 
LCL sees the limits of what can be achieved through private planning.  
 
Section 4.1 explains why and how the state enabled the building of privatised hill 
stations. Section 4.2 foregrounds the actors responsible for envisioning Lavasa and 
how their original idea, which was confined to real estate, transformed into a city-
making project. Section 4.3, the largest part of this chapter, demonstrates that the 
vision for Lavasa is indeed utopian and this utopia is mobilised to produce a series of 
political effects. Section 4.4 examines how, despite its vision and government 
support, LCL reached the limits of what it could achieve through privatised planning. 
Section 4.5 concludes by asserting the importance of reading Lavasa as a ‘market 
utopia’ that attempts to conceal the way in which it was produced, a premise from 
which the rest of the dissertation proceeds. 
 
4.1. Needing the New: 1996 Hill Station Regulation 
 
Long before Lavasa was formally conceptualised, Sharad Pawar40 wanted to create 
Maharashtra’s own lake district (Damle, 2010; Vaidya, 2010a, 2010b) and, with 74 
medium and large lakes within the vicinity, Pune district seemed like an ideal site. A 
consultant was hired to conduct a feasibility study in the mid-1980s and a committee 
from the Government of Maharashtra’s (GoM) Department of Tourism was sent to 
study the English Lake District. The consultant maintained that the English Lake 
District had been “developed on the most sophisticated lines”, and that despite 
there being only a “few hundred square miles of inland water lakes” the British 
government had been “able to project the Lake District as a major tourist attraction 
for the whole of UK through excellent planning and development control” (Chaney, 
1989: sec 2.1). Therefore the GoM could probably do the same to provide 
destinations for urban residents seeking “a natural environment which is lacking in 
their daily lives” (Chaney, 1989: sec 2.1).  																																																								
40 One government informant suggested that the lake district idea was floated and developed 
independently of Pawar (G1 interview 01/10/2013). Archival material shows that the idea for the lake 
district goes back to the early 1980s, when Pawar was Chief Minister. Furthermore, Pawar is on 
record on numerous occasions asserting that this was his idea (Vaidya, 2008; 2012).  
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A partial plan for a lake district was laid out in the 1991-2011 Pune Regional Plan. 
The Plan identified inadequate tourist amenities and large-scale unplanned 
construction in the Western Ghats41 as two key problems that needed to be 
addressed through planning and policy: “careful planning is needed to forestall 
degeneration of natural beauty in the face of pressures from unsatisfied and 
therefore unruly crowds” (Pune Regional Plan, 1991: 165). It further stated that the 
district must “plan for tourism” to “ensure that unplanned sprawls” and 
“unregulated activities” do not “disfigure” or “spoil” the “natural beauty, historical, 
and religious sites” within the region. To this effect, it identified an “urgent need to 
develop self-sufficient townships with adequate housing and infrastructure” (Pune 
Regional Plan, 1991: 165). In addition, the GoM announced its Tourism Policy in 
1993, declaring areas around the lakes in Pune District as Special Tourism Areas and 
proposing strategies and incentives to develop tourism in the region. 
 
The integrated lake district idea did not get off the ground;42 instead, in November 
1996, the Urban Development Department (UDD) of the GoM passed the ‘Special 
Regulations for the Development of Tourist Resorts/Holiday Homes/Townships in 
Hill Station Type Areas’ (henceforth referred to as the Hill Station Regulation). 
Although passed by the Manohar Joshi (BJP – Shiv Sena) government, there are 
strong reasons to think that the regulation was heavily influenced by Pawar’s vision 
of promoting tourism in Maharashtra, as Pawar himself has asserted (Damle, 2010; 
Vaidya, 2012). Regardless, the Hill Station Regulation was an astonishing piece of 
legislation. Barely four pages long, scant in detail, it amended all regional plans within 
the state, stating “any suitable area at appropriate height and suitable topographical 
features can be declared by Government in Urban development Department for 
purpose of development as Hill Station” (1996:1). Given the prohibitively high cost 
of developing a new hill station (estimated at INR 300-400 crores (USD 60-80 
																																																								
41 The Western Ghat Region is a mountainous ecologically fragile area on the western coast of India 
covering approximately 130,000 square kilometres. Spanning four states: Karnataka, Maharashtra, 
Kerala and Goa, it is considered to be one of the “most significant repositories of India’s biodiversity” 
(Gadgil, 2012: 3).  
42 By one account, the bureaucrats and planners who went to see the English Lake District returned 
enthusiastically, but over time many of them were transferred to different government posts and the 
project was forgotten (G1 interview 01/10/2013). 
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million))43 the projects would be undertaken by private developers, in locations of 
their choice, with no financial support from the state government. To offset the cost 
of such an undertaking, the government offered certain tax exemptions to interested 
companies.  
 
Once an area had been chosen by a developer and declared a hill station, statutory 
ceiling laws44 would be relaxed within the region’s boundaries, enabling 
developers/individuals to purchase up to 4000 hectares of land (considerably more 
than under the existing ceiling limit). In addition, the purchase of agricultural land for 
non-agricultural purposes would be permitted (a transaction that would usually 
require the permission of the District Collector45). Purchase of adivasi (tribal) land 
was also sanctioned (which was later revoked) and the rehabilitation of affected 
adivasi communities would be the responsibility of the developer (although no 
guidelines were provided)46. Given that the Indian state has historically protected the 
right to land of tribal populations, and regulated agricultural land to prevent large-
scale land accumulation in the hands of private companies or wealthy individuals (and 
keep it in the hands of small farmers), these were significant concessions.47 In short, 
barring some stringent rules on construction and planning, sweeping rights were 
granted to the developer. A few concerned citizens responded to the regulation 
during the mandatory period of public consultation (many informants suggested that 
the regulations were passed very quietly and it was only when projects began to 																																																								
43 G1 interview, 01/10/2013 
44 As part of post-independence land reform policies, the Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on 
Holdings) Act, 1961 was passed to limit the amount of land held by any one individual. The ceiling 
limits were fixed in 1961 and were dependent on the type of land in question. For instance, one 
individual can have at most 7 hectares (18 acres) of irrigated land capable of yielding at least two 
crops a year and 21 hectares (54 acres) of dry crop land. The government acquires landholdings in 
excess of this ceiling limit, compensation for which is determined by the Collector. This land is to be 
distributed to landless persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, landless persons, 
and to persons from a pre-defined ‘priority list’. If, after this, there remains surplus land, the Collector 
can assign it to ‘public purpose’.  
45 According to the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, land used for agriculture cannot be used 
for any non-agricultural purpose except with the permission of the Collector. This law was put in 
place to protect agriculture and farmers and prevent speculative hoarding of agricultural land by non-
agriculturalists.  
46 According to the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code 
and Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1974, land belonging to persons belonging to the Scheduled 
Tribes, cannot be transferred to non-tribals without the permission of the District Collector.  
47 While post-independence land reform policies varied from state to state, the general thrust of 
these policies was to distribute land to the landless/marginal landowners. In Maharashtra, tenancy 
reforms sought to empower tenant farmers by giving them rights to buy the agricultural land they 
tilled. However, these reforms were in practice weak or subverted by the ruling elite (Khekale, 1999; 
Chakravorty, 2013)  
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emerge, that they were made aware of its existence).48 Eventually the cabinet passed 
the regulation with few modifications and even less fanfare.  
 
The Hill Station Regulation was premised on three noteworthy assumptions: first, 
that new hill stations were required to take the pressure off “overcrowded” extant 
ones and were therefore in the public interest. Second, that new hill stations were 
needed because “proper planning” would stall unauthorised construction (and 
concomitant environmental degradation) across the ecologically sensitive Western 
Ghats. Third, that the GoM was in no financial position to undertake such large 
investments and thus these projects would have to be private sector undertakings. 
Each of these points merits discussion. 
 
The hill stations of Maharashtra (Matheran, Mahabaleshwar, Lonavala, Khandala, and 
Panchgani) are undoubtedly popular weekend destinations for urban Indians from a 
variety of socio-economic backgrounds. Informants across the political spectrum 
(builders, government officials, civil society) concurred that existing hill stations are 
indeed just as “overcrowded” (i.e. had reached “carrying capacity”49) as the cities 
from which their visitors seek to escape. The activists who filed a Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL)50 against the Hill Station Regulation also agreed: “[they are] crowded 
definitely, and we need new areas. Yes, we need to get out and build new ones”.51 But the 
need for new hill stations was not one that was determined through surveys or 
scientific studies. In fact, no study was undertaken to evaluate the need for or the 
potential locations for such settlements; there is nothing obvious about building new 
settlements to address the problems of population/growth in existing ones.52 As one 
activist/scholar explained: 																																																								
48 Letters were not available. Upon filing an RTI to view these letters, I received a response that they 
had been burnt in the Mantralaya fire. 
49 G1 interview, 01/10/2013. 
50 In 1998 the BEAG filed three (jointly heard) writ petitions contesting both the Hill Station 
Regulation as well as the Amby Valley project. The former was contested on grounds of violation of 
statutory planning laws, environmental degradation, and violation of adivasi rights. Amby Valley was 
contested on grounds of illegalities, environmental damage, and illegal eviction of adivasis. The case 
was heard in the Mumbai High Court and the bench ruled in favour of the government and in partial 
favour of Amby Valley. 
51 C12 interview, 02/06/2012. 
52 As discussed in Chapter One, India built 118 new towns between 1974-1981, accommodating close 
to five million people in them. Some scholars suggest that this was probably the largest new town 
programme in the world (Glover, 2013). While these new towns were of an entirely different nature 
from hill stations (often company towns or towns with an industrial core), they were premised on 
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“Hill stations crowded? Which place in Pune is not crowded? This number 
(demographic) has more money but their demand will never be satisfied. 
Estimate how many hill stations will be needed if even five per cent of the 
urban population wanted to visit. For 15 million Indians, we just don’t have 
enough places. If all of them wanted to go to a national park, it is not 
possible.”53 
 
Yet, the GoM held the need to build anew as self-evident. An affidavit by then 
secretary of UDD presents this point emphatically,  
 
“The development of new hill stations is in the public interest. I further 
submit that the need to develop new hill stations is beyond dispute. I 
say that the pressure on the existing hill stations in the state is 
increasing every year and that several remedial measures, like 
developing new hill stations, are required to be taken in public 
interest.” (Desphande, 1998: 7) 
 
Two points are noteworthy: first, the UDD argued that new hill stations would be 
solutions to the problem of overcrowding faced by existing ones. Furthermore, 
these new hill stations would avoid the problems faced by existing hill stations as it 
would be comparatively “easier to regulate and control their development than to 
control and regulate the further development and expansion or improvement of 
existing hill stations” (Desphande, 1998: 6). According to this logic, the pervasive 
crisis of monitoring unplanned development could only be addressed by creating 
regulation for new planned development.  
 
Second, the UDD claimed that construction of new hill stations was in the public 
interest. Hill stations today do not evoke the elitist imagery they once did, as being 																																																																																																																																																														
some similar planning ideas. Radhamal Mukherjee, an eminent sociologist at that time, shared some of 
these views, and felt that starting afresh had the potential and ability to avoid the problems of existing 
cities and the uncontrolled growth they were then facing (Glover, 2013). More recently, Navi Mumbai 
was constructed to address the overcrowding in Mumbai and to provide a planned alternative to the 
main city (Shaw, 2004). But almost none of these cities have served as effective decongestants to 
existing overcrowding problems. 
53 C6 interview, 11/10/2012. 
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“closed communities of their own kind in a setting of their own design” (Kennedy, 
1996: 2) as they are now holiday destinations for a wide spectrum of Indians. 
However, in this case, by the GoM’s own admission, the new hill stations would 
largely be sites of second homes, echoing a direct alignment with the historical 
function of the hill stations as “a public site for the pursuit of private interests, a site 
where the British could re-create some semblance of a bourgeois civic life” 
(Kennedy, 1996: 88). In a country where most citizens do not own first homes, 
creating opportunities for the ‘public’ to invest in second homes, conjures a 
particularly elite definition of ‘the public’. As a former official within Department of 
Town Planning, Pune (DTP) explained,  
 
“At that time people had money and they wanted to invest in second homes. 
That was the trend. When I was working as ---, almost 60 per cent of 
proposals for land development were for farmhouse development. Then the 
Amby Valley54 project came, because Mahabaleshwar and Panchgani were 
crowded; that was the rationale of the government.”55  
 
It is important to note that the overcrowding in existing hill stations was/is driven by 
often-unauthorised construction by the middle-class/elite. For instance, one of the 
first reports that assessed the hill station of Mahabaleshwar claimed that although it 
had been planned for 14,000 people, the town received 219,000 visitors in 1984 
(Kapoor, 1984). This tourist demand generated building activity, which led to “land 
speculation outside the municipal limits at the cost of private forests and agricultural 
land” (Jayal, 1984: 1). The report, however, did not suggest that new hill stations be 
built, instead it advised the GoM to place “strict checks” on building and speculation, 
as well as on deforestation. Regardless, it was to deter this unplanned growth and 
illegal activity that the Hill Station Regulation (to allow planned farm-house 
development) was ostensibly put forth.  
 
The question of who should build these towns attracted more debate. The Hill 
Station Regulation was passed five years after economic liberalisation, pre-dating the 																																																								
54 Details of the Amby Valley project will be discussed later in the chapter and throughout this 
dissertation. 
55  G5 interview, 05/09/12. 
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various state-specific township policies and the SEZ Act (2005) that emerged in the 
2000s. Private sector involvement was encouraged for financial reasons. The 
developer, rather than the government would incur the cost of infrastructure (roads, 
water, drainage, electricity, tree planting, social works) but “the ultimate benefit” 
would go “to the public and the society at large” (BEAG Vs GoM CWP 2772 of 
1998: para 2). As an informant explained, “even hill stations like Mahabaleshwar have 
both private bungalows and public places such as parks, lakes, etc. So a private developer 
could build an open settlement, which combines private real estate with public amenities”.56 
Thus from the UDD’s perspective, the regulations were “framed with a view to 
combine development of privately owned land and utilise private financial resources” 
to develop an infrastructure for “public purpose without any burden on [the] public 
exchequer” (BEAG Vs GoM CWP 2772 of 1998: para 2). The UDD further 
rationalised private sector involvement by not only citing financial constraints but 
also assuming the inevitability of privatisation:  
 
“Government policy in respect of the development of new hill station 
sites is in tune with the new trends sweeping across the whole globe. 
Liberalisation and privatisation have become inevitable concomitants of 
development process all over the world. The government of India and 
all the respective state governments in this country have accepted the 
role of private enterprises in development of infrastructural facilities. I 
submit that this Hon’ble court can take judicial notice of fundamental 
policy changes that have taken place in this country over the last 
couple of years.” (Deshpande, 1998: 9) 
 
To be sure, the Hill Station Regulation sparked some opposition, the most notable of 
which was a case filed by the Bombay Environmental Action Group (BEAG) in the 
Mumbai High Court (BEAG Vs GoM CWP 2772 of 1998). The BEAG opposed the 
regulations on multiple grounds. First, they argued that the regulation was in 
violation of a number of statutory planning laws as stated in the Maharashtra 
Regional Town Planning Act (MRTP Act), 1966. Second, that the regulation would 
facilitate large-scale land grabs and dispossess farmers and adivasis. Third, that a 																																																								
56 G1 interview, 01/10/2013. 
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private developer could not be responsible for rehabilitating displaced adivasi 
populations and there was “no instance that the petitioners” were “aware of where 
a private developer has ever rehabilitated an oustee” (Mehta, 1998: para i). Fourth, 
the petition challenged the logic of creating a private hill station, and argued that the 
government could not permit the development of private hill stations just because it 
had been unable “to curb encroachments as alleged”; by that logic, it argued, the 
government would have “to sell off all its land” (Mehta, 1998: para 18).  
 
However, even in their opposition, BEAG’s petition did not contest the need for 
new hill stations; it merely contested their ‘privateness’. The petition was heard and 
resolved swiftly, with the court order upholding the regulation and emboldening 
many of the government’s perspectives on crowding, planning and privatisation: 
 
“According to us, the notification is essentially a policy decision of 
the government... tourism is developing and increasing rapidly and it 
is absolutely necessary to ease the pressure on existing hill stations. 
The State is not able to make such huge investment and hence invited 
private participation. It is a new concept introduced and in 
consonance with the global trend. This reminds us what Francis 
Backo has said, “He that will not apply new remedies must accept 
new evils for time is the greatest innovator”... The development of 
hill stations is the need of the hour. 
 
It has been pointed out by the State government and it cannot be 
disputed that all the existing hill stations in the state on account of 
population pressure and unauthorised constructions and 
developments, are facing environmental and ecological problems and 
hence it was necessary to have new hill station sites for proper and 
regulated development.” (BEAG Vs GoM CWP 2772 of 1998: 58) 
 
That the Hill Station Regulation withstood legal contest is significant for a number of 
reasons. First, it legitimated the common sense notion, as put forth by the 
government, that more hill stations were needed. In so doing, it prevented any 
further contestation on the propriety of such projects i.e., on whether new hill 
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stations were indeed desirable. Second, it upheld the notion that these 
developments would be different from others because they would be properly 
planned and regulated. Third, by invoking the inevitability of privatisation, the GoM 
firmly placed the private sector at the heart of settlement development. In sum, it 
created the policy conditions for the creation of a private hill station and firmly shut 
down certain avenues for resistance to them. As a former town planner explained, 
“once the policy is launched, you can’t stop the development”.57 
 
With the regulation cemented through a court order, developers began to apply for 
hill station development permission. Amby Valley, a 5000-acre gated tourist resort 
with Swiss aesthetic aspirations, had already been partially constructed before the 
Hill Station Regulation was passed. A controversial project, its land purchases had 
violated multiple land laws and its construction had also flouted planning and 
environmental norms (BEAG Vs. Sahara CWP 3041 of 1998). It too was challenged 
in court by the BEAG. Furthermore, various local government departments 
challenged the legality of the project but in 1998, it was ‘regularised’58 under the Hill 
Station Regulation. Thus, ironically, the first hill station built under a regulation that 
sought to enable ‘properly planned’ settlements, was itself an illegal construction 
(BEAG Vs. Sahara CWP 3041 of 1998). Amby Valley, in many ways was a precursor 
to Lavasa, and it gained notoriety over fraudulent land transactions (which were 
subsequently demonstrated in court), and over having been regularised post-facto.59  
 
In summary, the process by which the Hill Station Regulation was passed and came 
to life is illuminating for the following reasons: first, it was imagined as a way to 
promote tourism and reduce the burden on existing hill stations, which had become 
overcrowded over time. The regulation emerged from a common sense need to 
generate more settlements, not based on techno-scientific analysis or even expert 
opinion, but rather from a long standing and widely held view that holds the new as 																																																								
57 G5 interview, 05/09/2012. 
58 Regularisation refers to the process by which courts and planning authorities provide legal status to 
settlements, buildings, and structures that are either illegal or in violation of planning norm. 
59 The Amby Valley project was built by the Sahara Group, a firm with wide business interests (retail, 
finance, housing, hospitality and manufacturing) whose CEO was imprisoned in 2014 for investor 
fraud. It assembled land before the Hill Station Regulation was passed and therefore violated both the 
Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 and the Maharashtra Land Revenue 
Code, 1966 (details discussed in Chapter Five). The Mumbai High Court regularised the project in 
1998 and it has since functioned as a gated community with minimal political opposition. 
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a solution to the intractable problems of the present. Second, it was justified on the 
grounds of preventing further environmental degradation caused by haphazard 
farmhouse development. It would therefore be a way to pursue planned and 
environmentally sustainable settlement development in the face of widespread 
ecological damage. Third, it redefined public interest to enable large-scale privatised 
development and permit a private developer to build real estate. It argued that such 
private development would fulfil a public purpose by providing tourism 
opportunities and revenue. Finally, the outcome of the court contestation ensured 
that the need for hill stations could not be effectively challenged. The redefinition of 
public interest was not only crucial in enabling the project but also effectively 
curbed all discussion on the propriety of such projects, thus legitimising the 
privatised hill stations. Hence, by 1996 the stage for Lavasa’s emergence had been 
set.  
 
4.2. From Lake Town to Lavasa  
 
On 11 February 2000, Aniruddha Deshpande and his partners (LM Thapar of 
Ballarpur Industries, Ajit Gulabchand of Hindustan Construction Company, and 
Anuradha Desai of Venkateshwara Hatcheries) incorporated Pearly Blue Lake 
Resorts Private Limited and sought permission from the UDD to develop ‘Lake 
Town’.60 Another developer, Aqualand Private Limited, placed a similar bid but 
Pearly Blue Lake Resorts was chosen, and the reasons for its selection are “not 
available on record” (CAG, 2011: 94). Furthermore, the Principal Secretary of UDD 
claimed that it had not been necessary to float a tender as the project had been 
sanctioned on “a first come first serve basis” (CAG, 2011: 95). Between March and 
June 2000, the DTP swiftly declared an area that had been reserved for reforestation 
in the Pune Regional Plan (1991-2011) as suitable for the development of a hill 
station. It was in this area that Pearly Blue Lake Resorts began purchasing land. 
Subsequently, in June 2001, another notification was issued declaring approximately 
the area across 18 villages in Pune district (Mulshi and Velhe Taluka) as a hill station. 
Even though the Hill Station Regulation was passed in order to develop ‘properly 																																																								
60 The names of the project and the company changed a number of times. In 2002, Pearly Blue Lake 
Resorts changed its name to Lake City Corporation (LCC), after which it changed its name to Lavasa 
Corporation Limited (LCL) in 2004. The project’s name changed from Lake Town to Lavasa in 2004. 
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planned’ settlements and avoid ecological damage, no scientific/feasibility study was 
undertaken to evaluate site appropriateness (CAG, 2011), and the choices of 
developer and location were made swiftly and with no fuss. 
 
Multiple mythologies exist about site selection. In a newspaper interview Sharad 
Pawar stated, “It is 100 per cent true that I selected the site for Lavasa… I brought 
the helicopter down to examine the spot. I was later told that there was sparse 
habitation at that place” (Vaidya, 2010a: n.p.). A key member of Pearly Blue Lake 
Resorts on the other hand said: 
 
“I and one of my colleagues kept trying to get [a] large [area of] land, so 
we tried by helicopter to find land where there is no road access and no 
electricity. There is no access; he [the developer] has to walk…That was 
the only land in which I could have done [bought] 10,000 acres, at least in 
Pune district.”61 
 
By most accounts, the site was largely selected for its remoteness and potential ease 
of land purchase. The site had other attractive features too – nestled in a verdant 
valley with a large reservoir, its natural setting was (and is) spectacular. Moreover, 
the area falls squarely within Baramati Lok Sabha constituency, Sharad Pawar’s 
political constituency and power base since 1967.62  
 
  
																																																								
61 L10 interview, 12/08/2012. 
62 Sharad Pawar was first elected the Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Baramati in 1967. 
He was subsequently elected as the Member of Parliament (MP) from the same constituency in 1984, 
and continuously from 1991 to 2004. Subsequently his daughter, Supriya Sule, was elected MP in the 
2009 and 2014 elections. Therefore Baramati has been Pawar’s power base since 1967. 
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Figure 4.1. Lavasa’s Location  
 
 
Source: Author (2014) from Census of India (2001)  
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As Pearly Blue Lake Resorts began to purchase land in the area, so did a range of 
other companies including Yashomala Leasings and Finance Private Ltd (YLFPL) 
(selected land records, 2012).63 Sadanand Sule, Sharad Pawar’s son-in-law, held 1664 
shares in YFLPL in 2000 (Subramaniam and Jog, 2012). In 2002, the company merged 
with LCC (formerly Pearly Blue Lake Resorts) and shareholders were given 750 
equity stakes for every share in YLFPT; this amounted to the Sadanand Sule and 
Supriya Sule having a 20.81 per cent stake in LCC (Subramaniam and Jog, 2012), 
which they sold in 2004, when they exited the project.64 By July 2003, Pearly Blue 
Lake Resorts had purchased approximately 7000 acres in the area (the details are 
the subject of Chapter Five).  
 
Another Pawar family member was also associated with the project. The area 
declared as a hill station included different types of public land, which private 
companies are prohibited from purchasing. For instance, forest lands were excluded 
from Lavasa under the Environment Protection Act (1986) and the National Forest 
Policy (1988). Irrigation land, however, was under the Maharashtra Krishna Valley 
Development Corporation’s (MKVDC) control; from 2000 to 2012 it was headed by 
Ajit Pawar, then Maharashtra’s minister of irrigation, deputy president of the 
Nationalist Congress Party, Sharad Pawar’s nephew, Supriya Sule’s cousin, and later 
the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra. 
 
 
																																																								
63 YLFPL was incorporated in 1986 and was absorbed into LCL in 2002. YLFPL’s name appeared on 
many land records but it was not possible to calculate the total land area that they purchased over 
the years. 
64 It is unclear when YLFPL began to purchase these lands (before or after the formal announcement 
of the project) and whether they did so deliberately as a means to acquire and assemble land before 
the project was officially announced and/or to give the appearance that multiple firms were buying 
land instead of one single developer. Some informants suggested that in such cases land is often 
acquired by front companies due to ceiling law restrictions and only merged once projects are 
declared and they are given permission to purchase more than the ceiling limit (this point is discussed 
at length in Chapter Five). 
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Figure 4.2 Key actors and their relationships  
 
 
Source: Author (2014) based on multiple sources (as detailed in this chapter) 
 
In August 2002, MKVDC leased out 141.15 hectares (128.78 hectares of land 
submerged under the Varasgaon Reservoir and 12.368 hectares of non-submerged 
land) at INR 275,000 (USD 5500) per annum for 30 years (which amounts to a paltry 
INR 23,000 (USD 460) per month or INR162 (USD 3.25) per hectare per month) 
(MKVDC, 2002). This move was widely criticised, as the MKVDC knowingly leased 
public land to a private company at prices based on rural land use (in 2002) rather 
than future urban use.65 LCC received permission to use the submerged land for 
																																																								
65 Local land revenue departments calculate ready reckoner rates on an annual basis. These rates are 
calculated by averaging the prices paid for different types of land in different locations as depicted in 
registered transactions and information gathered from surveying local people. These rates are used to 
determine the present value of land. However, given the large black money component in most land 
transactions, the registered value is usually much lower than the amount that was actually paid. 
 117	
water sports and the remaining land for commercial purposes. Furthermore, 
MKVDC authorised the company to build ten small check-dams on the rivers feeding 
the reservoir. The CAG noted that the “permission to a private party for the 
construction of bandharas (check dams) to store and utilise water” and to “lift water 
directly from an irrigation project which serves a larger public purpose” “was [the] 
first of its kind in the State” (CAG, 2011: 101). Thus the GoM, using its 
interpretation of public interest, made both public land and water resources available 
to the company for the purpose of privatised hill station development. 
 
Similarly, excess ceiling lands were also transferred to LCC. Excess ceiling land is 
land that has been set aside for redistribution to the landless (as part of land reform) 
but has not yet been redistributed. The government argued that by transferring 
excess ceiling land to LCC it would generate revenues of INR16,471,178 (USD 
200,000), a substantially larger amount than it could collect by transferring the same 
land to the landless (INR102,736 (USD 2000)) (Additional Collector Letter, 2004). 
Revenue generation has not historically been the purpose of distributing excess 
ceiling lands and despite this professed concern for revenue generation, the GoM 
exempted LCC from paying stamp duty (CAG, 2011: 103). The inconsistency of 
these actions was a source of controversy: “one needs to question the State of 
Maharashtra and Pune District Administration that while transferring excess ceiling 
land to the Lavasa Corporation instead of the landless villagers the Administration 
looked interested in making profits. However, at the same time they lost huge 
money by exempting Stamp Duty which could have been paid by the Lavasa 
Corporation easily” (People’s Commission, 2009: 7). 
 
With all this land under their control, LCC revealed plans for Lake Town – a hill 
station with “world-class” facilities, that would cater to “middle and high-income 
segments of Maharashtra” (LCC, 2003: 10) and be the “largest eco-tourism project 
in Asia and probably the world’s largest project on eco-tourism combined with a 
township” (LCC letter to MKVDC, 27 May 2002: 1). The plans for the project got 
bolder with time. What started as a 7000-acre Lake Town in 2000 became a 25,000-
acre city called Lavasa by 2004. In the interim, the role of its primary promoter, 																																																																																																																																																														
Therefore, the prevailing market value of land is often much higher than values listed in the 
government ready reckoner rates.  
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Aniruddha Deshpande, diminished (he finally exited the project in 2010), Supriya and 
Sadanand Sule sold their shares and exited the project in 200466, and in 2004 Pawar 
became the Union Minister of Agriculture. Since 2006, Lavasa has been managed by 
Lavasa Corporation Limited (LCL), a subsidiary of the reputed 100 year-old 
Hindustan Construction Company (HCC)67, with CEO Ajit Gulabchand at the helm. 
 
With an annual turnover of USD 1.6 billion in the sectors of engineering, 
construction, infrastructure, real estate, and urban development and management, 
HCC is a public listed company with a reputation for building highly visible 
infrastructure projects such as the Bandra-Worli sea link in Mumbai, the Farrak 
Barrage in West Bengal (the longest barrage in the world), and over 50 per cent of 
India’s nuclear power generation capacity (HCC, 2011). Ajit Gulabchand wanted to 
expand HCC’s business from construction to “the entire space of developing, 
building and operating infrastructure and real estate” and also the “private water 
space” (Gopalan, 2008: n.p.).  
 
Gulabchand has long been an outspoken critic of the inefficiencies of the Indian 
government, heavily influenced by his early years engaging with the government 
while working as the managing director of Ravalgaon Sugar Farm. The process of 
dealing with various “archaic laws” led to a formative conclusion that “such a 
system” had to be “fought” (Gulabchand quoted in Gopalan, 2008: n.p.). Since then 
he has been a champion of the free-market spirit and the power of private 
enterprise. Gulabchand describes himself as coming “from a family of nation-builders 
who have contributed much to the development of modern India” and “from a stock 
that has, against certain odds, created entrepreneurship” in the country. He asserts 
that his “heritage” drove him to undertake large and often-difficult infrastructure 																																																								
66 In 2004, the Sule’s sold their stake in LCL and exited the project. Therefore an INR 1.66 lakh (USD 
3000) investment in YLFPL in 2000 amounted to an INR 18.64 crores (USD 3.7 million) in 2004 (a 
1125 percentage increase in four years when they exited the project) (Subramaniam and Jog, 2012), 
Some activists estimate that the gains were even higher (Banerjee, 2012). 
67 The company has four shareholders, HCC being the largest with a 65 per cent stake. The three 
other shareholding companies (Avantha Group Venkateshwara Hatcheries, and Vithal Maniar) are 
largely ‘silent’ partners that do not contribute to or interfere with the day-to-day operations of LCL. 
Venkateshwara Hatcheries (13 per cent share), headed by Anuradha Desai, is headquartered in Pune. 
Originally an agricultural group of poultry farmers, the firm has diversified its businesses (including 
having a controlling stake in English Football leage team Blackburn Rovers). Avantha group (16 per 
cent share) is a large business house in India with business interests in coal, sugar, insurance, banking 
and education. Vithal Maniar (6 per cent share) is a Pune based industrialist, a childhood friend of 
Sharad Pawar, and a trustee of various Pawar educational trusts.  
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projects and that the government, once “humbled from its control passion”, would 
“start seeing that prosperity has to be brought in with speed” (Gulabchand quoted in 
Kalbag, 2012: n.p.). Perhaps these statements represent the hubris of an 
entrepreneur, for it is only through receiving extensive state contracts that HCC has 
been able to build the vast array of infrastructure that it has today. 
 
It is this desire to be a visionary and nation builder and his long history in the 
construction business that pushed him to believe in his ventures, arguing that 
“engineering construction” and “urban development are the dire need of Indian 
society” (Gulabchand quoted in Kalbag, 2012: n.p.). In interviews, many employees 
pointed to the importance of Gulabchand’s role in imagining and forging a path for 
Lavasa, “the chairman has this view that he does not want India’s image to be that of cows 
and buffaloes but an India that gives the world something new”.68 And it was under his 
control that the project went well beyond its initial mandate of becoming a tourist 
destination to becoming a “replicable model for the development of future cities” 
(LCL, 2014: 77).  
 
As noted in Chapter One, many new towns were made flesh by individual visionaries 
and their patrons. Colonial hill station properties were seen to be attractive 
investments, and nearly all the houses belonged to those in the civil and military 
service. They were often driven by a “founding father”, a single individual “whose 
foresight and initiative were credited with setting the community on a stable footing” 
(Kennedy, 1996: 106). For instance, Ooty had John Sullivan, Hugh Malet set up 
Matheran, and John Chesson forged Panchgani (Kennedy, 1996). And although each 
was a member of the colonial state, their “role in the hill stations seemed rather 
more like that of the amiable country squire” (Kennedy, 96: 106-7). Similarly, the 
new town communities built in the United States in the 1950s were developed and 
funded by some of the wealthiest individuals and corporations in the nation; their 
membership of the “elite social networks of the developers also helped them gain 
approvals and get regulations changed” (Forsyth, 2005:18). Although LCL changed 
hands and revised its visions substantially over time, with many initial shareholders 
																																																								
68 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
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departing, as we shall see in the following chapters, it would remain plagued by its 
murky beginning.  
 
Lavasa, in its early form, was therefore not so much a product of global capital and 
the forces of foreign investment, as much as of a network of powerful local actors, 
often occupying influential positions within government maintaining close ties with 
real estate companies. As I have shown thus far, in its original conception (both in 
policy and in plan) Lavasa was nothing more than a very large real estate project with 
recreational appeal. To enable it, the GoM went against decades of legislation that 
sought to prevent concentration of land in the hands of companies and landlords, 
and keep public land in the hands of the government and small farmers. In so doing, 
it redefined public interest to enable private real estate interests. This “coalescence 
of interests between state and elite actors” (Weinstein, 2014: 42) created the 
conditions necessary for city-making. It is debatable whether this shift was due to a 
neoliberal turn in policy exemplified in the GoM’s and the High Court’s reification of 
privatisation or whether it was simply an issue of graft, an opportunity for connected 
politicians and their developer friends to make money from the land market.69 
 
4.3. The Vision: A Private Utopia in the Public Interest 
 
In a strange twist, Gulabchand’s re-imagination of Lavasa grew well beyond the 
confines of real estate. Undoubtedly his vision required the city to be a profitable 
enterprise, but to reduce it to a mere real estate venture would be to short-change 
its plan considerably; for instance, Lavasa could have become one of the many 
exclusive gated communities in the area such as Amby Valley, but it did not. 
Gulabchand had a larger vision, one that befitted the government’s mandate to build 
a post-colonial hill station. 
 
Deshpande’s original idea was to build a resort township with a planning philosophy 
of “live and play”, i.e., a site for second/holiday homes, combining tourism and real 
estate (LCC, 2003). But in 2003, LCC held a design competition; twenty firms 																																																								
69 A number of journalists and political analysts suggest that trading in land by politicians is not 
intended solely for personal gain; rather, the financial gains made are used to finance elections.  The 
NCP, with its long-standing control over agrarian and political institutions in western Maharashtra, is 
considered to be particularly adept at leveraging land markets to generate revenue for the party.   
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applied, five of which were shortlisted. The brief was open ended – to generate a 
profitable business on the land parcel while staying within the confines of the Hill 
Station Regulation (LCC, 2003).70 The international engineering, architectural and 
design firm HOK71 submitted the winning bid, laying out a conceptual master plan 
for a New Urbanist town where residents could ‘Live, Work, Learn and Play’, a 
town that “conveniences its residents by placing all essential components of daily life 
within walking distance of each other” (LCL, 2012b: 7.) and combining leisure with 
employment, education and residential living. And just like that, the plan for India’s 
first post-colonial hill station, constructed at the desks of an international planning 
firm, was accepted and put into motion. 
 
With this conceptual Master Plan in hand, Gulabchand pulled together a team of 
senior professionals and firms from a variety of backgrounds to turn the vision into 
reality. As the Master Plan was being developed, LCL commissioned global 
consulting firms AC Nielsen and Accenture to conduct early consumer research to 
understand the needs and desire “for an alternate model of urban living”.72 They hired 
the international firm of Landor as branding and marketing consultants, who began 
to create an identity for the town (discussed at length later in this section). The 
business development team was tasked with developing a business plan for the city 
to ensure its profitability. LCL employed a retired Mumbai city planner, with more 
than 40 years of experience in urban planning in Maharashtra, to put together a 
development plan for the city and ensure that the town would abide by the planning 
rules and norms of the GoM. Subsequently, Gulabchand headhunted a former 
Kansas City city manager, to take the reins and devise systems by which the town 
would be governed and managed efficiently. Thus the team, assembled from both 
the public and the private sector, developed a range of plans, in which LCL’s 
intentions for the city were made legible. Inspiration came from a variety of sources 
and places: the physical Master Plan draws on the American planning movement of 
																																																								
70 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
71HOK is the largest design firm in the USA, with offices across the world. They have masterplanned a 
number of greenfield sites in India (in addition to Lavasa), such as the Khed Special Economic Zone, 
Ensaara Metropark Project, Nagpur. Globally they have provided master plans for numerous 
regeneration as well as greenfield projects including, Bandar Seri Begawan in Brunei, Golden Harbour 
Ecotourism Resort, Chengdu Meng Yane New Town, Guiyang New World, and Xiamen Tong’an 
New Town in China (HOK, 2014). 
72 L2 interview, 21/06/2012 
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New Urbanism which aims to create mixed communities, walkable neighbourhoods 
and compact, transit-oriented, spatial development. The city’s business model is 
inspired by the conference economy of Davos, Switzerland and the educational 
cachet of Cambridge, Massachusetts.73 Together, these plans reflect LCL’s stated 
goals and the means through which those goals are to be achieved. 
 
Putting these plans together, Lavasa was imagined as a “world-class city,” a “prime 
tourist destination,” with educational institutions and “non-polluting industries,” a 
“more liveable city of the future” where people can “Live, Work, Learn, and Play in 
harmony with nature” (LCL, 2012a: 2). It is envisioned as a city “unique in its scale 
and guiding philosophy” (LCL, 2012a: 2), offering a “wide variety of advantages of 
urban living in the lap of nature” and a “unique value proposition” of “good 
governance”, “sustainability”, and “value-added features not found in the average 
city” (LCL, 2012b: 1). Rather than one single city, it would be a conglomerate of five 
small towns, each with a population of 30-50,000, to be built over four phases.74 
When complete they will form Lavasa, a “city with a diversified economy” (LCL, 
2014: 30), a permanent stable population of 240,000, 2 million annual visitors, and 
an employment base of 80,000 (LCL, 2014: 33).75 Moving far beyond the confines of 
real estate, LCL put forth a vision of a new Indian city – profitable, inclusive, well 
managed, environmentally sustainable, and managed by a private company. Different 
elements of this vision reside in different plans, to which I now turn.  
 
4.3.1. Representations of Lavasa: Nostalgia and/in the Future 
 
Lavasa presents a mismatch between the scale of the vision (the size of the project 
and its unabashed ambition) and the scale of the city’s physicality. Dasve, the first of 
the five towns of Lavasa, is modelled on the quaint Italian seaside town of Portofino. 
The waterfront promenade is flanked by a string of colourful Portofino-reminiscent 
																																																								
73 L7 interview 21/08/2012 
74 The project will be built in four phases incorporating different villages (the dates of these phases 
have changed over time). At the time of writing the four phases were: Phase 1 (pre 2008- 2014) – 
Towns 1 and 2: Dasve, Mugaon; Phase 2 (2014-19) – Town 3: Dhamanhol and Gadle; Phase 3 – Town 
4: Sakhri and Wadavali; Phase 4 – Town 5: remaining villages. 
75 The first feasibility study conducted by Chaney Consultants (1989) suggested that Varasgaon 
Reservoir (Lavasa’s site) had the capacity to host 296 tourists in 2011, a far cry from Lavasa’s 
projected population. 
 123	
buildings, giving it the reassuring look of a small holiday town rather than a city of 
the future. In fact, during the early days of the project, LCL used photos of the real 
Portofino in its advertising, rather than the unfinished, subtropical ersatz. Although 
different architectural styles are/will be used in other towns (e.g. Goan in Mugaon), 
they are consistently neo-traditional, an aesthetic that is often embraced by the 
New Urbanism planning movement. Lavasa’s vision and urban form are an 
incongruous combination of the iconographies of the hill station and the ‘world-
class’ city, the past and the future.  
 
Envisaged as a form of geographic escapism and characterised by European 
architectural forms such as Tudor and Gothic buildings, Swiss chalets, and the 
enduring hybrid of Himalayan-Gothic, colonial hill stations were built “by the British 
for the British” (Baker, 2009: 3) and their appeal was centred on them being ‘not 
Indian’. Visitors went to recuperate from the illnesses that had been inflicted upon 
them by the Indian city as well as to engage in recreational activities. Marked by a 
longing for English domesticity and nostalgia, the hill stations’ “fantasy like” 
atmosphere of a “tranquil English village” imbued “their inhabitants with an 
unmistakable sense of themselves” as agents of a superior culture, charged with the 
responsibility to ensure that the fidelity and determination that had taken them to 
India did not deteriorate in this physically and morally corrupting land” (Kennedy, 
1996: 7). To that effect, King argues that hill stations served to “maintain the social 
structure and social behaviour of the British colonial community in India” (1976: 
196). The attempt to re-create rural England was not only to evoke something of 
the “physical appearance of their homeland but to recover elements of its moral 
meaning as well” (Kennedy, 1996: 106). Within this lineage, it is not surprising that 
Lavasa’s physical form is ‘not Indian’ but rather nostalgic, foreign, and bucolic. 
 
Mimicry has long been a common trope in urbanism. Just like the colonial hill 
stations, many other types of new towns have long drawn inspiration from and 
reference other (almost always foreign) places. Portofino, for instance, has not only 
inspired Lavasa but also Port Meiron in Wales and Loews Bay in Florida. Similarly, 
Chengdu British Town, Venice Water Town, and Huizou are new Chinese replicas 
of Dorchester (England), Venice (Italy), and Halstatt (Austria) respectively. Many of 
these towns, rather than generating a vision of the future, are themed environments 
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that have been “airlifted from their historical and geographical foundations” to 
recreate not only the superficial appearance of western historical cities, but also the 
“feel” – the atmospheric and experiential local color – of the originals through such 
devices as foreign names, signage, and lifestyle amenities” (Bosker, 2013: 2). These 
places are “meticulously reconstructed versions of the most iconic cities of the 
West”, the iconography of which is, according to Bosker “a potent symbol for their 
ascension to—and aspiration for––global supremacy and the middle-class comforts 
of the “First World” (Bosker, 2013: 3-4).   
 
A different kind of mimicry and referencing is evident in the building of ‘world-class 
cities’. Scholars have noted that Asian cities are increasingly inter-referencing each 
other, for instance, Mumbai aims to be the next Shanghai (Prakash, 2008), and 
Shenzen was to be transformed into Hong Kong. Indeed, the “art of being global” 
involves “promiscuous borrowings, shameless juxtapositions, and strategic 
enrolments of disparate ideas, actors, and practices from many sources circulating in 
the developing world, and beyond” (Ong, 2011: 23). These cities do not faithfully 
copy the original but rather use modeling as a “practice that tries to capture some 
aspect, style, or essence of that original” (Ong, 2011: 15). The ‘world-class city’ 
refers to the future, where “city ambitions are re-imagined in relation to shifting 
“forms and norms” of being global” (Ong, 2011: 4). Such a city is competitive and 
aspirational. And if the hill station looks to the past, then the ‘world-class city’ looks 
to the future, conjuring “worlds beyond current conditions of urban living” (Ong, 
2011: 13). If, as Kennedy argues, the purpose of nostalgia, is in part to “shift 
attention away from the circumstances that give rise to it” (1996: 116), then what is 
the purpose of looking to the future? Ong argues that such imageries are speculative 
and can include “associated disciplinary effects such as the introduction of new 
governing norms or the incorporation of unwilling or skeptical subjects into a new 
scheme” (Ong, 2011: 15).  
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Figure 4.3: The many Portofinos  
 
I) Portofino Harbour, Italy 
 
2) Dasve, Lavasa 
 
3) Loews Portofino Bay Hotel, Orlando, Florida  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. Image of 
the convention centre can be viewed at https://www.loewshotels.com/d/portofino-bay-
hotel/Exterior/__thumbs_hero_property/UEPBH_55668945_Portofino_Bay_-
_Primary_Image_1600x1035_150dpi.jpg ] 
 
Sources:  1) Stan Shebs (2000) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Portofino_harbor_right.jpg 
distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Generic license.2) Cryongen 
(2009), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lakeside_View_at_Dasve_-_Lavasa.JPG distributed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.  
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In trying to promise something new to India, it is not the skyscrapers of Manhattan 
or Hong Kong, but the bucolic quaintness of Europe that Lavasa’s architecture 
conjures. Much like many American and Chinese small new towns, Lavasa embraces 
European architectural nostalgia, arguably seeking to give itself a history of which it is 
fundamentally devoid.76 But it is not a meticulous copy like its Chinese counterparts. 
Juxtaposed against the city’s cobble-stoned ‘Portofino Street’, is the Lavasa 
Convention Centre on (the generically named) ‘Event Street’. The building’s glass 
façade belies the Italian aesthetic of the rest of the town (Figure 4.4), as do the villas 
with stone walls and verandahs, and theme-park-like water fountains in the middle of 
the reservoir, which light up at night. The bilingual signage is consistently blue and 
white, and the logo is ubiquitous. While from afar the town looks like a replica of 
Portofino, upon closer inspection, it is replete with incongruous architectural forms 
and corporate branding. Furthermore, by adopting state-of-the-art and often high-
profile technologies and plans, such as biomimicry and hydroseeding for 
environmental management (discussed at length in Chapter Seven), a NASA space 
theme park, and a ‘Nick Faldo’ golf course, it also seeks to offer something of the 
future. In promising a future city, its representations juxtapose quaint Italian 
architecture with world-class efficiencies. The city brochure makes this point 
emphatically: 
 
“Life in Lavasa has been envisioned as energetic yet calm, aspirational 
yet affordable, hi-tech yet simple and urban yet close to nature. Goan 
and Mediterranean themed villa and apartments radiate outwards 
from the cosmopolitan town centre all along the lakefront. Here, 
residents and visitors can access state-of-the-art amenities while 
enjoying the tranquillity of wide-open expanses and a scenic natural 
waterfront… Lavasa aspires to establish a new benchmark in India of 
																																																								
76 As one informant explained, the use of Italian architecture styles was about creating a sense of 
‘timelessness’: “Tuscan Villas, it means make your buildings and villas such that every second sale should not 
knock off the house, it should be timeless. Like the Victoria Terminus in Mumbai is a classic building, no one 
will think of pulling it down whereas any other bungalow in Pali Hill (Mumbai) will be knocked off by the next 
guy [who buys it] because the appreciation is always for the land and never the build up. So, it means that 
can we build our villas such that they stand the test of time even after three or four sales” (L2 interview, 
21/06/2012). 
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a fully planned city based on innovation and rejuvenation such that 
what is finally delivered is a balanced life.” (LCL, 2012: 4) 
 
Figure 4.4: Architectural styles in Lavasa  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. Image of 
the convention centre can be viewed at http://www.licc.in/index.aspx and rental housing at 
http://www.lavasa.com/live/rental-housing.aspx] 
 
The environment and nature are core motifs in representations of Lavasa. The city is 
being built along the banks of the Varasgaon Reservoir, in an area marked for 
afforestation in the Pune Regional Plan. It is precisely its unique location that renders 
the environment and nature so central to the project. Lavasa’s New Urbanist design 
principles ensure compact and dense development in the town centre to enable 
pedestrian rather than car use, which they claim (correctly) is less energy intensive 
than sprawl. Furthermore, since the area was denuded, planners have worked with 
biologists and developed a landscape plan to “rejuvenate deforested area[s] and 
drive future landscape performance” (HOK, 2014: n.p.). Lavasa’s Development Plan 
has been “prepared with the objective of delivering planning solution[s] through [a] 
creative blend of development and environment” and conceives Lavasa “as a place 
for modern human habitation in harmony with nature” (Lavasa SPA, 2011: 95).  
 
The physical reality and pictorial representations of Lavasa constantly straddle the 
nostalgic and the future. The latter shows future residents and visitors (none of 
whom wear any Indian clothing) enjoying the verdant town through consumption 
(restaurants, hotels, shopping, recreation) and engagement with nature. The aerial 
view depicts the town, where citizens can engage in work as well as entertainment, 
on the one side and an expanse of unpopulated hills on the other. In each of the 
representations of Lavasa in Figure 4.5 Lavasa is depicted as replete with urban 
amenities in a serene natural setting suitable for relaxation.  
 
In this vein, one of the most striking aspects of Lavasa is its elaborate and high-
profile branding and marketing. Once the Master Plan had been devised, Lavasa 
hired the international branding company Landor Associates to develop the city’s 
brand. In choosing the name ‘Lavasa,’ Landor applied the:  
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“usual principles of branding. They wanted it to be an acquired name, not 
a typical dictionary name. The first two or three workshops we had were 
on name creation. They gave us Scrabble ... everyone was given a few 
letters. The first two or three workshops were on naming. We were asked 
to create words which had phonetic value but did not mean anything. We 
created around 100 words out of which Lavasa was one. Everyone applied 
their own logic or rationale and come up with a name. Someone created 
the name Lavasa, I think [the] Chairman himself created it.”77  
 
The name, therefore, reflects the corporate ethos of the city, where the name is as 
manufactured as the city itself.78   
 
Taking this a step further, Landor developed a 9-cell brand driver, consisting of an 
accessory, a car, an animal, a piece of furniture, colour, font, architecture, game, and 
drink, in which the cells represented the core “values that personify the brand”79 (a 
photograph of which was displayed on most desks at LCL’s main office). For 
instance, the Sunto 6 watch signifies a “multi-functional watch” which is “simple” 
“efficient” and not “overt”. The Saab Estate represents “family values” – i.e. “Saab 
Estate is a family car, it is a family drive. Keep the family in mind when you develop this 
town. It is not a romantic getaway or an escapist town”.80 Similarly, the dolphin was to 
symbolise the sales team and customer service – “they should be smart, warm and 
cheerful and active”.81 Therefore, the image the company developed was meticulously 
thought through and deliberate in what it set out to achieve: 
 
“What are our brand dynamics? It has to be linear, it cannot be gaudy. 
There can be no curves in my brand. Landor has given me an entire book, 
as a bible, on how my look and feel should be. You will never see intricate 																																																								
77 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
78 However, some villagers suggested that the name Lavasa is an acronym composed of the names of 
the key investors – (L – L M Thapar, A – Ajit Gulabchand, V – Vithal Maniar, A – Anuradha Desai, S – 
Supriya/Sadanand Sule, A – Anirudha Desphande) – a hypothesis that seems plausible but could not be 
verified, suggesting that perhaps the delirium of corporate branding (or the story of it) was only 
masking the realpolitik of the project.  
79 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
80 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
81 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
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curvy things in anything: no curls, no flowers... It is a corporate brand and a 
destination brand. Because we were going to be pegging to industry, 
pegging to a certain kind of a profile, there has to be a certain elegance 
about it, it cannot be loud.”82 
 
Figure 4.5: Representations of Lavasa  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation] 
 
Urban planning in India has rarely been about selling urban space, but about 
acquiring, planning, and allocating space. A project of this size and scope, with real 
estate as one of its founding pillars, could not function without a powerful 
marketing team and strategy. Therefore, the marketing message had to be carefully 
and precisely chosen: 
 
“80 per cent of the revenue is real estate itself. So, we are actually a real 
estate player. But what we as a brand are doing is that we are creating a 
city; city, hill station, hill town, whatever you wish to call it. We are a 
company that also provides the social infrastructure and going forward 
industrial infrastructure, too. So we asked ourselves, are we really a real 
estate company? No. We are an urban development and management 
company which sells real estate. How do we differentiate ourselves from 
these people? So what would be the marketing tactics? We decided that 
we would never go and stand in a real estate exhibition on a stall where 
everybody else is also present. So, as a rule, we have never taken part in 
any exhibition. We never sell bungalows and apartments; we sell the model 
of city development. So there is no call to action about selling real estate in 
terms of [the number] of square feet and apartments and all those things. 
We tried to dwell a lot on our tourism aspect to make it a more exciting 
place to be. And through the thought leadership forums, we said that India 
needs new cities and Lavasa is a model – come be with Lavasa so that you 
are as visionary as we are.”83   
 																																																								
82 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
83 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
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Furthermore, LCL actively chose to build a city and not a gated community for a 
number of reasons, some more operational than others. The large project area 
contained a number of public roads, and it was not possible to ring fence the city. 
The inability of the company to buy all the land within its perimeter contributed to 
this decision (discussed in detail in Chapter Six). While Lavasa has a gate (at which 
security guards note your name, exchange pleasantries and offer you a map), in 
theory access cannot be denied as the road passing through is public. But LCL also 
had a vision: Lavasa should be for “the entire cross section and not just the elite”.84 The 
regulation of entry was debated and it was decided that visitors would be stopped 
for information but not be prevented from entering the city. Although LCL is 
“entitled by a court order to charge an entry fee to the area”, they decided that it was 
not “worth it” and that Lavasa should be a “free place”.85 Multiple employees felt that 
the project would have suffered less controversy had it been gated, “if we had gone 
for the Amby Valley approach86, we may have been safer. Today people can come in, take 
photos, organise protests, do what they like and it’s like an open city. As a planner I like 
that idea, that I’m building a city for everyone, not just the elite”.87   
 
Lavasa therefore straddles being a hill station, a tourist destination, a real estate 
project, and a city of the future. Its representations and built environment are both 
bourgeois banal and utopian – global in aspiration, yet domestic and reassuring. It is 
an original pastiche, combining various urban forms and models to deliver India’s 
future city, which as we shall see in the next section, is founded on the profitability 
of real estate.  
 
4.3.2. Turning a Profit 
 
According to LCL, Lavasa’s core value proposition is in integrating the “various 
businesses that comprise the development and management of Indian cities (such as 
real estate, infrastructure, consumption and governance) [that] are currently 
fragmented in most Indian cities” (LCL, 2014: 182). In so doing, Lavasa is not merely 
a real estate project or even a weekend holiday destination but a city with its own 																																																								84	L4 interview, 01/06/2012.	
85 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
86 The speaker is referring to the fact that Amby Valley is a gated community. 
87 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
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“365 day economy” (LCL, 2014: 182). It will generate profits from three revenue 
streams: real estate, infrastructure, and consumption (of retail, leisure, hospitality, 
education, and health). The aim therefore was, and is, not only to “develop and sell 
real estate but to develop an economy” where LCL will “expect to share in the 
revenue streams related” to its “ongoing consumption and infrastructure businesses” 
(LCL, 2014: 194). Each of these components is addressed below. 
 
As of 17 June 2014, Lavasa had signed agreements88 for 12 million square feet of real 
estate, which includes residential (1673 apartments, 513 villas, 135 villa plots and 399 
rental housing units), commercial, and institutional real estate (LCL, 2014). The 
target, once the project is completed in 2020, is 149 million square feet of real 
estate development. The real estate business therefore includes “the sale and/or 
lease of such structures and buildings and the lease of underlying land, development 
of plots, construction of residential, commercial, institutional, hospitality and social 
real estate as well as the sale of built up structures and/or lease thereof” (LCL, 2014: 
194). This revenue was/is only made possible by the astounding returns that could be 
made on land. For instance, land purchased in 2002, was bought at approximately 
INR 13 to 35 per square metre and those lands, developed and sold in 2010 were 
priced at INR 3114 and 6034 per square metre (CAG, 2011: 103). Some proportion 
of this increased appreciation is due the investment in infrastructure by LCL, but 
even so, the turnover on cheap rural land is a core pillar of their business model.  
 
However, as real estate revenues are largely one-off and short-term gains, the 
business model needed to go a step further:  
 
“When I came in 2006, we had already 10,000 acres of land with Lavasa. 
The first version of the Master Plan was in place so the business plan 
reflected the Master Plan because those two have to go together in a 
project like this. But it wasn’t really very sexy from a financial standpoint 
that would interest the financial community. So you would keep asking 
yourself ‘why am I doing this’ and keep going back at it and seeing how 
																																																								
88 LCL provides 999 year leasehold agreements so that it can retain control over the underlying land 
and development plan.  
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can we rework it… plus realising that it’s going to cost you a lot more than 
you thought it would.”89 
 
It was from this standpoint that the business development team developed the 
second component – LCL having equity stakes in the various businesses operating 
within Lavasa. In most of its current partnerships, LCL has an equity position - 
typically a minority position of 26 per cent but large enough to have a say in the 
business as per Indian company law. Each business operating in Lavasa not only 
contributes to the city’s economy but also provides LCL with dividends, although, of 
course, at some point, LCL may choose to exit from these businesses and cash in on 
their investments. Moreover, the consumption business is/will be founded on 
“ongoing revenue streams in the hospitality, education, healthcare, tourism, leisure 
and retail sectors of our economy, through direct or indirect participation” (LCL, 
2014: 194). Thus land is a core component of revenue for the first 10-15 years (as it 
is a finite resource) and long-term revenues are generated through annuity. At a 
certain point of time when the project reaches its critical mass, LCL hopes that the 
revenues from these businesses will pay the city. It is too early to say whether these 
plans will work out as anticipated. 
 
But to make this model work in the long run, the city can not only be a site for 
second homes (with a largely seasonal/weekend economy), it also needs to develop 
its own economy. If the city was “not recognized as a successful commercial 
destination”, then residents would use their properties only as second homes and 
this would “place additional pricing pressures” on Lavasa’s “consumption businesses” 
(LCL, 2014: 38). So the question became ‘how could LCL generate a 365-day 
economy?’ 
 
When the current head of business development joined the team with years of 
experience in the Indian hospitality industry under his belt, his brief was “to take the 
Davos model and replicate it”.90 The Swiss site of the annual World Economic 
Forum (WEF) is characterised by a large convention centre and a number of hotels. 
Thus “unlike Hong Kong where you can go to the convention centre, where you can 																																																								
89 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
90 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
 133	
spend two or three days without ever having to step out if you don’t want to and 
then go back to the airport”,91 Davos requires engagement with the city, which 
creates traffic throughout the town. Gulabchand, a regular attendee of the WEF, 
“wanted to replicate” the Davos model in the hope of eventually bringing an Indian 
version of the WEF to Lavasa.92 Thus with plans to host two million visitors per year, 
tourism would fill up the hotels and the city on the weekends, and the convention 
centre would create a “Monday to Friday economy”.93 In its short life, Lavasa has 
regularly hosted events at its convention centre94 but it remains by and large a 
weekend destination for tourists and is still far from being a 365-day economy. 
 
In addition to conferences and hospitality, the business plan has several other 
sources of consumption revenue. For instance, education is a significant component 
of Lavasa’s consumption business. Education was recognised as a focus for two 
reasons: first, higher education is a growing market in India where middle-class 
students are willing to pay high fees for a premium education. Second, LCL is 
acutely aware that most new town projects struggle with establishing baseline 
populations but Lavasa’s location and newness would not be a disadvantage as 
students are often willing to relocate for education. Therefore, Lavasa’s business 
plan incorporated partnerships with niche and highly reputed foreign educational 
institutions for which there are few substitutes in India in order to attract a stable 
population of students to the city, and ignite its economy. To that effect, LCL 
pursued a number of international and domestic institutional partners. For primary 
education partners, it searched the UK with the assistance of Deloitte consulting 
firm, and shortlisted a few international schools and also established a joint venture 
partnership with Doon Public School to start a boarding school in Mugaon by 2017 
(LCL, 2014). At the tertiary level, the corporation was approached by a number of 
Indian institutions such as Christ College and Symbiosis (Pune). Soon after LCL 
signed partnership deals with Ecole Hotelier Lausanne and Oxford University for 
executive education (although Oxford later pulled out of the arrangement). In 
planning the city as an education hub LCL took inspiration from Cambridge, 																																																								
91 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
92 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
93 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
94 For instance, it has held hospitality conferences, a literature festival in association with the Times of 
India, numerous Bollywood events, and a range of other corporate conferences. 
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Massachusetts.95 The corporation also entered into similar partnerships with a range 
of international hotels and private healthcare providers. A large proportion of its 
current contracts are joint ventures with well-known international brands in 
hospitality, recreation, health and education, and at the time of writing, were still 
being developed.  
 
Finally, LCL has developed and owns physical infrastructure assets such as “water 
and sewage, drainage, solid waste management, power, roads, street lighting, 
landscaping, public utilities and information, communication and technology” and it 
also has developed and maintains “social infrastructure such as town halls, parks and 
gardens, post offices and police and fire stations” (LCL, 2014: 178). It delivers these 
services and manages its assets through jointly owned Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPVs). These various SPVs will “treat 100 per cent sewage and solid waste”/“have 
100 per cent piped water and sewage”, have storm water drains that cover their 
road network, and have a water supply network to “deliver 216 litres per capita per 
day” and provide drinkable tap water (LCL, 2014: 178). In addition to developing 
these assets, LCC collects revenues through “the city management services in the 
form of common area maintenance charges, water usage charges and other 
miscellaneous fees” (LCL, 2014: 196). Indeed, it is the smooth functioning of this city 
management service that LCL believes is a “key feature” of its “replicable model for 
the development of future cities” (LCL, 2014: 76).   
 
That said, this ambitious business model presents a serious challenge, one that all 
new towns face: 
 
“The challenge of the model is that it is a chicken and an egg. It works if 
everything works, so you have to get this ballet going. The challenge is to 
get people to buy into it. And in the early days it is obviously a bigger 
challenge than it is later. So I remember when we first did the global 
exercise with Accor and others like Intercontinental [hotels] and they said 
‘looks great, sounds great, but in India we think it’s too early.’”96  
 																																																								
95 L7 interview, 21/08/2012 and LCL, 2009 
96 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
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With a range of revenue streams from real estate, shares and annuities, the business 
plan projected a financially secure future in the long run. LCL’s aim of creating a 
365-day economy using hospitality, education, health, and tourism as its key pillars is 
undoubtedly ambitious, requiring large amounts of upfront capital and an enormous 
appetite for risk. The project cost is estimated at INR 30,000 crore (USD 6 billion) 
and is being financed through equity, loans, quasi-equity, and securitized debt (LCL, 
2014: 53). After a failed attempt in 2010, in 2014 LCL filed for an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO), making itself a listed company on the Indian stock market in order 
to generate financing for future stages of the project.  
 
In summary, generating revenues and running the city in a profitable manner is one 
of the key components of Lavasa’s vision. Lavasa’s profitability is not merely a 
requirement for project viability in and of itself but also for demonstrating that 
Indian cities, if structured a certain way, can be profitable. As a “replicable model 
for development of future cities”, Lavasa must be functional and profitable, with a 
diverse economy, failing which, LCL’s “brand and image will suffer” and, accordingly, 
will lose any “competitive advantage with respect to winning future projects” (LCL, 
2014: 49). This sets Lavasa apart from many other new city projects, which were 
largely bankrolled by the state.  
 
4.3.3. Responding to India’s Urban Crises: Public Failures, Private 
Solutions 
 
Urban experiments, as discussed in Chapter One, are often responses to the 
existing maelstrom of urbanism. They seek to eschew the failures of the present to 
conjure a better and often radically different future. In this vein, LCL’s vision is 
premised on the failure of planning and governance of Indian cities, the solution to 
which “is for India to plan and build a portfolio of newer and smarter cities that 
provides for the increasing migration” (LCL, 2012b: 3). LCL seeks to build a 
prototype of such a better Indian city and claims that Lavasa will realise its vision 
through its various privately planned plans (master plan, development plan, and 
business plan) and through its unique governance structure. Like all models, this was 
to serve as a demonstration project – a model of an alternative future, one with an 
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integrated governance model, improved services, and greater resource efficiency 
than existing Indian cities: 
 
“Chairman Gulabchand’s view was that we can do better and we can do 
better on several levels. We can do better in the sense of how the services 
were provided and the quality of service that people would expect 
elsewhere in the world, and we can do better in terms of so many 
structural and resource efficiencies by coming up with a new model and 
the intention of Lavasa is to be proving that, a prototype for that…  
 
Our argument is that it is not the building that you are buying… It is not 
the four walls of your private residence that is your fundamental need, it is 
the city experience. It is the sense of belonging to a city, of services that 
you can rely on… there is not trash all around, you can drink water from 
the tap and the power is reliable…There is a much higher threshold of 
service and quality of life that is expected in the city.”97  
 
The informant is not only directly referring to the failure of planning and 
governance in existing Indian cities, but is suggesting that Lavasa is an experiment, a 
prototype that would improve ‘city experience’, largely defined as ‘service delivery’ 
in this instance. Lavasa’s conception is responding to two diagnosed failures of 
Indian cities – the failure of planning and the inadequacy of governance: 
 
“Our cities are not planned, they are extremely haphazard, I mean, even 
today, if anybody is honest they are still living off the infrastructure the 
British left behind. So to that extent there is a huge difference, where 
someone has actually done a traffic analysis and someone has thought of 
how much water, how much power, the standards that are required for the 
citizens.”98 
 
“We will overtake China by the 2030s as the [world’s] largest country [in 
terms of population]. Where are we going to live? I mean, the existing 																																																								
97 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
98 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
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cities are a disaster, at least most of them are… and you know, I don’t 
mean to be too harsh, the reality is that Indian cities are badly managed 
and that is not because there aren’t many good people trying to manage 
them but it is because structurally they are not given the resources, they 
are not given policy control. They are, in so many ways, handicapped. The 
cities aren’t run well, the services are bad and yet we are going to pour 
300 million people into them! It’s insanity.”99  
 
These views of Indian urban planning are neither new nor expressed by LCL 
employees alone. The first quote suggests that Indian cities suffer not from a failure 
of planning, but rather from its absence. Planning here is conceptualised in its 
techno-scientific form – as traffic analysis, knowing power requirements, etc. The 
second statement is made in a different vein; that governance in Indian cities is poor 
because of a fundamental structural problem – that of inadequate resources and 
control given to those who manage them. Scholars too have made this observation 
in the Indian context, arguing that municipal governments are powerless and do not 
have sufficient autonomy in governance from the politics of states and the centre 
(Pinto, 2000; Weinstein, 2009).100 
 
These views were expressed through high-profile full-page advertisements in major 
English daily newspapers (see Figure 4.6). The scale of advertising was deliberately 
large, to communicate the scale of the Lavasa vision.101 Aside from developing a 
strong brand identity through conventional advertising, in 2009-10, LCL embarked on 
an award-winning and highly visible ‘Future Cities Campaign’102 through 
advertisements in a major English daily newspaper and panel discussions with urban 																																																								
99 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
100 The Indian constitution, in laying out the country’s federal structure, did not outline the 
responsibilities of local government in detail (Weinstein, 2010). The drafters of the constitution 
ascribed power to state and central governments in part because of their concerns over regional 
fragmentation at the time. Independence leaders believed that local politics and power would more 
likely be organised on communal/ethnic principles rather than democratic ones, and so the federalist 
principle did not extend down to the local level (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). Although Indian cities 
are governed by municipal corporations (with a democratically elected mayor and municipal council), 
state governments have the right to override the decisions made by municipal corporations. 
Therefore, municipalities tend to have little autonomy and power. This changed with the passing of 
the 74th Constitutional Amendment in 1992, which enabled urban governments to make more 
decisions, but the actual devolution of powers has been poorly executed.  
101 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
102 See www.lavasafuturecities.com for the full campaign. 
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experts on television. These full-page advertisements, though very clearly sponsored 
by LCL, did not explicitly refer to the city in their main content. Instead they 
highlighted what they deemed as the key issues facing Indian cities: issues of 
governance, environment, technology, planning and infrastructure. This campaign was 
premised on two assumptions: that existing Indian cities had failed their citizens on a 
wide range of counts, and that they were “filled to the brim”, with “no place left to 
go” (LCL FCC, 2011a: n.p.). The campaign was “an initiative born of a vision to build 
new cities that are sensitive to the environment and intelligently planned for a fast-
evolving future” (LCL FCC, 2011a: n.p.) – implying that one of the main solutions to 
Indian urban problems was to build new cities. 
 
LCL’s account of India’s urban problems in this campaign achieved a number of things. 
First, it made visible the intractable problems of existing Indian cities. In each full page 
advertisement it asked a different question: “Why is our city infrastructure always 
behind time?”, “Why do you have to knock on a hundred doors to get one answer?”, 
“Where have all the trees gone?”, “Does somebody take responsibility for your city’s 
problems?” In doing so, it linked existing urban problems to failures of public planning 
and governance. Second, by concluding each advertisement with the question, “Isn’t it 
time to build our future cities?” it defined the future city as “One in which you can 
breathe clean air”, “A city where the infrastructure is planned for a growing 
population”, “Where the distance from home to work is minimal”, with “Transparent 
governance structures with an accountable city manager”, “Where decisions on city 
issues are taken on time”, “Where the city functions efficiently because it is mapped 
through technology”, “Where there is a balance in the use and replenishment of 
natural resources” (LCL FCC, 2011a: n.p.). In so doing, it provided a compelling 
vision of the future (Figure 4.6).   
 
Figure 4.6: Lavasa’s Advertising  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. It can be 
viewed at http://www.lavasafuturecities.com/media.html ] 
 
Through this campaign (spanning television shows, newspaper articles, and 
conferences), LCL attempted to set the terms of public discussion on the future of 
Indian cities. In so doing, it successfully presented Lavasa as a city and not a real 
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estate project and through its elaborate marketing and public relations strategy, 
called upon citizens to participate in rejecting existing urban decay and envisioning a 
different kind of urban future. It sought to make visible the problems that plague 
existing Indian cities. This is not to suggest that existing Indian cities do not suffer 
from acute problems, or that indeed newer ways of imagining cities are not needed, 
or that LCL has taken its own mission lightly. What this shows are the ways in which 
environmental, governance, and planning issues are being used to generate a 
compelling vision of a future city, one that is privately managed in a top-down 
manner, and relies on the privatisation of resources.   
 
That planning in India is always and already failing is “a ubiquitous and 
commonsensical refrain uniting voices from across sectors, disciplines and ideological 
positions” (Bhan, 2012: 35). Examples abound; the McKinsey Institute’s 2010 report 
on Indian urbanisation pointed to the “poor state of urban planning” as the root of 
India’s urban problems. When the Prime Minister launched the JNNURM, the most 
significant urban programme in India’s history, he claimed that cities needed to “re-
think planning” because “all previous efforts in city planning have been limited by a 
narrow-focused project approach” that had failed Indian cities. Some social 
movements refer to the “total bankruptcy and arrogance of the planning process” 
that has led to a “systemic failure of modern planning” (D Roy, 2004). Scholarly 
work is even more scathing in announcing the “failure, even irrelevance, of the 
dominant ideology of urban planning” (Bapat, 1983: 399). Planning in Indian cities is 
“continuously thwarted” by the “inherent unruliness of people and places” (Baviskar, 
2003: 92). In LCL’s conception, this failure is resolutely public, a failure of the Indian 
government to plan and govern its cities.  
 
It is not my intention to assess these narratives of failure. What is important here, 
as Bhan (2012: 27) argues, is that “narratives of ‘failure’ are simultaneously 
narratives of planning. Accusations of chaos, irrelevance, incompetence and 
exclusion, in other words, each rely upon an imagination of what functional, 
relevant, competent and inclusionary planning could and should look like within an 
Indian city”. These narratives are therefore powerful in what they produce and 
justify and, in some instances, give rise to new forms of urban practices: action by 
resident welfare associations (Ghertner, 2011), intervention in the city by courts 
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(Bhan, 2012), rejection of planning altogether and occupation of space (Benjamin, 
2008), and new urban policies. Narratives of ‘failure’ also provide critical impetus 
for ‘different’ kinds of planning, for ‘proper planning’, and in this case, planning anew 
by the private sector.  
 
Given these public failures, how does LCL propose to plan ‘properly’? And how 
does it intend to address the intractable problems of the contemporary Indian city? 
These goals are to be fulfilled by two separate teams: the planning team and the city 
management services team. The ambitious conceptual plan devised by HOK has 
remained largely unchanged and has been hugely influential on the physical form of 
the city. To implement it, LCL hired a former planner from the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Authority (MMRDA). As part the New Bombay (Navi Mumbai) 
planning team in the 1970s, he had experienced building a new town; his task was to 
take the Master Plan, leverage his knowledge of Indian planning regulations and 
norms, and transform it into a workable development plan within the Indian 
context. After 40 years of being a planner in Mumbai, he reflected, “I’ve seen that I 
have not been able to make any difference to the conditions of our cities, because frankly, 
urban planners have very little influence on what is happening in our cities today”.103 But 
planning a private city was not like planning Mumbai, and the planner found himself 
with much more power working for LCL; many informants suggested that he was 
instrumental in getting the project off the ground. It was he who wished to take 
public interest issues into account within the confines of a private project, and those 
two aims were, unsurprisingly, not always aligned: 
 
“When you work in the public sector you are constantly dealing with large 
projects and you are constantly representing the public interest. Here you 
are not concerned with public interest so much. But you have to regard the 
private interest, commercial interest. So sometimes there’s a conflict. You 
ask yourself, ‘What am I doing in terms of planning that helps the average 
resident/average consumer?’ I am accountable to both; I have to balance 
the requirement of unseen public interest and also the organisational 
interest. Because I can easily be faulted for doing something wrong. Of 																																																								
103 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
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course, if I do something wrong for the company, I will be removed. I am 
extremely conscious of it. The entire planning has to get a market 
orientation which was not there when I was in Navi Mumbai. I was more 
concerned with planning norms - I must provide such wide roads, such 
footpaths, such open spaces, density, FSI, etc. I would allocate plots for 
schools on the basis of the population but here I would broadly do that but 
I’ll keep my plan flexible to change and respond to the market needs. And 
these are changing all the time, what kinds of tie-ups they are doing. 
Project viability is extremely important.”104 
 
At LCL, the planner had much more influence and power because, although he had 
to operate under the constraints of profit-making, he not only had the authority 
(which he did not have in Mumbai) but also the resources to execute the plan. 
However, there were also compromises to be made. The planner had to work 
alongside a number of key departments such as Branding, Marketing and Sales, 
Business Development, Infrastructure Development, City Management, and Land 
Acquisition to ensure that the project came to life. These departments often had 
conflicting aims; for instance, while the planner’s task was to assemble as much land 
as possible at the lowest price and also develop a socio-economically inclusive city, 
the branding and marketing team had to sell the city as a desirable and aspirational 
destination, which in turn increased land prices:  
 
“There is obviously a gap between what I say and what my marketing 
people do. I would say build for lower income people but my business plan 
people will not do so much. They will keep on postponing them. The 
compulsion of managing the money and ensuring overall viability is a very big 
constraint on achieving your ultimate goal”.105 
 
Furthermore, the Development Plan had to be inclusive in other ways, too. LCL 
plans to “ensure social and economic inclusivity by facilitating creation of diversified 
economic activities, housing and social facilities” which would include a major 
employment economy that is independent of the hill station economy (Lavasa SPA, 																																																								
104 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
105 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
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2012: 31). It also includes both first and second homes and a sizeable amount of 
affordable housing in view of the relative inaccessibility and weak settlement 
structure (Lavasa SPA, 2012). LCL’s vision of inclusion is premised on the 
affordability of its services, where tourism, retail, hospitality, education and health 
will be segmented by price (Chapter Six discusses the plans for inclusion in great 
detail). But this inclusivity had to be communicated within the rubric of branding and 
marketing, which revealed the inherent tensions in presenting the project as 
aspirational as well as inclusive.106 
 
To summarise, the vision for Lavasa has been drawn from a range of (often 
incongruous) influences. At its core, however, Lavasa’s model is premised on the 
profitability of and control over real estate. The utopian ideas of building a 
privatised city with public goals such as inclusion, environmental sustainability, well-
managed public spaces, and functioning city services, are at once premised on and 
limited by the need for Lavasa to be profitable.  
 
4.4. The Limits to Innovation  
 
Despite LCL’s intentions, many of these initial dreams of planning and governance 
remain elusive. Set against democratic politics and a stringent regime of Indian 
planning laws, innovation became and remains politically contentious. Lavasa’s mixed 
identity as part-hill station, part-city was and continues to be a source of confusion 
and contestation. Lavasa emerged from the regulations to create new hill stations, 
but Lavasa is a city in imagination, defined, according to its chief planner, by “the 
composition of economic activities” (a “diversified economic base” for “a self 
sustaining economy”) and “urban form” (“with a town centre, which is dense enough to 
have a congregation of people and should reflect a busy lifestyle of a city”).107 However, 
these ideals were and are in conflict with the planning norms put forth in the Hill 
Station Regulation, which had certain normative ideas of what a hill station should 
look like: 																																																								
106 As the marketing person explained, “You can use different mediums to create inclusivity. I am not 
going to change my mainline ad because Sonia Gandhi and Medha Patkar are talking inclusivity. There are 
many people who feel that we shouldn’t create aspirations. Don’t create wrong aspirations, [to that] I agree. 
I agree [when you say] don’t mislead - but don’t create aspiration? Then you cannot run the marketing and I 
am going home” (L2 interview, 21/06/2012). 
107 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
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“There are people who have notions of what a hill station is, they 
visualise a hill station from the images of colonial hill stations – a green 
area, a few bungalows and only rich people - and there are some 
servants, etc to support that. We want to demolish this image and we 
want to say that this is another way a hill station can be developed. It can 
be a tourist destination but it will also have other things.”108 
 
The GoM’s normative ideas of what a hill station should look like were also shared 
by civil society. In 2005, the Town Planning Department (TPD) modified the 
regulations to increase the permissible construction within hill stations. Numerous 
concerned citizens and organisations wrote to the TPD criticising the amendments. I 
located many such letters; most lamented forest lands being lost to builders and 
politicians, and some provided substantive comments about the amendment itself. By 
and large, however, ordinary citizens/civil society members had a strong sense of 
what a hill station should look like. They argued that hill stations were places of low 
population and low density, and were “different from other urban areas” (Sardesai, 
2005: 2). Some suggested that many of the amendments were unnecessary, objecting 
to the “arbitrary and unscientific revision of the development control regulations 
(DCRs) to accommodate vested interest leading to a dilution of prescribed, 
statutory planning norms and standards” (Benninger, 2005: 2). Others responded to 
LCL’s published development plan asserting, “job creation is not a function of a hill 
station” (NAPM, 2011: 4; Kanvinde 2011: 3). Together, their normative idea of a hill 
station, as a quiet getaway, as low density with low-rise construction, was in 
fundamental opposition to the aesthetics and model that LCL had chosen.  
 
LCL stated that its vision was to rethink the concept of a hill station and render its 
morphology relevant to India’s contemporary socio-politico-environmental 
landscape. However, despite its political backing, its plans for innovation were 
thwarted by regulatory constraints posed by local planning and governance laws:  
 
																																																								
108 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
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“There is a conflict between the concept of a hill station and our 
marketing concept of a city. The conflict is that the Hill Station 
Regulations are constantly driving at making it a low density, sparse 
development which must not have too much of commercial activities, 
too many other businesses. But we feel, and perhaps rightly feel, that 
a city has to be sustainable, and sustainable in all the three 
important aspects: environmental, social, as well as economic. I 
believe that this economic sustainability cannot come to a tourist 
place unless you also have other activities to support it.”109 
 
In terms of governance, LCL found itself in a regulatory purgatory. While the Hill 
Station Regulation enabled the establishment of new settlements, it did not prescribe 
governance structures. The very fact that the Hill Station Regulation provided no 
clear framework for governance, suggests that these projects were never intended 
to be anything more than gated communities. The Hill Station Regulation provided 
detailed rules and norms about the minutiae of building codes, such as admissible 
floor space index and slope heights, yet it failed to even acknowledge the important 
issue of how these settlements were to be governed. Therefore, although an 
American city manager has been hired to demonstrate a new model of governance, 
run the city, and provide services to the citizens, he has no statutory authority. 
Lavasa thus finds itself a city in vision, imagination, and form, but not in law. LCL’s 
authority comes from the fact that it is a landowner. As a landowner it can issue 
leases and have some authority over construction but it does not have any authority 
as a city. As LCL develops its governance model the task of the city manager is to 
“manage the city services in a way that mimics a city organisation”.110  
 
The important issue of governance structure remains unresolved even at the time of 
writing, 14 years since the project was sanctioned. LCL, although a property owner 
building an urban settlement, finds itself part of four gram panchayats, to which it 
(ostensibly) pays property tax. For LCL this poses a conundrum, as it is in charge of 
managing the city’s assets and delivering services, yet the property tax generated by 
the city is to be paid to the gram panchayat. Within LCL, too, there is little 																																																								
109 L4 interview, 01/06/2012. 
110 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
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consensus on what should and can happen; some have suggested creating a 
municipality, others have argued for forming an industrial township authority 
governed by a nominated body which would dissolve the gram panchayats in the 
process.111 At the time of research, these discussions seemed to be taking place 
mainly behind closed doors in the upper echelons of power, rather than in 
consultation with gram panchayats. LCL did express an urgency in addressing the 
matter and multiple letters were written to the UDD to request further action 
arguing that “panchayats will not be able to provide a single governing authority 
required for integrated governance of entire development” (LCL letter to UDD 18 
January 2010). The corporation’s ambitious aim to create a model for urban 
governance in India only deepened the challenge: 
 
“If it is a private city, then we don’t have to worry about it. But if it is going 
to be a replicable model, India is a democratic country. For all of India’s 
problems, India is a true democracy. So, this has to be democratic. The 
question is not whether or not it will become democratic, the question is 
what is the process for getting there incrementally?”112  
 
How then is LCL to execute its vision, both in planning and in governance? How can 
it innovate within the confines of law and democracy? In 2007 LCL made a plea to the 
UDD to constitute a Special Planning Authority (SPA) for Lavasa. The request for 
SPA status was made to allow LCL to plan and manage Lavasa without constant 
interaction with the government. According to the Hill Station Regulation, all planning 
powers rest with the District Collector; this meant that Lavasa’s plans had to be 
approved by the Collector of Pune and Director of Town Planning. LCL argued that 
just for the first phase of development, six hundred pages of documents and six large 
box files of paperwork had to be prepared for the Collector. The process of approval 
was lengthy – involving scrutiny at multiple levels of government and even though 
responses were due within 60-90 days of submission, LCL did not receive a response 
until three years after submission (LCL letter to UDD 30 January 2007). Therefore, 
the request for SPA status was made to facilitate proper planning;  
 																																																								
111 L4 interview, 01/06/2012 and L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
112 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
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“In a make-shift arrangement GoM has delegated these powers to the 
Collector, Pune but as is explained in foregoing he is incapable of 
performing that role. It would therefore be in the public interest to set 
up a SPA for this area so that the development of the hill station is 
carried out in a planned and integrated manner. Preparation of plan 
will enable development of land not only belonging to the LCL but also 
of the land not acquired by the LCL.” (LCL letter to UDD 30 January 
2007: n.p.). 
 
The SPA, though it would be technically independent from LCL, could serve “as a 
precursor to a separate local authority for local governance” (LCL letter to UDD 30 
January 2007: n.p.). In 2007, LCL organised a meeting in Lavasa to further discuss the 
governance of the project. It was attended by Sharad Pawar (who by now was a 
minister in the central government and held no state-level public office), Ajit Pawar 
(Sharad Pawar’s nephew and the state’s Minister of Irrigation), Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra Vilasrao Desmukh, and other state government officials. Years later this 
meeting would come to be a source of suspicion. Those at LCL had a different view: 
 
“Today the media says we were corrupt because we called all of them, paid 
a bribe and got clearance. But people like us know, it took us one year to 
get them together. It is so difficult to get things in the government one by 
one. In fact, he [Gulabchand] should be complimented for getting them in 
one room.”113  
 
This meeting was in no small way, a testimony to the project’s continued political 
backing and Gulabchand’s political clout. But the fact that it had to be held in the first 
place demonstrates that Lavasa was still bound by certain laws and rules.  
 
Being awarded SPA status comes with a range of benefits; it allows LCL to control 
development and unauthorised development, permits it to levy charges, and gives it 
power to enter into land lease and sale agreements. But those powers also come 
with some “disadvantages” (as articulated by LCL), such as having their employees 																																																								
113 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
 147	
treated as public servants (applying the code of conduct of public servants such as the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988). LCL also has to engage in the time consuming 
processes of publishing “its planning proposals and invite suggestions and objections 
from the public process” (LCL letter to UDD 30 January 2007: n.p.). Furthermore, 
despite SPA status, LCL is not permitted to forcibly acquire land and the plans still 
have to adhere strictly to the existing Hill Station Regulation rules as determined by 
the UDD. Hence, the SPA could be seen as a quasi government, with some of the 
authority of government, but not all: it cannot, for example, impose taxes or forcibly 
acquire land.  
 
That a private company was awarded SPA status remains a point of contention. A 
number of letters of complaint were written, arguing that SPA status could not be 
awarded to a private company and was in violation of the principles of the 
Constitution. A PIL was filed in the Mumbai High Court and the matter was still 
pending at the time of writing. Therefore, while LCL’s vision for Lavasa was premised 
on delivering a solution to the planning and governance problems that plague Indian 
cities, it has struggled to find ways to innovate in terms of urban form and a novel 
governance framework within the structures of democracy. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Lavasa was sanctioned by the state, developed by a private company, and built with a 
middle-class/elite consumer-citizen in mind. It was set into motion by the Hill Station 
Regulation, which identified new privately planned hill stations as a solution to 
‘overcrowding’, ecological damage, and unplanned encroachment in the Western 
Ghat region of Maharashtra. This was further legitimated by the Mumbai High Court, 
which, citing the inevitability of privatisation as a desirable trend, recast the idea of 
public interest to include large scale management of resources by a private company. 
In this manner both the executive and the judiciary facilitated the emergence of 
India’s first privately planned and managed, post-colonial hill station.  
 
Roy (2007) shows how Calcutta is planned without maps and data, operating within 
the logic of informality, which allows the populism of the day to take hold (giving 
powers to planners to convert a slum into a park one day, and a park into a mall the 
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next). Similarly, Ghertner (2011) shows how planning in the city of Delhi does not 
often make use of data and maps, but is rather based on visual surveys. What is 
desirable and undesirable in the making of world-class Delhi is determined by the 
rule of aesthetics rather than a techno-scientific evaluation. In the case of hill station 
development, too, the ‘properness’ of planning was not ensured by scientific 
evaluation, but by invoking common sense. Common sense was used to justify the 
need for such a project as a solution to long-standing problems of congestion and 
poor ecological management. The lack of fuss in selecting the developer and the free 
hand given to private developers in site selection, planning and governance shows 
the extent to which the ‘properness’ of planning was equated with privatised 
development.  
 
But to see this project simply as part of a neoliberal turn in India’s urban 
development trajectory, or as a new idiom of planning, would be to ignore the direct 
private interests that fuelled this ostensibly public interest project. The policies put 
into motion were supported by powerful political actors with direct interests in real 
estate. In that respect the project can be interpreted equally as an outcome of 
“private interest networks” where “vernacular networks of association transform 
the ‘governmentalised’ state into one that is amenable to specific interests through 
forging various forms of alliances” (Sundaresan, 2014: 3). Indeed, like many new 
towns (discussed in Chapter One) and hill stations, Lavasa was made flesh only 
through the support of powerful developers and the alliances forged with various 
political actors. 
 
Despite its origins, the vision of Lavasa moved beyond the confines of real estate. Its 
vision is speculative; indeed, it is a gamble – a real estate gamble, as well as a gamble 
on what a future city should look like. But although Lavasa’s vision goes beyond the 
domain of real estate, it is only made possible by it. The vision is premised on 
speculative returns on real estate, which requires future citizens and businesses to 
invest in the city because it is a profitable real estate investment decision and 
because they are compelled by its vision. It is a speculation on the future that 
connects real estate with urban aspiration:  
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“There is a quantitative and a qualitative benchmark. The quantitative 
benchmark is that all of our property gets sold to the right people within a 
targeted period of time. The qualitative benchmark is the waiting list. This is 
a quantitative and a qualitative benchmark, the number of people who are 
aspiring to be a part of it that I need to create another Lavasa because my 
boundaries are full. Like creating a cult community, just as Goans love to be 
Goans. If Lavasa gets recognized as a community that is different, to me 
that is the ultimate taste of qualitative success. Another quantitative success 
is how much can we be brought in to create more developments in Gujarat 
and Madhya Pradesh and maybe UAE and maybe Europe going forward. 
Can we be thought leaders in that? Another qualitative success is that if your 
brand starts getting featured in international forums, it is a bench mark topic 
of discussion, it becomes a bench mark for others, people look up to it.”114 
 
Lavasa’s project is utopian in as much as it presents an idealised vision of the future. 
This utopia is expressed in a different register from the utopia of Chandigarh or 
Brasilia, or the megalomania of Fordlandia. It is a corporate market utopia, not unlike 
Disney’s Celebration, but with an Indian twist, responding to the particular problems 
of existing Indian cities. As a privately planned city, built on private property, with its 
own parallel governance systems, its success is premised on total control by the 
corporation, where planning is not democratic or participatory, but top-down with 
plans drawn up in the offices of various global consulting firms.  
 
Lavasa is imagined therefore, as a privatised city in the public interest. Its vision goes 
well beyond what the Hill Station Regulation expected, and it is a utopian vision, one 
that seeks to achieve inclusion (detailed in Chapter Six), ecological sustainability 
(discussed in Chapter Seven), and efficient and effective service delivery, all through 
privatised planning. This vision responds to what LCL diagnoses as a failure of 
planning and urban governance in India. But this future is called to action not through 
the gains of real estate but by invoking the failure of the government to meet the 
needs of the public, to deliver public goods such as governance, a clean environment, 
uncongested roads, and basic sanitation. It is precisely by turning to the widely held 
																																																								
114 L2 interview, 21/06/2012. 
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notions of planning and governance failures that Lavasa can conjure a future for itself, 
providing private solutions to public failures.   
 
But it is also utopian in that the vision is impossible to fully realise. Lavasa presents 
itself as a rupture, as many utopian projects do. Its goals of profit, governance, 
inclusion and sustainability bump and collide with each other and although it wishes 
to deliver private planning outcomes. Despite its political backing and its desire to 
become a model Indian city, free from the problems of public planning and 
governance, LCL’s attempts are thwarted by the very local state and democratic 
frameworks that it seeks to escape.  
 
As discussed in Chapter One, such visions, whether idealised, utopian, or 
experimental, are routinely undone and fail to achieve their goals. What is of interest 
then is not the fact that they do not live up to their ideals, i.e. whether these 
projects are successes or failures on the terms that were initially set out. Michel 
Foucault readily admitted that nothing happens as laid down in planners’ schemes – 
yet he insisted that they are not simply utopias “in the heads of a few projectors”. 
They are not “abortive schemas for the creation of a reality” but “fragments of 
reality” itself. They “induce a whole series of effects in the real” (Foucault, 1991:81). 
The utopia conjures images and circulates imaginaries about the future. What must 
be paid attention to is how the plan as an idea and the plan in action interact with 
one another to produce the actual city of Lavasa, how its vision and its reality come 
into contact. Accordingly, the following chapters will examine the making, unmaking, 
and remaking of various aspects of Lavasa’s ‘market utopia’. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Assembling Lavasa: The Myth and Muscle of the Market 
 
“The Lavasa Corporation did not get the state government to forcibly 
acquire land using the coercive power at its disposal through the Land 
Acquisition Act of colonial vintage. It purchased land from individual owners 
at the then prevailing market prices on the basis of government records 
regarding ownership rights… The vision of Lavasa is intrinsically inclusive.” 
(Kishwar, 2011: n.p) 
 
“Lavasa Corporation went in for direct purchase from its owners. From the 
complaints made by the farmers and villagers it [has] transpired that the 
company used various tactics for grabbing the land from the illiterate and 
poor people. There are many instances of fraudulent deals. The process of 
land grab was done by the agents of the company, creating proxy farmers 
and relatives, presenting fraud witnesses, forging land records, changing land 
records and corruption in collusion with the administration.” (People’s 
Commission, 2009: 8) 
 
Unlike other projects of comparable size, LCL pieced together 10,000 acres by 
purchasing lands from villagers rather than forcibly acquiring them using the state’s 
powers of eminent domain.115 As the quotes above indicate, while some civil society 
members (Kishwar, 2011; Damle, 2010) describe ‘direct purchase’ as fair to 
villagers, even inclusive, others depict it as just another method of grabbing lands 
from villagers (NAPM, 2011). Indeed, these opposing views are representative of 
the recent political debate around the extent to which land assembly for large-scale 
projects should be left to the state or in the hands of the market (Bardhan, 2011). 
They also raise a number of questions: given nationwide resistance to land 																																																								
115 Eminent domain: the right of a government to expropriate private property, with compensation in 
the name of public interest under the Land Acquisition Act (1984). The state government notifies 
landowners of its desire to acquire land, giving them 30 days to raise objections. It does so by 
declaring that the land is needed for some kind of public purpose project. Once this is done, notices 
are sent, compensations terms are agreed upon and possession of land is taken. This process can take 
many years (Chakravorty, 2013). 
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acquisition (as discussed in Chapter Two) how did LCL purchase thousands of acres 
from villagers? Why were these villagers willing to part with their lands? And if 
locals were cheated, as the People’s Commission asserts, then how did they 
respond and with what effects?116 
 
Developers were quick to put forth a self-interested hypothesis: if the land in 
question had little agricultural value, and developers were able to provide adequate 
compensation, villagers would be willing to sell their lands. As the chief planner at 
LCL explained, “if you’re purchasing land then you can negotiate… you will tailor-make 
your package to the person who is giving the land. People can ask for cash, or rehabilitation, 
or another house. I can have different packages for everybody”.117 Many scholars have 
argued that the key to ‘successful’ land acquisition is rooted in the issue of adequate 
and appropriate compensation (Chakravorty, 2013; Ghatak, 2012). That said, these 
‘successes’ are often furthered by grossly asymmetric information on land prices and 
future land use (Chakravorty, 2013; Levien, 2013). 
 
There is some theoretical merit to the planner’s argument. From an economic 
perspective, under free market conditions, the most efficient land arrangement is 
one where a buyer purchases land from a willing seller through a voluntary sale 
transaction. In such circumstances, an unwilling seller need not part with his or her 
land and the individual with the highest valuation for that land will own it. Small 
parcels of land for housing estates and commercial developments are often 
assembled in this manner. But land is not merely an economic/financial commodity, 
it is also characterised by deep cultural associations, providing people with 
livelihoods, security, and social standing (Agarwal, 1994). Indeed, in many parts of 
the world, and especially in India, the peasantry has refused to sell land irrespective 
of the compensation on offer (Chakravorty, 2013).  
 
																																																								
116 As discussed in Chapter One, Lavasa has been a site of tremendous contestation. The issues of 
illegal purchase of tribal lands, the leasing of public lands by the government to the corporation, and 
environmental degradation have been the key points of contention. However, land purchase per se 
has not been a salient or core element of this dispute i.e. questions of fraud have been raised, but no 
large-scale collective mobilisation (as observed in other cases) has taken place (this will be further 
elaborated within this chapter as well as the next). 
117 L4 interview, 01/06/2012 
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Land assembly without the use of the state’s powers of eminent domain is 
considered to be near impossible for a number of reasons; first, given the nature of 
landholding patterns in India (contested land holdings, unclear titles, the presence of 
a large number of small farms with the average operational landholding size being 
1.6 hectares in 2010 (NABARD, 2014)), transaction costs for such an endeavour 
would be prohibitively high. Second, the probability of holdouts (land-owners 
unwilling to sell) could prevent the developer from fully carrying out their plans 
(Singh, 2012). Third, the knock-on speculative effects on the price of land could 
result in untenably high land costs for the developer. Consequently, industrial 
development officials across the country generally insist that, “without the state’s 
role in land acquisition, large industrial and infrastructural projects would not get off 
the ground” (government official quoted in Levien, 2011: 463).  
 
Yet, many townships and SEZs of several hundreds to thousands of acres have been 
consolidated through private means. For example, the promoters of Kakinada SEZ in 
Andhra Pradesh bought 4800 acre through direct purchases from farmers, the Navi 
Mumbai SEZ developers bought several thousand acres through voluntary 
transactions, and the GMR group purchased 428 acres directly from the villagers in 
Chhatisgarh (Singh, 2012). Gurgaon (outside New Delhi) too was assembled through 
the market (Gururani, 2013; Donthi, 2014). In Pune district, Amby Valley, Nanded 
City, and Amanora Township are a few such examples. Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014: 
23) note that only the “more heavy handed attempts by state actors” to acquire land 
have received scholarly attention but in fact there are often “more creative” and 
“less blunt efforts to access land”. With the partial exceptions of very recent work 
by Baka (2013), Gururani (2013), and Levien (2013), the scholarship does not 
examine closely how and with what consequences is land assembled through market 
transactions. This chapter is in conversation with that nascent literature. Lavasa is 
the largest of these projects, in terms of both the area notified (23,000 acres or 93 
square kilometres) and the area purchased by LCL, (approximately 10,000 acres or 
38 square kilometres) (LCL, 2014).118 What were the conditions that made market-
based land assembly possible? And if forcible acquisition has often led to widespread 
																																																								
118 As reference, the average SEZ in India is approximately 400 acres, with the largest being 25000 
acres (Lakshmanan, 2009). 
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dispossession and/or resistance, what are the consequences of voluntary land 
transactions?  
 
This chapter argues that private land assembly was effective not simply because of the 
adequacies of compensation, but because of the distinct conditions under and 
mechanisms through which land had been purchased. First, private land assembly was 
fundamentally enabled by an earlier historical state-led dispossession – the building of 
the Varasgaon Dam, a process that altered the terms of agriculture, the relationship 
of villagers to agriculture and to the valley itself. Second, land was purchased slowly 
and quietly over a decade by a multitude of intermediaries/land agents/aggregators. 
Many of these intermediaries leveraged highly asymmetric information to purchase 
land and in some instances cheated farmers, by either forging documents, providing 
inadequate compensation, or engaging in aggressive coercion. Thus much of the land 
had already been purchased before the project was formally announced to the 
villagers.  
 
Despite these grievances, collective action was thwarted by three mechanisms 
generated by the market process itself. First, the presence of multiple intermediaries 
prevented the emergence of a single focal point for resistance. Second, the voluntary 
bilateral nature of the process, individualised land disputes making them issues to be 
addressed within the private and often domestic sphere, rather than collectively 
and/or publically. Finally, given that the transactions were voluntary (at least in 
theory), the NAPM could not convincingly argue that LCL itself had dispossessed 
locals. This disrupted the politically powerful narrative of ‘dispossession’ that is 
usually invoked when contesting land grabs.   
 
Section 5.1 describes the processes through which land was assembled, arguing that 
two key processes enabled assembly: dam-related displacements from the 1970s and 
a slow process of disaggregated aggregation of land by a multitude of land agents. 
Section 5.2 outlines the effects of this process of assembly. Specifically, it argues that 
the nature of private land assembly effectively squashed most forms of collective 
resistance and also individual resistance. Section 5.3 concludes with some theoretical 
implications.  
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5.1. The Processes of Assembly 
 
In March 2000, one month after Pearly Blue Lake Resorts had been incorporated, 
the company requested the GoM to designate approximately 93 square kilometres 
as hill station area. This area included 18 villages spread across two sub-districts 
(Mulshi and Velhe), lands marked for reforestation in the regional plan, as well as 
some government land. The declaration was issued promptly in July 2000. In keeping 
with the Hill Station Regulation, the GoM relaxed land-ceiling laws119 and allowed the 
company to purchase up to 4000 hectares of land (considerably more than under the 
existing statutory ceiling).120 Under Maharashtra State regulations and national 
statutes, some of these lands (such as agricultural lands) are available for purchase 
from owners directly, others (such as ceiling lands) are available for purchase with 
the permission of the District Collector, government lands can be leased, while tribal 
(adivasi) and forest lands are unavailable for either purchase or lease.121 A summary 
of the different land types is outlined in Table 5.1 below. By 2014, of the 18,689 
acres available for purchase, LCL had purchased 10,574 acres, largely in areas 
marked for phase 1 and 2 of the project. This chapter focuses on those lands that 
were available for purchase and not those that were on lease (which were discussed 
in Chapter Four). 
 
  
																																																								
119 As part of post-independence land reform policies, the Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on 
Holdings) Act, 1961, was passed to limit the amount of land held by any individual. The ceiling limits 
were fixed in 1961 and are dependent on the type/class of land in question. For instance, a single 
individual can have at most 7 hectares (18 acres) of irrigated land capable of yielding at least two 
crops a year and 21 hectares (54 acres) of dry crop land. Landholdings in excess of this ceiling limit 
are acquired by the government at a compensation rate that is determined by the Collector. This land 
is then distributed to landless persons belonging to Schedule Castes, Scheduled Tribes, landless 
persons, and to persons from a pre-defined ‘priority list’. If after this there remains surplus land, then 
the Collector can assign it to projects of ‘public purpose’.  
120 According to the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, land used for agriculture cannot be used 
for any non-agricultural purpose except with the permission of the Collector. This law was put in 
place to protect farmers from speculative hoarding of agricultural land by non-agriculturalists.  
121 According to the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, and Maharashtra Land Revenue Code 
and Tenancy laws (Amendment) Act, 1974, land belonging to members of the Scheduled Tribes 
cannot be transferred/sold to non-tribals. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of land type and ownership in Lavasa 
No Land Details 
Area       
(Sq Km) 
Area 
(Acres) 
1 Area of 18 villages as per revenue records 119.02 29398 
2 Government Forest Lands 25.85 6383 
3 Area notified as Hill Station 93.17 23022 
4 Submerged Land (Varasgaon lake) 17.51 4325 
5 Area Available for Development 75.66 18689 
6 Purchased by LCL until 2014 38.29 10574 
7 
Notified for Special Planning Authority (SPA) in 2008 (14 
villages) 
36.56 9034 
8 To be notified as SPA in the future 11.61 2869 
9 Additional area expected to be purchased by LCL 24.11 5959 
Source: LCL (2014: 187) 
 
Figure 5.1 from 2010 depicts the above table spatially: it shows the land area, the 
terrain (a mix of forest, water bodies, and agricultural land), the different kinds of 
property rights (private government, etc.), as well as LCL’s relationship to this 
landscape. The dark green marks forest and ‘forest-like’ lands, unavailable for 
purchase; the yellow areas are those that LCL had purchased as of 2010; the red and 
purple are areas under agreements with land owners; the white areas depict those 
parcels that have not yet been bought by the company; and the dark grey areas are 
those under dispute. Evidently, the process of land assembly has not been smooth, 
with large numbers of holdouts (subject of Chapter Six), some disputed areas, and a 
number of lands that are controlled via agreements. It was on this very fractured 
landscape – of forest, water, private, and public agricultural land – that the project of 
Lavasa unfolded. 
 
Figure 5.1: Lavasa land purchase status and ownership map within 
the area demarcated as hill station (2010)  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation]
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5.1.1. The Detritus of the Dam 
 
Mulshi, Velhe and Mawal sub-districts bear a long history of development-induced 
displacement. Over the course of the last century, a range of projects from medium-
sized dams to real estate townships has peppered the region’s landscape and altered 
the lives of its residents. The first of these projects dates back to the 1920s, when 
the Tata company embarked on building a dam to provide water and electricity to 
their cotton mills in Bombay. Tata acquired over 44,000 acres in 37 villages and 
displaced 15,000 people with the help of the colonial state. At that time too, heated 
public discussions ensued about whether displacement should take place for a 
private project and so it bears the distinction of being the site of the ‘world’s first 
anti-dam movement’ (Vora, 2009). Despite compensation offers of cash and 
equivalent land, villagers were not ready to relocate. The uprising did not prove to 
be successful in the long run – the dam was built and a large number of the displaced 
(and their descendents) have still not received compensation. As recently as 1982, 
descendents of the displaced agitated to close down a power station, demanding 
their historic compensation be paid (Vora, 2009). 
 
Despite this tumultuous local history, a number of other dams such as Panshet, 
Thamini, and Khadakwasla were built over the 1970s and 80s. In fact, an astonishing 
622 dams were built in Maharashtra during 1970-80, the highest number of any state 
in India during that period (CWC, 2012). Sanctioned by the Congress-led state 
government, these dams, though relatively small, resulted in substantial displacement 
across the regions. A number of dams were built within Pune district. Among them, 
Varasgaon Dam, the site of Lavasa today, was built in 1976 (completed in 1987) to 
increase the supply of water to Pune; it remains one of the three major water 
sources for the city. In order to build the dam, low-lying fertile lands (often used for 
paddy) had to be flooded; the GoM therefore forcibly acquired these lands from the 
inhabitants. The GoM forcibly displaced a total of 2094 landholders (khatedars) and 
rehabilitated some of them in Daund within Pune district. Villagers interviewed 
suggested that those who did get compensation were given 2 acres of land per family 
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on average. Data on displacement and rehabilitation are unavailable122 but one 
estimate suggested that approximately 60 per cent of project-affected persons had 
still not received compensation/rehabilitation by 2010 (Jadhav, 2010).  
 
With the best agricultural land now in the hands of the state or submerged under 
the reservoir, a large proportion of the displaced left for Daund, Pune, and Mumbai. 
Many of these dam-affected families retained ownership over their mountainous 
(Varkas/Dongar) land near the dam, but its poor accessibility and poor yield made it 
of little agricultural appeal. Some families stayed behind, eking out an existence on 
the hilly lands that had not been submerged (a terrain that was suitable for a very 
small variety of crops such as Nachni and Varai), either because they did not receive 
compensation or because the resettlement land awarded was of poor quality.123 They 
were financially assisted by remittances from family members who had migrated to 
Pune or Mumbai. Furthermore, in the years following dam construction, the area 
received almost no government services. Even as recently as 2001, despite their 
proximity to Pune, the villages did not have access to electricity, their own primary 
health care unit, road access, or irrigation (Census, 2001). Consequently, the area 
remained isolated and economically poor for a number of decades. 
 
Large agrarian changes took place within the Mulshi sub-district after the dams were 
built. For instance, the percentage of cultivators dropped from 62% in 1981 to 48% 
in 2001 (Patil, 2012: 28). Between 1980 and 2005, the net sown area declined by 22% 
to cover 40% of total land (Pune district’s average is 60%); non-agricultural use went 
up by 22%; land not available for cultivation increased by 6% in Mulshi and 15% in 
Velhe (highest in Pune district) (Pune district average is 4%); fallow land increased by 
14% in Mulshi and 13% in Velhe (Pune district average is 1%); and the total numbers 
of cultivators in Mulshi and Velhe dropped to the lowest in the district, second only 
to Pune city (all figures from Patil (2012: 45-56)). In short, while the region did still 
officially contain agricultural land, a good proportion of it was no longer being used 
for agriculture. 
 																																																								
122 Response to Right to Information (RTI) application filed with the Khadakwasala irrigation 
department stated that the data are still being compiled. 
123 Dh2 interview, 13/12/2012.  
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Villagers largely concurred with this narrative, citing that their “paddy fields went to 
the dam”, that they “were not cultivating anything on that land”,124 that many had left 
the area because there was “nothing there, nobody thought there would be a future here: 
there was no source of income, no facilities. There were just many uneducated people”.125 
The area’s remoteness only exacerbated their problems: 
 
“There was no road to go up there. It wasn’t easy, most of our family used 
to go to Pune or to Mumbai to find work. If you lived here and someone fell 
ill, it would take 2-3 days to get there (to Pune). So those who lived outside 
(the village) saw no use of keeping the mountainous land. People did not 
realise that something would come up later on.”126  
 
The project promoters leveraged this situation for their own benefit: 
 
“That was my biggest advantage, that there was no road. Nobody was 
staying there, it was barren, they had all been rehabilitated and whatever 
was left was small land. They were eager to sell… They had nothing to 
grow, it was barren land so they took whatever they could get.”127  
 
Therefore, state-led displacement and dispossession due to the construction of the 
Varasgaon Dam produced the conditions for land sales to take place with ease. First, 
the best, fertile land had been submerged, with the remaining hilly land having little 
agricultural value. Second, the remoteness and poor services and infrastructure 
made the area even less attractive for local populations. Finally, decades of 
government neglect as well as the construction of the dam, dispersed the community 
to Pune, Mumbai, Daund and the various villages around the Lavasa area. This 
migration ensured that a sizeable proportion of villagers’ livelihoods were not fully 
connected to land within Lavasa (with the notable exception of the adivasi 
community that continued to live there). This fragmentation led to increased non-
farm employment among the younger generation, and some villagers entered into 
																																																								
124 Dh2 interview, 13/12/2012. 
125 A2 interview, 19/12/2012. 
126 R1 interview, 16/09/2012. 
127 L10 interview, 12/08/2012. 
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the urban wage economy (long before Lavasa came), working and vending in Pune 
and Mumbai.128 
 
It is impossible to know whether land sales would have taken place had these initial 
conditions been different. But similar tales of transformation can be told of other 
parts of India where land sale/acquisition has taken place with relative ease. Baka 
demonstrates that in Sattur district of Tamil Nadu, farmers have “reduced cultivation 
activities or abandoned their lands” on account of poor monsoon and “on-going 
shifts away from agriculture” (2013: 138). It is often the resultant debt trap that 
forces them to part with their lands. Vijayabaskar (2010) argues that in Tamil Nadu, 
clear structural economic changes generated shifts in agrarian society such as 
agricultural labour shortages, increased non-farm employment and a decrease in 
farm size. This has led to increasing diversification out of agriculture (Nagarak, 2006; 
Djurfeldt et al., 2008) and farmers have begun to sell their lands. Similarly, surveying 
agrarian change in contemporary India, Shah and Harriss-White (2011) point to 
increasing landholding fragmentation, non-farm employment, and diversification of 
income for rural populations across the country.129 They argue that these changes 
are structural and the state has “an incoherent project, encouraging small-scale 
livelihoods, destroying them, protecting them, ignoring them, or allowing them to 
survive as an unintended consequence of other intentions altogether” (2011: 17).	
 
While there is a case to be made of a structural shift in India’s agrarian economy, in 
this case the dam produced the additional conditions for land sale by rendering 
agricultural livelihoods largely unviable. Some activists suggest that the process of 
making land less suitable for agriculture is a deliberate political ploy undertaken by 
																																																								
128 B2 interview, 20/01/2013; D2 interview, 30/09/2012. 
129 Shah and Harris-White (2011) posit that 63 per cent of producers own holdings of less than one 
hectare, and that the mean income for those who operate less than 4 hectares is negative. 
Furthermore, most households run on “salaries of teachers, government servants, shopkeepers or 
traders than the income from the rent of the farm or its produce” (2011: 15). Although there is no  
clear shift from agricultural labour to industrial work, estimates suggest that between 50 and 100 
million labourers are ‘footloose’, i.e. circulating as migrant labour, and that the rural non-farm 
economy has grown to become 20% of all rural jobs. In summary, “If they ever were, poor Indians 
with homes in rural areas are no longer simple peasants or rural wage labourers, but people who 
have complex livelihoods involving both forms of work: tilling their small plots of land and now, 
dependent on migrant wage labour, on working in the rural non-farm economy and on petty 
commodity production and trade in the capitalist economy to reproduce their household” (2011: 17). 
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politicians/government officials with real estate interests.130 For instance, in 2010 
police opened fire against villagers protesting the development of a pipeline in Maval 
sub-district. According to farmers, the pipeline would divert water and decrease the 
supply of water to nearby farms. Activists claimed that the “resultant decreased 
supply for farming” would  “affect the agricultural yield, thus leading to a lowering of 
land prices. At that opportune time the realtor lobby aided by the land mafia” would 
“have a field day buying out bulk stretches of land from financially weakened farmers 
– only to be resold to the urban rich at premium prices” (Roy, S., 2011: 11).  
 
Describing a less cunning set of circumstances, though in a similar vein, scholars have 
argued that the categorisation of land as “wasteland” often does not reflect “existing 
land use patterns”; rather it is a political construction (Whitehead, 2010)131 which 
serves to cast wastelands as ‘bad’ and something to be eliminated (Gidwani, 1992). 
Baka (2013) shows that by constructing these wastelands as ‘empty’ the state makes 
land available for alternative land use projects, including biofuels and real estate. 
Although the lands upon which Lavasa was built were not categorised as ‘wasteland’ 
or ‘barren’, they were in fact treated as such. In an inquiry looking into excess ceiling 
lands being made available to LCL, the Collector stated that, “the 7/12 extract of the 
land shows that the land is lying barren. These lands appear to be not very fertile and 
the quality of the land is low. Though this land has not been declared ‘uncultivable’ it 
seems to be unsuitable for agriculture” (District Collector Letter, 09 January 2005). 
In keeping with themes raised in Chapter Four, it is merely the common sense 
appearance of being barren as opposed to an evaluation of the land’s barrenness that 
allows for its transfer.  
 
Whether these dams were actively created to generate real estate or whether such 
changes are an unintended consequence of the dam is difficult to discern. However, 
by virtue of creating a large reservoir, the dam produced an idyllic waterfront site 
for a hill station/tourism project generating interest from a number of land 																																																								
130 C5 interview, 10/10/2012. 
131 As Whitehead (2010) demonstrates, the category of ‘wasteland’, introduced into Indian law in 
1793 in Bengal by the British, is not as a natural category but as a social and historical one. It is often 
synonymous with “land left idle”; the term is used as “a rhetorical device to justify state 
appropriation,” which historically supported both the conquest of new territories and the 
enhancement of state territorial control (2010: 86).  
 
 162	
speculators and elite Indians.  It effectively converted the use of land from agriculture 
to real estate even though, on paper, it remained marked as agricultural land. Farm-
houses began to crop up across Mulshi, Velhe, and Maval sub-districts in the 1980s 
and 90s. Indeed, it was precisely this menace of unplanned holiday/second home 
development that the Pune Regional Plan (1991-2011) and the Hill Station Regulation 
sought to address through building planned hill stations (discussed in Chapter Four). 
Many townships and tourist resorts have largely developed on the banks of/in the 
vicinity of various dams and man-made reservoirs, e.g. Amby Valley and Girivan along 
Mulshi Dam. 
  
Thus India’s new project of urban place-making was partially built on the detritus of a 
ubiquitous older national project – the dam. The villager’s willingness to sell land to 
LCL, brokers, and speculators, was due in no small part to an earlier round of state-
led forcible dispossession and decades of government neglect. The developers’ 
claims of the strength of the market in providing appropriate compensations must be 
contextualised historically. The specific land market conditions were (one can hope, 
inadvertently) produced through state-plans and are not particular to Lavasa alone, 
but common to a number of projects emerging on the banks of various dams in the 
Western Ghats in close proximity to Pune and Mumbai.  
 
5.1.2. ‘Direct’ Purchase 
 
It was into this milieu that a whole host of intermediaries – investors, brokers, land 
aggregators and real estate companies – entered.132 While official permission to 
purchase land was given in 2001, land records demonstrate that the process of buying 
land for development/non-agricultural purposes had started as early as the 1980s.  As 
other real estate companies had also bought land in the area, LCL entered into 																																																								
132 Middlemen have always occupied an important space in India’s highly local and vast land revenue 
system. Brass (2004) and Harriss-White (2003) demonstrates the deep reliance of citizens in 
accessing the state and land departments through gatekeepers and middlemen. Sud (2014), Baka 
(2013), and Levein (2013) argue that there is a new class of intermediaries, one that has emerged 
post-liberalisation as land markets have become lucrative. Sud (2014) highlights the wide varieties of 
middlemen: the fixers, brokers, agents, thugs, aggregators that do different kinds of work in facillitaing 
land deals. For instance, she argues that “aggregators are on top of the land brokerage chain”, “local 
brokers work with representatives of a potential land buyer, but also with the seller”, and “party 
representatives” “link the land deals to politicians” (2014: 600-1). In this chapter, I refer to them as 
intermediaries while recognising the tremendous heterogeneity of the group. I differentiate between 
them in instances where it is relevant to my argument.   
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agreements with four large land aggregators for a total of 3766 acres. It assembled 
the rest through 978 bilateral transactions, of which 871 were ‘resale’ and only 107 
transactions were made directly with the ‘original’ owner (District Collector, 2008). 
By 2003, LCC (then spearheaded by Deshpande) had purchased a largely contiguous 
7000-acre parcel of land (LCC, 2003). Therefore, while LCL did in fact engage in 
direct purchase, the company purchased a large proportion of its land from 
intermediaries instead of the ‘original owner’ (mul vatandaar). By LCL’s own estimates 
75 per cent of the lands that it purchased were not from “local farmers but people 
who were living in Pune, Mumbai, Dubai, or even London” (Kishwar, 2011: n.p).133  
 
Between 2000 and 2014, LCL purchased 10,225 acres (9619 acres of class 1 and 606 
acres class 2 agricultural lands)134 through market transactions. Figure 5.2 details the 
number of sales by village over time indicating that a large proportion of the land 
purchases took place between 2002 and 2004, followed by a steady decline and a 
short-lived second sales peak in 2007-08.135 Lavasa’s land was therefore purchased 
incrementally from villagers over two decades and through multiple buyers. The 
remaining lands were either leased from the government or are not within LCL’s 
control (see Table 5.1 for summary).136  
 
  
																																																								
133 The question of how such ‘farmers’ came to possess the land in the first place is moot but beyond 
the scope of this chapter (requiring a statutory investigation). 
134 Class I lands can be purchased on the market, Class 2 lands require prior permission from the 
District Collector and the payment of an additional fee ‘nazarana’. 
135 Reasons for the second peak are not known. 
136 At the time of research, LCL stated that the remaining 5959 acres of privately-owned land available 
for purchase would be considered “on an opportunistic basis” if it would assist in pushing their 
development plan forward (LCL, 2014: 30).   
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Figure 5.2: Total (class 1) land purchases made by LCC/LCL by 
village between 2001-2010. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, data tabulated from Revenue Department, Pune District (2012). 
 
Who were these firms and individuals that purchased land in advance of LCL’s arrival 
and why did they decide to invest in a remote, forested location? These 
intermediaries broadly fit into three categories: i) individual investors who sought to 
own a scenic second home or invest in individual plots of land, ii) individual 
aggregators who purchased large land parcels for the purpose of speculation and 
resale in the future, and iii) real estate companies trading in farm houses. Some of 
these purchases were part of a more widespread process of urban elites buying 
agricultural land for the purposes of parking black money, avoiding tax (capital gains 
on agricultural lands are not taxed), and making speculative investments (Kumar, 
1999).  
 
As Pearly Blue Lake Resorts began to purchase land in the area, so did a range of 
other companies including Solitude Leasings, Sharada Company, and Yashomala 
Leasings and Finance Private Ltd (YLFPL) (selected land records, GoM Mahabhulekh, 
2012). YLFPL, a small and local real estate company purchased land within the 
Dasve	Mugaon	Bhoini	Dhamanoval	Koloshi	Ugavali	Gadle	Vadavli	Padalghar	Admal	Palse	Pathershet	Bembatmal	
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stipulated lake city area.137 Sadanand Sule, Sharad Pawar’s son-in-law (and married to 
Supriya Sule, a Member of Parliament (2009 onwards) from Baramati in Pune 
District) held 1664 shares in the company in 2000 (Subramaniam and Jog, 2012). 
Similarly Sharada Company has also been associated with the Pawar family (Vaidya, 
2008; Sharada Group, 2014). In 2002, YLFPL merged with LCC and shareholders 
were given 750 equity stakes for every share they had in YLFPT; this amounted to 
the Sules’ having a 20.81% stake in LCL (Subramaniam and Jog, 2012).138 Other real 
estate companies operating within the area however, remained independent. For 
instance the Expat Group (Solitude Leasings) engages in real estate investing and has 
8000 acres of land on the outskirts of Pune city within its control (Expat Group, 
2014). It owned a sizeable portion of land within the area and eventually entered 
into a development agreement with LCL in the late 2000s (GoM Mahabulekh, 2012). 
 
Similar patterns emerge for various plots of land across the villages in Lavasa. In 
other cases, intermediaries sold the land within a few weeks or months of buying 
them, indicating clearly that the land was bought with the purpose of re-selling to 
LCL. These individuals could well have been fronts for other real estate companies 
or LCL (in its various previous avatars). Indeed, in Amby Valley, 69 individuals 
separately purchased a total of 3736 acres of agricultural land between 1992 and 
1996 and executed a general Power of Attorney in favour of Sahara Corporation, 
the parent company building the hill station. It was later found, through judicious 
investigation by activists, that all 69 were employees of Sahara Corporation in Uttar 
Pradesh (BEAG Vs GoM CWP 2772 of 1998). Studies from Rajasthan, Haryana, and 
Tamil Nadu indicate that intermediaries are either put forth by the developers 
(Gururani, 2013; Baka, 2013) or are aware of projects before they are officially 
sanctioned (Levien, 2011; Donthi, 2014; Sud, 2014a). LCL’s case demonstrates that a 
wide range of intermediaries were at work in the run-up to the project.  
 																																																								
137 YLFPL was incorporated in 1986 and was absorbed into LCL in 2002. YLFPL’s name appeared on 
many land records but it was not possible to calculate the total land area that it purchased over the 
years. 
138 It is unclear whether YLFPL began to purchase these lands before or after the formal 
announcement of the project and whether it did so deliberately as a means to acquire and assemble 
land before the project was officially announced or to give the appearance that multiple firms were 
buying land instead of one single developer. Some informants suggested that in such cases land is 
often acquired by front companies due to ceiling law restrictions and then merged once projects are 
declared and they are given permission to purchase more than the ceiling limit.  
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Land aggregation was not limited to real estate companies alone. Land records reveal 
that a large number of individuals engaged in land purchase in their private 
capacity.139 Had all the intermediaries simply been fronts for the company, LCL 
would not have the holdout problem that it does today (as is evident by the white 
areas in Figure 5.1, LCL does not own the entire land parcel marked as hill stations). 
Some of these holdouts are villagers while some are investors. Many of these resale 
transactions started as early as 1991. Take, for instance, survey no. 50/12 in Mugaon 
village. It was owned by Laxman Waghmare, who sold it to Ramesh Agarwal in 1991 
who then sold it to 4 joint owners (Nikhil Maruti and Agarwal family) in 2003 who 
finally sold it to LCL in 2004. Similarly, survey no. 50/3’s owner Dilip Golande sold it 
to Preetam Agarwal in 1992, who then sold it to LCL in 2004. These investors held 
on to their land parcel for over a decade, and are therefore unlikely to be fronts for 
any company.  
 
But the question of why people sold their lands to intermediaries remains. Villagers 
were not sent an acquisition notice but rather a notice that said that a hill station 
(giristhan) was going to be built in the area – many informants stated that, at the 
time, they did not understand what that meant. Furthermore, many purchases took 
place before the notice was sent.140 
 
“Some people sold because they needed money. But some simply thought 
they were not going to get anything by keeping the mountainous land with 
themselves. Once, one person sold it, everyone started selling it. People were 
not educated, they did not have any knowledge. People used to think there 
will be no development here since it is a hilly area and far away. They did 																																																								
139 These individuals could be fronts for larger companies. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Act (1966), 
puts forth a number of restrictions on land purchase, two of which are important here. First, only 
bona fide agriculturalists are able to purchase agricultural land. Second, companies and persons are 
only able to purchase a capped acreage of such land (ceiling laws). There are of course, ways around 
these laws, the discussion of which is not relevant here. What however, did take place is that 
“farmers” from other districts and villages, often wealthy, purchased land in the area as speculators, 
with no intention of farming it. This is by no means restricted to Lavasa but the valley in general. One 
informant, an established chartered accountant in Mumbai, owns 12 acres of farmland within the sub-
district (not within Lavasa) for the purposes of poultry farming. Such lands are often purchased to 
sink ‘black money’ and to provide safe asset that could generate speculative returns in the future. 
Indeed it was this very ‘unplanned development’ that the Hill Station Regulation sought to curtail. 
140 Determining the exact proportion of land purchased before the notice went out would require 
detailed analysis of land records going back more than 20 years for the entire land area. This level of 
analysis was beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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not know how smart these outsiders are. They are big people and have all 
the knowledge.”141   
 
The prices at which these lands were sold to intermediaries were extremely low: 
 
“My brother, who used to live in Uruli Kanchan, used to look after 
everything. I never paid attention. He said we should sell off that land. The 
three of us sold it off to an agent from Pune. We sold it for INR 2000 per 
acre (USD 40) at that time. He gave me some of the money. We have no 
land here now. Lavasa bought all our land ultimately.”142 
 
Similarly, one aggregator informant143 divulged that he began purchasing land in 1987 
at approximately INR 12,000 (USD 240) per acre. By 2012, he had close to 180 acres 
and sold a portion of this land to LCL in 2008 for INR 7.5 lakhs (USD 15,000) per 
acre. He suggested that, even in 2008, long after the arrival of the company, some 
villagers preferred to sell their land to aggregators instead of directly to LCL. The 
aggregator hypothesised that this was because aggregators were willing to pay more 
(and in cash) than the going market value for a plot of land, as selling a larger and 
contiguous land parcel to LCL would increase the price per acre that the aggregators 
could command from the company. 
 
Not all intermediaries were outsiders; some of them were locals occupying relative 
positions of political power, as sarpanches and members of the gram panchayat 
(names of certain sarpanches appear repeatedly in land records). As discussed in 
Chapter Two, Shankar Dhindale, the sarpanch of Dasve, was kidnapped and INR 47 
lakh (USD 94,000) was found in his home alongside some gold of undisclosed value. 
Similarly a talathi144 (resident of Admal village) was also widely rumoured to be one 
of the first land agents to operate within the area. He was subsequently removed 
																																																								
141 R1 interview, 16/09/2012. 
142 B2 interview, 20/01/2013. 
143 Ag1 interview 06/08/2012. 
144 A talathi is a government administrator who maintains village records; she or he is in charge of land 
records, and revenue records within a village or a group of villages. 
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from his position.145 Furthermore, barring one exception, all local intermediaries that 
I interviewed (and was told of) were upper-caste Marathas.146  
 
When I commenced my fieldwork, developers repeatedly told me of villagers who 
were being handsomely compensated for their lands as evident from the influx of 
expensive Scorpio vehicles and garish mansions into village life. These cars and villas 
almost always belonged to the sarpanch or an aggregator. Both Gururani (2013) and 
Levien (2013) discuss at great length the pivotal role of the sarpanch in the land 
market; the sarpanch and his family became the key beneficiaries (Gururani, 2013) of 
land purchases. For instance, in Khed SEZ, not far from Lavasa, the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) targeted benefits for sarpanches, such 
as guaranteeing them construction and earthmoving contracts, despite their lack of 
experience. Such contracts were seen as “confidence building measures” 
(Balakrishnan, 2013: 108). In Lavasa too, two of the interviewed sarpanches had 
employment contracts with LCL. Many sarpanches were no longer full-time residents 
of their villages, but lived in Pune, visiting their village two or three times a week. 
When the project found itself amidst controversy and under examination by the 
central government, many sarpanches banded together and filed an affidavit in 
support of the project. Of course, not all sarpanches are involved in real estate 
transactions of land aggregation, and in some cases (as we shall see in Chapter Six) 
they protest the company’s actions. Regardless, they are consistently the 
intermediaries between the company and villagers. It is only through using these 
agrarian intermediaries that the project can come to life.  
 
																																																								
145 Ag2 interview, 18/12/2012. 
146 It is not surprising that the intermediaries are largely Maratha. Palshikar (2011) notes that the 
dominant sub-groups of the Maratha peasantry have had control over the state, agrarian institutions, 
as well as networks of patronage since the 1950s. This has changed in recent years; although Marathas 
still dominate the legislature, “their ability to mediate between agrarian interests and non-agrarian 
interests has considerably declined during this period the Maratha elite too has diversified its portfolio 
beyond rural and agrarian interests. The elites from the Maratha community are increasingly entering 
new avenues of material domination – print media, hotel industry, construction industry, transport 
and related service sector organizations”. However although Marathas are, and have historically been, 
the politically dominant caste in western Maharashtra, they are a highly differentiated caste group. In 
recent years this has led to some sub-castes retaining elite status and the poorer sub-castes (Maratha-
Kunbi) seeking OBC status. The aggregators I interviewed largely came from elite Maratha 
backgrounds, where caste and class intersect. The smaller local level brokers came from other sub-
castes. 
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Many informants also recall being told, in one way or another, that Sharad Pawar 
wanted their land. This is plausible given both his involvement in the project and his 
many real estate ventures (discussed earlier). Informants explained: 
 
“Dh1: Yes, it was sold. Now, you travel so much, you must know… sold to 
Lavasa, to Sharad Pawar. In the beginning people sold land for INR 2000 
(USD 40) (per acre) to Sharad Pawar. 
AP: They gave it to Sharad Pawar? 
Dh1: Yes, Sharad Pawar. 
AP: How do you know that? 
Dh1: You tell us. It is people like you who say these things and that is why I 
know. When I tell someone, he would know too. If you wouldn’t say, I 
wouldn’t know.147” 
 
“P1: Lavasa belongs primarily to Sharad Pawar. It is due to him that the 
Lavasa project happene. We know this. There is no documentation but 
people know this commonly. Ajit Gulabchand or Anirudhha Deshpande 
cannot get permissions for water etc on their own. Ajit Pawar has 100 acres 
of land nearby. They (politicians) buy land in the name of other people such 
as their relatives. Earlier, you were not allowed to buy land above a certain 
limit such as 50 acres. They would buy land in the name of their staff too. 
For every rule, there is a loophole.”148 
 
The narrative of Sharad Pawar ‘wanting’ the land, whether true or not, was enough 
to push people to part with their holdings in the early years of the project, given that 
the area fell within his political constituency and has long been his base of political 
power. Furthermore, a number of the aggregators and sarpanches interviewed were 
affiliated with the NCP, Pawar’s political party. Thus the rumour of the project’s 
political backing formed an important part of encouraging or coercing villagers to 
part with their land. However, given that not all villagers sold their land, this threat 
could not have been made with uniform force or credibility. 
 																																																								
147 Dh1 interview, 13/12/2012. 
148 Ag2 interview, 18/12/2012. 
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Returning to the chapter’s opening quotes, LCL did most certainly engage in direct 
purchase, but often not with ‘original’ owners. Intermediaries had done their work 
for them. Intermediaries have been associated with putting pressure on villagers to 
sell land, and using “deceptive practises to motivate sales and keep prices low” 
(Baka, 2013: 417). Such instances are not unique to this valley but have been 
witnessed in land markets across the country (Vijayabaskar, 2010; Baka, 2013; 
Gururani, 2013; Levein, 2013; Sud, 2014a). In the case of Lavasa too, a number of 
different types of fraud and theft took place; first, some brokers generated fake 
Power of Attorney (PoA) documents and used them to transfer land. For instance, in 
the case of survey numbers 8/7 and 37/3 of Sakhri village, an intermediary bearing a 
fake power of attorney for the landowners, transferred the land to LCL (Civil Suit 
1682 of 2009). Many such PoA agreements were forged with false fingerprints, e.g. 
Arvind Yashvant, allegedly had a false PoA for Bhivrao Pasalkar, and sold land to LCL 
(Civil Suit 62 of 2011). Second, some brokers drew up agreements surreptitiously, 
taking more land than had been agreed upon. Third, some villagers had agreed to sell 
their land but did not receive the promised compensation. Variations and 
permutations of these three types of ‘frauds’ were reported by a number of 
informants, though not by all. A detailed discussion is provided in the next section.  
 
The dynamics of aggregation and brokerage therefore, call the concept of ‘direct 
purchase’ into question. While it is still true that land was assembled through 
bilateral transactions, what this hides is that lands were bought in a highly 
disaggregated manner starting in the 1980s. The question of why people sold is 
therefore difficult to answer, as the sales took place over a long time span, often to 
very different types of buyers. It was difficult for villagers to imagine, as they 
suggested, that these many disaggregated purchases would eventually contribute to a 
single large project.  
 
Informants (consisting of developers and land agents)149 revealed that it is common 
practice for corporations to acquire large land parcels either by creating front 
companies which finance land purchase, giving the broker a percentage, or by using 
independent aggregators who are contracted to assemble land. Such aggregation 																																																								
149 C16 interview 02/08/2012; Ag2 interview, 18/12/2012. 
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takes place over long periods of time, before projects are officially declared, and 
often with inside information on when land use policies will change to enable the 
company to pool the various front companies together. As one informant 
emphatically suggested: 
 
“What Lavasa did was that they used multiple agents. Today, no one can 
say that this [land fraud] has been done by Lavasa. Those agents started 
buying since 1986. All that land was consolidated and came to Lavasa. 
That story that is circulating that Sharad Pawar was flying above the land 
and he saw the land etc. etc. is utter nonsense. Land acquisition started in 
1980s, it was well organised and it did not happen incidentally.”150 
 
In the case of Gurgaon, Donthi (2014) shows that speculators purchase farmland in 
anticipation of a change in land zoning, and usually know which areas will be 
converted from farm to urban/industrial. He argues that such inside knowledge can 
yield substantially higher returns, in some instance 40 times the gain that could be 
made if lands are bought after the project has been declared. Thus, while front 
companies purchased agricultural land it was only when the area was declared as a 
hill station area that land values were unlocked. The land market is therefore 
constructed by both the anticipation of a change, followed by an actual change in 
regulation. It is a piece of legislation, in this case the Hill Station Regulation, that 
partially determines the nature of the land market.  
 
Villagers also described a range of compensation packages on offer (in addition to 
monetary compensation). Some were given homes, others were given land 
elsewhere, and every household interviewed had one member employed within 
Lavasa. Although LCL was not required to provide resettlement (as it was 
purchasing rather than forcibly acquiring land), it took some steps to do so 
regardless. For instance, in the first phase of development, LCL constructed 34 fully 
constructed 600 square-foot houses in a serviced resettlement colony for those 
villagers who sought resettlement (Lavasa SPA, 2012). The titles to these houses 
were transferred through a deed. In other cases it provided infrastructure, starting 																																																								
150 C7 interview, 27/07/2012. 
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with the construction of temples, to provision of water tankers and primary 
schooling. Finally, one member from each family that sold land to LCL was given 
employment within the company or via a contractor as part of their compensation 
package; 327 locals were officially provided with jobs within LCL (Lavasa SPA, 2012). 
The jobs range from overseeing road maintenance to landscaping; however, many 
villagers remained sceptical of the promise that these jobs were permanent.151 Such 
practices are commonplace under Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)/rehabilitation programmes. In this case however, by agreeing to sell their lands 
for the promise of employment, villagers themselves assessed their potential labour 
value to be higher than their land value (these issues are discussed at length in 
Chapter Six). 
 
In summary, private land assembly was fundamentally enabled by an earlier historical 
state-led dispossession – the building of the Varasgaon Dam, a process that altered 
the terms of agriculture, the relationship of villagers to agriculture and the valley 
itself. While some purchase did take place directly with LCL, a large proportion of 
the land was purchased slowly and quietly over a decade by a multitude of 
intermediaries. Taking advantage of highly asymmetric information, much of the land 
was purchased before the project was formally announced to the villagers. These 
intermediaries in some instances did cheat farmers, by either forging documents, 
providing inadequate compensation, engaging in aggressive coercion, or deploying the 
force of political power.  Land purchased by LCL directly from ‘original owners’ 
remains a small fraction of the total sales. The process of private land assembly 
therefore, was not a triumph of the adequate compensation of the free-market 
because the land market itself was actively manufactured and undergirded by state 
policy and agrarian structures. 
 
5.2. Brokering Land, Brokering Peace  
 
Many informants did not articulate their positions as victims of overt land theft, but 
stated that they had willingly sold their land, at what they considered (in hindsight) to 
be very low prices given the future use of the land. They expressed, quite clearly, 																																																								
151 D1 interview, 20/01/2013; D3 interview, 11/10/2012.  
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that they had not been ‘smart, and/or educated’ and very often, took responsibility, 
with regret, for their decisions to sell: 
 
“We got outsmarted, we were not far sighted, we saw some money and we 
could not see beyond that. We thought for the time being, we thought we 
could fill our stomachs. We thought for the short run and the land was 
gone.”152  
 
“Earlier, the elders used to think that nothing could be done on this 
mountainous land and it was going to be like that forever. Now people regret 
it. Each bungalow is worth more than a crore of rupees.”153  
 
They stated that at the time they sold their land, they could not, even in their 
“wildest dreams”,154 contemplate the scale of the project that was to emerge. In the 
absence of such knowledge, their lands appeared to have little use value, being 
difficult to cultivate (even if they were not entirely barren). This point is germane to 
the negotiation of price as the sociological imagination of those landholders did not 
and could not conceive of the scale of real estate investments and the size of the 
project to come. The prices they demanded were therefore based largely on present 
rural use, determined by the land’s (lack of) agricultural productivity and historically 
depressed values rather than its potential future use (which would be determined by 
location, topography, and centrality to the future plan).  
 
Unlike eminent domain acquisition, where (in a simplified schema) communities 
collectively bargain with the government for appropriate compensation, here, each 
family (or individuals) had separately made a deal with an intermediary/LCL, making 
different compensation demands. Instead of framing the problem in terms of larger 
systemic injustice: that land markets are heavily stacked against the poor, particularly 
under conditions of asymmetric information about the future of a project and/or 
knowledge of prevailing land prices, it was framed as an outcome of a poorly made 
personal economic decision. As the quotes above demonstrate, the villagers 																																																								
152 V4 interview, 16/12/2012. 
153 R1 interview, 16/09/2012. 
154 D3 interview, 11/10/2012. 
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attributed their predicament to having succumbed to a bad deal on account of being 
uneducated and not having sufficient foresight. 
 
Moreover, a number of informants described jointly owned land being sold by one 
or two members, often against the will and knowledge of another member. A 
number of court cases disputing LCL’s land ownership reflect the widespread 
prevalence of family disputes in land transactions. One informant suggested that 
agents often deliberately targeted families that were known to have rifts within 
them.155 Describing such land sales as being part and parcel of family dynamics, some 
villagers conceptualised the problem as a private and domestic one, rather than a 
systemic one: 
 
“All our land is not in the same place and is owned jointly with uncles. 8 acres 
were left and these 8 acres were equally split between 4 brothers, but they 
sold 7 acres. They sold one of our acres too. So we got into a dispute, but 
such things happen in every family, isn’t it?”156 
 
Finally, those who had been ostensibly defrauded of their land could not link their 
predicament to LCL directly. Against the litany of intermediaries, many of whom 
were not from the local community, villagers found themselves with grievances 
directed against too many different entities and one too many steps removed from 
the company itself. About half of the informants interviewed felt that LCL had in fact 
employed aggregators but, without substantive evidence, they could not collectively 
connect their present landlessness or the poor compensation they had received for 
their land to LCL. Although the land was ultimately transferred to LCL, and villagers 
did often make demands from LCL directly, the company was able to distance itself 
from the ‘frauds’ conducted by these intermediaries and indeed argue, as was 
discussed in the previous section, that LCL was being penalised for no fault of its 
own. Rather it was the government that had transferred land without proper 
procedure or on the basis of poor records.   
 
																																																								
155 C16 interview, 02/08/2012. 
156 B1 interview, 28/09/2012. 
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Members of the NAPM and LCL employees pointed out that a vast majority of these 
land transactions could only have taken place with the assistance of the state 
administration. Local government officials (tehsildar, talathi, and others in the revenue 
department) are responsible for ensuring that correct procedures have been 
followed, that PoAs are not fake, and that all parties involved in the transaction are 
either present or aware of the sale/transfer being made. However, as we have briefly 
seen in the previous section, the revenue department permitted a range of improper 
land transactions – either deliberately or as a by-product of poorly maintained land 
records. These improper transactions were difficult to challenge by individual 
citizens. As many scholars of the local state in India have noted, the rural poor with  
“weak social networks find it hard to make complaints about corruption”; in fact, 
they expect that low-level officials will be “involved in corruption” (Corbridge et al., 
2005: 205). 
 
Poor record-keeping affected not only villagers but also LCL. In some cases lands 
bought from intermediaries generated substantial problems for LCL. For instance, 
the Comptroller Auditor General of India’s (CAG) investigation of Lavasa’s land 
records revealed that 48 ceiling land transactions had taken place and 58.2 hectares 
of tribal land had been purchased, even though the law prohibits both types of 
transactions (CAG, 2011). In both cases, despite its substantial powers to investigate 
government activity, the CAG was unable to determine from the land records 
whether the Collector had given permission. Under breach of conditions, LCL was 
served notices by the District Collector to forfeit those lands. LCL, however, 
claiming that it had purchased those lands through due process, put up a fight. As a 
former Collector, now working within LCL explained: 
 
“Government machinery happily transacted and mutated land entries one 
after another and then they served the notice that the land was originally 
tribal. We might be the 3rd or 4th transaction. The initial buyer may not have 
bought with bad intentions but with bad record of rights. Obviously when this 
type of notices have been served, we are taking recourse of various Supreme 
Court judgments, so much development has been done. The Supreme Court 
also says you cannot wake up after 20 years, there has to be reasonable 
time. Finally, authority also has to take a pragmatic view, we cannot forfeit 
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the land after 20 years. Obviously we will face some fine but that is a better 
outcome. So that sort of compromise, somebody else has made the wrong 
entry earlier but I’m holding the land now. Initially these 5000 acres was 
transferred from one company to us, so there we did not have any chance to 
conduct due diligence.”157 
 
Furthermore, once land titles had been transferred to the aggregators, given the 
rules of the land market, original landowners could do little to get their lands back 
unless they could demonstrate in court (on a case-by-case basis) that the transaction 
was illegal or fraudulent or had otherwise not followed procedure. To that effect, an 
informant lamented, “once they had cheated us, what was the point? We tried but what 
was the point?”158 
 
Villagers found that raising such issues with the gram panchayat (village local 
government) was difficult too, given that some of the most powerful members of the 
panchayat, particularly sarpanches, were aggregators themselves (in some instances 
with criminal connections),159 and were on good terms with LCL. By a gram 
panchayat member’s own admission, individual land issues would not be dealt with 
via the panchayat:  
 
“The gram panchayat is not concerned with this issue. As far as possible, 
people do address these matters on an individual level according to their 
capacity. Some people go to the court or the Tehsildar,160 sometimes they 
come to the gram panchayat with their problems and the gram panchayat 
can help them in finding options. As far as possible, they solve it on their 
own.”161 
 																																																								
157 L5 interview, 10/10/2012. 
158 Dh1 interview, 13/12/2012. 
159 The talathi of Mulshi district (responsible for keeping the village land records) was arrested in 2012 
for assaulting Lavasa security guards. The assault involved him pointing a loaded gun at the security 
guard and getting a gang of seven men with swords to ransack the office. While not all talathis are or 
would be considered criminal, this incident suggests that they wielded considerable power, which may 
or may not have been sympathetic to villagers’ concerns (Times of India, 20 July 2012). 
160 Tehsildar – gazetted administrators at the sub-district level appointed by the state government and 
in charge of tax revenues, appointment of village officials - sign and execute land sales as well as act as 
a magistrate in revenue disputes. 
161 D1 interview, 20/01/2013.  
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Since even the gram panchayats conceptualised land disputes as a casualty of the 
market process (or had a direct hand in the matter), villagers took their issues to 
court. By and large very few court cases were filed against LCL: 36 cases in total, 
amounting to less than 5 per cent of total transactions according to the 2007-08 
Collector’s report. This number rose to approximately 51 pending civil proceedings 
and 44 revenue proceedings in 2014 (calculated from LCL, 2014).  Of the 51 civil 
cases filed, 40 involved an intermediary (false PoA, family disputes, illegal sale deeds, 
and poor government record keeping) (LCL, 2014).   
 
Still, this does not represent a sizeable proportion of total land transactions. 
Informants who had articulated being cheated chose not to approach the court for a 
number of reasons. Court cases require requisite paperwork, such as title deeds and 
various proofs of caste and residence, which are notoriously difficult to obtain and 
are subject to the vagaries of local bureaucracies (Gupta, 2012). Mumtaz (2011) 
suggests that numerous scheduled caste and scheduled tribe families in the region 
have “languished without caste certificates to support their legal entitlements to the 
land” (2011: 1). An informant concurred: 
 
“We have been asked to get documents related to our ancestors, our previous 
generations. We have been trying to get documents for the last 8 years. Just 
as people go to work every day, we go to government offices to get 
documents. Nobody is giving us the required documents. Whether it is the 
talathi or any one…  we have not received our caste certificates yet. Every 
time we need a document, we have to keep making numerous trips to the 
court and to Paud. They (the court) keep demanding documents. What do we 
know about these documents? Shouldn’t people like the sarpanch get it for 
us?”162 
 
Furthermore, in the court of law, LCL, being infinitely more resourced and 
connected, would have the upper hand:  
 
																																																								
162 M1 interview, 06/09/2012. 
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“Their 7/12 (land) agreements happened much more speedily than ours. Even 
if you hire a government advocate, they [LCL] could pay him more than you 
would. They can manage anything. In fact, we will end up wasting whatever 
money we have. The ordinary man cannot do anything – those people who 
had the standing, support and money went to court.”163 
 
But when individual land claims are filed in the revenue court it is up to the revenue 
official, based on the paperwork, to determine the outcome of the case. A recent 
report by the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) shows that revenue courts 
often alienate locals in “connivance” with landlords. When adivasis do manage to file 
a case in court, the probability of their case being rejected is 54% in Maharashtra, 
considerably higher than the national average of 36% (ranging from 0.25% in Gujarat 
to 62% in Assam). This is because, despite the ‘legal presumption’ being in favour of 
the tribal person, it appears that the burden of proof was placed on the tribal 
claimant to his/her disadvantage, when the spirit of the law was the opposite. Even 
once cases have been won, handing over possession is an altogether different 
matter” (MRD, 2008: 156). Baka (2013) notes that farmers often do not pursue legal 
processes owing to the financial cost and that sometimes, even if the farmer is 
victorious, the toll of legal fees can make the victory seem hollow. Similarly, Visser 
and Spoor demonstrate that farmers in Russia left agriculture even when lands had 
been returned (2011: 164) due to the financial burden of the litigation. 
 
Most importantly, a court case was undesirable for both parties, as neither LCL nor 
the villager would unequivocally benefit from one. The lengthy legal process could 
ensure that the case would be in court for years, potentially preventing LCL from 
developing it and generating high fees for villagers. Moreover, both LCL and villagers 
wished to maintain good relations with each other. As a representative from LCL 
explained:  
 
“In such typical cases our judicial system is such that matters are lengthy and 
drawn out. So it is very easy for a company to keep the matter in court and 
																																																								
163 D1 interview, 20/01/2013.  
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make the owner frustrated. Here we don’t allow that because in the larger 
picture, I want the support of all villagers.”164  
 
Villagers too stood to gain from keeping the peace: 
 
“The land that was bought by them could not be bought back. People have 
bought motorcyles on loan. How is the loan supposed to be paid? They have 
to be by Lavasa’s side. If they do not stand by Lavasa’s side, it is their loss.”165 
 
Hence, the best option for both (willing) parties would be to settle the dispute out 
of court:  
 
“After all, what fees would the advocate get from the farmer? If he agreed to 
manage things, he would get fees from the farmer as well as the company. In 
such a situation, even the advocate would be tempted. The farmer would pay 
INR 10,000 (USD 200) but the company would be INR 100,000 (USD 
2000). Obviously, the farmer would be helpless. Instead of losing everything, 
they would prefer settlement.”166  
 
“It is hard for people to go to court. You need to find money and lawyers and 
Lavasa can just manage these people by giving them some money and deal 
with the issue. Many of the cases that the People’s Commission167 heard, 
Lavasa settled them and now those disputes don’t exist.”168 
 
While many villagers attempted to address these issues on their own through the 
court or through settlements, a small and vocal group joined hands with the NAPM. 
The NAPM mobilised a number of (mostly adivasi) residents of (largely but not 
solely) Mugaon village (the village with the largest adivasi population) to engage in 
highly visible collective protest, demanding that lands be returned to the people they 																																																								
164 L5 interview, 10/10/2012. 
165 D1 interview, 20/01/2013.  
166 D1 interview, 20/01/2013.  
167 The People’s Commission was set up by a number of prominent civil society members and the 
NAPM in October 2008 to investigate land deals and displacement due to twelve dams and Lavasa in 
the Western Ghats region. They produced a report in 2009 that outlined key concerns.  
168 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. 
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had been stolen from, and they did so with some successes.169 The NAPM’s 
collective action prospects were thwarted by the murkiness of the land transactions 
and the difficulty in determining who was telling the truth about being defrauded and 
who was merely trying to get their land back to re-sell their lands at higher prices.170 
The verification of facts in this instance was extremely difficult and required a 
statutory body to conduct an investigation on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether indeed, land theft had indeed taken place.171 As an activist explained: 
 
“Between 2000-2004 whatever happened in terms of land transactions was 
very dubious, so we cannot really say that people themselves have sold that 
land or if the company has forged those documents. It is very difficult to tell 
and there is a very thin line to demarcate the two.”172 
 
In keeping with their ideological resolve, which is committed to resisting 
neoliberalism and the resultant dispossession and displacement (due to factories, 
enclosures, SEZs), the NAPM organised protests in Lavasa, Pune, Mumbai, and Delhi, 
reported frauds to the media, and took land matters to court. Many (though not all) 
of the NAPM members sought to shut down the project and have lands returned to 
the original landowners. While NAPM’s drive to deliver justice to those who had 
been cheated was respected by most villagers, including who had not participated in 
the movement, their larger aim of destabilising and halting the project was not as 
widely appreciated. Many villagers opined that since they had already sold their land, 
and LCL was now the rightful owner, even if the project stalled, the land would not 
be returned to them (unlike if the lands had been acquired using eminent domain). In 
such circumstances they were better off with the project continuing: 
 
“If they (NAPM) do it for the rights of the poor and the adivasis, it is all right. 
But if they talk about shutting down the company, obviously we are not going 
to support them. It is about our survival, we have no other option. Today, even 																																																								
169 The NAPM filed a series of court cases, including 17 cases against Lavasa for purchasing adivasi 
land. They won 2 cases (in 2012) where lands were returned back to the government for reallocation 
to the adivasis. 
170 The NAPM’s position on land purchase and acquisition has not been of negotiating better 
compensation. Rather, it holds the view that farmers must not sell their lands as it both impoverishes 
their assets and impacts their long term livelihoods.  
171 C3 interview, 08/10/2013. 
172 C4 interview, 18/04/2012. 
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if these people (LCL), have us by their foot on our neck, at least they give us 
our daily bread.”173 
 
Consequently, while there were attempts to generate collective action against Lavasa 
on issues of land, protest around land was largely muted and restricted to one village 
(Mugaon), where it revolved around the issue of adivasi and ceiling lands. In the case 
of the former, the sale of adivasi lands to non-adivasis is prohibited by law. In the case 
of ceiling lands, lands that had at one point been redistributed to the villagers as part 
of land reform, could not be transferred without appropriate permissions from the 
Collector. Thus, unlike private lands, for which sales were permitted without any 
special permissions, for ceiling and adivasi lands, the legality of the purchases were 
questionable due to guarantees the government provided to landholders in law. 
Therefore, resistance organised by NAPM took on a caste dimension because it was 
relatively easier to dispute adivasi land than agricultural land (discussed in Chapter 
Six). Indeed a number of non-adivasi informants were under the impression that the 
NAPM worked exclusively for adivasis. Consequently, little collective action took 
place around privately purchased lands (the vast bulk of the lands in the area), which 
largely belonged to those who were neither adivasi nor scheduled caste. Although 
the process of land assembly was a “silent process” of the kind that Vijayabaskar 
(2010) observed in Tamil Nadu, it is not, as he argues “secured more through a 
process of consent than coercion" (2010: 42).  
 
Finally, almost all present literature on the topic of land assembly in India refers to 
instances where the state has played a significant role in forcibly acquiring land from 
farmers. It focuses on describing the events as instances of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ in order to shed light on the processes of capitalism in general. The 
act of forcible transfer of lands from peasants to industries/corporations (in the 
name of public interest), lends itself easily to a narrative of dispossession. What 
these studies neglect, is that this narrative is not merely an academic or analytical 
insight into the changing politics of land, rather it is also politically used as a critique 
of state policy and its support for land acquisition. The critique is a powerful one, 
one that unequivocally accuses governments of supporting the interest of capital at 																																																								
173 Dh1 interview, 13/12/2012. 
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the expense of farmers, and one that has deep resonance in contemporary Indian 
politics. Indeed, the head of LCL’s land acquisitions demonstrated an awareness of 
the political strength of such critique: 
 
“There are so many baseless allegations against this project, now if you go for 
land acquisition, whatever claims people like Medha Patkar are making, are still 
strengthened because of forcible acquisition by government machinery. So we 
want to keep out of that actually. That is the biggest reason we don’t want to 
resort to typical land acquisition.”174  
 
Political opposition to land acquisition has often been framed as an ‘opposition to 
dispossession’ and state governments have been forced to engage with farmers on 
this issue. The private land assembly process not only generated different outcomes 
for different people it also derived partial legitimacy from the fact that villagers had 
at least in theory consented to selling lands and had chosen to do so. The political 
argument then that this necessarily amounted to dispossession was substantially 
weakened. In the face of a litany of brokers and unverifiable facts around land 
transactions, the NAPM and the villagers could not effectively critique the project as 
being one that dispossessed people (as they have successfully done in other 
instances).  
 
In summary, this protracted land purchase had a number of effects, all of which 
further served the process of land assembly. First, while the local community often 
expressed land grievances, the particular dynamics of private land assembly prevented 
sustained land-related collective action from taking place. Land conflicts became an 
issue to be addressed within the private and domestic realm as a problem of making 
bad deals, instead of a collective problem seen as an issue of structural injustice (as is 
seen under context of land acquisition). Second, the use of courts, though difficult 
and uncommon, became the only (and individualised) avenue for action. Third, those 
who had already sold some land became invested in the project’s functioning. Finally, 
NAPM’s politically salient critique of dispossession was disrupted by the consent with 
																																																								
174 L5 interview, 10/10/2012. 
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which some villagers had sold their land. Thus, despite some land-related complaints, 
the market process in effect brokered relative peace in favour of LCL.  
 
5.3. Conclusion: Land Markets and Dispossession 
 
The Indian state has long acquired lands for development projects such as dams, 
factories, towns etc. With the emergence of SEZs, large infrastructure projects, and 
large-scale agriculture, the issue of ‘land grabs’ has regained its prominence (Sampat, 
2010; Zoomers, 2010; Deininger, 2011; Gardner, 2012; Shrivastava and Kothari, 
2012; Sud, 2014a, 2014b). The political salience of land acquisition is exemplified by 
the recent redrafting of the colonial Land Acquisition Act (1894) into the Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act (2013), which places greater 
requirements of consent, dictates that compensation must be four times that of 
registered market value, and outlines rules for rehabilitation of project-affected 
people. In the run-up to this bill, the issue of whether the state should intervene in 
instances where companies opt to purchase land directly from landowners generated 
much public debate. In this instance, can market purchase, which, at least in theory, is 
voluntary, be a viable alternative and with what consequences? 		
I have shown in this chapter that, unlike many other projects that used eminent 
domain acquisition, LCL could more or less successfully assemble their large land 
parcel with little sustained political resistance. This was made possible in part by the 
historical specificity of the land under question (the effects of the Varasgaon Dam). 
Although the state withheld its powers of eminent domain, it assisted the company 
by creating the conditions under which this rural population was sparse, effectively 
fragmented, partially urbanised, and disconnected from agriculture. As I have shown, 
this land market did not simply exist, but it was actively produced by the state 
(through policies and politicians), and made to work by a whole host of 
intermediaries. The presence of intermediaries, producing and leveraging conditions 
of asymmetric information, ensured that the odds were heavily stacked against most 
villagers. To that effect, Sud (2014a: 594) points to the importance of looking beyond 
the “powerful transnational and national actors” participating in land grabs. Similarly, 
a recent literature on India highlights the importance of local intermediaries in the 
making of urban space/real estate projects (Baka, 2013; Gururani, 2013; Levien, 
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2013; Sud, 2014a). This chapter contributes to that literature by not only showing 
that intermediaries are important to the functioning of land markets and the 
production of urban space, but also by examining the kinds of social and political 
effects that their presence produces. The production of this future city conceals its 
reliance on agrarian structures and the particular spatial history of the land. 
 
Bardhan warns us that “the land market in India is not like any other market of 
economics textbooks, and it often involves the manipulation and strong-arm tactics 
of land speculators and the land mafia in collusion with the politicians” (2011: n.p.). 
This leads us to ask, whether we can think of private land assembly as a form of land 
grab resulting in dispossession. Levien argues that a land grab is “an extra-economic 
process,” enabled by a “broker state” through political, legal and violent forces, and 
that “it only makes sense to talk about a ‘grab’ when land is expropriated using 
means other than voluntary market purchase” (Levien, 2011: 436). However, in this 
chapter, I have problematised the idea of “voluntary market purchase” to show that 
‘grabs’ can take place even with consent. Agrarian studies have long shown that 
economic processes can compel farmers to selling their lands if they are in debt, or 
for survival. In practice it is difficult to untangle what is voluntary and what is 
coerced, as the conditions for voluntary sales can be heavily stacked against villagers; 
an eminent threat may induce a voluntary exchange, and fraud may blur the lines 
between voluntary and coerced.  
 
Dispossession – “to deprive someone of land, property, or other” (OED, 2013) – 
implies force and deliberate action but does not necessarily suggest the nature of 
that force. One could argue therefore, that in a world of constrained choices and 
asymmetric information, voluntary sale of land can in fact result in dispossession. In 
some instances, those affected by such projects part with their land based on 
promises of resettlement, employment, and other markers of ‘development.’ In 
others instances they sell at greatly deflated prices without any knowledge of what is 
to come. Compliance to sell does not necessarily signal consent or support for the 
project, or constitute a mere rational economic decision, and it can still be seen as 
an instance of dispossession.  
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But equally, one cannot assume that all consent to sell is necessarily dispossession. 
Just as there are instances of villagers being defrauded or coerced into selling lands 
under grossly asymmetric information, there are also instances where villagers 
articulated selling their lands directly to LCL. This enabled them to gain a foothold in 
another (often urban) economy, and/or substantially better their own economic 
conditions (despite the bittersweet knowledge that, had they held on to their land 
they could have commanded higher prices). Of course not all villagers consented 
with full knowledge of the project. But a sizeable number of villagers did see 
opportunity to make large amounts of money quickly through the burgeoning local 
land market.  
 
It is precisely this space of interpretation – whether the choice to sell was a ‘real’ 
choice or not – that renders opposition to private land assembly difficult. In the 
absence of clear facts demonstrating theft, the NAPM, even in their opposition to 
the project, had to grapple with the very real possibility that villagers had sold the 
land of their own volition. Irrespective of whether the choice was made under 
duress, the absence of forcible acquisition prevented the politically powerful critique 
of dispossession, one that the NAPM has invoked with resounding success in many 
other instances. It was no longer a simple case of peasantry vs. capital/state but 
rather individual cases of fraud and theft, which could only be addressed in court. 
The NAPM could not therefore confront it in ways that it was used to, through a 
thoroughgoing critique of the state, its policies of dispossession, and its use of force. 
For those who sold their lands, it was not merely handsome compensation or a 
tailor-made rehabilitation package but the complex processes that the 
intermediaries, sometimes with political power, unleashed as they swept through 
these villages. But, as we shall see in the next chapter, this market process generated 
some unexpected effects for the project. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Life in Lavasa: Holding Out for Inclusion 
 
As you descend past the breathtaking viewpoints, down the winding road and into 
the Varasgaon valley you are confronted with an intentionally European-looking 
town. With red, orange and yellow buildings flanking the town centre’s wide 
waterfront promenade, Dasve’s architecture conveys both the grandness of Lavasa’s 
vision and the quaintness of its spirit. Adjacent to the town hall is an ochre building, 
vernacular in style; with its façade weathered by the monsoon and a tin shack 
flanking its outer wall, it betrays Dasve’s faux-Italian aesthetic. Bustling with activity, 
it houses a dhaba (eatery), a small grocery store, a flourmill, and some rental 
accommodation. Despite its central location, this property does not belong to LCL 
but to Shankar Margale, Dasve’s most prosperous holdout. 
 
Shankar Margale, a member of the dhangar175 community, is doing well economically. 
He withstood the land purchase process (described in Chapter Five) and retained 
possession of some of his centrally located plots. His property now forms a hub for 
a multitude of budget tourists, students, car and bus drivers, villagers, and land 
agents, who step in for a quick bite, a cup of tea, or a packet of cigarettes. The 
businesses housed here and on nearby tracts generate substantial rental revenue 
every month.  
 
As briefly discussed in Chapter Five, LCL was unable to purchase each and every 
landholding within the area demarcated for the hill station. Under similar 
circumstances elsewhere (e.g. in many SEZs), the state’s powers of eminent domain 
would have been invoked to forcibly expropriate land from such holdouts. However, 
since the GoM did not extend this favour to LCL, holdouts are present all across 
Lavasa and some, epitomised by Shankar Margale, are highly visible. Furthermore, 
Lavasa is not planned as a gated community; rather, its aims reflect the desire to 
build a new city, which is both inclusive and profitable. Thus, Shankar’s case impels 																																																								
175 The dhangar community is a traditional nomadic pastoral community from Maharashtra. They have 
been classified as a nomadic tribe and have recently sought to be re-classified as a Scheduled Tribe.  
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us to ask a number of connected questions: how and with what effects have rural 
communities (specifically the holdouts) been thrown into and shaped city-making? If 
Lavasa indeed aims to be an ‘inclusive city’, as discussed in Chapter Four, then how, 
if at all, and on what terms are these holdouts included in the city? What are the 
consequences of holdouts, like Shankar Margale, for Lavasa’s plan?  
 
Fig 6.1: Shankar Margale’s property in Dasve, Lavasa 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
 
This chapter argues that while LCL does have plans to build an inclusive city – one 
with affordable services and a corporate social responsibility programme – its idea of 
inclusion is premised on LCL retaining control over land. Therefore, in LCL’s 
conception, the holdouts (as land owners) are an aesthetic, planning, and security 
liability. These holdouts are heterogeneous, spanning caste and class, and have 
different relationships with the company. While they pose a challenge for the 
company in terms of planning and resistance, they also politically legitimise the 
project: their existence is invoked by LCL as testimony to the lack of coercion/use of 
violence in the land purchase process and as an affirmation of LCL’s ideology of 
development. Furthermore, in finding themselves amidst a city building project, some 
holdouts provide affordable services to others while creating livelihoods for 
themselves, ironically making real the possibility of inclusion. I show that it is through 
their propertied citizenship, and not their plan-based inclusion or the power of their 
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vote, that they are able to lay claim to the city. I further argue that they are in good 
measure responsible for the project surviving multiple legal and political 
contestations. Thus, while the holdouts prevent LCL from executing its plan in some 
measure, paradoxically, it is their presence that allows the plan to at least partially 
succeed.  
 
Section 6.1 lays out LCL’s plan for inclusion and how it has been conceptualised to 
include villagers and holdouts. Section 6.2 describes the different kinds of holdouts 
that currently reside within Lavasa and their relationship to the city. Section 6.3 
examines the effects of their presence on LCL’s plans. It argues that while the 
holdouts resist the project they also ultimately embolden it, albeit in paradoxical 
ways. Section 6.4 concludes by reconceptualising the holdout and rethinking ideas of 
inclusion, planning, and resistance in contemporary India. 
 
6.1. Planning for Inclusion 
 
Scholars have argued that comprehensive master planning is often exclusionary to 
the poor (Rao, 2006; Benjamin, 2008; Holston, 2008), this is because master planning 
in India is largely controlled by development authorities that often “promote a very 
restrictive form of land development”, regulate economic activity, and protect “the 
interests of elite groups who compete with poor groups to access productive 
locations and public resources” (Benjamin and Bhuvaneshwari, 2001: 1). 
Furthermore, given that bureaucrats rather than democratically elected 
representatives often control such organisations, the urban poor’s avenues to 
influence planning processes are arguably constrained (Benjamin, 2008). Master plans 
reflect the dominant ideology of political power by constituting what is formal and 
informal, and determining what lies within the plan and is in violation of it. Thus, the 
areas that fall outside the ambit or the rules of the plan often become sites where 
the urban poor, sometimes through insurgence (Holston, 2008) and occupation 
(Benjamin, 2008), stake their claims to the city. It is precisely this insurgence and 
occupation that simultaneously allows claims of citizenship to be made and also 
constitutes ‘planning failure’. 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, recent scholarship on Indian cities has emphasized the 
growing power of the private sector as well as the middle class in restructuring and 
remaking urban space (Baviskar, 2003; Chatterjee, 2004; Fernandes, 2006; Goldman, 
2010; Ghertner, 2011). The private sector has gone beyond the mere provision of 
urban infrastructure and services to planning and visioning urban spaces, often 
creating settlements that cater to the elite at the exclusion of the poor. In a similar 
vein, middle class urban movements often frame their discourse through rights as 
“consumer citizens” (Fernandes, 2004) and “such reform movements devalorize the 
citizenship of those who are poor and property-less” (Roy, 2007: xxxiii). Indeed, a 
large body of scholarship points to how planning and urban governance in India, 
whether in the domain of the state, the middle class, or the private sector, is largely 
exclusionary to the poor.  
 
While there is considerable literature to demonstrate that post-liberalisation urban 
and rural development is exclusive, splintered, takes place in enclaves, marginalises 
the poor and therefore generates resistance, this literature misses a key facet of 
contemporary Indian planning. Roy suggests that, “the story of Indian cities is more 
than that of splintering urbanism and secessionary citizenship” (Roy, 2011: 265). 
Rather, it is “engendered through claims of integration, public interest, and urban 
democracy. It is a reclaiming of the city, of the urban commons, rather than a retreat 
to gated enclaves” (Roy, 2011: 265). Accordingly, “the idea of the ‘inclusive city’ has 
for some time now held sway in official and development circles” (Gootu, 2011: 36). 
New forms of urban development therefore seek to include the poor; what are the 
terms of this inclusion and what are its effects?   
 
This section shows how inclusion is conceptualised within Lavasa’s plan. As outlined 
in Chapter Four, although Lavasa (Lake Town as it was then) was initially 
conceptualised as a real estate venture both through government policy and in its 
own plans, as time passed the vision for the project expanded. LCL insisted that 
unlike Amby Valley and other exclusive townships, Lavasa would not be a gated 
community but a profitable and “inclusive” city for the “entire socio-economic 
spectrum” (LCL, 2009: n.p.). While many critics have asserted that this is a mere 
public relations exercise, I take LCL’s claim seriously, treating a privately planned 
inclusive city as an empirical phenomenon with social consequences in order to 
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examine what it means for a city premised on private property to be inclusive. I lay 
out how such inclusive planning proposes to incorporate villagers (including 
holdouts) and not just those (largely middle-class/elite) citizens it hopes to attract 
from elsewhere. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, LCL’s physical, business and governance plans are 
founded on its authority as a private property owner and its total control over the 
demarcated land area. The business plan is premised on the ability of LCL to 
leverage private property to generate short term revenue from selling and leasing 
real estate, and medium and long term revenue from annuities and service delivery. 
Therefore, one of the prime goals of its development plan is to “encourage private 
initiative in city development by supportive measures to make the project adequately 
remunerative” (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 31). LCL’s plans for inclusion are therefore 
circumscribed by its need to maintain control over its property and generate profits. 
 
Equally important is LCL’s goal to make Lavasa an inclusive city. This goal finds 
expression in Lavasa’s Development Plan, which aims “to ensure social and 
economic inclusivity by facilitating creation of diversified economic activities, housing 
and social facilities” (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 31). Therefore, inclusivity in Lavasa is 
premised on the provision of city services and amenities at a range of price points, 
and LCL conceptualises its residents as “consumer-citizens” (LCL, 2009: n.p.): 
 
“[Lavasa is] supposed to cater to all people, and when you cater to all 
people you need something at all price points. So we thought we need 
something for everyone right from a driver to a CEO and everything in 
between. Obviously you have to create a business model that works, given 
the cost of construction and the cost of land… so when we went looking for 
partners we wanted a portfolio that covered the spectrum… restaurants, 
shopping… again we looked at all the price points – so you have your wada 
pav and all your fancy restaurants and everything else in between. We’ve 
followed this principle in everything: we have affordable housing for those 
working in Lavasa who can’t afford to buy a villa and even when we 
launched real estate sales we started at a INR 10 lakh (USD 20,000) price 
point for a studio. So there was something at every 10 lakhs, and we have 
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maintained that.”176 
 
With an indigenous population of 3129 villagers (Census, 2011) and an anticipated 
steady-state population of 240,000 by 2020 (LCL, 2014), Lavasa is and will be a city 
of migrants. The planners projected the demographic characteristics of Lavasa’s 
population based on observed trends in Mumbai and Pune, as well as hill stations 
within Maharashtra. They assumed one “non-residing servant” per four apartments, 
three residing servant employees per one-acre villa (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 43), and 
made similar projections for labour involved in commercial businesses. LCL aims to 
have a workforce participation rate of 35 per cent and generate jobs for 96,706 
people by 2021 (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 45). Housing will be built based on these 
projections. For instance, the Development Plan assumes that 57 per cent of 
households will be from the ‘Low Income Group’ (those households with a monthly 
income of less than INR 20,000 (USD 400)) and accordingly, 57 per cent of housing 
units (21,796 of 38,081 units) will be built for this demographic group. Therefore, 
individuals who fall within the lower income group could become property owners 
in Lavasa. In discussions, LCL employees often boasted about the affordability of 
their housing stock relative to other Indian cities. Furthermore, LCL also developed 
workforce housing and a rental housing strategy in order to create “a truly inclusive 
and cosmopolitan hill station” (Lavasa SPA, 2012: x). 
 
For all its talk of inclusion and cosmopolitanism, the ‘Lavasa Citizen’s Guide’, in 
keeping with the rules of building societies/resident welfare associations/gated 
communities, reflects some prevalent Indian middle-class attitudes towards domestic 
workers. The handbook recommends that “Servants and Drivers employed by the 
citizens” (LCL, 2012a: 6) should be registered with security and that “exposure of 
cash and valuables” should “be avoided in front of servants”. In fact “close 
supervision of servants/maid servants” is advised as “casual supervision/over-
confidence may lead to pilferages (small quantity theft sometimes difficult to realize 
at that point of time)” (LCL, 2012a: 7). These are characteristic middle-class tropes 
of petty crime, security, and the ‘untrustworthiness’ of servants (Falzon, 2008; 
Waldrop, 2008).  
 																																																								
176 L7 interview, 21/08/2012 
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Most striking however, is that villagers are seldom, if ever, referred to as citizens of 
Lavasa. Both interviews and company documents revealed a separation in semantics 
and imagination between the villagers and the future citizens of Lavasa. Accordingly, 
the needs of the villagers are addressed through a distinct Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) unit (which was recently renamed Community Development). 
While some members of the LCL team were cognisant of and often troubled by the 
separation between city development and community development, hinting that 
eventually CSR should and would fall away, official documents maintained the 
distinction:  
 
“We stopped calling it CSR because CSR is completely different. We 
resumed calling it Community Development because that is what it is. And 
he (the Community Development Officer) has a very good relationship with 
the sarpanches and many other village leaders. To a large degree he acts as 
an ombudsman for them. He helps us deliver messages and deliver 
programmes but also takes information back to them. He helps them if 
someone needs a job, places them in a job that fits their skills, and helps 
them with other problems they have. I think we have a long way to go in this 
relationship. Unfortunately, some of the less altruistic NGOs in this country 
have convinced villagers that a relationship with a corporate is just ‘see what 
you can get’, that it is fundamentally visceral. I think, and it is not just my 
view but also the chairman’s view, that if their quality of life improves, it is 
good for us; it is not just good for them but also good for us. We would 
eventually like to see some of these gaothans177 go away because they don’t 
need to be separate, because their quality of life has come up so much that 
they can be regular functioning members of Lavasa.” 178 
 
The quote above is instructive. It reveals that LCL’s relationship with villagers, 
whether named CSR or not, is conceptualised as CSR – a set of programmes 
undertaken in order to “improve lifestyles”179 that in the long run are also beneficial to 
LCL. The CSR programme today includes a whole host of services, activities, and 																																																								
177 Gaothan – A portion of the village used for settlement as defined by the Maharashtra Land Revenue 
Code, 1966. 
178 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
179 L3 interview, 12/07/2012. 
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employment opportunities; including a crèche for children, an English-medium school 
run by an international charity called ‘Cristel House’, provision of school uniforms 
and materials, medical check-ups, vocational training, contract employment, 
construction of temples in various villages, water tanks (in the absence of tap water), 
and a “superstition eradication campaign” (Lavasa SPA, 2011: 104). The concern, as 
articulated by another LCL employee, was that if villagers were not able to integrate 
into Lavasa, it would “lead to bad relations”, affecting the project in the long run. 
Furthermore, ensuring “cordial relations” would prevent “hurdles” while executing 
plans; should there be a “road blockage” such a relationship would “be able to resolve” 
the issue.180 This view is consistent with the business rationale for CSR, which argues 
that taking care of villagers is not merely a social responsibility but also makes 
economic sense. First, it can improve the reputation of the firm, which translates 
into eventual profits. Second, should there be an accident/dispute, CSR can preserve 
the corporations’ ability to continue working within the community. Third, a buy-in 
from locals at an early stage prevents larger and costlier hurdles for the corporation 
in the future (Welker, 2006). Lavasa’s CSR programme is headed by an experienced 
CSR officer (previously employed by Tata in Singur) and its activities are held up as 
symbols of not only the sincerity of LCL’s (somewhat paternalistic) good intentions 
but also as proof that LCL brought ‘progress’ to the villagers, who, as the quote 
above demonstrates, are still not “functioning members of Lavasa”.181  
 
But LCL’s idea of inclusion does not encompass the myriad ways in which inclusion is 
practiced (for better or worse) in India today. For instance, it does not include 
affirmative action quotas (reservation quotas) and is not governed by a 
democratically elected local government. In fact the CSR engagement takes place 
primarily through interactions between the CSR official and a committee (nagrik vikas 
sangh)182 that is largely composed of male village elites such as the sarpanches and 
other educated villagers. This committee meets on an ad hoc basis to discuss mutual 
concerns and many informants felt that it only discussed issues that directly 
benefited the village elite. While many activities can be justified under CSR, certain 
activities “are more amenable than others”, therefore, “investing in villagers who 																																																								
180 L3 interview, 12/07/2012. 
181 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
182 L3 interview, 12/07/2012. 
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secure” a firm’s ability to operate within the area makes more sense than investing in 
villagers with little influence (Welker, 2006: 368). 
 
More importantly, it is clear that LCL’s idea of inclusion did not (at least at the 
outset of the project) include the possibility of villagers leveraging their own private 
property or receiving joint development rights, as has been the case in a handful of 
other large-scale projects.183 This reflects a long-standing bias in Indian urban 
planning that conceptualises inclusion in terms of housing rather than as access to a 
productive location/inclusion in the urban economy (Benjamin and Bhuvaneshwari, 
2011). LCL’s vision for inclusive development is premised on their own exclusive 
ownership of private property. According to their Development Plan: 
 
“Availability of developable land in a contiguous manner is a further 
challenge. LCL has devised strategies such as obtaining right of way 
agreements to make available contiguous land especially for 
infrastructure works such as roads, transmission lines, sewerage 
network etc. As the development of [the] first phase, namely Dasve, is 
taking shape owners are reluctant to sell land and in other areas are 
demanding [an] unreasonable price. The LCL plans to devise strategies 
of involving the land owners in the development process so that the 
last tranche of lands are easily available.” (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 119) 
 
Therefore, it is only when LCL is unable to buy land from the holdouts and they 
have the capacity to demand an “unreasonable price” that they are offered joint 
development rights.184 The proportion of joint agreements remains small, for reasons 
that will be discussed in the next section.185  
 
LCL’s plan therefore represents a trade-off between private property ownership and 																																																								
183 Under the Gujarat government Town Planning Scheme, land is acquired from farmers and pooled, 
areas for public infrastructure are delineated and the remaining area is reconstituted into developed 
plots and returned to landowners. Under this scheme, existing landowners remain landowners of 
smaller but higher value plots than before. Similar schemes of joint-ownership or joint development 
rights have been instituted in, for example, Mahindra World City, Rajasthan and Magarpatta City, 
Pune.  
184 L5 interview, 10/10/2012. 
185 Data on the exact number of acres under joint agreement is unavailable. From Figure 5.1 we can 
estimate it to be less than 10 per cent of the total purchasable land area. 
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a certain kind of inclusion. Its ownership of property is central to its ability to ensure 
profits and govern the city. That is to say, its right to control, develop, and govern 
springs from its authority as a land-owner, as the Special Planning Authority (SPA) 
only controls those parts of the project already owned by LCL (discussed in Chapter 
Four). Therefore, the holdouts pose an interesting planning problem; while they are 
firmly located within Lavasa’s plan area, LCL is unable to develop these parcels in 
keeping with their plan. According to LCC the holdouts could pose numerous 
problems: they could build “illegal structures” which would not “conform” to the 
Hill Station Regulation, they could become free riders, they might not have any 
“regard for beautification”, their presence would make pollution difficult to control, 
and finally, they might “compromise aspects” of “security and law and order” as the 
“sense of security” would be “diluted by unregulated development in isolated 
pockets” (LCC, 2003: 3). The holdouts were conceptualised, at least initially, as a 
threat with the potential for plan violation – as an aesthetic, security and legal 
liability. Consequently, LCL continues to attempt to buy out the holdouts. 
 
In summary, in juggling its dual project goals of profit and governance, LCL’s plans 
for inclusion were confined to providing services to, and job opportunities for, 
villagers, rather than making them equal partners in the development process. While 
LCL includes villagers and future lower income migrants in its plans, these groups are 
conceptualised as beneficiaries of CSR programmes and future urban homeowners 
(buying their ‘low income’ apartments from LCL). Therefore, the villagers’ inclusion 
does not come from their own land ownership, their democratic rights as citizens, 
or their right to the city. By refusing to become merely consumers and beneficiaries 
in their privatised city, the holdouts contest the very terms of the Development 
Plan. 
 
6.2. The Holdouts 
 
Who are these holdouts and what is their relationship to the city? The holdouts can 
be roughly categorised into three groups: the first consists of villagers who own land 
that can be legally sold (with or without the District Collector’s permission) but who 
have chosen not to sell some or all of it. Some of these villagers are local residents, 
others live elsewhere but retain possession of their land. The second group consists 
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of adivasis and dhangar communities, which are prohibited from selling their adivasi 
and/or ceiling lands under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. As detailed in 
Chapter Five, many adivasi and ceiling lands are under dispute, as some brokers 
purchased them illegally and eventually transferred them to LCL. These families 
retain occupancy of their land, although in some instances they do not possess clear 
land titles. Furthermore, many of them are members of the NAPM. The third group 
consists of intermediaries/ investors from outside the area who purchased land in 
the region as speculative investments. These investors do not reside within the area 
earmarked for Lavasa and are absent from the day-to-day functioning of the city, 
therefore, they will not be discussed in this chapter. For the first two groups, land 
ownership significantly determines the relationship of village communities to LCL. A 
brief description of the village communities (and holdouts) is required in order to 
proceed. 
 
According to the 2011 census, the 18 villages within Lavasa have a total population 
of 3129 (692 households). Most families (96 per cent according to Aparna 
Tamhankar and Associates (2012)) have resided in the area for more than 25 years. 
The extant population is predominantly Maratha and 14 per cent are members of 
scheduled tribes (adivasi) (444 individuals) (Census, 2011). A third (157) of the latter 
reside in the village of Mugaon and 117 across Dasve, Bhoini, Koloshi and Dhamanol, 
all of which are part of Phase 1 of Lavasa. The remaining 170 live in the villages that 
are part of Phase 4 of the project (Census, 2011).  
 
Not all villagers sold their entire landholding to LCL or intermediaries and therefore 
approximately 56.5 per cent of them were landowners in 2012 (Aparna Tamhankar 
and Associates, 2012). The size of their landholdings varies, as do the number of 
owners per holding (many parcels were jointly owned by more than six people). 
Table 6.1 summarises the distribution of land ownership in the project area in 2012 
showing that 75 per cent of resident families were either landless or owned less than 
an acre of land, and approximately 6 per cent were large landowners with holdings 
greater than 10 acres. It is important to note that these lands are in different 
categories, such as ceiling and agricultural land. The landless population is referred to 
as ‘landless villagers’ for the rest of the chapter. Some members of this group have 
historically been landless while others became landless by selling all their land either 
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to an intermediary or to LCL.186 Approximately 40 families (from the latter group) 
were resettled within the project area and were provided with employment, 
housing, and basic services in keeping with LCL’s CSR plan (LCL, 2014).  
 
Table 6.1: Percentage of village population by land holding size 
across Lavasa’s three phases  
 
Phase Landless < 1 acre 1-5 acres 5-10 acres > 10 acres 
Phase 1 42.75 20.39 26.67 5.49 4.71 
Phase 2 51.43 19.59 19.18 6.12 3.67 
Phase 3 36.36 18.18 30.58 4.55 10.33 
Source: Aparna Tamhankar and Associates (2012) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, a large proportion of the land purchases had taken 
place by 2003 before LCL (in its current form) took control over the project. The 
percentage of holdouts varied drastically by village (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 6.2); 
areas where land purchase began over a decade ago (e.g. Dasve, Mugaon, Koloshi, 
and Dhamanol) have fewer holdouts than those areas marked for Phase 4 of the 
project (e.g. Bhode, Varasgaon). In many villages, such as Bhoini and Varasagaon, the 
number and pattern of holdouts in 2010 did not differ substantially from that in 
2003, indicating that those who held out in 2003 continued to do so even in 2010 
(Figure 6.2). However, LCL has had more success in villages within Phase 1 of the 
project, presumably because it is purchasing land with tenacity given its urgent need; 
the holdout area in Dasve declined substantially between 2003 and 2010. Moreover, 
some holdouts only sold a portion of their landholding to LCL, others preferred to 
enter into development agreements rather than out-right sale.  
																																																								
186 As discussed in Section 3.3.1, a major shortcoming of this thesis is its treatment of the landless 
population within the Lavasa project area. This gap exists in great part because by the time fieldwork 
was undertaken, many historically landless families had already left the area. The remaining population 
of landless villagers were largely those who had sold their lands to LCL.  
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Figure 6.2: Land Ownership in Dasve and Bhoini in 2003 and 2010  
 
Source: Adapted by author from LCC (2003) and Lavasa SPA (2012) 
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6.2.1. Holdouts as Speculators 
 
Unsurprisingly, the ability to hold out reflects both class and caste privilege. Many 
sarpanches for instance, are aggregators and large holdouts themselves, owning land 
in prime locations. For instance, one deputy sarpanch (from the upper-caste Maratha 
community) retained a large plot along the main road. That said, Shankar Margale 
and his wife (who belong to the dhangar community) have been deputy sarpanch and 
sarpanch of Dasve for the last two local elections, revealing that holding out and 
political power do not always map neatly onto caste. 
 
All holdouts interviewed had sold some land to LCL or an intermediary. These slow 
yet constant sales are partially indicative of the land game that the villagers were 
engaging in. As discussed in Chapter Five, while early sales were made, at least in 
retrospective assessment, largely due to ignorance, the desire to make money, or to 
escape debt. Sales that took place after the city was built were much more measured 
and carefully considered. Unsurprisingly, as people became aware of the project and 
the economic climate of Pune district changed, fewer and fewer people agreed to 
sell; land sales more or less came to a halt in 2010 when the project came under 
duress. Many large landowners sold off their lands gradually, demanding higher and 
higher prices as the project became more visible. All informants were quick to point 
out just how steeply land prices had risen and irrespective of age, gender and caste, 
were fully aware of what current land prices were. Furthermore, the holdouts were 
cognisant of the Master Plan and strategically held on to some pieces of land over 
others. Some quotes (all from Maratha respondents but from a range of class 
backgrounds) are instructive here:  
  
“I will not give my land, it has a house built on it. There is a road around 
there and all the land around it has been taken. If the company comes there 
in the future and if they need a place to store something, then I can rent it. 
These two pieces of land are the ones I own, two acres. As long as I am alive, 
I cannot sell that land. Whether my sons will sell it after that, I can’t say. But 
I teach them the same thing too.”187 																																																								
187 Dh1 interview, 13/12/2012. 
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“They have plans to build 40 buildings of workforce housing in Bhoini, near 
our land. In Mugaon they have big plans to build malls but in Bhoini they’re 
building for workers and storage. Next month their plans will need to be 
executed on our land.”188  
 
“I had a map of all my lands and I thought that if the company surrounds 
me then I should have a plot of land that will not put me in difficulty; where 
there is water and public road access. Based on that I kept this piece of land 
and sold off other small parcels. I’m not going to give this land, this is the 
heart of Lavasa, and so I will not make the mistake of selling this land.”189  
 
The above quotes illustrate that some holdouts are speculating on both their lands 
as well as their futures. Other holdouts with small parcels of land held on to them 
for cultural rather than solely speculative purposes, expressing the importance of 
keeping ancestral land:  
 
“But we will always keep some, because it is our ancestral land. My father 
was born here, his father was also born here, and we will make sure to 
keep the land he kept for us.”190 
 
Many holdouts in Phase 1 of the project set up businesses on their lands. Some built 
shops and restaurants to cater to the thousands of construction workers present at 
the site. In turn they also cater to the budget traveller, students, and taxi and bus 
drivers. Others leased their land to other villagers who either owned land in more 
remote areas or had already sold their lands.191 On average, in 2012, the rent for a 
small shop was INR 2000-2500 (USD 40-50) per month, and some larger properties 
had up to six such tenants.192 As with most businesses, the location of the 
landholding is key in determining the profitability of the venture; they are largely 
located on the (public/government) main road that passes through Lavasa. Those 																																																								
188 BI interview, 28/09/2012. 
189 D4 interview, 30/09/2012. 
190 B1 interview, 28/09/2012. 
191 A1 interview, 19/12/2012. 
192 Field notes, 16/09/2012. 
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holdouts with lands along the road and close to Dasve town centre generate sizeable 
rent revenues, especially in instances when LCL required the land. For instance, the 
holdout with the land across from the town hall, was rumoured to rent his land to 
LCL for INR 100,000 (USD 2000) per month (rent amount unverified) for the 
purposes of a parking lot.   
 
Figure 6.3: Photographs of holdout properties 
 
Source: Author (2012) – left: rental housing built by a landowner, right: liquor store in Dasve 
 
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, displacement due to the Varasgaon Dam 
resulted in a highly mobile and dispersed local population. All non-adivasis 
interviewed had at least one member of their direct family studying/working/living in 
Pune or Mumbai. Moreover, more than half of the male informants had worked in 
Mumbai or Pune in recent years. Some had had their livelihoods compromised by 
exclusionary urban development enforced by the state’s planning apparatus. For 
instance, many of the elderly men I interviewed had worked for the old textile mills 
in Mumbai and returned to their villages after the last of the mills closed in the early 
1990s.193 Similarly, men in their thirties had worked in Mumbai as street vendors, 
selling clothes and other consumer items but the municipality deemed their roadside 
stalls illegal and closed them in the mid-2000s.194 Thus, the ‘public’ city had either 
rendered the livelihoods of these migrants unviable and/or the conditions of the 
urban wage economy did not represent an avenue for upward mobility. Hearing of 
Lavasa’s emergence, many migrants returned to their villages to find employment or 
to start their own businesses through the security of their land ownership. For 																																																								
193 B2 interview, 20/01/2013. 
194 Dh1 interview, 13/12/2012. 
 202	
instance, one informant’s father sold some of his land to LCL in exchange for 
employment; the informant then moved back to Lavasa to start his own business, in 
order to “be his own boss” rather than “someone else’s slave”.195 Similarly, Shankar 
Margale used to work as a security guard in Pune for a salary of INR 6000 (USD 
120) per month but returned in order to set up a shop. Leveraging their rural 
property, these holdouts tried to do in the ‘private city’, what they could not do in 
the public one – find stable employment, start their own business, and live with the 
security of land tenure. Some articulated the same disenchantment with urban decay 
that Lavasa’s marketing machinery evoked: 
 
“Earlier, there was no source of income since the dam was built. We used to 
live in Pune for work for around 5-6 years. Since Lavasa started we moved 
back – my mother and father used to live here. They told me that there is 
some development happening and that maybe some source of income would 
be available… The village is the village after all. The condition of the city has 
become pathetic.”196 
 
As part of LCL’s land sale agreement, one member of every family that sold land was 
entitled to a ‘permanent’ job in Lavasa. Since all informants had sold some land, 
almost every holdout family had at least one household member (more often than 
not a male member) employed by the company or one of its contractors. While LCL 
did honour their commitment, and the salaries offered were on a par with urban 
wages in Pune, the landless villagers repeatedly called into question the permanence 
of this employment. LCL hired contractors for a large proportion of the day-to-day 
operation of Lavasa, such as gardening, construction, road-maintenance. Villagers 
who had been employed by contractors, were only too acutely aware that their jobs 
were not indeed permanent and that the contractors could, at least in theory, hire 
and fire as they pleased. Levien (2013) makes similar observations for an SEZ in 
Rajasthan.  
 
“They said they would give permanent jobs to a person from the family. 
There was no legal agreement – they gave jobs, but not permanent ones. 																																																								
195 Field notes, 15/09/2012. 
196 A2 interview, 19/12/2012. 
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The contractor can come anytime and tell us that he does not like our work 
and ask us to leave.”197 
 
More importantly, the permanence of their employment was predicated on the long-
term success of Lavasa. The holdouts were therefore speculating not only on their 
future real estate values but also their future wages. If Lavasa did not succeed, then 
those villagers who had already sold their land would also lose their jobs. Unlike in 
instances of eminent domain acquisition, the lands villagers had sold would not be 
returned to them. In other instances, this combination of ‘permanent’ employment 
and land ownership imbued holdouts with a sense of power:  
 
“I’m a local, employee and a landowner, I am also educated. I know all the 
rules and regulations. So they won’t have the gall to fight me; I have worked 
for them and I know how they operate. They can’t fire me and they can’t 
take my land. They can’t do anything.” 198 
 
Thus, those who sold and those who did not, were either by force or choice, 
speculating in some way or another, albeit from different positions of power. 
 
The unwillingness of holdouts to part with land can be seen as a type of propertied 
resistance to the terms of the project and a gamble on land prices rising in the 
future. As demonstrated earlier, by the time of fieldwork, a number of such holdouts 
were fully aware of LCL’s plans and where their own lands fell within the Master 
Plan. Their ambitions varied considerably but they were unwavering in their desire 
to retain total control over their properties and develop them independently. The 
tenacity of their ability to hold out is yet to be seen, as LCL moves into the next 
phase of development and pressure to sell mounts. 
 
  
																																																								
197 D1 interview, 20/01/2013. 
198 D4 interview, 30/09/2012.  
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6.2.2. Holdouts as Insurgents 
 
Unlike the holdouts referred to above, those associated with the NAPM engaged in 
overt resistance against the project. In the controversy that accompanied the 
project, NAPM’s members routinely accused LCL of theft and illegal purchase of 
tribal and ceiling land (as demonstrated at great length in the People’s Commission 
Report (2009)).199 A number of villagers in Mugaon mobilised against Lavasa through 
the NAPM200. The battles to regain control of landholdings were drawn out and 
involved the use of courts as well as physical occupation of the lands in questions. At 
the time of research (2012) seventeen adivasi families had contested the sales in 
court (all of whom were residents of Mugaon and members of NAPM)201: two had 
received rulings in their favour (SDO order 50/1 of 2011) and the remaining cases 
were jettisoned due to lack of documentation.202 
 
These holdouts argued that their landholdings had been fraudulently transferred to 
an intermediary and then to LCC. Furthermore, they refused settlement or 
compensation, and demanded that their land title be returned. In NAPM village 
meetings (in which both villagers and NAPM’s urban members were present), the 
long-term perils and implications of selling land were routinely discussed. Many of 
these holdouts were in agreement with the position NAPM’s most prominent 
members that land should never be sold, regardless of the price offered: “even if 
Lavasa pays you crores of rupees, barely one or two of your generations will be able to 																																																								
199 Mulshi and Velhe Taluka are not designated as tribal districts. Therefore, lands allotted to adivasis 
were allotted to them on the basis of being landless. Some of these adivasis own ceiling lands that 
were allotted to them by the government through the land reform process of the 1970s. Under the 
1966 Revenue Act, government lands (tribal lands, ceiling lands) owned by an adivasi cannot be sold to 
non-adivasis. Poorly kept land records were routinely cited for the transfer of these lands from 
scheduled caste/adivasi persons to intermediaries. Many such families were employed in Lavasa as 
gardeners or cleaning staff. 
200 Exact numbers are difficult to provide as the number of villagers associated with the NAPM 
changed over time. At the time of research, I noted approximately 20 families from Mugaon village 
that came to NAPM meetings and filed court cases etc with the assistance of the NAPM’s members in 
Pune.	
201 These two adivasi owners had proved in court that they had received the land from the 
government in 1972. Their lands were sold to an investor in 1997 and then again in 2000. But in 2012, 
the court found that this transaction was unlawful, as adivasi land cannot be transacted. Thus, the land 
was restored to the government (SDO court orders, 2011). At the time of writing, this land had not 
been allotted back to the adivasi owners.  
202 Various documents such as caste certificates and proof of land title are required in order to 
process such cases. As discussed in Chapter Five, these are often difficult to obtain from local 
government offices. 
 205	
survive on it. The second generation will only just be able to survive, the third generation will 
not get anything”.203 One can argue that this does not necessarily have to be the case, 
as selling one landholding could generate enough capital to start and run businesses 
on other land parcels or enable families to get a foothold in the urban economy. 
However, the urban members of the NAPM pointed out that as adivasis were largely 
illiterate and their livelihoods were intimately connected with the land itself, selling 
their landholdings and becoming wage labourers in a corporate city would be 
tantamount to destroying their own livelihoods and dignity.204  
 
The stories of four such NAPM-member holdouts: Leelabai Margale, Bandubhau 
Walhekar, Thumabai Walhekar, and Dhyaneshwar Shedge appeared regularly in 
media coverage as well as legal documents. They came to represent a different kind 
of holdout with an antagonistic relationship to Lavasa (in comparison to those 
described in the previous section). Take, for instance, the case of Leelabai Margale, a 
dhangar woman whose father-in-law had purchased 60 acres of land from a local 
family. According to her, some of this land (which she had now inherited) had been 
fraudulently transferred to an intermediary, who then sold it to LCL. LCL, now the 
legal owners of the land, offered to settle the matter by remunerating her but 
Leelabai refused to give up possession. A number of confrontations ensued, including 
an alleged case of arson, and threats of violence from local thugs (DNA, 05 January 
2011).205 LCL attempted to build a road through this disputed property and Leelabai 
blocked access by building a barricade.206 Cases were filed in various courts and at 
the time of writing the matter was still ongoing. Similarly, Thumabai Walhekar, 
another adivasi woman, blocked LCL from developing a quarry and a road through 
her property.  
 
Bandyabhau Walhekar’s land was purchased using a fake power of attorney 
document by Sharada Suresh Shetty and was later transferred to LCL. With 
assistance from the NAPM, Walhekar managed to secure his land documents and file 																																																								
203 Field notes, 07/12/2012. 
204 Field notes, 07/12/2012 
205 In her comparative analysis of the types of intermediaries across three states in India, Sud (2014) 
shows that ‘musclemen’ are essential to the work of intermediaries and are a regularly used last 
resort when holdouts refuse to sell.  
206 LCL argues that the road was in the jurisdiction of the Zilla Parishad and handed over for 
maintenance to LCL. 
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a police complaint, a complaint in the Tehsil office, and a court case. In a letter of 
complaint to the Pune superintendent of police (drafted by the NAPM) he stated 
“goons, instigated by the company, have force-entered into my land, have threatened 
to kill me at the point of gun, and have time and again blocked the road to my land 
and home. I tried to file a report with the police over these threats by Lavasa 
company at the Paud Police Station, but the police refused to take cognizance of the 
same and did not register an offence” (Walhekar, 2010: 2). Despite the harassment 
he did not surrender his land holding. The harassment of adivasis in collusion with 
the police has also been recorded in other instances. For example, in the case of 
Amby Valley, 36 adivasis filed a legal complaint with the Mumbai High Court in 1998, 
claiming that their lands “had been taken away and/or grabbed by Sahara; that Sahara 
and its employees had threatened and intimidated them (with the assistance of the 
sarpanches and the local Police)” (BEAG affidavit, 1998: 1). Furthermore, in that 
instance, the (maratha) sarpanch allegedly “threatened an adivasi…with dire 
consequences to his life and to his family if the adivasis continued to oppose the 
Sahara project” (BEAG affidavit, 1998: 2).  
 
While these holdouts were at the forefront of the NAPM struggle against Lavasa, 
LCL employees and those villagers in support of the project unsurprisingly 
repeatedly questioned their narratives. However, what is relevant to this discussion 
is not whether their experiences are representative or the veracity of each party’s 
claims, rather, it is the traction that these narratives received in the media and the 
political effects that they produced. The stories of Leelabai, Dhanyeshwar Shedge, 
and Bandyabhau Walhekar were and continue to be repeatedly offered up as 
evidence demonstrating LCL’s duplicitous land buying practices and malice 
(Shrivastava 2011; Ganesh, 2012). They became the faces of resistance to the 
project. Not only did they refuse to part with their land but they also disrupted 
LCL’s plan by preventing access to their land and by rejecting LCL’s ideology of 
development (not participating in their CSR activities or other programmes). 
 
No kind of inclusive plan whatsoever could bring them into LCL’s fold. They are 
examples through which Lavasa’s vision of itself as an inclusive urban development 
project was and continues to be challenged. This was achieved at two levels: it 
brought into focus the tactics used for land market transactions and furthermore, it 
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called into question the premise of Lavasa’s development plan. These holdouts 
attempted to block the plan by waging a well-publicised struggle against LCL, which 
tarnished the project’s image, and led to multiple government investigations. Such 
overt resistance has also been seen in many other similar mega-projects across the 
country and worldwide. Indeed, the NAPM has mastered and deployed such non-
violent tactics of resistance over a number of decades. Behind the NAPM’s 
resistance also lay an opposition to large-scale capitalist development, which 
transforms land-owning rural citizens into urban wage labourers.207208  
 
6.3. Emboldening the Plan 
 
These highly public acts of resistance generated their own response. Trouble began 
to brew in 2009, when urban members of the NAPM brought media attention to the 
project and the associated land and environmental issues. Given both the scale of the 
project, the high-profile people associated with it (Ajit Gulabdhand, Sharad Pawar, 
Supriya Sule, and Ajit Pawar) and the prominent figures associated with the 
opposition (Medha Patkar and Anna Hazare), it quickly became front-page news, 
leading to numerous government investigations, several court cases, and an inquiry 
by the Comptroller Auditor General of India (CAG) in 2011. Patkar, on behalf of the 
NAPM, drafted multiple letters to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra (Prithviraj 
Chavan) and the Minister of Environment and Forests (Jairam Ramesh), who then 
ordered a detailed investigation into the matter in every related government 
department (including the Urban Development Department, Town Planning 
Department, Pune District Collector’s Office, Forest and Revenue Department, and 
Irrigation Department). These departments scrutinised their records largely because 
of the political heft of the NAPM; a large number of government documents that I 
examined specifically referred to the NAPM and Medha Patkar’s inquiries as being 
																																																								
207 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. 
208 The NAPM works to “bring the struggle for primacy of rights of communities over national 
resources, conservation and governance, decentralised democratic development and towards a just, 
sustainable and egalitarian society” (NAPM, 2012: n.p.). While it consistst of heterogeneous 
movements (both rural and urban), which draw on a range of discourses including Gandhianism, 
Ambedkarism, Marxism, environmentalism, and feminism (Omvedt, 1993), they are united by their 
“commitment to deepening democratic control over markets, productive resources, and economic 
development more generally” as well as their struggles against corporate and state led displacement 
and dispossession (Levien, 2007: 124).  
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the reason for the investigation.209 Ultimately, Lavasa was stalled on environmental 
grounds, days before LCL was to file its Initial Public Offering on the Mumbai stock 
market (discussed in Chapter Seven).  
 
LCL had anticipated a setback or two. In an interview in 2007, Ajit Gulabchand 
prophetically said, "I will make sure the village communities also benefit from 
Lavasa…when Medha Patkar comes calling, I hope they will stand by me” (Caroll, 
2007: n.p.). With the project now stalled and the company losing money everyday, 
its strategic response was to counter the various allegations being made against LCL. 
To tackle these multiple problems, LCL, like many companies in similar situations, 
sought the assistance of villagers, asking them to testify in support of the project and 
its intentions. Members of the gram panchayats of all 18 villages signed affidavits 
endorsing the project.210 Some sarpanches and other villagers travelled to Delhi to 
protest MoEF’s stay order and show their support for the project. LCL requested 
that villagers explain their views on television and narrate their experience of 
‘progress’, “we told them that we needed the company. Earlier people did not even know 
what a mobile phone was. If any relatives passed away in Mumbai or Delhi, we wouldn’t 
know unless someone came to inform us physically or wrote a letter”.211   
 
In a twist of fate, the company began to ‘need’ and ‘use’ the villagers and the 
holdouts. Significantly, many of the (speculating) holdouts were held up as proof of 
Lavasa’s fair and just land purchase practices, presented as testimony to the absence 
of coercive land grabbing tactics (Kishwar, 2011).212 LCL argued that had they 
deployed political muscle or violence, the holdouts would not exist.213 Furthermore, 
since many holdouts used their properties to set up businesses and generate 
livelihoods and incomes, they were displayed as examples of the ways in which 
Lavasa is a beneficial and inclusive project for villagers who have suffered decades of 
government neglect (see Kishwar, 2011: Damle, 2010). Although these holdouts 																																																								
209 For example: Letter from Tenancy Branch to Circle Officer, 17/04/2011; Collector’s note on land 
deals in Mugaon, 01/01/2008; Ceiling land summary letter from SDO Mawal to the Collector, 
08/03/2011.   
210This was a strategy deployed by Amby Valley too, where sarpanches filed an affidavit in court in 
support of the project. BEAG questioned the authority for sarpanches to speak on behalf of villagers, 
as the former were direct beneficiaries of the project (BEAG affidavit, 1998). 
211 B1 interview, 28/09/2012. 
212 L3 interview, 12/07/2012. 
213 L3 interview, 12/07/2012. 
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were not originally part of LCL’s plan, ironically, they found themselves co-opted 
into the narrative of Lavasa’s developmental story. 
 
In effect the powerful protest of a small number of the NAPM’s members (both 
urban members and and the holdouts that actively resisted the project), increased 
the power of villagers and holdouts not associated with the NAPM. While the latter 
were supportive of NAPM’s struggle to deliver justice on the issue of land rights, 
they did not support the NAPM’s position to shut the project down altogether. 
Instead, these holdouts leveraged their short-lived bargaining power to demand 
services such as water, electricity, education facilities and temples.214 While the 
holdouts maintained control over their own private property, they were further 
emboldened through the political strength of the resistance demonstrated by the 
NAPM (in which they did not participate). As two holdouts explained:  
 
“The company was shut down for a year or year and half. It was because of 
the movement (the NAPM) that the gram panchayat and villagers got some 
support. Had the NAPM not questioned Lavasa, they would have not been 
answerable to anyone. They would have not given rehabilitation land.”215 
 
“At one point, Lavasa urged the villagers to give up that entire patch of land. 
They sent letters to the villagers but when Medha Patkar accused them of 
fraud, they retracted a little bit. In exchange they offered a bullock, a house 
with a garden, and an acre or two of land to till in Daund. But people 
rejected the offer.”216 
 
The villagers used this opportunity to make demands:  
 
“The authorities asked us villagers to support them, so we laid down a few 
conditions. There was no school, we asked them for a school for our children. 
Another request was regarding a water supply. And we also asked them to 
renovate the temple, it was made out of stone earlier and they had it 																																																								
214 There were reports that even in 2011, a number of villagers had still not received electricity, 
despite multiple requests to the company and the government (Chandawarkar and Joshi, 2011).  
215 D1 interview, 13/12/2012. 
216 Dh2 interview, 13/12/2012. 
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renovated. They need some support right now, so they are willing to bend 
backwards a bit. They need the villagers. They have to run the project 
here.”217 
 
Thus, LCL began to ‘need’ the landless villagers and the holdouts to demonstrate, 
not only their innocence, but also their intentions of creating an inclusive city. The 
villagers leveraged this need to ask for certain services and entitlements. 
 
Furthermore, while some of the villagers supported the project because of the 
employment prospects it presented, the landowning holdouts were keen to support 
the project because their own property values and businesses were tied up in 
Lavasa’s success. Ross (2000) describes the early days of Disney’s Celebration 
experiment, in which a large proportion of its new residents (who had purchased 
homes) had grievances they wished to raise with the company (quality of 
construction, schooling, etc). He explains that despite a great many problems, the 
residents never took the matter to journalists, afraid that negative press coverage 
would lower their property values. The fear of devaluing their own homes, in which 
they had invested their life savings, led them to, at least outwardly, support 
Celebration. Property ownership in Lavasa too works in curious ways; on the one 
hand it may prevent the Master Plan from being executed in totality, but on the 
other, people’s economic stake in the project made them cautious when considering 
the possibility of rebellion.  
 
How do we make sense of these events? As noted in Chapters Two and Five, the 
lack of collective resistance to the project cannot simply be understood as support 
for it. Compliance can be about ‘grudging resignation’ or ‘active ideological support’, 
thus one cannot assume ideological support from compliance. Scott (1985) details 
how the ubiquitous absence of declared contestations should not be seen as a 
hegemonic acquiescence. It is by paying attention to the negotiations made in 
everyday life, to what people do and say, that we can see how “counterhegemonic 
consciousness is elaborated” (Scott, 1990: 200). If there are ideological ruptures, 
then what work do these ideological ruptures do?  																																																								
217 A2 interview, 19/12/2012. 
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Could the holdouts be considered as enlisted in the hegemonic project of the 
inclusive privatised city? As Scott (1985) points out, support in action should not be 
equated with ideological support. While some of the holdouts were supportive of 
the project and the material benefits it brought, they were clear that the project was 
not intended for them, it was for the urban elite. The holdouts did ideologically 
support capitalist development, and although sympathetic to the NAPM’s calls for 
justice and cognisant of the benefits it had brought them, they were not aligned with 
NAPM’s development ideology218. They wanted to be part of Lavasa’s capitalist 
development, not as the wage earners that LCL hoped to transform them into, but 
as landowners and equals. As one informant explained, “I don’t want to make any kind 
of agreement, or lease. I don’t want to do anything with them. I will not give to them or to 
someone else. Whatever development I want to do, I will do by myself”.219 Yet, not all the 
holdouts had the ability to remain so indefinitely: 
 
“We will need to sell some, because we don’t have the money to develop our 
entire property. So we will sell some so that we can develop 2-4 guntha. If we 
wanted to develop one acre properly we will need ten crores at least. So we 
will raise funds by selling some land. Maybe we will set up a hotel.”220 
 
Given their background, they also understood the tenuousness of their own power:  
 
“Ultimately, if the company has invested so much money, it is not going to just 
let the project go. They aren’t just going to sleep over the problem. People do 																																																								
218 As discussed in footnote 205, the NAPM is made up of constituent movements and draws on a 
range of development paradigms; therefore it would be erroneous to ascribe a single coherent 
development ideology to the whole of the NAPM. As Omvedt (1993) observes of ‘new social 
movements’ and Levien (2007: 122) argues, the members of the NAPM’s constituent social 
movements are heterogenous with “not equivalent relationships to the means of production” and 
have “variegated negative experiences with the manifold effects of market liberalization.” That said, 
the NAPM does resist the “hegemonic logic of neoliberalism” and depends on “the marginalised and 
the displaced fighting against the landed and trading classes” (Levien, 2007: 126). It sees the “need for 
an effective alliance to strengthen the secular ethos and struggle for development that empowers 
people against the hegemonic, exploitative culture associated with the terms ‘privatisation’ and 
‘liberalization’” (NAPM (1996) in Levein, 2007: 129). In this instance, the NAPM, was clear in its 
opposition to the existence of Lavasa – LCL’s control and use of resources, the commodifiation of 
land and the concomitant destruction of agricultural livelihoods, privatisation, Lavasa undemocratic 
governance framework. 	
219 D4 interview, 30/09/2012. 
220 B1 interview, 28/09/2012. 
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not understand this. They do not understand that they must have the 
necessary backing. Lavasa wouldn’t be able to do this without the necessary 
backing… building dams and fighting in Delhi courts, they are able to do it 
because they can.”221 
 
Echoing Joan Robinson’s prescient statement that it is better to be exploited by 
capitalism than not exploited at all, some holdouts felt that they had limited choices,  
 
“it is all about exploiting the villagers, and once their work is done, they will 
push us aside, but if the company stops functioning, we will have to go back to 
living in the same way that we lived earlier.”222  
 
Caught between a rock and a hard place, some felt that they had little choice but to 
extend their support to the project. 
 
In summary, the various types of holdouts and villagers had, and continue to have, a 
number of implications for Lavasa’s plan and its emergence. The investor holdouts 
remain a problem for Lavasa in terms of land ownership. However, they have not 
engaged in any political or other interference with the project. The holdouts 
associated with the NAPM resisted Lavasa in overt ways: they waged a sustained 
struggle against the project, using tactics of protest, media campaigns, and their 
ideological opposition to the project and all the principles that it stands for. This 
small group, largely lower-caste and sometimes landless, did so because they could 
not and did not wish to see themselves be integrated into the wage-labour of Lavasa 
nor did they see themselves as entrepreneurs in the privatised city. On the other 
hand, the other holdouts sometimes struggled to keep their lands, but understood 
that an oddly symbiotic relationship could form with Lavasa, if they cooperated and 
held on to their lands. Given decades of government neglect, and the exclusionary 
politics of both agrarian change as well as planning in other Indian cities (e.g. the 
harassment of vendors in Mumbai), these holdouts saw the project as their chance 
to engage in the propertied urban citizenship that had so far eluded them.  
 																																																								
221 Dh2 interview, 13/12/2012. 
222 P1 interview, 14/12/2012. 
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One could suggest, using Polanyi, that this attempt to create a market utopia, which 
is premised on displacement from land, generated a political response in the form of 
a counter movement as exemplified by the NAPM. This counter movement then 
forced LCL to make concessions (rehabilitation, schooling, employment, etc) and 
ultimately re-embedded a slightly modified market utopia back into society through 
the support of those holdouts and villagers who are not ideologically opposed to the 
project. These different forms of resistance interacted with one another to 
ultimately embolden LCL’s claim of building an inclusive city.   
 
6.4 Conclusion: Inclusive Planning and Resistance in the Private City 
 
This chapter sought to answer two related questions: what is the nature of 
integration of rural communities (holdouts in particular) into Lavasa and what are its 
effects? LCL’s plan for inclusion, as we have seen, is centred on the poor being 
consumers of, and within, the city, accessing services and housing at lower price 
points than the middle class or elites. It sees them as recipients of benefits 
administered through its CSR programmes and, by and large, does not engage with 
them as active citizens, decision makers, or partners in the process of building the 
city’s economy. In Lefebvre’s terms, rural communities subsumed in the city’s making 
do not have the ‘right to the city’. In this regard, the holdouts are conceptualised as 
violations of the plan, preventing ‘proper planning’ from taking place.  
 
But plans do not always unfold in predictable ways. They are open to “multiple 
manipulations” and “unintended outcomes”, and it is a “live and lively process and a 
contested domain that generates unexpected collaborations and conflicts that can 
make the plan possible, or not” (Gururani, 2013: 121). The plan to include rural 
citizens in the process of city-making unravels in messy ways when a segment of the 
villagers (those associated with the NAPM) reject this form of inclusive development. 
 
Here we see that there are broadly two types of holdouts, the first retain property 
rights and legal entitlements to their land. They are included within the plan precisely 
because the plan formally excludes them (as the rights of the SPA only extend to 
those properties that LCL owns). Although one could argue that LCL retains power 
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by its sheer size and economic heft, I argue that the ownership of property gives the 
holdouts an opportunity to negotiate with the company. The NAPM holdouts, often 
from a lower caste and poorly educated background, in the absence of proper 
documents, and in the instance of fraud, control their lands both through legal 
contestation and physical occupation. Their properties are included in the plan (as 
LCL often formally owns them) but they are excluded from the plan as individuals as 
they resist its very ideological project (they do not participate in schooling, or access 
employment). It is their counter-hegemonic resistance, as instantiated within the 
approach of the NAPM and made real within the framework of democratic politics in 
India, that further entrenches the ability of the first set of holdouts to negotiate with 
LCL and make claims on the city. 
 
In exploring how different villagers and holdouts engage with Lavasa, and how their 
interaction with each other affects the unfolding of the project, this chapter reflects 
on the territorial politics of planning and resistance. First, it challenges the 
assumption that holdouts are a problem for planning projects. This refutation comes 
with the obvious caveat that if a project area has too many holdouts, then plans may 
indeed be thwarted. But if the number of holdouts is small enough, they can serve a 
positive purpose for projects given the political power of movements and litigation 
to block projects. Some holdouts are presented as beneficiaries of the project, as 
well as as examples of the lack of coercion in LCL’s land purchase policy and one 
could postulate that their absence would have seriously compromised LCL’s 
credibility.  
 
Second, this chapter questions the dominant narratives of resistance and hegemonic 
aspirations in understanding spatial transformation in India today. Recent literature 
on land grabs often assumes that those who are being dispossessed are “previously 
and straightforwardly ‘outside’ capitalism”, or in a stronger form takes for “granted 
that they were self-sufficient peasants producing for subsistence and/or holding their 
land in common” (Hall, 2013: 1597). Some versions assume that “the people being 
dispossessed live in communities that are internally homogeneous, and/or that they 
have been ‘in place’ since time immemorial” (Hall, 2013: 1597). This view has been 
refuted by a long history of agrarian scholarship in India that has shown the 
relevance of caste in negotiating with and gaining from development projects. Here 
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too, I demonstrate the range of responses to and opinions of the project. Scott’s 
(1990: 136) comment that “most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be 
found neither in over collective defiance of power holders nor in complete 
hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar positions” 
rings true. I have shown that despite their discomfort with elements of the project 
and the company, some holdouts do want to be included in capitalist development. 
Their ability to negotiate with the company is only strengthened by the real 
possibility of the project shutting down.  
 
Third, although the resistance and counter-resistance story may appear peculiar to 
Lavasa, it is increasingly a feature of the politics of development in contemporary 
India. Here, different forms of resistance come into conflict, generating a new kind of 
spatial politics. Roy (2011) refers to the Singur case, where villagers rallied to 
demand that they indeed wanted the factory jobs when the factory was closed. In a 
number of other cases too, companies have mobilised villagers (though not always 
holdouts) to support them in times of political trouble. While some informants 
argued that this is merely a political tactic employed by companies to counter 
resistance223 (and in LCL’s case, we can see that it is), it is also one that can 
empower certain villagers to finally be included in the plan. This is as much a 
reflection on the holdouts themselves as on the current political climate of 
resistance. Increasingly there is a marked tension between villagers’ opposition to 
certain projects and their desire to participate in the very same types of 
consumption, economic organisation and governance. In the jostling for power, the 
company engages the needs of the villagers to overcome the impasse in their 
contestation over the use of urban spaces. In so doing, the holdouts can create space 
in the city for themselves (at least in the short-term, their power in the long-term 
remains to be seen). 
 
Finally, although the analytical focus on the state is relatively weak in this chapter, its 
presence, however, is not. The state looms over this project both as a facilitator, as 
well as a potential threat, through its ability to stall or alter the terms of the project; 
this is not a trivial presence. This dynamic between state, capital and society, offers 																																																								
223 C3 interview, 08/10/2013. 
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us an optic through which to assess Chatterjee’s now well-known distinction 
between political and civil society. Chatterjee’s (2008, 2014) claim that civil society in 
India is aligned with corporate hegemony does not find evidence in this instance, as 
the NAPM is decidedly opposed to the company. The NAPM’s actions are more in 
line with Escobar (1995) and Nandy (1989) who understand civil society as a domain 
where oppositional movements to developmentalism are generated. Furthermore, 
civil society’s ability to leverage the state shapes and strengthens political society and 
opens avenues for negotiation both with the state and the company.  
 
Scholars have argued that the urban poor access their right to the city through the 
power of their vote as members of groups/populations that make claims on the state 
(Chatterjee, 2004), local democratic processes that allow for the occupation of 
locations (Benjamin, 2008), and by negotiating arrangements with individuals within 
the local government, such as police, municipal officers, etc (Anjaria, 2011). 
Therefore, a top-down privately planned city, within which villagers have no avenues 
for democratic representation/interaction, would seem to be the antithesis of 
inclusive; certainly Lavasa’s conception of inclusion is nothing more than CSR. But 
here too, in the larger context of Indian democracy, the ability for social movements 
to call for investigations and threaten to shut down the project, does indeed result in 
protection and inclusion for some. It is through this combination of resistance and 
propertied citizenship, and not their plan-based inclusion or the power of their vote, 
that certain villagers are able to carve out space for themselves and make claims on 
the city. 	
 217	
Chapter Seven 
 
Resisting Lavasa: Eco-Cities and Eco-Warriors 
 
“Lavasa’s vision is that it is possible, and we’re going to show how to do it, 
how you can have a developed city co-exist with a restored environment. 
What was here when we came was not a pristine virgin forest, it had been 
denuded by the indigenous population for many decades. Our challenge was 
not to keep it as we found it, our challenge was to bring it back to what it 
was a hundred years before it had been slashed and burned. To show that it 
can be done with a city in the same place, that’s our challenge. Because 
that’s what India needs –it needs hundreds of new cities. Just saying that 
there are certain areas in which you can never go because the city will 
naturally trash it is an assumption that we do not accept.”224   
 
Many greenfield settlements distinguish themselves from existing Indian cities 
through claims of possessing integrated ‘world-class’ infrastructure and being ‘eco-
friendly’.225 Lavasa is no different. With its bewildering array of initiatives ranging 
from biomimicry226 to hydroseeding227, LCL is committed to being a “prototype of a 
medium-sized city which can act as a financially viable and an environmentally and 
socially sustainable substitute to the ill-served and overcrowded mega cities” (LCL, 
2010: 5). The opening quote is significant for a number of reasons. First, the 
informant sees the indigenous population (and by extension the absence of state 
management) as having effectively “denuded” the forest over decades. The blame for 
the valley’s current condition is thus squarely put on local populations and their 
unsustainable agricultural and forestry practices. Second, he sees LCL as a trustee of 
the environment, tasked not only with its preservation but its restoration. Third, he 																																																								
224 L8 interview, 12/07/2012. 
225 For example, Amanora township in Pune advertises itself to be “ecologically sound” (Amanora, 
undated); Khed City in Maharashtra “creates an urban context that synthesizes human need, 
environmental stewardship and economic viability, creating a global model of urbanism where 
residents will live in harmony with nature” (HOK, 2014: n.p.); Manesar in Haryana seeks to be the 
country’s “first global business eco-city” (Business Standard, 22 April 2011). 
226 Biomimicry is “a new discipline that studies nature's best ideas and then imitates these designs and 
processes to solve human problems” (www.biomimicryinstitute.org). 
227 Hydroseeding is a process used for planting seeds over a large area by spraying a combination of 
seeds and mulch.  
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assumes that India “needs hundreds of new cities” and therefore the dual challenge 
for LCL is to undo historical ecological damage while building a city that India needs. 
In this regard, Lavasa has won a host of international awards for planning and 
environmental responsibility.228 
 
But, as earlier chapters have shown, NAPM has led protests and has written 
extensively against LCL for causing environmental destruction, claiming that it has 
cut “lakhs of trees”, polluted local water sources, and illegally taken public land 
(People’s Commission, 2009: 8). In 2010, in unison with other local environmental 
activists, the NAPM filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) petition in the Mumbai High 
Court challenging the city on environmental grounds, the outcome of which is still 
pending. Simultaneously, they persuaded the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF) to investigate the project. Following which, on 25 November 2010, the 
MoEF issued a stay-order to the Lavasa on environmental grounds, prohibiting any 
further construction from taking place (MoEF, 2010a).  
 
This chapter asks how and why did an ‘environmentally sustainable’ project get 
contested and stalled on environmental grounds? Some commentators have asserted 
that LCL paid lip service to the environment while others have argued that the 
NAPM does not care about the environmental merits of the project, that it simply 
seeks to shut it down (Singh, 2011). Are LCL’s environmental commitments hollow 
and simply an elaborate public relations ‘greenwashing’ exercise? Are the activists 
‘anti-development’ as LCL cautions? What environmental claims do the opposing 
sides make? Why did the state sanction hill station development on grounds of 
ecological conservation (as seen in Chapter Four) and then turn around and stall its 
first project? If ecological projects are simultaneously politico-economic projects, as 
Harvey (1996) argues, what political purposes, if any, do these conflicting 
environmental discourses serve in steering (and halting) an aspect of India’s urban 
transition?  
 
																																																								
228 Prizes awarded to the Lavasa Master Plan: Congress of New Urbanism (USA) - Charter Awards 
for Best Master Plan in 2005, American Society of Landscape Architects - Award of Excellence for 
Dasve Master Plan in 2005 and American Society of Landscape Architects - Honor Award for Mugaon 
Master Plan in 2009.  
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Scholarship on environmental politics in India has paid close attention to the 
“environmentalism of the poor” i.e. the struggles of the rural poor and forest 
dwellers in preserving nature “against business firms and the state” (Martinez-Allier, 
2013: 2). Some of this literature has been critiqued as being almost orientalist in its 
tone, casting tribal populations and the rural poor as somehow being naturally and 
intrinsically environmentally conscious (Sinha et al., 1997). But almost no literature 
has taken seriously the environmental claims made by corporations. The social 
intentions of corporations, perhaps much like Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
(of which environmental sustainability is often a part), are seen as “foregone 
conclusion[s]: smoke and mirrors, conjuring acts, greenwashing, a sham that reeks 
from afar of corporate public relations” (Welker, 2006: 5). They are assumed to be 
always and already insincere in their commitment, of using the environment as a way 
to grab resources. To take them seriously then “is to be complicit in painting a coat 
of reality upon a corporate fiction” (Welker, 2006: 5). With the global rise of eco-
cities (Rapoport, 2013; Caprotti, 2014), this chapter rejects this view and seeks to 
examine closely what corporate urban environmentalism can be, the effects that it 
produces, and how and why it comes to be contested.  
 
This chapter argues that LCL’s environmentalism is not a mere exercise in 
greenwashing, nor is NAPM’s activism fuelled by an ‘anti-development’ stance. 
Rather, the contestation is premised on ideologically opposed conceptions of 
environmentalism. LCL’s and NAPM’s respective conceptions of the environment 
are imbued with ideologies of development that on the one hand reify the urban and 
on the other uphold the rural as the core sites of development. Furthermore, they 
present irreconcilable views on privatisation and the control and ownership of land. 
These ideals are also held up for the political work that they enable and are part of 
the wider political strategies through which such projects are both put forth and 
contested.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: sections 7.1 and 7.2 interrogate LCL’s and the 
NAPM’s conceptions and uses of environmentalism respectively. These sections 
examine the environmental work done, the discourses deployed, the ideologies that 
they reflect, and the political work that they produce. Section 7.3 outlines how the 
project came to be stalled by the MoEF, placing this move within the larger context 
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of the environmentalism of the Indian state. Section 7.4 concludes by reflecting on 
the connections between environmentalism and political contestation in 
contemporary India. In so doing, the chapter critically examines the ways in which 
competing discourses and politics of environmentalism have emerged as a political 
force in an aspect of India’s urban transition.  
 
7.1. Environmentalism of the Eco-City 
 
Although elements of (Euro-American) ecological urbanism can be traced back to 
planners such as Mumford and Howard and their designs for compact and efficient 
cities in proximity to nature, it was Register (1987) who coined the term ‘eco-city’. 
He conceptualised the city in terms of ‘urban ecology’, which advocated treating the 
city as a living system that can “feed itself and satisfy all its energy demands without 
help from outside its boundaries” (Datta, 2012: 985). This vision was premised on 
ten principles including compact layouts, transit nodes, social diversity, recycling, 
simplicity, innovative technology, partnerships with businesses, and environmental 
awareness, among others (Roseland, 1997). But, given the scope of the term, its 
wide use has come to embody a range of meanings and incorporate a variety of 
planning strategies: from retrofitting existing towns to building master-planned new 
towns (Datta, 2012; Rapoport, 2013; Caprotti, 2014). 
 
Amid mounting pressures to respond to global climate change, eco-cities in their 
most recent form have emerged as potential ‘solutions’ to an imminent ecological 
crisis (May, 2011; Chen, 2012b; Caprotti, 2014). Most eco-cities exist only on paper, 
although a few are currently under construction in Asia (Caprotti (2014) provides a 
detailed review). Dongtan, China’s first prestige eco-city project, was planned as a 
carbon neutral town to house half a million people in a Wetland area (Pow and Neo, 
2013) but the project has been plagued with delays and construction is yet to begin. 
Similarly, Yixing’s Sustainable Development Demonstration Zone focuses on the 
solar energy industry as the driving force underpinning the low carbon development 
model (Chen, 2012b). These sites are designed as demonstration projects, which 
show possible models of an environmentally sustainable and economically productive 
urban future. They “promise economic progress, social harmony and ecological 
protection and represent the apotheosis of China’s pursuit of green civilisation” 
 221	
(Pow and Neo, 2013: 2256). Writing on Huangbaiyu, May suggests that they “hold 
forth the promise of cutting the tie between urbanisation, energy and land 
consumption”, “enabling those who have heretofore been left behind by the 
industrial revolution to enjoy an increased quality of life without pushing the planet 
beyond an ecological tipping point” (2011: 103). These new, large, and “top-down 
eco-city projects master-planned by prestigious international architects” “bear little 
resemblance to the modest, bottom-up initiatives proposed by early eco-city 
advocates” (Rapoport, 2013: 141). Accordingly, Pow and Neo (2013: 2262) argue 
that the contemporary eco-city represents a kind of “neoliberal urban economic 
form”, for its framing is built upon environmental sustainability and economic 
competitiveness. Eco-cities in this view can be seen as a way to “re-embed 
neoliberalism in society, to make it more acceptable socially and politically, and to 
ensure that it is environmentally sustainable” (Jessop, 2002: 17). Such attempts (in 
China) can therefore be seen “legitimisation strateg[ies] for cities and urban 
governments which are otherwise engaged in the pursuit of economic growth” (Pow 
and Neo, 2013: 2258).  
 
India has not forayed into eco-cities in the manner China has, although plans for 
China-inspired and Japan-assisted prototypes periodically surface and resurface (but 
never materialise).229 For example, the Gujarat Infrastructure Tech City is “envisaged 
as an eco-city” and “will serve as a habitat showcasing business oriented, 
environmentally sensitive growth with equity” (GIFT, 2011: n.p.). In the Indian 
context, the term eco-city is so ubiquitously and loosely used that it is devoid of any 
meaning; it is signifies anything and everything from basic waste-recycling 
infrastructure to the use of energy efficient electrical fixtures. This is hardly 
surprising, for even the term ‘sustainability’ is a contested one, and problems in 
defining it have “long been recognized” (Pow and Neo, 2013: 2258).  
 
Given the looseness of the term, one can dismiss Lavasa, and indeed many eco-city 
projects, as ‘green washing’ at best or ‘green grabbing’ at worst. There are examples 
of the former where corporations have superficially undertaken environmental 
initiatives to further their own image and business or as forms of “(dis)information 																																																								
229 The Indian government in collaboration with the Japanese government is planning to build 7 ‘eco’ 
and ‘smart’ cities along the Delhi and Mumbai Industrial Corridor (Economic Times, 03 May 2010) 
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seeking to repair public reputations and further shape public images” (Laufer, 2003: 
253). But as, Watson points out, while the labels ‘smart’ or ‘eco’ are embodied with 
“symbolic power”, and are no doubt part of a “marketing ploy to encourage local 
and other investors”, they are also linked to debates on “how cities can maximize 
the benefits of technology and how they can become more environmentally 
sustainable” (2014: 226).  
 
Caprotti asks that we pay attention not only to the place-marketing intended of 
these “green utopias”, but also the mechanisms through which they are made 
possible. Eco-cities are often built on areas of “low-land value” and sometimes on 
areas subjected to “green grabbing” practices” (2014: 11) where land and resources 
are transferred from the poor to the powerful for “environmental ends” (Fairhead et 
al., 2012: 238). As a result, those who are dispossessed “become a proletariat 
separated from land and nature, releasing resources for private capital” (Fairhead et 
al., 2012: 238). Such analysis, however, fails to take seriously the form and content of 
environmental commitment of such projects. What then is the environmental 
promise that these cities make? How is environmental sustainability understood by 
these projects? What purposes, if any, do these environmental discourses serve in 
the making of these cities?   
 
In its earliest avatar, Lavasa (then Lake Town) was to be an eco-tourism project: the 
“ultimate sanctuary”, “a massive garden”, a “green laboratory”, housing 
“environmentally friendly industry”, and “a utopian escape for thousands would be 
idyllic, picturesque, natural, quaint, connected, eco-friendly and yet offering a good 
mix of leisure and activity based infrastructure” (LCC, 2003: 7). Lake Town, 
therefore, was not originally imagined as an environmental prototype or a solution 
to climate change, rather, it was to be a place where nature was an aesthetic 
dimension of planning, facilitating a pleasant experience of the city. In its subsequent 
iterations, LCL’s plans retained the aesthetic importance of the environment (a point 
which shall be discussed shortly) but also expanded its environmental vision. 
 
Lavasa’s environmental management plan highlights a number of environmental issues 
such as soil erosion, water, air and noise pollution, waste and biodiversity. LCL’s 
broad environmental goals are to minimise pollution and to restore previously 
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denuded forest cover. It is cognizant of the ecological pitfalls of development 
projects and seeks to mitigate environmental degradation by developing management 
plans for each of the above-mentioned sectoral concerns. LCL considers its key 
innovations to be its compact city plan (a byproduct of New Urbanism), its 
biomimicry plan, its strategy to reduce soil erosion (continuous contour trenching), 
and its approach to increase forest cover through hydroseeding. Furthermore, 
Lavasa’s Development Plan has been “prepared with the objective of delivering 
planning solutions through a creative blend of development and environment” and 
conceives Lavasa “as a place for modern human habitation in harmony with nature” 
(Lavasa SPA, 2012: 95). This “harmony”, as we shall see, is aesthetic, technological, 
and premised on LCL’s control over the environment. That the city should “function 
in harmony with the natural environment” is central to both New Urbanism (Till, 
2000) as well as earlier planning concepts such as deep ecology and the garden city 
(Wong and Yuen, 2011: 3). Regardless, most of LCL’s strategies focus heavily on 
containing ecological damage, as required by various environmental laws and planning 
norms. In this regard its plan is neither ambitious nor particularly unusual.  
 
Informants indicated that LCL’s desire to preserve the environment was both an 
ethico-moral and business decision. One of Lavasa’s key selling points is its location 
in the Western Ghats, an “ecologically sensitive” area marked as one of the four 
“biodiversity hotspots” in the country (Gadgil, 2012: 1, 110).230 It is precisely its 
unique location that makes the environment and nature so central to the project:   
 
“[We need] to ensure that our actions or our development don’t pollute or 
contaminate this natural resource and to ensure that this place is beautiful. 
Why would one want to leave Bombay and go live in another urban centre? 
One of the unique selling points of this place is that it is beautiful and it is 
beautiful because it is a part of nature. That is why the component of 
																																																								
230 It is of course paradoxical that an eco-city should be built in an environmentally fragile area but this 
is not peculiar to Lavasa. Songdo eco-city in Korea was built on the “destruction of precious 
wetlands, home to some of the rarest species on the planet, causing the disappearance of some. Once 
reclaimed, its developers have pursued sustainable building practices, applying guidelines and materials 
that promote efficient energy use, and recycling 75 per cent of construction” (Shwayri, 2013: 53). 
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environment becomes the spine through which development process takes 
place.”231 
 
As the quote above demonstrates, nature and its preservation are conflated with an 
aesthetic image of what will be beautiful and therefore appealing for Lavasa’s future 
consumer-citizens. The environment is essential to recreation and the forests, “once 
restored to their original glory, will serve for countless recreational opportunities 
such as bicycle rides, rigorous hikes, nature walks, bird watching, and camping” 
(HOK, 2011: 66). Therefore, the experience of nature is central to the overall 
experience of Lavasa: 
 
“As waters gush down the hills through the nala corridors, 
pedestrians can enjoy the natural beauty of a healthy, thriving 
ecosystem. Oriented on the water, and celebrating the life it gives, 
these open spaces will be bands of passive recreation and small 
pockets of relaxing recreational space. As water gathers in pools on 
its journey down to the lake, visitors can relax in a shady grove at the 
water’s edge or hike up the hill to the water source. 
 
With reforestation being a major goal of the proposed development, 
the once-pristine deciduous forest will eventually return to its original 
glory and will serve for countless passive recreation opportunities. 
From bird-watching to camping, these areas will take “a walk in the 
park” to a whole new level.” (HOK, 2011: 68) 
 
Such consumption of nature is consistent with Lavasa’s self-imagination as a world-
class and its appeal as a hill station. As discussed in Chapter Four, Hill stations have 
always been respites from the drudgery of Indian cities, as sites of recreation and 
recuperation. The British transformed the natural environment by introducing new 
plants and altering the landscape to “enhance its aesthetic” and “picturesque 
qualities” (Kennedy, 1996: 62), in order to create a kind of nature that was more 
resonant with parts of England (especially the Lake District). The world-class city on 																																																								
231 L6 interview, 21/08/2012. 
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the other hand, must bear a “world-class aesthetic” (Ghertner, 2011), in which ideas 
of planning, cleanliness, and order take root. Lavasa draws on both these 
representations, as is depicted in the image in Figure 7.1 where a couple enjoys the 
lake from their own boat, while the strip of wind turbines suggests a commitment to 
an ecological future: “modern infrastructure, amenities and the vibrancy of the 
nature around is what is envisioned will give Lavasa its ‘soul’” (LCL, 2011: 17).  
 
Figure 7.1: Representations of Mugaon in the Conceptual Master 
Plan  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation] 
 
The planning ideal is therefore to construct an urban environment that lives “in 
harmony with nature”, i.e. “a city with the allure of the countryside” (LCL, 2009: 
n.p.). It is through the “globally circulating concepts of new urbanism” that this type 
of environmentalism is associated with the “concept of ‘quality of life’, and ecological 
progress is increasingly interpreted through physical, aesthetic signifiers such as 
parks, clean public space, and newly constructed housing” (Chen, 2012b: 90). The 
environment in this conception is a source of aesthetic and recreational pleasure, to 
be consumed and enjoyed by the future citizens of Lavasa. 
 
Figure 7.2: Lavasa’s environmental marketing  
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. It can be 
viewed at http://www.lavasafuturecities.com/media.html ] 
 
LCL’s environmental vision is also inextricably linked to urban design and 
technological innovation. LCL worked with the Biomimicry Guild (U.S.A) to 
incorporate biomimicry in the Master Plan for Mugaon by identifying six of the most 
important ecosystem services and designed ecological performance standards for all 
of them. Furthermore, referring to the process of mass plantation through 
hydroseeding, it claims “technology will help plant a million trees”232 (LCL, 2011: 																																																								
232 Examining eco-estates in South Africa, Ballard and Jones (2011: 26) argue that such attempts to 
increase indigenous forest cover are not done for the “environment alone but also constitutes an 
investment in nature as a step in its commodification. The execution of landscape designs through civil 
engineering and mass planting means these “natural” spaces are created through intense intervention, 
or what Harvey calls “the market provision of constructed authenticity” (1993: 12) Natural does not 
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n.p.). It extends technological and design solutions to various other aspects of 
environmental management such as topsoil conservation, watershed management, 
and biodiversity enhancement. Lavasa takes great pride in being at the cutting edge 
of environmental technology, as is reflected in its advertising (Figure 7.2). In keeping 
with theories of ecological modernization that valorise technology as being the 
propelling force behind sustainable development (Pow, 2013; Caprotti, 2014), its 
environmental vision is part and parcel of what it deems as futuristic about the city.  
 
These technologies and visions serve a function. Datta (2012: 991) claims that 
ecologists employed by LCL in its early stages had recommended “low-cost local 
techniques of restoration and conservation such as transplantation of native species, 
building on lower slopes, restoration through seed collection and replanting, and the 
use of locally available materials for building which would have been more sensitive 
to the region”. But those techniques were not used as they were “apparently 
regarded by LCL as inappropriate for global marketing” and it “preferred to use 
more internationally renowned environmental technologies like biomimicry and 
hydroseeding to restore hillside slopes” (2012: 991). Similarly, in assessing Lavasa’s 
Bamboocraft project, a CSR project through which 65 workers create crafts and 
furniture from locally grown bamboo, Buckingham and Jepson (2014) argue that 
Lavasa’s commitment to the environment is performative; it seeks to position itself 
and be internationally recognised as sustainable and does so by getting globally 
recognised certifications such as Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification for 
its bamboo business, and the US Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED)233 certification for its buildings and neighbourhood design. Furthermore, it 
seeks to become a “benchmark for sustainability in Asia” (LCL, 2010: n.p.) by 
developing the first grading certification system for sustainable cities (Buckingham 
and Jepson, 2014: 1).  
 
The rationales for and practices of environmental conservation are not merely 
international in scope; they are rooted in anxieties of the nature of Indian politics. 																																																																																																																																																														
mean, for consumers of these landscapes, that nature is left to its own devices but rather that it is 
channeled in the direction of a pre-industrial ideal.” 
 
233 LEED is a set of ratings that were developed by the US Green Building Council. These ratings are 
used to grade energy efficient resource use in the construction, design, and operation of buildings and 
neighbourhoods. 
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The environmental plan is also a speculative response to the real possibility of the 
project suffering a setback on environmental grounds. As one informant explained: 
 
“I do remember the chairman saying in the beginning that if there was one 
thing that could trip us up, it would be the environment and so he was very 
intentional and as a company we were intentional to make sure that what 
we did was way ahead of anything that was as per Indian standards and 
that it was documented.”234 
 
That said, while LCL has innovated with respect to certain segments of 
environmental protection and restoration, none of these are innovations of the kind 
and scope that its Chinese counterparts have put forth. For instance, responding to 
Climate Change is not a key concern for LCL, nor does it seek to make Lavasa a 
zero-waste/zero-carbon city or power it entirely on renewable energy (unlike 
Dongtan, China). Rather, LCL expresses moderation in its environmental goals. For 
instance, it aims to generate a modest 25 per cent of the energy consumption from 
renewable sources such as solar and wind in Mugaon, revealing that this model will 
only be “replicated depending on [its] success” (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 104). This is 
because LCL conceptualises ‘sustainability’ as a ‘balance’ between social, economic 
and environmental components:  
 
“[For it to become a zero carbon city, it has to have] its entire power 
generation through renewable energy. If you ask me to do that in Lavasa, 
then the economics of Lavasa will go for a toss. You can’t build a city with 
only renewable energy in a place like Lavasa, There are only four months 
of rainfall and the efficiency of solar plants is not more than 18-20 
percent. At 18-20 percent how would it be sustainable? And if I give you 
solar power at the rate of INR 20 and you get conventional energy at the 
rate of INR 5, then it is not sustainable for a power requirement of 500-
600 MegaWatt. If you look at wind (power), we are in category B. In terms 
of material, it is not a resort town, where only a few of us who can afford 
rooms worth INR 4000-5000 (USD 80-100) per night to live in. It has to 
																																																								
234 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
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be a mixture. If it has to be a mixture, then it has to be like a conventional 
city but offers a certain amount of world-class facilities… Most of the cities 
in terms of green field developments are not located in conditions like 
Lavasa. Some of them are located on flat lands. But I would love to find 
cities we could be friends with and learn from one another.”235 
 
Therefore, Lavasa’s environmentalism is still limited by its economic objectives of 
being a profitable venture. Unlike its Chinese counterparts, which benefit from 
enormous state subsidies, Lavasa’s environmental goals are therefore defined and 
determined the conditions of the market.236  
 
LCL’s environmentalism is premised on its ability to control, monitor, map, fence in, 
landscape, and police the natural environment. As Lavasa is built on private property 
and LCL is responsible for the condition of the environment, including increasing 
forest cover and preventing water pollution, it has been forced to engage with 
nature as a resource to protect and cordon off rather than a source of livelihood for 
locals. In this manner LCL’s plan embodies a “post-materialist perspective where the 
forest is not central to economic production but rather to the enhancement of the 
'quality of life' (Guha, 1993: 245). That is not to say that LCL employees are not 
individually cognizant of the dependence of the rural poor on the environment. 
However, as the chapter’s opening quote suggests, LCL does not consider many of 
their practices sustainable. Therefore, in an attempt to restore the environment, it 
has effectively enclosed the area and prevents villagers from gathering fuel wood, 
grazing their animals, and using the reservoir in manners that are not in keeping with 
LCL’s overall environmental plan.237 It has also educated “villagers to stop slash and 
burn” and instead employed them in “mass plantation activities” (LCL, 2010: 25). In a 
sense it represents what Guha and Martinez-Alier call environmentalism of ‘the 
north’ where, “environmentalism has, by and large, run parallel to the consumer 
society without questioning its socio-ecological basis, its enormous dependence on 																																																								
235 L6 interview, 18/12/2012. 
236 In a recent survey of eco-cities, Rapoport (2013) argues that “contemporary eco-city projects” are 
“driven as much by economic objectives as environmental ones” and that their ambitions are often 
limited by “the realities of operating within a profit-driven, entrepreneurial planning environment.” 
(2013: 137). 
237 This led to some conflicts with villagers particularly around livestock grazing and firewood 
collection (L11 interview, 12/07/2012). 
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the lands, peoples and resources of other parts of the globe” (1997: 18). As 
Mawdsley reminds us, “the global situation of a high consuming minority and a poor 
majority is not just a North/South issue, but also one that is inflected within national 
inequalities” (2004: 81). 
 
How do we make sense of LCL’s environmentalism and the work that it does? A 
growing literature on urban areas has highlighted an emergent “bourgeois” or middle 
class urban environmentalism (see Mawdsley (2004) for a review). This literature has 
focused primarily on the ways in which urban middle classes have invoked 
environmental issues to capture (often public) land, and marginalise and dispossess 
the urban poor (Baviskar, 2003). For example, judicial orders from the Supreme 
Court of India closed all “polluting and non-conforming industries” in Delhi, 
displacing close to two million people and 98,000 industrial units (Baviskar, 2003: 
90). Casting the poor as polluters, these changes were driven by middle class 
environmentalists filing environmental PILs around “upper-class concerns” of 
“aesthetics, leisure, safety and health” (Baviskar, 2003: 90) to order urban space in a 
particular way. Furthermore, this literature also demonstrates how the middle 
classes are powerful in steering the terms of public debate on a variety of issues, 
including the environment. Lavasa, although not strictly a middle class project, bears 
some connection with these themes.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, in 2009-10, LCL embarked on an award-winning and 
highly visible ‘Future Cities Campaign’238 through advertisements in a major English 
daily newspaper and panel discussions with urban experts on television and at 
conferences. These full-page advertisements, though very clearly sponsored by 
Lavasa, did not explicitly refer to the city in their main content. Instead they 
highlighted what they understood to be key issues facing Indian cities: issues of 
governance, environment, technology, planning and infrastructure. This campaign was 
premised on the assumption that existing Indian cities had failed its citizens on a wide 
range of counts. Lavasa’s expression of urban environmental issues in this campaign 
did a number of things. First, it made visible the environmental degradation of 
existing cities. It asked, “Where have all the trees gone?” and claimed, “Cities are 																																																								
238 See www.lavasafuturecities.com for the full campaign 
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dying a slow death thanks to environmental mismanagement” referring to 
environmental issues such as soil erosion, untreated sewage, and traffic jams. In 
doing so, it linked urban environmental issues to failures of planning and governance. 
Second, by concluding each advertisement with the question, “Isn’t it time to build 
our future cities?” and defining the future city as “One in which you can breathe 
clean air,” it offered then a compelling vision of the future. It asked the public to 
“Imagine a city where preserving the environment is a way of life”, “That plants 
more trees than it cuts down”, “Where there is a balance in the use and 
replenishment of natural resources”, “Where life is powered by clean and renewable 
energy”, where “City planning is done using biomimicry, the science of using nature’s 
best ideas to solve design challenges”, and “Where ecological thinking is the only 
way of life.” In making such claims to being an environmentally sustainable city of the 
future, it rationalised its own existence, deep in the middle of an ecologically 
sensitive area (Lavasa Future Cities, 2011). 
 
Through this campaign, LCL attempted to set the terms of public discussion on the 
future of Indian cities. In so doing, it successfully presented itself as a city project and 
not a real estate project. Through its elaborate marketing and public relations 
strategy, it called upon citizens to participate in rejecting existing urban decay and to 
envision a different kind of urban future. It sought to make visible the environmental 
pollution that plagues existing Indian cities. This is not to suggest that existing Indian 
cities do not suffer from acute environmental degradation, or that indeed newer 
ways of imagining cities are not needed, or that Lavasa has taken its own 
environmental mission lightly. What this shows is the ways in which environmental 
issues are being used to generate a compelling vision of a future city, one that is 
premised on real estate, is privately managed in a top-down manner, and relies on 
the privatisation of natural resources. 
 
But Lavasa is a real estate project, generating new surplus through the monetization 
of land and the city. Its internal benchmarks of success are primarily real estate sales 
and future city building projects. Unlike similar projects in East Asia, LCL has steered 
clear of the language of consumer demand. It has articulated the need for new cities 
as being part of imagining an alternative future for India. It is thus also building, 
sustaining, and making real the representation of a private and somewhat utopian 
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space and so it is not just a gamble as a real-estate project (it is built in the middle of 
forested land), but also a speculation on a certain representation of space—a 
privatised city “in harmony with nature” (Lavasa SPA, 2012: 95). If successful, it will 
draw in new interests and investors and generate a public that sees cities on the 
same terms. This speculation also takes place in anticipation of the real political risks 
– the ability of the government and activists to stall projects – associated with poor 
environmental management. 
 
In summary, LCL’s environmental claims are not merely instances of greenwashing; it 
has moral, business, and political incentives for some sort of environmental 
conservation. But its environmentalism is aesthetic, ideologically connected to the 
primacy of the urban over the rural, and tied to technological innovation. It fails to 
address the link between consumption and environmental degradation and also the 
connections between the environment and livelihoods of those locals who live off it. 
The environment and nature are not seen as productive resources but rather as 
objects to be cordoned off and consumed (through recreation). This 
environmentalism serves as a justification for the project’s astounding location, LCL’s 
level of control, as well as its vision for the future city. 
 
Figure 7.3: Lavasa Future Cities Campaign 
[This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. It can be 
viewed at http://www.lavasafuturecities.com/media.html] 
 
 
7.2. Environmentalism of Protest 
 
For all its efforts, LCL’s idea of sustainable development was firmly rejected by the 
NAPM and other urban environmental activists. In recent years, a number of 
industrial projects have been delayed, stalled, and sometimes cancelled on 
environmental grounds, for example, the Vedanta coal mining project and five SEZs 
in Goa (Sampat, 2013). But rural environmental conflicts are not new and have often 
“pitted the rich against the poor” e.g. a multinational company or a dam project 
against local villages and tribal populations (Guha and Martiner-Alier, 1997: 5). This 
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narrative suggests that the richer party “seeks to step up the pace of resource 
exploitation to service an expanding commercial-industrial economy, a process 
which often involves partial or total dispossession of the communities who earlier 
had control over the resources in question” (Guha and Martiner-Alier, 1995: 5). 
These environmental conflicts are not restricted to industrial projects; attempts at 
scientific forestry and reserving forest areas for wildlife conservation have also been 
contested on grounds of displacing and dispossessing poor forest dwellers, and 
critiqued for their exclusionary outcomes (Saberwal and Rangarajan, 2003; Saberwal 
et al., 2000; Grove et. al., 1998). Many such mega-projects have often publically 
pitched the conflict as a tussle between development and the environment (see 
Guha (1995) and Mawdsley (2004) for reviews), seeking to cast environmental 
movements as being ‘anti-development.’ This discourse is hardly new but has re-
gained fervour in recent years. Rural and urban environmental conflicts in India have 
been intimately connected with questions of land, livelihood, control over resources, 
and access to fuel, water and the city itself.  
 
The NAPM was drawn to Lavasa in the early 2000s through the then Corporator of 
Pimpri-Chinchwad municipality (near Pune). A group of villagers alerted him to the 
land sales taking place for the project239 and he put them in touch with Pune-based 
members of the NAPM. Early concerns about Lavasa were firmly rooted in 
addressing land fraud and displacement, and immediate efforts were put into 
investigating the land claims of the villagers who were experiencing land disputes. 
Another activist and legal expert (with experience contesting SEZs in Maharashtra 
and Goa) visited the area and took note of various land related grievances, which 
took months to untangle (as discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six). Alarmed 
that such a project was being constructed in an ecologically sensitive area, she 
immediately inquired whether the project had received the requisite environmental 
clearance.240 She found that the company had environmental clearances from the 
GoM and not from the central MoEF, which according to her was a violation of the 
recently amended (2004) Environment Impact Assessment Act, 1994.  
 
																																																								
239 C5 interview, 10/10/2012. 
240 C4 interview, 18/04/2012. 
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As the NAPM grew in strength to include some villagers as well as environmental 
activists from Pune, they pursued a number of avenues to contest the project; they 
engaged in protest, brought media attention to the land issues detailed in Chapter 
Five and Six and the project’s environmental impact, they wrote formal complaints 
to government departments and forced inquiries in multiple government 
departments. Due to the political heft of Medha Patkar, they eventually got the ear 
of the Union Minister of MoEF, Jairam Ramesh. What followed was a high profile and 
highly visible campaign against the project. In a letter to the Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra, Patkar summarised the crux of NAPM’s opposition to the project:  
 
“[Lavasa] has taken away a forested land, a perennial river, mountain 
that is full of trees and some of the very well endowed water 
reservoirs in the catchment area of Varasgaon Dam with the help of 
their immense riches and consequently have displaced thousands of 
adivasis, farmers, Katkaris and have by force and by deceit tried to 
create this project. The GoM is playing a supportive role instead of 
opposing such an environmentally detrimental project by wealthy 
sharks.” (Patkar, 2010: n.p.) 
 
The NAPM raised multiple environmental issues in the press and in various 
government departments. They asserted that the project was diverting water 
resources from Pune and polluting water sources, that it was causing deforestation, 
and that in the absence of required permissions from the competent authority, 
Lavasa was illegal.  
 
At the heart of their opposition lay a three-fold rejection of development related 
displacement, privatisation of the commons, and the violation of environmental laws. 
These are consistent with struggles that the NAPM has waged elsewhere in the 
country. As discussed earlier, the NAPM consists of heterogeneous movements, 
which draw on a range of discourses including Gandhianism, Ambedkarism, Marxism, 
environmentalism, and feminism (Kothari and Sethi, 1984; Omvedt, 1993). They are 
united by their “commitment to deepening democratic control over markets, 
productive resources, and economic development more generally” and stand against 
corporate and state led displacement and dispossession (Levien, 2007: 124). Studying 
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the NAPM’s involvement in the movement against the excessive use of local ground 
water by Coca-Cola’s bottling unit, Ciafone argues that they articulated a powerful 
critique of corporate globalization and privatisation, illuminating the exploitation of 
the resources of the rural poor for the consumption of those on the other side of an 
increasingly widening economic divide in the vaunted new free marketplace of India” 
(Ciafone, 2012: 115). Thus, the NAPM’s opposition goes beyond contesting the 
individual project to a complete rejection of the prevalent and dominant ideology of 
development.241 
 
Despite pursuing multiple strategies of contestation for land and environmental 
concerns, the two issues are intimately connected for the NAPM, and their 
conception of environmentalism is tied to interests of securing land and the 
commons against privatisation. Baviskar (1995) notes that while scholars treat 
conflicts around water and forests as environmental conflicts, they do not see 
contests around land as environmental conflicts. But activists and some social 
movements often (but not always) see them as connected, arguing that for rural 
communities, land, forest, water and other resources are seen not as ‘wilderness’ (as 
often seen by their elite/middle-class counterparts) but as sources of livelihood. In 
that sense environmentalism is fundamentally a question of rights to the 
environment: 
 
“Land rights, water rights, right to the forest, right to the village ... in one 
way it was about saving people, it’s all together, we cannot look at these 
separately. For instance, if Krishna Valley water is saved, then Pune’s water 
is saved, and the people’s water is saved”242 
	
Thus the issue of contention for the NAPM is not just the protection of the 
environment but also the protection of land and environment-dependent livelihoods 
from privatisation of the commons. Ultimately, the fight is not about the 
preservation of nature and natural resources in a way that is typically associated with 																																																								
241 This ideology has roots in the NBA movement, which is resolutely against large scale, capital-
intensive development projects such as big dams. That said, critics state that it is based on the 
"idealisation of the traditional lifestyles of farmers, especially adivasis” who are “depicted as producing 
food crops for their own subsistence" (Omvedt, 2004: 416). 
242 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. By “saved” the informant means saved from privatisation and pollution. 
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wildlife conservationists (who also seek to secure the valley from megaprojects). 
Rather, it is rooted in preserving local people’s rights to those resources.243 The 
critique therefore, was not limited to Lavasa as a project alone, but to the dominant 
ideology of development at play in contemporary India. This includes not just 
corporations, but also the government and civil society organisations that operate 
within a similar ideological conception of development:  
 
“In the last 20 years, after globalisation, the temperament and values of 
people [have] changed... Full corporatisation has taken place…Even civil 
society has become centrist in this and [its] aspirations have also changed 
accordingly: ‘so what if there’s a little bit of environmental damage and 
some people have to be uprooted, this is also a way of progress.’ We have 
to work in different ways against all of this. We have to work and appeal 
against the state, and push this kind of thought out of civil society too, 
whatever laws are there one has to rely on them. One also has to talk to 
the media and explain justice and injustice to them.”244 
 
As scholars have noted, while social movements may convey a consistent message, 
their members are not always in agreement with one another (Nilsen, 2013; Cox, 
1999). So too was the case with the NAPM. While the members were singularly 
united against Lavasa, their critiques of the project varied. For some members, at the 
heart of their environmental critique of Lavasa lay the belief that the urban is 
fundamentally parasitic on the rural. Their environmentalism is a thoroughgoing 
critique of urban consumption and it is premised on the idea that the rural way of 
life – characterised by a low-intensity use of resources – is ecologically sustainable. 
The NAPM challenged the very assumption that more new cities are needed in India. 
Defining resources as physical and environmental, their opposition is based on a 
long-standing critique of consumption and the inequities that such consumption is 
premised on: 
 
“City development is dependent on rural areas. Our challenge is this: What 
does the city produce? All the resources that are needed for the city – be it 																																																								
243 For a critique of this view of this see Baviskar (1995), Sinha et al. (1997). 
244 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. 
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electricity, water, wood, whatever it is, it comes from the villages, and it is 
priced/valued at next to nothing because their environmental costs are borne 
by villagers.”245 
 
To these members of the NAPM, neither capitalist ‘development’ nor urbanisation 
are seen as a foregone conclusion or even desirable end goals (unlike LCL who take 
unplanned and uncontrolled urban development as a given, thus rationalising planned 
interventions). Regardless, all interviewed members of the NAPM see urbanisation in 
its current form, particularly through greenfield sites, as ways in which elites capture 
land and privatise resources through state (and politician) enabled real estate 
speculation. Their critique is premised on challenging the need for new cities, and in 
particular the need for cities built by the private sector on real-estate speculation:  
 
“I don’t know the need of Lavasa, another city next to Pune. Why do we 
need Lavasa? That’s why an assessment for any kind of development 
should be done, a project of this kind of magnitude, whether it’s industrial 
project or infrastructure project or anything. And if there’s a need you have 
to justify the need. That’s what we said, ‘bring out a base study or a 
whitepaper on it and say Lavasa is required in Maharashtra.’ But there is 
no base study… What is that logical justification behind Lavasa? That is 
something I want to know. So it means that we need more minerals in 
coming days and we are trying to exhaust everything in the next 10 years. 
So what’s the futuristic vision for anything? Do you have one at all? Or are 
you just running a government just for a sake of combinations and saying 
that India is growing at 7 per cent GDP.”246 
 
“There are 10 per cent of people who have consumer strength. How much 
can they consume? Agricultural growth and industrial growth are all 
down… Everything else is real estate. Real estate is the thing now, and 
everyone is putting their money into real estate. And that’s why there are 
plans to develop all these big cities. And these cities are coming up in the 
most beautiful places, where there is water. That’s where they want to 																																																								
245 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. 
246 C4 interview, 18/04/2012 
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create a city for the rich. Whatever is left in India, that’s what they are 
searching for.”247 
 
Some activists, though certainly not all, held the view that urbanisation is antithetical 
to environmentalism. And it is only through small-scale rural living that sustainable 
development can be achieved (a long-standing trope rooted in Gandhi’s ideas)248: 
 
“Our argument is not understood in the first world that gives these prizes [to 
Lavasa], that a country like India where today 65 per cent of the population 
is dependent and survives on the land, then it is not necessary at all. Change 
the pattern of villages, put some life into the villages, locate small industries 
there, bring value addition in crops, and create employment opportunities. 
Put a stop to the fully subsidized and close-to-nothing value that is put on 
the resources that are being drawn to cities. If you put a stop to that no city 
will be able to survive, especially not Lavasa.”249  
 
There were other non-environmental reasons for opposition too; the activists were 
opposed to a private company engaging in city-making: 
 
“The private sector cannot be involved in this and should not be involved in 
this. In the first place, LCL shouldn’t be doing anything. So it’s not only that if 
they offset the impact on the environment they should do it. I’m of the view 
that LCL has no business being in this. I’m not saying the state does it in a 
better way. But still an arrangement is there – we still have a constitution – 
which gives me space to question and challenge. In Lavasa the relationship is 
like this: I am not a citizen, I’m a customer.”250  
 																																																								
247 C1 interview, 04/04/2012 
248 At Independence, Gandhi (as he outlines in Hind Swaraj) wished to revive the village economy as 
the centre of development. Nehru’s ideas for India’s transformation, as we saw in Chapter Two, were 
rooted in promoting industrialisation. At the core of Gandhi’s idea was the belief that true liberation 
lay in generating local livelihoods within village communities. His long-standing rejection of 
industrialisation is summed up in this iconic quote “God forbid that India should ever take to 
industrialism in the manner of the West… The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom 
[England] is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million [India] took to similar 
economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts” (Gandhi, 1928: 422).  
249 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. 
250 C2 interview, 26/03/2012. 
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Thus, while not all activists and NAPM members upheld the goal of self-sufficient 
village economies or even saw the urban as fundamentally parasitic, they came 
together because they felt that they needed to oppose Lavasa on a principled 
position. Some members were ambivalent about the need for cities, arguing that they 
were not opposed to new cities per se, but just this particular privatised form.251 For 
others, the core concern was the issue of land rights. For many the opposition was 
rooted in the desire to “stem the cancer” from growing i.e. that stalling the project 
(through legal means or otherwise) would prevent more hill stations from emerging 
and desecrating the Western Ghats.252 
 
The activists see Lavasa as emblematic of other megaprojects in India, which seek to 
extend ‘corporate rule’ in India. Lavasa’s own environmental efforts are seen to be 
particularly dangerous, “If you have a company that says we’re building green and such a 
city where we’re growing trees and there will be greenery, well if someone says that, then to 
others it will look better than other kinds of destructive projects.”253 Activists therefore, 
were concerned that the recognition of Lavasa’s environmental efforts would give 
legitimacy to the project and similar future projects. 
 
Such critiques are not new for development projects, but the contestation has often 
been on the grounds of land and dispossession. In this case, however, environment 
became more important as land related grievances could not be easily contested (as 
seen in Chapters Five and Six):  
 
“One has not been able to establish violation for the 5000 acres of land, as 
for most of it they [LCL] have been able to show that they have purchased 
it. So, in the eyes of law there is nothing wrong with it. But if you say that 
one estimate is that more than 300,000 trees have been cut, that a lot of 
hill cutting has taken place, or when you come to water bodies, a lot has 
been disturbed, then you say that the ecology has been disturbed.”254 
 
																																																								
251 C2 interview, 26/03/2012; C4 interview, 18/04/2012; C7 interview, 27/07/2012. 
252 C6 interview, 11/10/2012. 
253 C1 interview, 04/04/2012. 
254 C2 interview, 26/03/2012. 
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Such strategic action is unsurprising, as the NAPM is an experienced social 
movement, deft at contesting projects; they utilise multiple political strategies when 
needed:  
 
“We try different things because we don’t know what will click. Like a war 
is going on and you have different battlefronts. You have one war, but 
different battlefronts. In some places you will win, in others you will lose.  
So we will not put all our eggs in one basket.”255 
 
Therefore, in addition to raising issues in the media and with the government, some 
environmental activists along with the NAPM filed a PIL petition in the Mumbai High 
Court. The matter is still sub-judice but it is worth reflecting on the core substance 
of the petition. The petition did not incorporate some of the complex issues related 
to displacement and the interconnectedness of the right to land, water, and 
livelihood as discussed in their letters to various government departments. Its 
“primary grounds for impugning the construction” was that the project was 
“desecrating the pristine Western Ghats” (Suniti S.R & Ors Vs. LCL, PIL 90 of 2010: 
10) and had not taken the requisite environmental clearance from the appropriate 
environmental body as stipulated under the Environment Impact Assessment 
Notification, 2004 (1994). Furthermore, the project had violated a planning 
regulation, which prohibited construction at higher than 1000 metres above sea level 
as Lavasa’s entrance gate was built at 1050 metres. While their original 
environmental concerns were certainly expansive, the series of complaints and 
litigation launched against the company bore a particular focus. The framework of 
the law structured the kind of environmental complaints NAPM could and could not 
raise. The most important point of contention was the issue of how and from whom 
LCL had received environmental clearance; in the absence of appropriate clearance, 
they argued, the project was illegal.    
 
“All forests have been cut, all these people (locals) were shifted to higher 
contours and then they merrily cut off all the forest and they were forced 
to do it – charcoal making, destruction of the forest, vandalising of the 																																																								
255 C2 interview, 26/03/2012. 
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forest took place. I wouldn’t normally say such a thing because then I am 
blaming the wrong guys for the destruction. But if I were to say it, then the 
original displacement is government-induced environment destruction at the 
hands of tribals, now this can’t get into litigation. But this bothered me the 
most. That the biological diversity was destroyed, that the people have 
been displaced and there is an entire resource transfer. So biological 
resources have either been depleted, eroded or transferred and physical 
resources have also been transferred. Now all this can’t come into a plaint. 
Because this is not justicable, there is no law that helps us. In fact there 
may be laws but it would not have fallen within this PIL. Which took the 
environmental law, rooted in the 1986 Act. But the plaint stood because of 
the Environment Act and the notification which says 1000 metres, had that 
not been there, nothing could have happened…There you see the irony of 
this whole thing: a whole bunch of arbitrary things could be stopped by 
another arbitrary thing. So you catch hold of something that you can get a 
handle on and then add other things, so once the case has been admitted 
then you start contesting.”256  
 
In summary, the activists opposed the Lavasa not solely because they felt it had 
violated environmental laws and degraded the environment but also because they 
were opposed the project – the ideas of environmentalism and development, and 
the privatisation it embodied. The confines of the law determined the kind of action 
they could take, which in this instance amounted to a PIL rooted in issues of 
improper permissions and violation of planning laws. Although the land conflicts may 
seem separate from environmental issues, they are part and parcel of the NAPM’s 
conception of the environment as being intimately connected to rights of villagers 
over resources. Regardless, an analysis of NAPM’s strategies suggests that very 
specific aspects of environmental violations were and are being leveraged, not only 
for environmental purposes, but also for larger political struggles. 
 
 
 
																																																								
256 C6 interview, 11/10/2012. 
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7.3. Environmentalism of the Indian State 
 
So far we have seen the nature of Lavasa’s environmental vision and the ways in 
which it was and remains contested both ideologically and strategically by the NAPM 
and other activists. But the question remains, why did the state sanction hill station 
development on the grounds of ecological conservation and then turn around and 
stall Lavasa?  
 
As extensively discussed in Chapter Four, the Pune Regional Plan (1990-2011) 
identified several major problems in the Western Ghats. First, that the area suffered 
from inadequate tourist facilities and that existing hill stations had “become 
crowded” (1991:6). Second, that affluent people from Mumbai and Pune were 
purchasing agricultural land for “speculative purposes and weekend recreation” 
(1991: 6). Third, that these ad hoc and unplanned farmhouse schemes degraded local 
ecology and generated pollution. Simultaneously, the plan identified the interior areas 
of the Ghats as “untapped” for their tourism potential. It argued that “careful 
planning” was “needed to forestall degeneration of natural beauty in the face of 
pressures from unsatisfied and therefore unruly crowds” (Regional Plan, 1991: 165). 
Seeing illegal and/or unplanned real estate developments as a foregone conclusion, 
the Regional Plan’s (and by extension GoM’s) solution to ecological damage in the 
Western Ghats was to enable private companies to build planned settlements. 
Although these rationales were contested through environmental litigation by the 
Bombay Environmental Action Group (BEAG) in 1996, the court upheld the 
government’s policy decision: 
 
“It has been pointed out by the State government and it cannot be 
disputed that all the existing hill stations in the state on account of 
population pressure and unauthorised constructions and 
developments, are facing environmental and ecological problems and 
hence it was necessary to have new hill station sites for proper and 
regulated development.”  (BEAG Vs GoM, CWP 2772 of 1998: 58) 
 
In summary, the court ruled that the Hill Station Regulation, “envisage controlled 
and regulated development and attempt to maintain ecological balance” (1998: 59).  
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It was therefore, on an ecological premise that hill stations like Amby Valley and 
Lavasa were encouraged to emerge within ostensibly forested locations (or areas 
marked for afforestation within the Regional Plan). Despite the need for ‘proper 
planning’ neither Lavasa’s nor Amby Valley’s site was assessed for feasibility, or 
ecological appropriateness. Rather, Lavasa’s site was chosen for the ease of land 
purchase and for its aesthetics. According to the GoM, the environment would be 
safeguarded through a number of strict government-determined planning and 
building regulations, alongside stringent rules pertaining to pollution control. For 
instance, the Hill Station Regulation prohibited construction on hills with certain 
slopes, high-density construction, extensive tree-cutting etc, and required that 70 
per cent of the area be open-space. At the heart of this policy lay the Indian state’s 
long standing ambition of balancing development and environment, a point to which 
we shall return to shortly. In keeping with this mandate, the GoM issued a number 
of exemptions to LCL to facilitate their project. It permitted cutting hill slopes, and 
enabled a private company to undertake a development project in an area marked 
for afforestation in the regional plan. In 2004, the GoM provided LCL environmental 
clearance for developing the first 2000 hectares of the project.  
 
Under the Indian Constitution, the environment, unlike other sectors such as urban 
development, falls within the domain of the central and not the state government. 
That is not to say that state governments have no say in environmental matters, 
rather that the central government has the ultimate authority over environmental 
decisions. This is because the ‘environment’ has been formulated in a number of 
ways in law and policy to reflect the multiple approaches to sustainability. Although 
not a fundamental right, the 1976 amendment of the Indian Constitution listed 
environment under the Directive Principles of State Policy257, which states that “the 
State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the 
forests and wildlife of the country” (Divan and Rosencranz, 2008: 45). Consequently, 																																																								
257 “This difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in the Constitution has had 
profound effects in shaping the relationship between urbanisation and environmental justice. Since 
there are no fundamental rights to environment, in the absence of appropriate policies affected 
parties must file petitions in court on the basis of violation of their fundamental rights to life 
(interpreted as the right to shelter or livelihoods). Success in such litigation is low since 
environmental disagreements are settled in India on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the 
judiciary” (Datta, 2012: 986). 
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the PILs filed based on the violation of environmental laws and/or a violation of a 
fundamental right to life has been increasing.258 While development projects have 
often been contested on environmental grounds, the ecological sensitivity of Lavasa’s 
geographical location rendered it particularly vulnerable to opposition. 
 
The NAPM therefore brought the project to the attention to the MoEF, arguing that 
not only had there been substantial ecological damage, but that Lavasa did not have 
the requisite clearance for the EIA from the central government. MoEF then 
investigated the matter and on 25 November 2010, a few days before LCL was 
about to list its company on the Mumbai stock market, the MoEF in Delhi issued a 
stay order under section (5) of the Environment Protection Act (EPA) (1986). In the 
first instance, the stay order was premised on two grounds; first, that the project did 
not have requisite clearance from the MoEF as stipulated under the 2004 
amendment of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA), 1994. Although the 
project had received clearance from the GoM, given that substantial changes had 
been made to the project (size and expenditure), the clearance was required from 
the MoEF and not the GoM. Second, that 47.30 hectares of the project had been 
constructed at above 1000 metres above sea level, which was a violation of the EPA, 
1986. The order prohibited LCL from continuing construction arguing that the 
matter needed to be investigated further. Notably, the order was propelled by a 
letter of complaint from the NAPM and issued without an actual assessment of the 
environmental merits of the projects,  (MoEF, 2010a). 
 
LCL, outraged, filed a counter-suit (CWP 9448 of 2010) against the MoEF in the 
Mumbai High Court arguing that they had obtained the requisite permission from 
the Maharashtra State Environment Board on the grounds that this was a new 
township and that the clearance had been granted to them prior to the EIA Act, 
1994 being amended in 2004. However, the Mumbai High Court rejected this plea, 
held the stay-order and further directed the MoEF to hear the complaints against 
Lavasa as made by the NAPM in their PIL, consider LCL’s response, and set up a 
committee to examine the environmental degradation in Lavasa (MoEF, 2010b).259  																																																								
258 See Sivaramakrishnan (2011) for how the environment has become an object of the law. 
259 “PILs in India have come to be characterised by a collaborative approach, procedural flexibility, 
judicially supervised interim orders and forward-looking relief. Judges in their activist avatar reach out 
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In a meeting at the MoEF on 14 December 2010, representatives of LCL argued that 
the development of Lavasa had largely improved the environment since construction 
commenced as the company had planted 600,000 trees and employed 441 villagers 
(MoEF, 2010c). They asserted that the stay order would deprive 1000 families of 
employment, bankrupt the company, put public sector loans and third party rights of 
foreign and domestic customers in jeopardy, and deplete opportunities available to 
the local population for their own development. Some sarpanches drafted a joint 
letter stating that the project had benefited the villagers. In contrast, the NAPM 
pointed out that such a large project should have not been allowed to emerge in 
such a fragile region without ‘proper’ assessment, that its presence was affecting the 
livelihoods of local people, and that water sources were being polluted. If LCL had 
emerged to be an example of ‘proper planning’ then it was this very properness that 
was then questioned by the NAPM and the MoEF. The MoEF surmised that there 
had been “large scale environmental degradation”, that the GoM had awarded 
environmental clearance without jurisdiction, and that no “proper” transport study 
had been conducted for the project (MoEF, 2010c).  
 
What followed was an elaborate process of LCL requesting permissions and 
rebuttals from the NAPM. The MoEF set up a committee to investigate the extent of 
damage and the actions to be taken. Through a mere three-day visit, with little 
baseline data, this expert committee evaluated the project. They argued, “that as 
India’s urban profile undergoes a change, as indeed it will, it becomes essential that 
the spirit of the EPA which calls for a proper balance between environment and 
development is maintained” (Ravindran, 2011: 3). In the absence of baseline data the 
committee was unable to scientifically evaluate the environmental damage done over 
time. However, it observed that the “land profile” had been damaged “extensively”, 
with serious physical damage and violations of existing laws and land allotment 
regulations”, and “extensive cutting and filling of land for infrastructure 
developments” (2011: 5-6). Waste disposal needed to be addressed, top soil erosion 
contained, and the check dams needed to be evaluated from a “systemic 																																																																																																																																																														
to numerous parties and stake-holders, form fact-finding, monitoring or policy-evolution committees, 
and arrive at constructive solutions to the problems flagged for their attention by public-spirited 
citizens” (Rajmani, 2007 : 294). 
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perspective” to understand their downstream impacts.260 It recommended that the 
GoM review the Hill Station Regulation and constitute a committee with 
stakeholders to ensure environmental compliance: “large number of such projects 
may come up in [the] future without proper planning assessment of the 
environmental impacts of projects of such large magnitude and also without taking 
into view the opinion of local residents to whom such developments are detrimental 
to their lifestyle” (MoEF, 2011: 18). 
 
In November 2011, after a year of back and forth, with multiple committees and 
consultations, the first phase of the project was granted permission subject to a 
number of conditions and penalties. As a penalty, MoEF ordered that the LCL 
“restore the environment” at its own cost, that it create an environmental 
restoration fund of 5 per cent of their expenditure, increase expenditure on CSR, 
report to the MoEF every six months, and finally that the GoM would have to take 
“credible action” against the company for these violations (the GoM later filed a 
criminal complaint against LCL’s directors). LCL argued that the MoEF had no 
authority to impose these kinds of conditions on them for clearance. It also argued 
that no other project that had been stalled on similar grounds had been ordered to 
meet such conditions. MoEF responded that the scale of Lavasa made it unlike any 
other project they had encountered. The MoEF did not, however, challenge the very 
idea of building such a project in an ecologically sensitive area. Thus, the NAPM 
argued that the MoEF did not have the jurisdiction to give post-facto clearance, given 
that the matter was now in the Mumbai High Court. 
 
In other words, Phase 1 of the project was ‘regularised’. The Indian state, through 
courts and planning bureaucracy, routinely ‘regularises’ projects that are often illegal 
in some respect (built without requisite permission, constructed on public lands, are 
encroachment etc). A large body of scholarly work has discussed regularisation in 
the contexts of irregularities, illegalities and informality (See Sunderesan (2014) for 																																																								
260 The committee also noted a number of other irregularities, highlighted numerous procedural 
issues, and argued that the Master Plan had been approved by the Collector, Pune without following 
the procedures of public consultation as laid out in the MRTP Act, 1966. It asserted that the land 
leased by the MKVDC was to be used for the purposes of green open space and not for the 
development of a convention centre. Furthermore, it highlighted that the Special Planning Authority 
(SPA) was overwhelmingly constituted by Lavasa employees, which made its independence 
questionable.  
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extensive discussion). So pervasive is this practice that projects are often built and 
properties sold under the assumption that they will eventually be regularised 
(Weinstein, 2009). In fact, LCL, in its original petition had requested that the project 
be regularised on the grounds that third party investments from investors and public 
sector banks would be jeopardized. In the domain of the environment too then, such 
regularisations or post-facto clearances are regularly granted.261 
 
Because the terms of investigation were set around environmental damage and 
clearance, the investigation did not take into consideration the kinds of issues raised 
by NAPM. For instance it did not engage with displacement, or rights of villagers to 
resources. Neither did it contest the very basis and premise of the city’s existence 
(although the committee did suggest revising the Hill Station Regulation). One could 
argue that its ideas of environmentalism were much more aligned with those of 
LCL’s. By making environmental degradation about measurable norms and standards, 
the nebulous idea of what constitutes ‘proper planning’, resurfaced once again. This 
echoes Baviskar’s observation that: 
 
 “The Indian exercise of defining what is environmental and what is 
not, is somewhat arbitrary. Whereas the conflict around agricultural 
land tenure and use, or around the workplace, is usually not treated as 
environmental, conflict around forests or water resources is deemed 
to be quintessentially environmental. This distinction is hard to 
maintain because land management is also of critical ecological 
importance, and confrontations over forests are also about the 
ownership and control of the means of production” (Baviskar, 1995: 
41).  
 																																																								
261 Although in Jagpal Singh vs. the State of Punjab and Others (2011), the Supreme Court in the case of 
the use of commons lands, directed the state government to: “prepare schemes for eviction of 
illegal/unauthorised occupants of gram sabha/ panchayat/Poramboke [grazing lands]/Shamlat land and 
these must be restored to the gram sabha/gram panchayat for the common use of villagers of the 
village. …The said scheme should provide for the speedy eviction of the illegal occupant, after giving 
him [sic] a show cause notice and a brief hearing. Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge 
expenditure in making constructions thereon or political connections must not be treated as a 
justification for condoning this illegal act or for regularising the illegal possession. Regularisation 
should only be permitted in exceptional cases, e g, where lease has been granted under some 
government notification to landless labourers or members of SCs/ST” (quoted in Sampat, 2010: 4). 
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Notably, this technical and bureaucratic narrative also has a personal element to it. 
Every single informant suggested a political conspiracy in either stalling or giving 
clearance to Lavasa. They varied in their micro-details but the meta-narrative was 
the same: that this environmental clearance became the site where the ruling 
coalition’s (UPA) internal politics were played out. Since LCL was seen to be Pawar’s 
project (now Union Minister of Agriculture and leader of the NCP, part of the UPA) 
Sonia Gandhi (head of the UPA) sought to discipline him by interfering with his pet 
project. Others argued that the clearance was eventually issued because Pawar used 
his political weight: 
 
“I think that it was a central level tussle between the Congress and the NCP. 
Lavasa turned out to be the field where they were able to play that battle; 
the Congress and Sharad Pawar tussle is always there. Lavasa, for the 
Congress, was a way of settling that score [Me: but then in the end they let 
it go anyway]. No, but the thing is that for that time period, there was some 
policy that Sharad Pawar was opposing and later on he kept quiet. And then 
it’s not that the Congress is against Lavasa. I would even say that it wasn’t 
even the MoEF. I don’t believe that Jairam Ramesh had a real concern for 
environment; he was just doing what his bosses were asking him. If Jairam 
Ramesh had a real concern for the environment then he would have done 
something in Jaitapur262 rather than Lavasa. If the environment is of concern 
then Jaitapur is the main much bigger concern than Lavasa – and in Jaitapur 
he takes on a different stand. Which means that environment is not the 
concern, so environment becomes merely the battlefield.”263 
 
An informant from LCL concurred: 
 
“So when it finally got down to it there was nothing they could pin onto the 
environment, it was personality driven probably. That’s India. The challenge 
in India is that we don’t have empirical standards. I know because I sat in 
one of the meetings and they showed on the map that this was bushland but 																																																								
262 Jaitapur is the site of a nuclear power plant in Maharashtra. It too was contested on environmental 
grounds in 2010 but it received environmental clearance swiftly. 
263 C2 interview, 26/03/2012 
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they don’t know how much bushland, so how much bush should be there, 
nobody knows. So those are the challenges.”264 
	
What does this set of incidents tell us about environmentalism of the Indian state? 
First, the Indian state (state, central, and the courts) sees urbanisation and the 
development of new towns as desirable. Rather than questioning the need for such 
projects, environmental protection becomes about following pre-decided rules and 
norms, and following the rule of law. Second, in the absence of the ability to have a 
substantive conversation about the environment, it is through law and clearances 
that the state exerts its environmentalism upon other actors.265 Third, such conflicts 
can also be seen as part of larger political tussles, in which the environment is merely 
a bottleneck that can be used by political players at the central level against state-
level actors. 
 
7.4. Conclusion: Environmentalism as Political Strategy 
 
Environmentalism, as Baviskar argues, “is not concerned with nature per se, it is 
concerned with the sustainable use of nature” (1995: 42). The conflict therefore is 
“not merely over material resources”, ownership, rights, and control but also 
“involves fundamentally different conceptions of” and claims about “different 
relationships with nature” (Baviskar, 1995: 42). To address the seeming paradox 
about how and why an eco-city got contested and stalled on environmental grounds, 
EP Thompson’s statement that “every contradiction is a conflict of values as well as a 
conflict of interest” is both values and interest is insightful (Thompson (1975) in 
Baviskar (1995: 42)). 
 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, there is no doubt that environmental 
sustainability is of concern to LCL, the NAPM and other activists that opposed it, 																																																								
264 L7 interview, 21/08/2012. 
265 Scholars have noted that law pertaining to environmental issues in rural and urban areas differs in 
its focus. In the former, concerns are rooted in individual and collective rights to the environment and 
in the latter in civic sense and security (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). In both instances, environmental 
questions remain enveloped in “legal debates and issues of government that provide a genealogy of 
ideas about the environment as both an essential resource for individual living and societal heritage 
for public good” (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011: 906). 
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and the state. Three points are of interest. First is that the environmental 
contestation is based on two ideologically opposed conceptions of 
environmentalism. LCL’s view is premised on urban development being a foregone 
conclusion and centred on the purported need to design cities that are 
environmentally sustainable and driven by consumption. This conception, in keeping 
with the tenets of ecological modernization, reifies the urban as an ideal and 
technological progress as the pathway to it. The NAPM’s position is premised on the 
assumption that city development, no matter how ‘green’ it claims to be, often 
comes at the cost of village life. Furthermore, the environment is not merely a set of 
resources to be passively consumed through recreational activities, it is the lifeblood 
of rural populations and its protection is inextricably linked with their land and water 
rights. These environmentalisms therefore reflect a conflict of values.   
 
In a sense both these ideals can be seen as utopian, one upholds the urban, the other 
the village. Guha notes that within social movements there are “almost always 
competing factions offering competing interpretations” (Guha 1999: 293). The same 
can be said of corporations, where employees hold differing views (as Welker (2006) 
demonstrates). In the face of conflict, however, environmentalism can and is used 
strategically to depict a single view. While it is theoretically important to engage with 
categories and constructs as dynamic and contested, the work of environmental 
movements (and corporations) “demands working assumptions, temporary 
certitudes, and acts of faith” (Baviskar, 1999: 288). In this light, one could criticise 
the social movement’s “claim that indigenous communities’ rights to forests have 
priority over distant urban consumers” on grounds that such a view constructs a 
“problematic topology around locality, closed community, nativism, subsistence, and 
so on” (Baviskar, 1999: 289). But such analytical categories perform a function to 
“support struggles against the structures of domination” (1999: 289). Similarly, Jones 
argues that while “law charges resistance with moral weight and language” it requires 
consensus and in adopting such legal strategies, issues such as “rights, justice and 
power have to be discussed and agreed upon…before a transcript for public 
consumption can be offered” (1998: 505). The same can be said of corporations, 
who unlike social movements are not fighting battles against domination, but 
nonetheless require constructs, which often change to suit the moment, to put forth 
their own political agendas. In this case the vision they wished to portray was that of 
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an internationally recognized, aesthetically pleasing, and inclusive eco-city. 
 
This brings me to my second point; these conflicting ideas of environmentalism are 
underpinned by conflicting interests. LCL’s goal is to generate a compelling urban 
future that is sellable and marketable both domestically and internationally. Such 
visioning is made possible by and further enables land and resource privatisation. 
Ultimately the tropes of environmental degradation in existing cities and by 
extension the environmental promises of the eco-city are used to generate more 
support for future cities and associated real estate sales. In the case of the NAPM, 
the environment is invoked to guarantee land and resource rights to their members, 
particularly those who are adivasi and scheduled caste. It serves as a way in which to 
challenge privatisation and resource capture by leveraging environmental laws in a 
context where land disputes are increasingly difficult to fight (as demonstrated in 
Chapter Five and Six). In this instance the environment is also used strategically as 
part of a larger, nation-wide struggle against privatisation, displacement, and 
neoliberal economic development (Levien, 2007). 
 
Third, as the mediator of environmental conflict, the Indian state acts somewhat 
schizophrenically and seems to have an incoherent project. On the one hand, the 
state government pushes for urban development projects through policies that 
encourage private urban development in forested areas. On the other hand, when 
faced with political pressure the central government stalls the very project on 
environmental grounds. The state in this case, is not a unitary actor with a singular 
logic – the goals of the centre and the state governments come into conflict. The 
GoM passed the Hill Station Regulation to enable proper planning and forestall 
ecological degradation. Yet, no assessment was undertaken to evaluate site 
suitability, despite the ecological sensitivity of the region; it simply handed over a 
parcel of land marked for reforestation to a private company. The central 
government, however, questioned the properness of LCL’s environmental planning, 
and without any baseline data on the ecological conditions of the area and/or 
substantial evaluation, swiftly stalled the project on grounds of improper clearances. 
Moreover, although the GoM overstepped its authority and issued environmental 
clearances to Lavasa, it was never held responsible for its actions.  
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It is also noteworthy, that these are not anonymous principled contests but are 
propelled by powerful individuals with political heft – Lavasa being Pawar’s project 
and the NAPM being represented by Medha Patkar. Furthermore, there is a tussle 
between the state and the centre and also the personalities that occupy these 
positions. The Indian state is not unequivocally aligned with big business, it pays close 
attention to what powerful (arguably personality-driven) social movements like the 
NAPM say. Nor are the goals of the centre and the state government aligned: if the 
GoM extended every kind of privilege, exemption and helping hand to the project, 
then the MoEF, undoubtedly under the pressure from the NAPM, swiftly pulled the 
rug from beneath LCL’s feet. Although the project did receive partial clearance in 
the end, it did so at significant, almost debilitating cost to LCL. In the year that the 
project stayed idle, it lost an estimated INR 2 crores (USD 400,000) every day. In 
the process, its credibility was damaged and many business partners pulled out. The 
clearance came with multiple restrictions, including a criminal case against the 
project put forth by the GoM. Although construction has resumed for phase I, it 
remains to be seen if the project can and will get back up on its feet. Ultimately the 
Indian state seeks to establish some kind of ‘balance’ between environmental 
protection and urban development. This ‘balance’ translates into support for the 
project as the state’s ideology of sustainable development is more aligned with LCL’s 
than with the NAPM’s. 
 
In conclusion, urban megaprojects are being met with protest all over the country. 
Eco-projects seek to demonstrate a possible environmentally sustainable form of 
urban development. Yet, many of these projects are contested on environmental 
grounds. These protests have often succeeded in halting projects altogether and are 
an important force in steering an aspect of urbanisation. This chapter argues that 
these conflicts are both led by irreconcilable ideological positions around 
urbanisation, control of land and resources, and the sustainable use of the 
environment. It also shows how the environment is invoked to generate support 
both for and against land and resource privatisation. In a sense then, the competing 
discourses of environmental sustainability have become political strategies through 
which such projects are both put forth and contested.  	
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
 
Days after Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in 2014, he announced 
plans to build 100 ‘smart cities’ across India and remarked, “cities in the past were 
built on river banks, they are now built along highways. But in the future they will be 
built based on availability of optical fiber networks and next-generation 
infrastructure” (Economic Times, 09 July 2014: n.p.). Set against India’s predicted and 
awaited urban explosion, its infrastructure deficit, and its ambitions for economic 
growth, the fervour to build anew is palpable. Although what constitutes a ‘smart 
city’ has yet to be unveiled, INR 7000 crore (USD 1.2 billion) has been allocated in 
the 2014-15 budget, and partnerships are being pursued with the governments of 
Japan and Singapore (Economic Times, 10 July 2012: n.p.). Whether and just how 
these cities emerge and function remains to be seen. 
 
Through a close engagement with Lavasa, this dissertation has examined the impulses 
behind and the implications of building such new cities. With so much emphasis 
being placed on building new cities, most of which are still in the planning stage and 
not yet built, it is important to understand Lavasa as a site that has actually emerged. 
Accordingly, the thesis examined the ideologies, institutional arrangements, and 
political processes at work in the making of Lavasa. It also showed how rural 
communities are thrown into city-making and how they reshape its making. It 
explored how the imagined, material and lived aspects of the making of a ‘model’ city 
shape, and are shaped by, competing ideologies of development, and land and real-
estate politics; how a vision for a new Indian city was imagined and made real, in a 
quintessential example of the production of space. In short, it analysed how a city 
became both a site and object of politics. This dissertation, therefore, contributes to 
urban studies through an ethnographic study of the first city developed, financed, and 
managed entirely by the private sector in post-independence India.  
 
I began the thesis with a brief overview of historical attempts at building new cities 
and argued that such visions are often the products of individual actors seeking to 
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demonstrate alternatives to existing urbanism, and that they are invariably resisted, 
subverted, and remade. Chapters Four to Seven made specific arguments about 
different aspects of the politics of place-making, they each referred to an element of 
the plan and the response to the plan – the plan on paper and the plan in practice; in 
Lefebvrian terms, as the interaction of the conceived, perceived, and lived space in 
the production of a city. The central object of inquiry is how space becomes an 
object of politics: space as the city itself, space as land being converted from rural to 
urban use and ownership, space as a site upon which numerous and often competing 
claims are made, and space as a product of and means to those claims. I have treated 
Lavasa as an empirical phenomenon with social consequences in order to examine 
what it means for a new city premised on private property to be inclusive, 
environmentally sustainable, and profitable. In so doing, I have explicitly rejected the 
notion that “corporations cannot do good because they are profit maximizing” 
because such an argument “conflates the moral nature of corporate intentions with 
the moral content of the outcomes produced through corporate actions” (emphasis 
in original, Welker, 2006: 5). Furthermore, since Lavasa and, indeed, all of Modi’s 
smart cities (if they are ever built) are premised on converting rural land and 
livelihoods into urban ones, we are impelled to examine the processes behind, and 
effects of, such a transformation. Therefore, as discussed at length in Chapter Three, 
I contend that this single site can be used as a synecdoche to comment on the larger 
forces of privatised forms of urbanisation as well as the rural urban transition in 
India.  
 
In telling this story, I demonstrated how the symbolic power of this ‘market utopia’ 
and the imaginaries deployed conceal the conditions of its possibility, i.e. the ways in 
which it was made through the state, through speculation, and the discursive and 
material operations of the land market. I illustrated the centrality of the control of 
land to the project of privatised city-making. Furthermore, I argued that theorising 
the role of the state in urban processes requires us to pay attention to local 
networks of elite political actors who inhabit and move between the state, society, 
and the corporation. Finally, I showed that contemporary environmental concerns 
are also centred on contestation of the use and control of land. Together, I argued 
that the land market’s construction shapes and informs the politics of the present.   
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This concluding chapter reflects on the central themes raised through the study of 
Lavasa and the light they shed on understanding the politics of urbanisation in 
contemporary India. The contributions made to the three themes laid out in 
Chapter Two i) speculative urbanism, ii) privatisation and the Indian state, and iii) 
contestation and consent, are discussed in Sections 8.1 to 8.3. Section 8.4 presents 
the limitations of this work and suggests avenues for future research. Section 8.5 
concludes with a short note on the contribution of this dissertation to urban theory. 
 
8.1. Speculative Urbanism  
 
Assessing his experience of building Radburn, architect Clarence Stein reflected that 
“a private corporation had at best a gambler’s chance to build a new community” 
(Hall, 2002: 133). Indeed, any corporation building a new city is gambling on a 
number of things, including the city’s present and future real estate values, its 
desirability to future populations, and, in contemporary India, its ability to withstand 
contestation. In this respect, one can argue that any vision is speculative, because it is 
based on a conception of the future and gambles on a whole host of unknowns. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the term ‘speculative urbanism’ has been used to depict 
urban processes that are premised on the uncertainty of the future as well as on 
hefty real estate profits. This dissertation contributes to seeing speculation as a force 
of urban change in three ways, as summarised below. 
 
First, the thesis contributes to the growing evidence that the post-liberalisation 
Indian state has shifted from protecting farmers from speculation to enabling 
speculation to take place on a grand scale (Goldman, 2010; Shrivastava and Kothari, 
2012; Levien, 2013). Levien (2013) argues that the Indian state is effectively a ‘land 
broker state’, which expropriates land from citizens for the benefit of private capital. 
Sud (2014b) tempers this narrative, arguing that although such transfers are taking 
place, state governments are attempting to balance the governance of land between 
farmers and industry and that policies and outcomes vary substantially on a state-by-
state basis. In Chapter Four I showed how the state (both the GoM and the Mumbai 
High Court) played an active role in facilitating real estate speculation by creating 
and upholding policies geared towards privatised hill station development in the form 
of second-home investments. It gave permissions and rights to developers and 
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transferred public land to the company at low prices in the name of ‘public interest’. 
In this respect, the Hill Station Regulation is in keeping with (and precedes) other 
state policies, such as the 2005 SEZ Act, which have recast the idea of public interest 
as being equivalent to economic growth and increased revenue for the local 
government, rather than being cognisant of wider development goals (Ramanathan, 
1996; Sampat, 2010). That said, in the case of Lavasa it is impossible to ignore the 
importance of the network of powerful political actors and developers involved in 
the project (and their private interests). Kohli (2009) and Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2004) argue that liberalisation in India has been more business friendly rather than 
market friendly, where private growth is generated in the name of public interest. 
Sud (2014b) finds this distinction useful in thinking about land, arguing that some 
state governments are market friendly and others are business friendly. It is worth 
investigating to what extent business friendly practices are mapped onto the private 
interests of politicians. This thesis therefore cautions the reading of such speculative 
land transfer policies and as simply ‘neoliberal’ or even ‘market friendly’ and begs a 
closer investigation of the direct private interests that ensure certain ‘public interest’ 
projects take hold and others do not.  
 
Second, a number of scholars have argued that real estate speculation comes at the 
cost of the poor because it fuels the dispossession of rural landowners (Goldman, 
2010; Levien, 2013) and the exploitation of wage labourers (Searle, 2010). Here, too, 
I have shown that that certain groups were dispossessed by the workings of the land 
market. However, as I demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, it is not merely the 
developer who engages in speculation; local politicians, brokers, intermediaries, 
holdouts, and villagers are all engaged in a variety of speculative activities, hedging 
their present actions on possible future outcomes. Intermediaries speculated on 
land, buying it long before the project was announced. So too did some sarpanches, 
who participated and benefited from land speculation. Some holdouts speculatively 
held on to their lands in the hopes of better material outcomes and in turn became 
directly invested in the success of the project. Meanwhile, those who had sold their 
lands speculated on their employment opportunities. Hence, many villagers – 
brokers, holdouts, and the landless – were, either by force or choice, speculating in 
some way or another, albeit from different positions of power. This speculation is 
rooted in the discursive and material construction and operation of the land market; 
 256	
it becomes a double-edged sword – it is the force that dispossesses and displaces 
some but also creates the conditions for some villagers to support the project. In 
engaging with the numerous forms and agents of speculation, this thesis provides a 
counterpoint to a large literature on land grabs which often fails to account for the 
agency of villagers and agrarian intermediaries in participating in speculation.  
 
Third, speculation has productive power and produces political effects. While Lavasa 
is a real estate project, generating surplus through the monetisation of land, it is also 
building, sustaining and making real the representation of a private, somewhat 
utopian, space. Lavasa was imagined not just as a gamble as a real estate project 
(after all, it is built in a forested setting) but also as a speculation on a certain 
representation of space – the future city. The vision of Lavasa promises that future 
cities, when planned and managed properly through private partnerships and with a 
complete top-down vision, can avoid the politics and turmoil that characterises the 
Indian city of the past (and present). These planning ideals are fundamentally 
premised on the use and control of land and the ability to turn cheap rural land into 
real estate. By using representations of a prosperous and well-planned future (and 
contrasting it against the maelstrom of existing Indian urbanism), LCL seeks to 
expand business opportunities in order to build many more Lavasas across the 
country, thus generating more real estate profits for the company. However, this 
vision is being implemented with no clear sense of LCL’s governance powers 
(beyond those of being property owners) and despite the promises of top down and 
privatised planning, the project remains at the mercy of India’s democratic 
framework. This level of analysis is in agreement with the literature on urban 
visioning, which suggests that such imaginaries are deployed to deepen real estate 
profits (Searle, 2010), insulate projects from public accountability (Shatkin, 2008), 
and rationalise new forms of ‘order’ and semi-authoritarian governance (Bhan, 2014). 
 
But such visioning can serve other purposes too. Surveying different SEZs across the 
country, Jenkins et al. (2014) highlight the importance of the interaction between 
anti-SEZ activism and the state in determining the outcomes of the projects. In some 
cases, such as Maharashtra (Majumdar and Menezes, 2014), Rajasthan (Levien, 2013), 
and Tamil Nadu (Vijayabaskar, 2010), resistance has been relatively weak. However 
in West Bengal and Goa, activism was successful in closing SEZs and despite 
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substantial “interests working actively in the aid of capital” the state was “not 
immune to popular resistance” (Sampat, 2013: 19). This backdrop indicates that the 
threat of (successful) resistance to private enclaves is real and the range of the local 
state’s response to such projects is wide.  
 
I have shown that it is precisely the threat of such resistance, and an uncertainty 
about the future that generates planning ideals such as inclusion (Chapters 4 and 6) 
and environmental sustainability (Chapter Seven). While the speculative visioning 
takes place amid globally circulating references of what a world-class city should look 
like: ‘smart’, ‘well planned’, and ‘sustainable’, it also takes place by calculating the very 
real risks of resistance on the grounds of land, displacement, and the environment. 
To that effect, only days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced his smart 
city plan, Lavasa’s website rebranded itself as a ‘smart city’ (through it website), 
arguably to gain political support. In order to ensure that the city is desirable to both 
domestic and international firms and faces minimal local resistance, an improbable 
market utopia – profitable, inclusive, environmentally sustainable, and well planned – 
is generated. The vision, therefore, is not limited to globally circulating ideas of 
urbanism but also references local and politically salient concepts, conceived in 
anticipation of the potential disruption caused by democratic politics in India. 
 
In summary, this dissertation provides us a lense through which we can think about 
speculation as a force of urbanisation. It goes beyond conceiving of speculation as 
generated through increasingly mobile finance capital (cf. Harvey; Searle, 2010; 
Goldman, 2010) to include forms of speculation taking place at all levels and by all 
kinds of actors. Furthemore, speculation on the (successful) future of the project 
within a political environment of resistance, generates public planning goals such as 
inclusion and environmental sustainability. Thus speculation not only propels the 
project in material terms but also directly impacts the form and politics of the city-
making project. Thus, in thinking about new city projects more broadly, this thesis 
urges a more expansive use and understanding of ‘speculative urbanism’. 
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8.2. Privatisation and the Indian State 
 
The history of privately built new towns, as discussed in Chapter One, shows us that 
such projects have always been enabled in one form or another by the state. Indeed, 
different levels of the state have been present at every stage of Lavasa’s making: from 
its inception and assisting with land and permissions to ultimately stalling the project. 
As a private city-making project, first sanctioned and then obstructed by different 
levels of the state, Lavasa can be used as an optic through which we can reflect on 
the relationship between the state and capital in India. In order to do so however, 
we need to distinguish between the different levels of the state (local, central, and 
the courts) and also free the analysis from state-capital and state-society binaries. In 
this section I focus on the dissertation’s contribution to two themes: i) the 
importance of individual political actors in forging urban outcomes and ii) the 
seemingly contradictory actions of the Indian state.  
 
In tracing the state’s role in Lavasa’s making, two observations are noteworthy: first, 
this ‘state’ consists of specific actors who actively supported the project. In this 
instance the most visible political actors belong to the Pawar family – Sharad Pawar, 
Ajit Pawar, and Supriya Sule – who have long been prominent figures in Pune’s and 
Maharashtra’s politics, are members of the NCP, hold public office, and are also 
shareholders in multiple real estate firms in Maharashtra (Ray and Tare, 2011). In 
recent years, the relationship between real estate developers and politicians has 
come under wider public scrutiny, and it is clear, as scholars are beginning to argue, 
that this relationship is a formidable force in determining the direction that urban 
development takes (Sami, 2010; Weinstein, 2014).266 In this instance, the Pawars are 
not merely benevolent supporters with exceedingly good relations with certain real 
estate developers, but arguably also direct beneficiaries of the project (although the 
extent of the benefits accrued is a source of debate).  																																																								
266 This argument also extends beyond real estate. Kohli (2009) argues that the power and influence 
of business groups in India has grown and these groups wield significant political influence. In the 
domain of national politics, an increasing number of businessmen/industrialists are members of 
parliament. For example, Anil Ambani of Reliance Corporation filed nomination papers for the Rajya 
Sabha in 2004, committing INR 10,000 crores (USD 200 million) to building a power plant in Uttar 
Pradesh. “Such explicit partisan linkage seems to go against the dictum that most businessmen 
financed and supported all parties in attempt to maximize their returns and minimize political risk” 
(Sinha. 2011: 472). The direct benefits may explain why the Indian state is considered pro-business, 
rather than pro-market. 
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Sundaresan (2014) refers to these webs as ‘private interest networks’ that “inhabit 
the space of governance and produce private and public interest outcomes through 
engaging in various forms of associational relations” (2014: 296). It is through the 
involvement of politicians, both their insider knowledge as well as their ability to 
create legislation, that land markets are constructed. Similarly, key employees within 
the LCL, such as the Chief Planner and the Vice President of land acquisition were 
former (senior) government employees, with detailed knowledge of state planning 
apparatus and land systems, and non-trivial social and professional networks within 
local government. Majumdar and Menezes (2014: 253) show that when building the 
Maha Mumbai SEZ, the Reliance Corporation employed “prominent former 
bureaucrats and state planners who had thorough knowledge of, and easy access to, 
officials in the state’s planning machinery”. Unsurprisingly, informants argued that 
Lavasa’s swift emergence could largely be attributed to the various actors that 
moved effortlessly between the worlds of the state and the private sector.267  
 
Such movement between state, society and the corporation is not limited to the 
upper echelons of power. As detailed in Chapters Five and Six, this dissertation 
concurs with recent scholarship by Gururani (2013) and Levien (2013), which 
discusses at great length the pivotal role of the sarpanch in the land market, and in 
particular how the sarpanch can become the “greatest beneficiary” (Gururani, 2013) 
of land buy-ups. Sarpanches often act as intermediaries in the land market as well as 
between the company, the local government, and the village. In Khed SEZ, not far 
from Lavasa, the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) offered 
incentives to sarpanches such as guaranteeing them construction and earthmoving 
contracts, despite their lack of experience. Such contracts were seen as “confidence 
building measures” (Balakrishnan, 2013: 108). In Lavasa too, two of the interviewed 
sarpanches had some kind of employment contract with LCL. Many such sarpanches 
were no longer full-time residents of their villages, but lived in Pune and came in two 
or three times a week. When the LCL was under examination by the central 
government, some sarpanches got together and filed an affidavit in support of the 
project. That said, not all sarpanches are involved in real estate transactions of land 																																																								
267 C4 interview, 18/04/2012; C2 interview, 26/03/2012. 
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aggregation, and in some cases they protest the company’s actions. Regardless, it was 
only through using these agrarian intermediaries that the project could come to life. 
In examining post-liberalisation politics, Chatterjee (2008: 56) observes the 
ascendancy of “the corporate classes relative to the landed elites”. In this instance 
the corporate classes largely retain their power by bringing landed elites into the fold 
of the project. This should caution both academics and policy makers as to the 
weight they give to sarpanch testimonies when evaluating development projects.  
 
To summarise the first point, the lack of a clear (Weberian) distinction between 
state and society has been well documented in the scholarship on the local state in 
rural India (Harriss-White 2003, Corbridge et al., 2005; Gupta, 1997, 2012). This 
literature largely refers to how this lack of distinction impacts rural citizens’ 
engagement with and experience of the local state. However, the role of such 
blurring in the making of urban India is only just beginning to be uncovered (see 
Sunderesan (2014), Sami (2013), and Shakin and Vidyarthi (2014) for a recent review 
and a call to re-think state-society binaries in urban studies). It is clear that political 
actors at all levels of the state (from ministers to sarpanches) straddle the business 
and political worlds, and wield enough power to heavily influence the determination 
of where and how urban projects emerge. We therefore encounter the importance 
of the agency of local political actors in shaping the production of space in what 
seems to be a corporate city-making project.  
 
What implications does this have for our understanding of the Indian state and its 
relationship to capital? Recent policies supporting SEZs, industrial townships, and 
industrial corridors have led scholars to argue that the Indian state is increasingly 
serving the interest of capital; Levien (2013) calls the Indian state a ‘land-broker 
state’, which facilitates large-scale transfer of resources to corporations. There is 
certainly much truth to this – as we have seen, the state does facilitate private real 
estate projects in the name of public interest, leases public lands at deflated prices, 
and facilitates land transactions. But it is uncertain whether this is because of graft, 
motivated by private interests, or whether it is a function of an ideology that upholds 
the dominance of capital. What we do know is that “the politico-administrative 
class” is “directly tied to private interests” and this “partisanship and directness of 
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the nexus in many ways defines the character of the contemporary Indian State” 
(Yadav and Palshikar, 2011: n.p.).  
 
Which bring us to the issue of inconsistent actions by different levels of the state. 
Both the GoM and the Mumbai High Court championed privately developed hill 
stations – seeing them as not only desirable but also necessary. This was evident in 
their unequivocal support for the Hill Station Regulation, which was enacted by the 
GoM and confirmed by the High Court’s decision to uphold the Regulation as a 
means to further private investment, develop tourism, and protect the environment. 
To this effect the court and the GoM gave post-facto clearance to the Amby Valley 
project (Lavasa’s predecessor). LCL, too, benefitted from a range of locally given 
exemptions and clearances; that the project went from planning to building in less 
than a decade is testimony to the support that was extended to it (Mumtaz, 2011; 
CAG, 2011).  
 
While the idea of building new hill stations per se was not contested, the central 
government, as represented by the MoEF and the CAG was critical of the project, 
aired its ‘irregularities’ and proceeded to temporarily stall it, inflicting heavy penalties 
(as seen in Chapter Seven). At the time of writing, the project does not have full 
clearance (only Phase 1 does) and the GoM has filed a criminal complaint against 
Gulabchand and LCL board members (at the behest of MoEF). Furthermore, Lavasa’s 
parent company, HCC, is in court against the state government in multiple cases on 
the grounds of not having been remunerated for other public infrastructure projects 
completed by them at the behest of the state268 (Gulabchand has repeatedly gone on 
record in the media about non-payment of contracts by the government). The 
investigation of local government practices by the central government elucidates that 
the state neither acts as a unitary actor nor does it demonstrate incontrovertible 
support to capital. This may not be surprising as the tendency to view the Indian 
state as a unitary actor has long been challenged by scholars of Indian federalism 
(Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Yadav and Palshikar, 2011). 
 
																																																								
268 For example, the GoM owes HCC INR 600 crore (USD 100 million) for the Bandra-Worli Sea 
Link completed in 2010 (HCC, 2013). 
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However, here too it can be argued that it was elite political actors who precipitated 
these divergent actions. The project was brought into the public eye largely through 
the political heft and dedication of the NAPM. Consequently, multiple government 
departments were forced to launch inquiries into Lavasa; the UDD, the Collector’s 
office, the Revenue department, and the Tahsil office, under the auspices of various 
laws, had to investigate, justify and/or correct their actions. Whether this is merely a 
performance is yet to be seen. Regardless, powerful urban activists and social 
movements use the law to launch inquiries to hold the local state accountable and to 
leverage the central state against the local state. 
 
While, on the one hand, the state government pushed for urban development 
projects through policies that encouraged privatized development in forested areas, 
on the other hand, the centre, when faced with political pressure, stalled the very 
same project on environmental grounds. In this case, the state is not a unitary actor 
with a singular logic and so the goals of the centre and the state governments come 
into conflict. It is also noteworthy that these are not anonymous contests but are 
propelled by powerful individuals with political heft – Lavasa was backed by Pawar’s 
and is Gulabchand’s project and the NAPM is represented by Medha Patkar. In fact, 
there are few projects in the country that have involved a cast of such politically 
influential characters. Thus, the tussle between the state and the centre also reflects 
the power of the personalities that occupy these positions. We see then, that the 
Indian state is not unequivocally aligned with capital and it is often held accountable 
by powerful (some would argue personality-driven) social movements like the 
NAPM. We also observe that the goals of the centre and the state government are 
not always aligned: although the GoM extended every kind of privilege, exemption 
and helping hand to the project, the MoEF, undoubtedly under pressure by the 
NAPM, swiftly pulled the rug from beneath LCL’s feet (even if it partially replaced it 
a year later).  
 
Shatkin and Vidyarthi (2014) posit that this moment of urban reform is largely “state-
driven” and has experienced only “sporadic and partial success” as the “state has 
frustrated the ambitions of corporations, consumer citizens and others, who cover a 
vision of global urban transformation and the commodification of space” (2014: 5). 
Roy (2009a) argues that such actions are consistent with the state’s informalised 
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planning practice, whereby the state leverages the blur between what is legal and 
illegal and is able to align itself with populist measures to further its sovereign power. 
But Roy does not distinguish between the levels of the state and how and why they 
act in contradictory manners, and in Lavasa’s case it is not even clear that the state 
is, in fact, furthering its sovereign power. While the central state has certainly 
frustrated the making of Lavasa, it is a different level of the state from the one that 
sanctioned the project. These contradictory state actions can also be seen as 
disciplinary practices, by the central government down to the state government, by 
senior political leaders to those below them. How this continues to play out as the 
project proceeds, remains to be seen. This thesis thus calls for a more disaggregated 
and less structural view of the state in urban politics.  
 
8.3. Contestation and Consent  
  
LCL, anticipating resistance to any large building project, hoped to overcome it by 
planning and presenting Lavasa as an inclusive and environmentally sustainable city. 
Why and how, then, was it resisted on those very grounds? In Chapter Four we saw 
that the Hill Station Regulation legitimated the common sense notion as put forth by 
the government and developers, that more hill stations were needed. In so doing, it 
prevented any further contestation on the propriety of such projects, i.e. it closed 
avenues for future public debates on whether new hill stations were desirable and 
closed off certain avenues for resistance to Lavasa, and other similar projects. This 
however, did not prevent the project from being resisted in other ways. 
 
Throughout the thesis I have shown that Lavasa presents a complex case of multiple 
strategies of resistance and counter-resistance and contestation has taken place on a 
variety of grounds. In the realm of the law, there have been land claims in revenue 
courts, and PILs in the Mumbai High Court. Alongside individual landowners blocking 
road access and cordoning off their landholdings from Lavasa, there have been overt 
protests staged by the NAPM. Some holdouts refused to sell their land despite their 
ideological agreement with the project. And finally, there were instances when the 
NAPM forced multiple government departments to pursue inquiries regarding the 
project, which ultimately led to its temporary cessation. Every single element of the 
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plan (private planning, market prices for land, inclusion, sustainability) was ultimately 
contested and remade through various acts of resistance. The workings of the land 
market generated a very specific type of resistance, one that was fragmented and 
reliant on local revenue courts instead of collective action. The local state, often the 
very site of those land frauds, had to investigate and mediate these disputes and the 
NAPM’s political heft ensured that these disputes were examined closely. What does 
this tell us about the politics of resistance in contemporary India and the role of 
resistance in the production of space?  
 
First, as outlined in Chapter Five, the ‘voluntary’ land purchase process produced a 
complicated terrain of land fraud and sales, which, in some instances, led to 
dispossession. While the process that unfolded was unlike that in Singur or 
Nandigram, where the state forcibly acquired land from farmers, it can nonetheless 
be seen as a land grab. Chatterjee (2008: 53) argues that capitalist growth in 
contemporary India “will make room for the preservation of the peasantry, but 
under completely altered conditions” and that given the conditions of urbanisation, 
shifting to “urban and non-agricultural occupations is no longer a function of their 
pauperisation and forcible separation from the land, but is often a voluntary choice, 
shaped by the perception of new opportunities and new desires”. As discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six, it is debatable to what extent this choice is voluntary. But its 
‘voluntary’ nature shaped resistance strategies and also the politics of the project. 
 
Second, that the project is both resisted and supported by different groups of 
villagers should not be surprising. The caste and class dimension of support for 
projects has been noted in several other instances across a range of development 
projects. It is no surprise that landowners who stand to gain from the project 
support its continuance and buy into the hegemonic ideology of development, 
despite their other reservations about the project. However, what is less explored is 
how overt and politically powerful forms of resistance, as undertaken by the NAPM, 
in the end and perhaps inadvertently, can further embolden those villagers who gain 
from the project. The real threat of the project closing down imbued those in 
relative support of the project with more bargaining power, with which they made 
claims on LCL. LCL leveraged this support symbolically to demonstrate the 
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inclusiveness of their project. Paradoxically, the end effect of overt resistance to the 
project was to further legitimise it.  
 
Third, it remains clear that despite attempts to create urban spaces that are privately 
governed and devoid of a democratically elected government, the actual emergence 
of these projects remains uncertain and fraught. Roy offers an explanation for this; 
that Indian planning operates through a regime of informality rooted in a “state of 
deregulation”, where “the ownership, use, and purpose of land cannot be fixed” and 
“the law itself is rendered open-ended and subject to multiple interpretations and 
interests” (2009: 80). It is this very regime that both allows the state to allocate land 
to private companies and also keeps alive multiple, and often insurgent, claims to 
land that have been “nurtured and fostered by systems of deregulation, unmapping, 
and informality” (2009a: 81). Thus, “urban developmentalism remains damned by the 
very deregulatory logic that fuels it” (2009a: 81), that is to say, these informalised 
practices of planning set into motion new ways of making the Indian city, but these 
attempts are always partial and eventually undone; “it is precisely the nature and 
ambitions of these plans that will be their undoing, for the “chaos” that they seek to 
evade is precisely the context in which they must take root” (Bhan, 2014: 235).  
 
There is much truth to Roy’s explanation; while the local state did give public land to 
LCL, it also did keep multiple land claims of adivasis alive. However, these land 
disputes were not the Achilles’ heel of the project; nor was it the electoral power of 
those who were being displaced, or acts of insurgence (Holston, 2008) or occupancy 
(Benjamin, 2008). Rather it was the importance of the NAPM as a social movement, 
with a highly visible, powerful and arguably elite leader (Medha Patkar) able to 
demand inquiries and insist on being heard by those in power. Although numerous 
individuals and activists made complaints regarding the project to the government, 
only the NAPM’s complaints were routinely referred to in government documents. 
These complaints and requests for investigations were made largely with the 
assistance of the law: information demands were made through the RTI Act (2005), 
environmental clearances were checked, and land records were pursued in local 
government offices via revenue court proceedings. It was only through using their 
political muscle that the NAPM managed to push such inquiries through and bring 
the project to a temporary standstill. In light of this, it is important when 
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conceptualising resistance in cities to examine the power of social movements to 
command leverage of different levels of the state not necessarily based on their mass 
support (which they can lack) but rather on their political heft.  
 
8.4. Limitations and Future Research 
 
The scope of this dissertation was to examine the making of Lavasa and how it 
became an object of politics. As the project is ongoing, my research is limited to 
issues and events that have taken place in the 18 years from when the Hill Station 
Regulation was passed (1996) up until the time of research and writing (2014). Since 
the city is a work in progress, things will certainly change; new governments both at 
central and state level may alter their stand on the project, relationships between 
LCL and the villagers could take on a new dimension, and the project could take 
another direction. Therefore, this dissertation can only be a partial account of the 
emergence and consequences of this city. Nonetheless, it provides an early snapshot 
into a city-making project. 
 
Despite the focus on Lavasa, given the constraints of time and space, the dissertation 
did not ask and answer a number of questions: it did not probe into issues of 
governance (which are still being worked out as briefly discussed in Chapter Four), 
nor did it study those who bought property and invested in the city (the future 
citizens) and why they did so. Because fieldwork was conducted in the year that 
construction had been stalled, it did not focus on the politics of labour: the 
construction workers and the migrants working to build Lavasa. Finally, the thesis 
did not make any predictions about whether Lavasa will, in the end, reach its goal, or 
answer the routinely asked questions: “is Lavasa good or bad? Can it be a model?” A 
project of this scale and scope will likely morph, re-orient and transform numerous 
times as it continues to develop. Thus the verdict on the city, whether its goals will 
be met, whether it will deliver on its promises, and what form it will ultimately take, 
will be out for a number of decades, if not more.  
 
Some readers may feel that not enough focus was placed on the most marginalised 
communities – the landless and adivasis – and how Lavasa impacted them. This was 
not an omission but it remains a gap. As discussed in Chapter Three, a large 
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proportion of the landless population had already left Lavasa when I commenced 
fieldwork. Tracing them would have been possible with some concerted effort but it 
would have expanded the scope of my thesis and the time required for fieldwork. 
The land story told in this thesis is therefore, partial and some may argue that the 
perspective that this offers on the project is much too sanguine. 
 
Furthermore, the precise nature of the networks between various political actors, 
brokers, intermediaries, and LCL (the nature of the networks, the importance of 
caste and political party membership) would have significantly strengthened the 
claims of this thesis. However, these relationships were near impossible to untangle 
due to their ‘open secret’ nature, i.e. known to all, yet unverifiable. For the purposes 
of academic work, I could not base conclusions on hearsay.  
 
Given both the peculiarities and the groundbreaking nature of both the idea of 
Lavasa (it is the first city to be built, planned and managed entirely by the private 
sector in post-liberalisation India) and how it came to be, the extent to which some 
findings from this study are generalisable (from a positivist perspective) are limited. 
In particular, one could argue that Lavasa’s land model could only function because 
of the specific history of the land in question (the conditions generated by the 
building of the Varasgaon dam). In light of this, I have chosen to conclude the thesis 
with a discussion, not on the very particular land market story, but on its broader 
implications for our understandings of speculative urbanism, the Indian state, and the 
politics of resistance.  
 
Looking to the future, there are at least three substantial avenues for further 
research. First, to examine more deeply the investment side of Lavasa – very little is 
known about actual consumer preferences and those who buy into such speculative 
and aspirational projects or even the investors and banks that finance such projects. 
While these projects are assumed to be desirable to the Indian elite, little is known 
about the actual preferences of this group and why and how they become 
stakeholders in such projects. Second, looking elsewhere, there is a need to study 
the numerous new city projects that are currently underway to examine the 
collective impact of such projects on ideas of urbanism and local populations. For 
instance, one could examine the importance of international circuits of planning in 
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the making of new towns – the foreign consultants and planning firms, and the ways 
in which policy ideas travel and are made local. Third, there is immense scope to 
look laterally across the politics of urban development projects in India and examine 
how this much cited ‘nexus’ between builders and politicians actually operates 
through land, planning, and the law (rather than in violation of it).   
 
8.5. From Lavasa to Urban Theory 
 
Beyond adding yet another case study of city-making to an already long list of works 
describing new city projects (summarised in Chapter One), what can this study add 
to urban theory? What does it mean to think comparatively from a single site? Sayer 
(1991) argues that “geographical scale” and “abstraction of thought” are often 
conflated, where the local is seen as “concrete” and “particular” and the global as 
“abstract” and “theoretical”. But Lefebvre’s understanding of the production of 
space decidedly rejects the conception that place is concrete and space is abstract; 
“instead, space and place are both conceived in terms of embodied practices and 
processes of production that are simultaneously material and discursive” (Hart, 
2006: 21). Hart (2006: 22) purports that “conceptualising space as socially produced, 
moves us beyond “case studies” to make broader claims.” Here, then, we are not 
comparing pre-existing objects or examining cases as local variants of a larger 
general phenomenon, for example, how Lavasa compares to other new cities, or 
whether at all it is representative of new city development. Rather, we are 
interested in observing how the city is constituted “through power-laden practices in 
the multiple, interconnected arenas of everyday life” (Hart, 2002: 13) and what that 
reveals about urban processes at play.  
 
Hence, by locating the study within a long history of building new towns, the thesis 
implicitly draws upon: transnational perspectives on urban formation in cities of the 
‘global South’; privatised urban development practices and their effects (Shatkin 
2008, 2011; Sami, 2012; Gururani, 2013; Watson, 2014); new elite politics of spatial 
segregation (Ellin, 1997; Caldeira, 2001; Falzon 2004; Low, 2005; Ballard and Jones, 
2011); and new forms and tactics of urban resistance (or lack thereof) (Ghertner, 
2010; Roy, 2011; Levien, 2013; Shatkin, 2014; Jenkins et al. 2014). In so doing, I 
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follow the recent call for a transnational approach to urban studies, which, while 
being located in the particular ethnographic contexts of cities of the global South, 
asks questions that are applicable to all cities (Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2009b). 	
 
First, I have considered an instance of the production of the space in a post-colonial 
setting, where city-making is driven by real estate profits and not just reform and 
control of urban space. Thus, Lavasa is site through which one can reflect on the 
processes of privatised urbanisation. As outlined briefly in Chapter One, 
contemporary urban studies scholarship has by and large reflected on new city 
projects as being shaped by neoliberal policies and processes. Parnell and Robinson 
(2012) provide a trenchant critique of using neoliberalism as the dominant optic 
through which to understand urban processes apace in the ‘global South’. They 
suggest, instead, that we must “reflect on processes other than neoliberalism which 
are shaping cities” and rightly point to the importance of the local state as being 
“potentially developmental, even progressive” (2012: 594). They argue that such a 
re-framing can “contribute to a post-neoliberal theorisation of urban processes by 
illuminating the multiple drivers of urban change, from the developmental or activist 
state to the role of traditional elites and the persistence of extra-capitalist power 
bases as well as the political and accumulation strategies of capital, states, and other 
institutions” (2012: 597). 
 
And so, this study takes seriously the call to develop a “post-neoliberal analytical 
optic” (Parnell and Robinson, 2012: 594) to understand urban processes and in 
particular new city development. It has argued against the dominant characterisations 
of contemporary urban processes as being driven by neoliberal policy and processes 
and demonstrated the importance of foregrounding the local actors and the highly 
local control of land as drivers of urban change. By examining the role of real estate 
developers, the influence they wield, their relationship with the state and political 
elite, and the strategies they use in the making of urban space. While the state in 
urban studies is often conceptualised as structural and operating a unitary logic, the 
dissertation has demonstrated (through disaggregating the levels of the state and its 
constituent actors) that not only does the state have an incoherent project, but that 
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this incoherence can creates spaces for political (and progressive) action (as seen in 
the strategies used by the villagers and the NAPM).  
 
Second, it expands conceptually the modalities of speculation (as discussed in Section 
8.1). It goes beyond conceiving of speculation as generated through increasingly 
mobile finance capital making investments in the built environment (cf. Harvey; 
Searle, 2010; Goldman, 2010; Watson, 2014) to include forms of speculation taking 
place at all levels and by all kinds of actors. Furthermore, speculation on the 
(successful) future of the project within a political environment of resistance 
generates public planning goals such as inclusion and environmental sustainability. 
Thus speculation not only propels the project in material terms but also directly 
impacts the form and politics of city-making. It dispossesses some and yet can 
embolden the ideological project of city making. Accordingly, the dissertation argues 
for thinking more expansively about speculation – going beyond finance capital, to 
seeing it as a force through which urban plans are both conceptualised and made 
real. 
 
Third, I have implicitly demonstrated that such cities cannot merely be understood 
as attempts of the elite to secede, or projects of spatial segregation/geographic 
escapism or “bypass-implant urbanism” (Shatkin, 2008: 383) (as also argued by 
Ballard and Jones, 2013; Watson, 2014). The hegemonic and aspirational symbolism 
deployed is very much part and parcel of contemporary urban imagination (in 
addition to being legitimation strategies (Shatkin, 2008; Pow and Neo, 2012)). More 
importantly, these imaginaries can conceal the ways in which cities are made in real 
and material ways. They can also conceal the historical conditions that enable such 
cities to emerge and be profitable. In traversing the rural and the urban, this 
dissertation highlights the centrality of the control and use of land in understanding 
urban political processes and outcomes. This ranges from land use policies to local 
everyday contests over land. Thus, when examining new city developments, it is 
important not only to pay attention to the plan and the imaginaries deployed but 
also investigate the use and control of land. The specificity of land can significantly 
shape and inform the politics of planning, privatisation, and resistance.  
 
As new city developments emerge in India and across the globe, new moments and 
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opportunities for theorisation of urban change are emerging. As reflected upon in 
Chapter One, these new settlements have largely been conceptualised as neoliberal 
projects rooted in real estate speculation and pushed forward through globally 
circulating imageries of urban futures. I have, through this thesis, offered a modest 
corrective to that narrative and demonstrated the importance of foregrounding the 
local in understanding how, why and in what ways urban space is produced. 	
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Appendix I: List of Important Dates, Chronology of 
Events 
 
 
 
Date 
 
Event 
 
1976-1987 Varasgoan Dam construction takes place. 
27 May 1986 Yashomala Leasings and Finance Private Limited (YLFPL) 
constituted. 
18 May 1990 Government of Maharashtra sets up the Regional Planning 
Board for Pune District under the Maharashtra Regional & 
Town Planning Act, 1966. 
1991 onwards Sahara begins purchasing land through illegal transactions 
for Amby Valley project. 
13 September 1993 Draft Regional Plan for Pune for the period 1990-2011 
comes into force. 
March 1995 Sahara begins construction in Amby Valley without 
requisite permissions. 
26 November 1996 Special Regulations for development of tourist 
resorts/holiday homes/township in hill station type areas 
(Hill Station Regulation) enacted. 
25 November 1997	 Pune Regional Plan (1991-2011) approved by UDD. 
7 April 1999	 Tourism given status of ‘industry’ by GoM 
21 January 2000	 Aqualand India Pvt. Ltd seeks permission to purchase land 
for the development of a hill station in Mulshi. 
February 2000	 Pearly Blue Lake Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Constituted (Aniruddha 
Desphande)  
15 March 2000	 Pearly Blue Lake Resorts Pvt. Ltd. seeks permission from 
collector to acquire 2000 ha of land around in Mulshi. 
21 June 2000	 Pearly Blue Lake Resorts Pvt. Ltd. requests that 18 villages 
(Warasgaon, Saiv Badruk, Mose Badruk, Patharshet, 
Bembatmal, Palse, Admal, Padalghar, 
Dasave, Bhoini, Mugaon, Bhode, Ugawali, Dhamanhol, 
Koloshi, Gadle, Sakhri and Wadawali) be notified as hill 
station type areas. 
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15 July 2000	 UDD issues notice to designate land in 20 villages 
(including the 18 above) as hill station (by modifying the 
Pune Regional Plan). 
12 December 2000	 Pearly Blue Lake Resorts Pvt. Ltd. changes name to The 
Lake City Corporation Private Limited (LCC). 
30 May 2001 Hill Station Regulations modified by UDD to remove the 
lower limit of 2000 ha for the construction of hill stations. 
I June 2001 Hill station area demarcated: declared 18 villages as 
requested by M/s Pearly Blue Lake Resorts as land suitable 
for development of hill station. 
 
27 June 2001 In-principle approval given to LCC for Lavasa. 
15 January 2002	 YLFPL is amalgamated with LCC. 
30 May 2002 Maharashtra Pollution Control Board gives consent to 
establish Lavasa. 
22 August 2002 Lease agreement signed between LCC and MKVDC for 
141.15 hectares of irrigation land. 
5 December 2002	 Permission for purchase of 400 hectares of agriculture land 
granted by Directorate of Industries under MTAL Act, 
1948. 2003	 LCC requests GoM (MIDC) to acquire the lands they have 
not been able to purchase, and request is denied. 
18 March 2004 Department of Environment (GoM) gives environmental 
clearance to project. 
26 March 2004	 Company changes name from Lake City Corporation Pvt. 
Ltd. (LCC) to Lavasa Corporation Ltd (LCL). 
2004	 Supriya and Sadanand Sule exit LCL as sharedholders.  
5 January 2005 MPCB grants LCL consent to operate. 
4 July 2005 MoEF tells GoM that Lavasa needs Centre’s environment 
clearance. 
15 July 2005 MPCB replies; says project does not require Centre’s 
approval. 
31 August 2006 Pune Collector approves Lavasa's first layout plan. 
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30 August 2007 Pune Collector gives first permit to build.  
12 June 2008 LCL declared Special Planning Authority (SPA) by UDD 
with respect to 14 villages. 
April 2009	 People’s Commission Report produced by NAPM. 
5 August 2009 LCL seeks clearance for 5,000 hectares from state EIA 
authority. 
21 August 2009	 UDD issues a letter permitting research and development 
in hill station. 
30 June 2010 MoEF seeks report on Lavasa from GoM. 
14 July 2010	 GoM grants mega-project status to Lavasa. 
4 August 2010 State says EIA notification of 1994 not applicable, but 2004 
notification applies. 
25 November 2010	 MoEF issues stop-work order to LCL for violations of 
provisions of EIA notification 1994 (as amended in 2004 
and 2006). 
5-7 January 2011	 MoEF officials visit Lavasa to examine environmental 
damage. 
17 January, 2011	 MoEF concludes construction is illegal and damaging to 
environment. Asks GoM to take action and sets out 
conditions for LCL. 
9 November 2011	 MoEF gives partial and conditional environmental clearance 
to LCL. 
10 March 2011	 NAPM appeals MoEF’s decision in Mumbai High Court, 
says no provision in law for post-facto clearance. 
24 March 2012	 Mugaon (town 2) plans launched. 
27 August 2012	 170,000 visitors visit Lavasa during one monsoon season 
(June – August, 2012). 
Sources: BEAG, 1998; CAG, 2011; LCL, 2014
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Appendix II – List of Informants 
 
N
o 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
Date of 
Interview 
 
Lavasa (11) 
I  LI  PR 13/07/2012 
2 L2 Marketing 21/06/2012 
3 L3 CSR 12/07/2012 
4 L4 Planning 01/06/2012 
5 L5 Land 10/10/2012 
6 L6 Environment 18/12/2012 
7 L7 Business Development 21/08/2012 
8 L8 City Manager 12/07/2012 
9 L9 Planning 24/09/2013 
10 L10 Founding Partner 12/08/2012 
11 L11 Environment 12/07/2012 
Civil Society (17) 
12 C1 NAPM 04/04/2012 
13 C2 NAPM 26/03/2012 
14 C3 NAPM 08/10/2013 
15 C4 NAPM 18/04/2012 
16 C5 NAPM 10/10/2012 
17 C6 Activist and Academic 11/10/2012 
18 C7 Activist and Academic 27/07/2012 
19 C8 Journalist 07/12/2012 
20 C9 Journalist 21/08/2012 
21 C10 Activist 20/09/2012 
22 C11 Consultant 25/06/2012 
23 C12 Activist 02/06/2012 
24 C13 Activist 12/04/2012 
25 C14 Developer 24/08/2012 
26 C15 Developer 12/09/2012 
27 C16 Developer 02/08/2012 
28 C17 Academic 05/12/2012 
29 C18 Developer 28/09/2013 
Government (5) 
30 G1 Urban Development 01/10/2013 
31 G2 Collectors office 17/12/2012 
32 G3 District office 26/01/2013 
33 G4 Town Planning 26/06/2012 
34 G5 Town Planning 05/09/2012 
Villagers (42) 
35 A1 Admal 19/12/2012 
36 A2  Admal 19/12/2012 
37 A3 Admal 19/12/2012 
38 A4 Admal 19/12/2012 
39 B1 Bhoini 28/09/2012 
40 B2 Bhoini 20/01/2013 
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41 B3 Bhoini  20/01/2013 
42 D1 Dasve 20/01/2013 
43 D1 Dasve 21/01/2013 
44 D2 Dasve 30/09/2012 
45 D3 Dasve 11/10/2012 
46 D4 Dasve 30/09/2012 
47 D5 Dasve 30/09/2012 
48 D6 Dasve 21/01/2013 
49 D7 Dasve 19/12/2012 
50 D8 Dasve 19/12/2012 
51 D9 Dasve 23/12/2012 
52 D10 Dasve 23/12/2012 
53 Dh1 Dhamanol 13/12/2012 
54 Dh2 Dhamanol 13/12/2012 
55 Dh3 Dhamanol 13/12/2012 
56 Dh4 Dhamanol 13/12/2012 
57 Dh5 Dhamanol 14/12/2012 
58 Dh6 Dhamanol 14/12/2012 
59 K1 Koloshi 14/12/2012 
60 K2 Koloshi 15/12/2012 
61 K3 Koloshi 15/12/2012 
62 M1 Mugaon 06/09/2012 
63 M2 Mugaon 07/09/2012 
64 M3 Mugaon 06/09/2012 
65 M4 Mugaon 06/09/2012 
66 M5 Mugaon 23/12/2012 
67 M6 Mugaon 23/12/2012 
68 P1 Palse 14/12/2012 
69 R1 Ramnagar 16/09/2012 
70 V1 Varasgaon 06/12/2012 
71 V2 Varasgaon 06/12/2012 
72 V3 Varasgaon 08/12/2012 
73 V4 Varasgaon 06/12/2012 
74 V5 Varasgaon 08/12/2012 
75 Ag1 Intermediary 06/08/2012 
76 Ag2 Intermediary 18/12/2012 
77 Ag3 Intermediary 06/01/2013 
 	
 	
